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Foreword
This dissertation originated in the wake of my internship for a study for the Dutch 
Scientific Council for Government Policy, in the final months of 1992. The dissertation 
project itself started March 1st, 1993. Until June 1st, 1997, I was employed as a 
Ph.D student at the Netherlands School for Social and Economic Policy Research 
(‘Onderzoekschool Arbeids, Welzijn en Sociaal-economisch Bestuur’) at Utrecht 
University and did the field work on the three national markets for intermediate 
skills that provide the empirical basis for this book.
Having already published the empirical results of the three country studies in 
separate books and a couple of papers, and with an article containing the first draft 
of what was to become the theoretical chapter on its way towards publication, 
I was fortunate enough to find myself recruited by Ton Wilthagen to come work 
as a senior researcher with the Hugo Sinzheimer Instituut at the University of 
Amsterdam. After five and a half wonderful years there, I accepted the invitation 
to join the Hanzehogeschool as ‘lector arbeidsverhoudingen’ to set up an applied 
labor market research unit there. Busy with various new projects over those later 
years, I spent various summers refining the integration of the three aforementioned 
country studies and the theoretical work into this volume. There’s probably a reason 
that Sisyphus is the only figure from Greek mythology that I distinctly choose to 
remember from my classical high school education. Finally, this dissertation rests 
as my defense, and I find tremendous satisfaction in its completion. The delay 
did offer a few blessings in disguise. For one, it allowed me to include the first 
national evaluation of the Dutch Vocational and Adult Education Act (‘Wet Educatie 
en Beroepsonderwijs’ or WEB) in the analysis. For another, and in no small part 
thanks to the excellent feedback from my counselors, I think I have managed to 
find the best tone for its conclusions.
I have quite a few people and organizations to thank over those years. The 
Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport sponsored the original four years of 
the Ph.D project. The (unfortunately discontinued) Netherlands School for Social 
and Economic Policy Research at the Universiteit Utrecht hosted it and employed 
me. Willem Dercksen first lured me into an internship that (while I had been stupid 
enough to initially decline the position) got me seriously intrigued by the topic of 
vocational education and training governance. And he subsequently offered me 
this Ph.D. project. Frans van Waarden organized various internal seminars in those 
years that got me theoretically addicted to the delicate interplay between markets 
and institutions. Roger Henke was the ideal street-level bureaucrat for a resident 
as well as a traveling Ph.D. student. Maaike Zorgman, Peter van Leeuwen, Wim 
van der Voort, Frank Tros, Markus Haverland were the most prominent among the 
stimulating and enjoyable colleagues.
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The Dutch Organization for Scientific Research, the Dutch Ministry of Education, 
Culture and Science (in particular Peter van den Dool, Bert de Vries and Bernard 
Verlaan), the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (in particular Marga 
Drewes), the Deutscher Akademischer AustauschDienst, and the Netherlands 
America Commission for Education Exchange each sponsored various parts of 
the German and American field work for this project. The German Institute for 
Vocational Education and Training (‘Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung’) hosted me for 
four inspiring months in Berlin. Jochen Reuling gave me ample intellectual attention 
and feedback, and introduced me to a great number of relevant others in the field, 
starting with Dutch Berliner Dick Moraal.
The Industrial Relations Research Institute of the University of Wisconsin-
Madison offered me an equally stimulating environment for six months. Wolfgang 
Streeck and director Paula Voos invited me there. Joel Rogers, Jonathan Zeitlin and 
others provided guidance and introductions in the field. The Center On Wisconsin 
Strategy of the University of Wisconsin-Madison (COWS; again Joel Rogers and 
Laura Dresser) introduced me to Wisconsin alumnus Eric Parker, whose dissertation 
helped me tremendously. COWS and Eric also introduced me to the Wisconsin 
Regional Training Partnership; and COWS organized a seminar for my return visit 
to Madison. The Center on Work and Education of the same university (specifically, 
Allen Phelps) provided me with an additional home base during the Wisconsin field 
work, and they invited me back to present at the Workplace Learning Conference 
in Milwaukee in April 1996. The National Institute for Metalworking Skills and its 
advisor Pete Trott offered me the chance to gain a true appreciation of the vast task 
facing such skills standards partnerships in the U.S. by inviting me to attend their 
meeting in Cleveland, Ohio in January 1996. Jeff Rothstein and the rest of his class 
made me never regret having opted for a Wisconsin winter instead of an analysis 
of vocational education and training in, for example, the Hawaiian spring. Last 
(but not least) I first met David Finegold in Wisconsin. Being able to reflect on my 
findings and ideas with David himself on a number of occasions was very fortunate, 
very helpful, and very enjoyable.
The Max Goote Kenniscentrum voor Beroepsonderwijs en Volwasseneneducatie 
(in particular Fons van Wieringen and Willem Houtkoop) organized and organizes a 
stimulating continuous dialogue between Dutch academic VET researchers (such as 
Ben Hövels and Loek Nieuwenhuis) and policymakers through various seminars and 
publications. Their work provided me with an excellent intellectual home base in the 
Netherlands on which I could rely. They also published my first individual book, on 
the German apprenticeship system, and subsequent other work.
The Hugo Sinzheimer Institute at the Universiteit van Amsterdam was a true 
home in my years there. It offered me a wonderful director and colleague in Robert 
Knegt; a talented ‘apprentice’ in Martijn van Velzen (not just a buddy but also almost 
as stubborn as myself); the lovely Astrid Ornstein (who really ran our show there); 
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many other great colleagues (including Frank Tros, who re-joined me there); and 
the chance to set up and continue my own line of research. I truly thought that I 
would never find anything close to it when I left. I was right.
And I was, of course, wrong, or I would have not just extended my contract at 
the Hanzehogeschool Groningen. Geiske Steendam, Heleen van Balen and Jannes 
Houkes were instrumental in getting me there. Ina Homans and her staff (who 
really run the show there) made me feel at home from day one. Trijnie Faber offers 
me ample room to maneuver, feedback to help focus our efforts, and rewards to 
those efforts by steadily integrating our applied research into her Hanze School 
of Law. Past and present members of my ‘kenniskring’ made and make me stay. 
Marije Bosscha, Ilse Koning and Eddy Kootstra did most of the heavy lifting in the 
editing and lay-out of this book. The English correction was provided from outside 
the Hanzehogeschool, by Tjerk Busstra and ‘paraneef’ Mary de Laat. 
Most importantly, however, I have to thank the roughly two hundred vocational 
education and training experts of various organizations at different levels in the 
Netherlands, Germany and the United States that I have interviewed over the 
years, for providing me with ample time and precise information on the operation of 
their VET system from their perspective. The importance of all those interviews for 
gaining a delicate appreciation for the operation of different vocational education 
and training markets just cannot be overestimated. While I have chosen to phrase 
the analysis in this book without direct quotiations, I could not have grasped these 
systems and their nuances without them.
Special thanks go to my three counselors. Willem Dercksen challenged me “to 
complete the incomplete work of the Wagner committee” when granting me my 
master’s degree in december 1992. The likelihood that this (or another) dissertation 
will actually meet that challenge is of course somewhere between slim and none. 
When he left for the Pacific, however, continued cooperation became a little bit too 
impractical.
Ton Wilthagen was the first to step in. He has been both a friend and an ideal 
colleague and mentor since we met. The choice to assist him with his ambition to 
develop a flexicurity research line in our Amsterdam years was one of the better 
ones I have ever and will ever make. The same goes, of course, for my choice to 
continue our cooperation by starting my own applied research group in Groningen - 
a chance Ton encouraged me to accept, despite the fact that it prevented me from 
keeping my promise to join him full-time in the NWO flexicurity program we had 
just acquired.
And, finally, I was fortunate enough to have my first mentor, Peter Leisink, join 
us for the final part of this journey. When I joined the political student group and 
the Faculty Council at the Utrecht Faculty of Social Sciences, Peter was the resident 
expert on faculty politics of the Faculty and our coalition partner in that Council. 
Peter was always there to provide insight and advice. Looking back on those years, 
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I have always felt that my intellectual and professional development owes much 
more to my student political activities than to the courses I took. Peter was a large 
part of that. And he and Ton were a big help in refining my comparative analysis.
For me, vocational education and training as a research topic offered me the 
chance to combine my interests in both education and labor market governance. 
Friends (in particular little big ‘brother’ Berend Wilkens) and family I thank for their 
patience through the years, as well as the occasional lack thereof. I hope this book 
will now enable them to understand that what I learned while analyzing markets for 
intermediate skills is that
it never gets old.
 
Groningen, September 2007    
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1. Introduction: research questions and design
This book is about markets for intermediate skills. It is also about the coordination 
within and between the (vocational) education system and the (sub-baccalaureate) 
labor market, and the institutions that govern them.  Our goal was to improve our 
understanding of how particular governance regimes influence the operation of 
vocational education and training (VET) markets. We conducted an international 
comparison of three different governance regimes of VET markets in Germany, the 
Netherlands and the American state of Wisconsin. The central question underlying 
the national analyses and comparisons is:
 
How do markets for intermediate skills operate in Germany, the Netherlands, and 
the American state of Wisconsin?
For each of the three national cases the following questions will be answered:
• What options for vocational education and training exist?
• Which rules and actors govern them?
• How does the interaction of these rules and actors help to explain the actual 
choices of young people and employers regarding vocational education and 
training in these countries?
The idea for this project originated in a previous project, a policy-oriented study 
of the ongoing reform of Dutch upper secondary vocational education and training 
(VET) in the early nineteen nineties on behalf of the Dutch Scientific Council for 
Government Policy (‘Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid’ or WRR; 
cf. Dercksen & Van Lieshout, 1993). That project analyzed apparent dilemmas in 
the progress of the policy reform of the Dutch VET system at the time. One of 
the intriguing aspects of that Dutch reform effort was that it was simultaneously 
inspired by two foreign examples - from countries (Germany and the U.S.) that 
are generally considered to be almost opposite examples where it comes to the 
institutionalization and operation of markets for intermediate skills.
The ambitious reform of Dutch VET legislation had triggered our interest in the 
governance of VET markets, and in particular the interplay between institutional 
arrangements and actors’ strategies. VET reform efforts were targeting particular 
institutional arrangements that either were considered accepted best practices 
(such as German apprenticeship) or innovative reforms (such as various attempts 
at the improvement and creation of national skills standards systems). Knowledge 
on how particular institutional arrangements shape the operation of VET markets 
and the strategies of various actors (primarily, young people and firms) in such 
markets is relevant to such reform efforts. This research project thus concentrated 
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on the fourth level of ‘methodological insertion’ into the object of study that Giddens 
(1984: 327-328) distinguishes: the specification of institutional orders. Giddens 
(1984: 329) describes the specification of institutional orders as follows:
 “…the specifying of  institutional orders, involves analyzing the conditions 
of  social and systems integration via identification of  the main institutional 
components of  social systems.”
In particular, we wanted to focus our study on the analysis of particular institutional 
arrangements that attracted international attention from policymakers looking for 
inspiration for their own national VET reforms. The first of those was apprenticeship in 
particular, and more generally, formal work-based training. Not just the Netherlands, 
but many other countries were inspired by the successful German apprenticeship 
system. A traditional apprenticeship model is that in which apprentices combine 
work-based training (and productive work) at a firm for four days a week with related 
instruction at a school on day five. Under the slogan “dualisering” (dualisation), 
increasing work-based training was included as a separate goal in Dutch policy 
reforms since the early nineteen eighties. The Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), an international association of countries with a developed 
capitalist economy, had launched a program on the changing role of vocational and 
technical education and training (VOTEC) that reflected this international interest 
(cf. Van Den Dool et al., 1994; Koch & Reuling, 1994; OECD, 1994a; 1996a; DOE & 
OECD, 1994). The German apprenticeship system was (and still is) considered a ‘good 
practice’ example of an initial VET system, as it supports a ‘high-skills equilibrium’ 
(cf. Finegold & Soskice, 1988; Soskice, 1994; Van Lieshout, 1996a; cf. chapter 2). 
While most experts were (and are) skeptical about any effort to straightforwardly 
copy the German apprenticeship system abroad (cf. Finegold & Soskice, 1988), 
various national governments nevertheless were inspired by this foreign example 
and tried to incorporate lessons in their own policies. Apart from the Netherlands, 
such efforts have been particularly noticeable in countries perceived to suffer from a 
‘low-skills equilibrium’: the U.K. and the U.S. (Finegold & Soskice, 1988).
Besides work-based training, the other important institutional aspect of the 
German apprenticeship system that attracted international interest was the role of 
(binding) skills standards. German firms can not just train apprentices in any way 
they choose. Each apprentice is trained in a training occupation that is regulated 
by binding national skills standards developed by representatives of employers’ 
associations, unions, VET schools and government (i.e. Koch & Reuling, 1994; 
Van Lieshout, 1996a). Next to work-based learning, skills standards systems were 
another important theme in national VET reform efforts and international reform 
debates such as in the VOTEC program.
Simultaneously, the Dutch government aimed to increase the room to maneuver 
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for individual schools through its VET reform. International inspiration for this policy 
aspect did not come from Germany, but from the operation of American two-year 
colleges in their regional labor markets. Schools should play an active, almost 
entrepreneurial role in regional markets for intermediate skills – not unlike some 
of these two year colleges did. Contrary to Germany, however, the U.S. was and is 
considered a low-skills equilibrium, with a market for intermediate skills operating 
quite different than in Germany. In fact, there were reform efforts on their way in 
the U.S. at that time that themselves took inspiration from German apprenticeship 
and tried to stimulate work-based training and skills standards systems to help 
improve the American market for intermediate skills.
We thus decided to analyze the institutionalization and operation of markets for 
intermediate skills in two other countries, and compare and contrast them with the 
Netherlands: one other country classified as a high-skills equilibrium (Germany), the 
other as a low-skills equilibrium (U.S.). We thus opted for a ‘most-different systems’ 
design (cf. Przeworski & Teune, 1970) in our choice of countries. Analyzing contrasting 
cases on their governance regimes, the operation of the VET market and the type 
of equilibrium achieved within the national institutional context such as Germany 
and the U.S. should help improve our analysis of the role of particular institutional 
arrangements (such as an apprenticeship legislation) in different contexts.
Germany (chapter three) provides us with a case where work-based learning 
(apprenticeship) and national skills standards cover most VET, to the extent that 
they can be considered to compose a near monopoly in the national market for 
intermediate skills. The result is a generally acknowledged high-skills equilibrium. 
The U.S. (chapter four) provides us with a case where work-based learning 
(apprenticeship) and national skills standards play a minor role in the market for 
intermediate skills. A market, that is characterized as a low-skills equilibrium. The 
Netherlands (chapter five) provides us with another high-skills equilibrium, based on 
somewhat similar and somewhat different institutions when compared to Germany. 
While apprenticeship and national skills standards also play an important role in the 
Dutch VET market, primarily school-based VET tracks account for the majority of 
Dutch VET.
We have made two further specifications in terms of geographical scope. First, 
at that time, the socio-economic situation in (former) East Germany, and the 
problematic attempt to build a West-German style apprenticeship system there, 
implied that we would have to do two separate case studies for West and East. 
Interesting as a case study of the East-German attempt to build a West-German 
style apprenticeship system would be, for our comparative purposes we have limited 
ourselves to the West-German case of an established, apprenticeship-based high 
skills equilibrium.
Second, the variance in VET (and labor market) institutionalization between 
individual American states made us to focus the empirical work there on one 
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particular American state. Because of our interest in work-based learning and skills 
standards systems, we have opted for a state where apprenticeship and related 
skills standards have historically played a somewhat less marginal role than in most 
other American states, and where reform efforts were under way to strengthen and 
expand these aspects. The state of Wisconsin offered this opportunity. This state 
is in fact particularly intriguing as Wisconsin had already drawn inspiration from a 
study trip to Germany and its apprenticeship system when drafting its ‘traditional’ 
apprenticeship Act early in the twentieth century – more than half a century before 
the recent interest in (German) apprenticeship peaked in the U.S..
As to the methodology of the casestudies, we had learned the value of a substantial 
number of interviews in addition to desk research in our previous project on Dutch 
VET policy reform. Governance of markets for intermediate skills generally occurs 
at three, interacting, levels: firstly, at a local level, with the trainee, a school and/or 
a firm as the most relevant actors; secondly, at the sector level, where employers’ 
associations and unions may or may not institutionalize collective training supports 
and/or regulations; and finally, at the national level, where the state dictates education 
and labor market laws, sometimes through a process that includes input from other 
national actors (such as school associations and peak organizations of employers 
and unions). The view and appreciation of how VET markets operate can differ 
substantially depending upon the point of view from which you experience it. For a 
researcher, it is therefore helpful to gather the experiences from different parties at 
different levels, and in different sectors. We therefore chose to conduct a significant 
number of interviews with various types of actors at each of the three levels in 
Germany and the U.S. The interviews were intended to gain an understanding of the 
operation of VET systems beyond the relatively well-known basics such as laws and 
other relevant rules: of how they are implemented and created in daily practice, and 
the opinions and motivations of the actors concerned.
At the national level, we have interviewed representatives of relevant government 
departments, peak employers’ associations and union federations, other relevant 
national organizations and leading research experts. Since both the U.S. and 
Germany are federal states, we have interviewed representatives of these actors at 
the federal level as well as at the level of an individual state (Wisconsin in the U.S., 
Baden-Württemberg in Germany).
At the sector level, we thought it important to gain an understanding of 
intranational differences in the institutionalization of markets for intermediate skills 
by specifically focusing on three different sectors: construction, metalworking and 
banking. We have selected these three, as they refer to quite distinct types of work, 
while on the other hand they are sectors that tend to be relatively well researched 
– which means that the chances of relevant secondary information being available 
to the researcher would be relatively good in each country. Within the context of 
this project, we lacked the resources for extensive, in-depth case studies of each of 
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these sectors in each of these countries, so we had to limit ourselves to interviews 
with representatives of employers’ associations and unions and sector experts from 
VET schools  and a review of literature and statistics.
At the local level, we interviewed representatives from different VET schools and 
firms, as well as other relevant organizations or institutions. At this level, we chose 
to limit the interviews with firms to just one economic sector (metalworking). With 
the limited number of interviews we could conduct with individual firms within this 
research design, we thought it more important to gain an appreciation of similarities 
and differences between firms’ training policies in the same region and sector (so, 
for similar jobs, and within the same context of sectoral and national regulations). 
More specific information on the field work is included in the introduction of each 
country chapter.
Chapter two will explore relevant theories and concepts to provide us with a 
theoretical approach to address these issues. Chapters three through five will 
subsequently explore the institutionalization and operation of the market for 
intermediate skills in each of three ‘national cases’: (West) Germany, the American 
state of Wisconsin, and the Netherlands, with a specific focus on work-based learning 
and national skills standards. The institutionalization and operation of these national 
markets in the nineteen nineties were studied through a combination of desk 
research and interviews with experts involved in the governance of these markets at 
various levels. The sixth and final chapter will summarize the results and answer the 
central question, and will discuss the merits of the theoretical approach presented in 
chapter two on the basis of the analysis and comparison of the three cases.
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2  An actor-centered institutionalist approach to markets for 
intermediate skills
2.1 Introduction
This chapter will introduce the theoretical framework used to analyze markets for 
intermediate skills in this book. The framework builds heavily on key ingredients 
from various theories, but combines these ingredients into a perspective, developed 
specifically for the analysis of markets for intermediate skills. The approach is 
therefore intentionally an eclectic one. On the appropriateness of such an approach, 
we agree with Giddens (1984: xxii):
“To some this may appear an unacceptable eclecticism, but I have never 
been able to see the force of  this type of  objection. There is an undeniable 
comfort in working within established traditions of  thought - the more so, 
perhaps, given the very diversity of  approaches that currently confronts 
anyone who is outside any single tradition. The comfort of  established 
views can, however, easily be a cover for intellectual sloth. If  ideas are 
important and illuminating, what matters much more than their origin is 
to be able to sharpen them so as to demonstrate their usefulness, even if  
within a framework which might be quite different from that which helped 
to engender them.”
While eclecticism is nothing to be avoided, it does demand an elaboration of the 
framework and its main concepts. Giddens (1984: xx) pointed out that this does 
not require a complete epistemological elaboration:
“Rather than becoming preoccupied with epistemological disputes (…) 
those working in social theory, I suggest, should be concerned first and 
foremost with reworking conceptions of  human being and human doing, 
social reproduction and social transformation.”
In this fashion, this book is concerned with reworking conceptions of vocational 
education and training (VET) and its institutionalization. The most important 
conception to be reworked is that of the ‘market’. Market mechanisms are important 
coordination mechanisms in vocational education systems and on markets for 
intermediate skills. However, there are other coordination mechanisms that are 
equally important, such as the state, firms, and associations. And these coordination 
mechanisms influence one another. It is important to organize empirical research in 
a way that is sensitive to the existence of alternative coordination mechanisms that, 
in their interaction, shape social fields – such as markets for intermediate skills1.
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This chapter will elaborate the theoretical framework and its main concepts 
that will guide the analysis throughout this book. Actor-centered institutionalism 
(Mayntz & Scharpf, 1995; Scharpf, 1997) serves as the backbone of our 
theoretical approach (section 2.2). Actor-centered institutionalism proceeds from 
the assumption that social phenomena are to be explained as the outcome of 
interactions among intentional (individual and/or collective) actors, but that these 
interactions are structured, and the outcomes shaped, by the characteristics of 
the institutional settings within which they occur (Scharpf, 1997: 1). It thus fits 
the primary requirement formulated by Dercksen & Kamps (1992) for promising 
theories to analyze markets for intermediate skills: it combines institutional and 
actor-centered theories.
Actor-centered institutionalism, however, offers a framework of how to proceed 
with empirical studies rather than a fully specified theory (Scharpf, 1997: 3), let 
alone a fully specified theory on the operation of markets for intermediate skills. 
After introducing the general actor-centered institutionalist framework in section 
2.2, the remainder of this chapter will ‘map’ the problem at hand (the ‘production’ 
of intermediate skills) into this framework by exploring and connecting various 
‘field-specific’ theoretical insights on skills production and acquisition.
2.2 Actor-centered institutionalism
2.2.1 The new institutionalism
Institutionalist perspectives once figured prominently in both economics and 
sociology. The ‘old’ institutionalism consisted mainly of detailed configurative studies 
of different administrative, legal and political structures; it did not encourage the 
development of intermediate-level categories and concepts that would facilitate 
truly comparative research and advance explanatory theory (Thelen & Steinmo, 
1992: 3). In sociology, for instance, functional theory served as the sociological 
counterpart of anatomy in medical studies and physiology in biology. It viewed 
human interactions as integrated in social systems, and focused on identifying and 
labeling the system’s parts. Particular phenomena were often explained in terms of 
the ‘needs’ of the collective system.
 From the 1950s onwards, this old institutionalism has faded and a ‘behavioral 
revolution’ (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 3) occurred: rational choice theories such as 
neo-classical economics rose to dominate the social sciences. Rational choice theories 
are based on the concept of methodological individualism, which prescribes that 
(collective) phenomena are to be explained in terms of statements about individual 
actors (cf. Boudon, 1981: 52). Actors themselves are analyzed as rational utility 
maximizers, whose preferences are exogenously given. At the time, the Western 
world opted to strengthen international ties, and prosperity grew rapidly in each 
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of its countries over the 1950s and 1960s. So the potential convergence among 
traditionally very different nations emerged as a more dominant explanandum than 
remaining national (institutional) differences. While institutions did not disappear 
from the research agenda, they had been pushed to the side, as the spirit of the 
new behavioralist paradigm was to get beyond the formal structures of the old 
institutionalists, by looking at the actual, observable beliefs and behaviors of groups 
and individuals (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 4).
The economic shocks in the early seventies, however, resulted in quite different 
responses from these same nations, and in subsequently different paths of economic 
development. As the average economic and employment performance of OECD 
countries declined, the relative distance between more and less successful countries 
increased considerably for most indicators of economic performance (Scharpf, 
1987: 227). So explanation of cross-national differences that were apparently more 
persistent than one had come to think, regained a prominent position on the agenda. 
While rational choice theories still dominate much of the social sciences today, 
this historical event has marked the re-emergence of institutionalist paradigms. 
This new institutionalism is more than a carbon copy of traditional institutionalism. 
The various versions of this new institutionalism share a family tie in criticizing 
certain aspects of rational choice theories. Neo-institutionalist paradigms do not 
try to reduce all collective phenomena to mere aggregates of individual actions, 
but see institutions as having an irreducible sui generis role in determining human 
action (Crouch et al., 1999: 23). And perhaps the most important respect, in 
which the various neo-institutionalist paradigms differ, is the extent to which they 
simultaneously incorporate (relaxed) core elements of rational choice theories – 
as the following overview of various neo-institutionalist paradigms will illustrate. 
Mayntz & Scharpf (1995: 40-43) distinguish2:
•	 economic institutionalism (perhaps better know as transaction cost economics), 
which tries to explain the existence of institutions by a relaxed version of rational 
choice theory (cf. Williamson, 1975; 1985);
•	 an organizational-sociological institutionalism; it criticizes neo-classical economics 
for primarily viewing organizations (firms in particular) as production/exchange 
systems shaped by technologies and the transactions they are involved in. It 
alternatively stresses symbolical and cognitive elements within organizations 
such as opinions, ideologies and myths (cf. Powell & DiMaggio, 1991);
•	 institutional economics, which aims for an institutional explanation of economic 
facts (cf. Granovetter, 1985; Streeck, 1992);
•	 an institutionalism within the political sciences which concentrates its criticism 
on the reductionist and utilitarian character of rational choice approaches, which 
exclusively explains political phenomena as aggregate effects of utilitarian 
behavior by individuals, and neglects organizational structures and normative 
and symbolical causes of individual behavior (cf. March & Olsen, 1989);
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•	 a second version of institutionalism within the political sciences, which concentrates 
its criticism of mainstream theories on the neglect of the consequences of 
political processes and their organization, which influence the aggregation of 
individual behavior into collective effects (cf. Evans et al., 1985).
To be sure: neoclassical economics and sociological rational choice theories still 
dominate much of social sciences today and have found ways to improve their 
paradigms in the face of these criticisms. For neoclassical economics, important 
examples have been the increased attention for the role of information and 
information imperfections (Arrow, 1974), of bounded human rationality (Williamson, 
1975), of customs and norms (Akerlof, 1984), and of market imperfections, failures 
and rigidities as well as labor market segmentation (Solow, 1980). Williamson’s 
transaction cost economics is cited in the literature as both a neo-institutionalist 
and a rational choice paradigm, which goes to show that, just as the distinction 
between the political left and right has become substantially less clear-cut in recent 
times, the same holds true for rational choice theories and neo-institutionalist 
perspectives.
2.2.2 Actor-centered institutionalism: an introduction
Mayntz & Scharpf (1995) propose to combine methodological individualism with 
institutionalism in a framework they label ‘actor-centered institutionalism’ (also cf. 
Scharpf, 1997). Actor-centered institutionalism offers ‘…a tailor-made approach for 
research on the problem of governance and self-organization on the level of entire 
social fields’ (Mayntz & Scharpf, 1995: 39), in particular in fields related to state 
intervention. 
 Of the aforementioned versions of new institutionalism, actor-centered 
institutionalism is most closely related to the (second) version from the political 
sciences, which concentrates its criticism of mainstream theories on the neglect of 
the consequences of political processes and their organization that influence the 
aggregation of individual behavior into collective effects, but it distinguishes itself 
from it in a number of ways (Mayntz & Scharpf, 1995: 43):
•	 actor-centered institutionalism does not confine itself to political institutions;
•	 actor-centered institutionalism works with a narrow definition of institutions;
•	 actor-centered institutionalism analyzes institutions both as dependent and 
independent variables;
•	 actor-centered institutionalism does not ascribe a determining influence to 
institutions, but sees institutional factors as building a – stimulating, enabling 
or restricting – context for action.
11
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
The basic assumption underlying actor-centered institutionalism is that an analysis 
of structures without reference to actors is as handicapped as an analysis of actor’s 
behavior without reference to structures (Mayntz & Scharpf, 1995: 46). Instead 
of assuming a dominant role for either institutions or actors, the sharp distinction 
between institutions and observable actions in actor-centered institutionalism tries 
to integrate both perspectives: action-theoretic or rational choice and institutionalist 
or structuralist perspectives (Mayntz & Scharpf, 1995: 46; Scharpf, 1997: 36). 
Actor-centered institutionalism thus preserves the principle of methodological 
individualism while connecting it with institutionalism (Scharpf, 1997: 1):
 “…as it proceeds from the assumption that social phenomena are to be 
explained as the outcome of  interactions among intentional actors (…) 
but that these interactions are structured, and the outcomes shaped, by the 
characteristics of  the institutional settings within which they occur.” 
To the extent that behavior is shaped by institutions, the behavioral regularities we 
can expect are likely to vary with time and place – because institutions vary across 
time and place. So the best social sciences can hope for are not universal theories, 
but ‘sometimes true theories’ (Coleman, 1964: 516-519) that provide explanations 
that hold only under specific institutional conditions. To explore explanations in such 
cases, the institutional context must be varied in comparative studies of a more 
qualitative nature. The problem is that the potential number of different constellations 
of situational and institutional factors in this type of research will be so large that it 
is unlikely that exactly the same factor combination will appear in many empirical 
cases. This means that the requirements for statistical hypothesis testing will often 
not be met: given the number of potentially relevant variables, we will usually not 
have the requisite number of cases to perform statistical tests. And contrary to the 
natural sciences, the possibilities for experimental designs that permit isolation 
and systematic variation of a single factor are limited – in particular when it comes 
to macro-level questions. The result is an unattractive dilemma: if we attempt to 
follow standard methodological precepts we have to reduce the complexity of our 
hypothesis drastically by focusing on a greatly reduced number of variables. But the 
systematic effects of all those omitted variables cannot be controlled, so the results 
would be of doubtful validity. On the other hand, descriptive case studies alone 
are not enough; they tend to overemphasize historically contingent sequences of 
events at the expense of structural explanations3. What we need are hypotheses 
that specify a causal model showing why and how a given constellation of factors 
could bring about a particular effect, and we need to have empirical evidence that 
the effect predicted by the hypothesis is in fact being produced. This requires a shift 
away from the focus on the quality of methodological procedures toward a greater 
concern for the quality of the hypotheses (Scharpf, 1997: 22-29).
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 Actor-centered institutionalism offers a framework of how to proceed with 
empirical studies, rather than a fully specified theory (Scharpf, 1997: 37). Compared 
to a fully specified theory, a framework has less information content in the sense 
that fewer questions will be answered directly and more will have to be answered 
empirically (Scharpf, 1997: 30). What it should do is provide us with a descriptive 
language, and an ordering system that describes the location of, and the potential 
relationships among, more limited ‘causal mechanisms’ (cf. Elster, 1989; Little, 
1991) that we draw upon for the theoretically disciplined reconstruction of our 
nearly unique cases (Scharpf, 1997: 30; 37). The remainder of section 2.2 will 
further elaborate the main characteristics of the ‘descriptive language’, ‘ordering 
system’ and ‘causal mechanisms’ provided by actor-centered institutionalism: 
institutions, actors and actor constellations. 
2.2.3 Actor-centered institutionalism: overview and explanatory   
  approach
In explaining social phenomena, actor-centered institutionalism sees observable 
behavior by (individual or composite) actors as a ‘proximate’ cause, while the 
institutional context functions as a ‘remote’ cause (Mayntz & Scharpf; 1995: 46-47).
The first step to explanation is to identify the set of interactions that are to be 
explained, as this constitutes the unit of analysis. This then allows us to identify 
the actors that are actually involved, and whose choices will ultimately determine 
the outcome (Scharpf, 1997: 43). Actors are assumed to be capable of making 
purposeful choices among alternative courses of action (Scharpf, 1997: 7). They 
are assumed rational in the sense that they will attempt to maximize their own self-
interest (in terms of payoffs); but they are not assumed to be perfectly rational. 
Actors have specific capabilities and action orientations (Scharpf, 1997: 43). We 
will elaborate on actors and their orientations in section 2.2.5. It is important, 
however, to already emphasize here that many of the actors analyzed in actor-
centered institutionalism are not individuals. While the truism of methodological 
individualism is that in the final analysis only individuals can act, we know that 
individuals will often act in the name of and in the interest of another person, a 
larger group, or an organization (Scharpf, 1997: 52). And in particular an analysis 
of sectoral governance and self-organization in state-related fields will often have 
to focus on the interactions between composite actors, such as political parties, 
labor unions, and firms, rather than on individuals acting on their own account 
(Scharpf, 1997: 39). This is due to both the inherent focus on societal subsystems, 
and the fact that in particular state-related sectors tend to be densely organized 
(Mayntz & Scharpf, 1995: 43-44). The notion of a composite actor implies a capacity 
for intentional action at a level above the individuals (Scharpf, 1995: 52). Since, 
however, only individuals are capable of having intentions, the capacity to act at 
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the higher level (e.g. a union) must be produced by internal interactions between 
individuals (its members and staff). The result is the multi-level character of any 
conceptualization of actors above the level of individuals of at least two levels. On 
one level, a composite actor (e.g. a union) has certain resources that it employs in 
strategic action vis-à-vis other (composite) actors (e.g. an employers’ association); 
on another, that same composite actor is an institutional structure within which 
individuals (union members and staff) interact to produce the actions ascribed to 
the composite actor. We will more fully discuss the concept of composite actors in 
section 2.2.5.
The courses of action available to an (individual or composite) actor are labeled 
strategies. More often than not, strategies available to different actors in the same 
field are interdependent, in the sense that the outcome of a particular strategy 
chosen by an actor will simultaneously depend upon the choices of other actors 
(Scharpf, 1997: 7), and the other way around. Markets are a good example of 
this: if I want to buy squid at my local market today, the chances of success will 
depend on the amount of squid offered by vendors as well as the number of other 
locals who had a taste for squid when they woke up this morning. Outcomes in 
turn reflect payoffs for actors. Payoffs represent the valuation of a given set of 
possible outcomes by the preferences of the players involved (Scharpf, 1997: 7); 
for instance, getting good quality squid, getting squid of an inferior quality and 
getting no squid.
When strategies of different actors are interdependent, what is important is 
the actor constellation among the plurality of actors involved. The constellation 
describes the actors involved, their strategy options, the outcomes associated with 
strategy combinations, and the preferences of the actors over these outcomes 
(Scharpf, 1997: 44-45). The actor constellation describes a static picture, rather 
than actual interactions producing outcomes. These actual interactions can differ 
widely in character: any given actor constellation can correspond with a variety 
of modes of interaction (Scharpf, 1997: 45-47). It matters, for example, whether 
the same group of people will interact within a system of majority voting, or under 
hierarchical direction (a boss decides) to achieve a particular outcome. We will 
elaborate on actor constellations and modes of interaction in sections 2.2.6. and 
2.2.7, respectively.
The proximate cause (observable behavior by actors) is influenced by the 
remote cause (institutions) in many ways. The institutional context constitutes (in 
particular composite) actors and actor constellations, structures actors’ disposal of 
resources, influences their orientations, and shapes important aspects of situations 
that confront individual actors (Mayntz & Scharpf, 1995: 49), as section 2.2.4 will 
discuss. But it does not constitute all types of action and action-relevant factors, and 
where it does, it does not completely determine action. Laws, for instance, shape 
the existence of collective actors (e.g. firms), but they do not completely determine 
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their characteristics as a social organization, their orientation in a specific situation, 
or their actions (Mayntz & Scharpf, 1995: 47). The same goes for the broader 
structures in which composite actors are embedded: a part of, for instance, their 
lasting relations will be institutionally prescribed, while other relations are more 
informal and unrelated to legislation. And while there are institutionally arranged 
incentives for interaction between certain actors, real situations will simultaneously 
contain numerous non-institutional incentives.
Figure 2.1: The domain of interaction-oriented policy research
Source: Scharpf (1997), p. 44
Scharpf (1997: 5-10) emphasizes the importance of thinking game-theoretically 
when connecting proximate and remote causes in explanations. His emphasis is on 
thinking game-theoretically: “It is sufficient that the basic notions of interdependent 
strategic action and of equilibrium outcomes be self-consciously and systematically 
introduced into our explanatory hypotheses.” (Scharpf, 1997: 6-7). Strategic action 
implies that actors are aware of their interdependence and that in arriving at their 
own choices each will try to anticipate the choices of the others, knowing that they 
in turn will do the same (Scharpf, 1997: 10). Equilibrium outcomes are outcomes 
in which no player can improve his own payoff by unilaterally changing to another 
strategy. Together, these concepts provide the basis for counterfactual ‘thought 
experiments’ that systematically explore the outcomes that would have been 
obtained had the parties chosen other courses of action. If it can be shown that 
the actual outcome was indeed produced by strategy choices that, for all parties 
involved, were the best that they could do under the circumstances, one has a 
persuasive explanation (Scharpf, 1997: 10).
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2.2.4 Institutions in actor-centered institutionalism
The framework of actor-centered institutionalism emphasizes the influence of 
institutions on the perceptions, preferences, and capabilities of individual and 
composite actors and on their modes of interaction (Scharpf, 1997: 38). Within 
the new institutionalism in general, there are about as many definitions of the 
concept of an institution as authors that have written about it. Some employ a 
very broad definition of institutions, in which the concept refers to a broad range 
of categories. March & Olsen (1989), for instance, include routines, procedures, 
conventions, roles, strategies, organizational forms and technologies, as well as 
beliefs, paradigms, codes, cultures and knowledge that surround roles and routines. 
Others employ a much narrower definition. North (1990: 3), for instance, defines 
institutions as “rules of the game in a society, or, more formally, humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction”.
Actor-centered institutionalism falls in the second category, as it restricts “the 
concept of institution to systems of rules that structure the courses of actions that a 
set of actors may choose.” (Scharpf, 1997: 38). This definition does not only include 
formal legal rules that are sanctioned by the court system, but also social norms 
that actors will generally respect and whose violation will be sanctioned by loss of 
reputation, social disapproval or withdrawal of cooperation and rewards (Scharpf, 
1997: 38). Mayntz & Scharpf (1995: 45) point out two important consequences of 
this approach to institutions. First, this way institutions are not simply treated as 
the given result of a previous evolutionary development, but as things that can be 
intentionally created and changed through the actions of specific actors. Second, 
restricting the definition of institutions to specific regulatory aspects is an important 
step in realizing the premise that the institutional context enables and restricts, but 
not fully determines behavior. Mayntz & Scharpf (1995: 45-46) correctly point out 
that when one would, for instance, also include daily routines into the definition of 
institutions, there would be little room left for individual actors to maneuver outside 
of the scope of institutions.
Within the framework, the concept of an institutional setting or context does not 
have the status of a theoretically defined set of variables that could be systematized 
and operationalized to serve as explanatory variables. The point is that rules are 
highly individualized and produce their causal effects only in their concrete shape. 
The term ‘institutional setting’ or ‘context’ therefore serves as a shorthand term 
to describe the most important influences on those factors that in fact drive the 
explanations: actors with their orientations and capabilities, actor constellations 
and modes of interaction (Scharpf, 1997: 38-39).
Institutions have explanatory value because they reduce empirical variance. In 
the extreme case, sanctioned rules will effectively reduce the range of potential 
behavior by specifying required, prohibited, or permitted actions (cf. Ostrom et 
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al., 1994: 38). More often, however, positive and negative incentives attached to 
institutionalized rules will merely increase or decrease the payoffs associated with 
the use of particular strategies, and hence their probability of being chosen by self-
interested actors. In this sense, the view of institutions is in harmony with that of 
most rational-choice theorists (Scharpf, 1997: 39).
But institutions do more than constrain feasible strategies: they also constitute 
composite actors, and shape the valuation and perception of (possible) outcomes. 
As to the first: composite actors are institutionally constituted because they were 
created according to pre-existing rules (e.g. schools according to education laws) 
and they depend on rules for their continuing existence and operation (e.g. the state 
education budget). Composite actors only exist to the extent that the individuals within 
them are able to coordinate their choices within a common frame of reference that 
is constituted by institutional rules. Such rules define the membership of composite 
actors, material and legal action resources they can draw upon, the purposes they 
are to serve and the values they are to consider; they are of particular interest 
within actor-centered institutionalism (Mayntz & Scharpf, 1995: 48; Scharpf, 1997: 
39). Likewise, some institutions create arenas where various actors could interact, 
as well as occasions or reasons to do so (Mayntz & Scharpf, 1995: 48). Where 
institutions ascribe tasks to actors, and put actors into a particular constellation 
with one another, one can also speak of social differentiation (Mayntz, 1988). 
Second, as rules also (co-)define interests and values, they will (co-)determine 
how outcomes will be evaluated by the actors involved. Thus, they (co-)determine 
the preferences of these actors. Moreover, institutionalized responsibilities also 
influence actors’ perceptions. Actors with different responsibilities will often focus 
attention on different phenomena, and may have different views on the causes of 
the same phenomena. Once we know the institutional setting of interaction, we 
know a good deal about the actors involved, about their options, and about their 
perceptions and preferences (Scharpf, 1997: 39-40).
Institutions do not tell us all, however: a simple change of the incumbent CEO, 
for example, may induce a significant change in a firm’s strategy without changes 
to the institutional context. Again, it is important to note that actor-centered 
institutionalism does not have a determinist view on institutions: institutions 
influence repertoires of more or less acceptable courses of action, and as such 
leave considerable scope for strategic and tactical choices of actors (Scharpf, 1997: 
42). But if we have to consider all institutional as well as non-institutional factors 
influencing all actors involved, explanation and empirical research is in danger of 
becoming overly complex, and evolving into specific historical reconstructions. 
Actor-centered institutionalism therefore uses an institutional variant of the rule of 
diminishing abstraction (Lindenberg, 1991). It makes pragmatic sense to reduce 
levels of abstraction only gradually in the search for theoretical explanations. 
Therefore, we should begin with institutional explanations; and only when there 
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are clear indications that institutionally shaped perceptions and preferences will not 
provide satisfactory explanations, should we look for empirical information on more 
idiosyncratic, actor-centered factors – such as a change in CEO (Mayntz & Scharpf, 
1995: 66; Scharpf, 1997: 42).
The fact that actor-centered institutionalism attributes an important explanatory 
role to institutions does in no way imply a determinist notion of social development 
over time. Scharpf (1997: 31) warns that many actor constellations have several 
possible outcomes. There may be more possible equilibrium outcomes, or none 
at all. Furthermore, institutions are created by human action (either through 
evolutionary processes of mutual adaptation or purposive design) so there is no 
reason to assume convergence towards one best solution – if that should exist 
at all. Institutional development is path-dependent in the sense that where you 
end up is strongly influenced by where you started from; and where you end up 
is not necessarily an equilibrium, let alone a Pareto-efficient one. Once institutions 
have been installed, and actors have come to rely on their coordinating function, 
institutional change will be costly. This makes institutions hard to reform or abolish 
even if the circumstances that brought them about and originally justified them, no 
longer exist (Scharpf, 1997: 41, also cf. Simitis, 1994)4.
 2.2.5 Actors and actors’ orientations in actor-centered    
  institutionalism
2.2.5.1 Composite actors
As composite actors will typically figure prominently in actor-centered institutionalist 
analysis, it is important to discuss the conditions under which it is appropriate to 
apply actor-centered concepts to units that include several or many human beings 
(Scharpf, 1997: 51). 
 To begin with, we will discuss some cases were one might be tempted to apply the 
concept of a composite actor where one should avoid to do so. It is common practice 
to use aggregate categories for describing parallel actions of populations of individuals 
who share certain salient characteristics, such as ‘the farm vote’ or ‘capital flight’. But 
there, the explanation in the end rests exclusively on the individual level, and the 
more simple aggregate description is justified exclusively by the assumed empirical 
similarity among individual choices. The same holds for more complicated micro-
macro links than mere aggregation, such as the situation when similarity between 
individual actors’ choices does not stem from similar characteristics or preferences, 
but where certain acts by some will increase or decrease the likelihood that others 
will act in the same way (for instance, bandwagon effects in election campaigns). In 
both cases, the aggregate effect is a result of individual choices from individual actors 
acting from their individual action perspectives and with regard to their individual 
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expected payoffs; but it is not in itself an object of anyone’s purposeful choice. 
These aggregates are thus not capable of strategic action; but one could model such 
aggregates as responding in a predictable fashion to the moves of (individual or 
composite) actors that are capable of strategic action (Scharpf, 1997: 53-54).
 To qualify as a composite actor, an actor must have the capacity for strategic 
action – which is to say that on the basis of accurate perception and adequate 
information-processing capacity, it is able to respond to the risks and opportunities 
inherent in a given actor constellation by selecting those strategies that will 
maximize its interests. In the cognitive dimensions, composite actors therefore 
depend on interpersonal information processing and communication. Strategic 
capacity increases as the worldviews and causal theories of relevant subgroups 
converge on common interpretations of a given situation and of the options and 
constraints inherent in it. In the evaluative dimension, the capacity for strategic 
action presupposes the integration of preferences. In general terms, this implies 
a capacity to accept some losses in order to obtain larger overall gains (or to 
avoid larger overall losses). The capacity for strategic action thus depends, on the 
one hand, on the preexisting convergence or divergence of relevant perceptions 
and preferences among the members of the composite actor, and, on the other 
hand, on the capacity for conflict resolution within the collective unit. Empirically, 
we are likely to find composite actors that are by and large capable of strategic 
action in those areas in which they are routinely engaged. Differences in strategic 
capacity will primarily show up when existing collective actors are confronted with 
novel problem situations that cannot be handled successfully within the existing 
repertoire of strategies (Scharpf, 1997: 58-59).
 The term composite actor is thus reserved to constellations in which the ‘intent’ 
of intentional action refers to the joint effect of coordinated action expected by 
the participating individuals; they intend to create a joint product or to achieve 
a common purpose (Scharpf, 1997: 54). Composite actors build the context for 
action for these individuals, in the same way as the institutional environment builds 
the context for the organization’s actions. This implies that in principle the same 
empirical phenomenon must be analyzed from two perspectives: from the outside 
as a composite actor and from the inside as an institutional structure within which 
individual actors interact to produce the actions ascribed to the composite actor 
(cf. section 2.2.3). If it were necessary to extend every analysis to the latter micro 
level each and every time, the concept of composite actors would be pragmatically 
useless (Scharpf, 1997: 52). This is where, as we saw in the previous section, 
Lindenberg’s (1991) rule of ‘diminishing abstraction’ is taken to imply that, first, 
one should not seek to explain things by referring to actors’ peculiarities what one 
can explain through institutions, and second, even when pursuing an actor-centered 
explanation, one should first work with simple assumptions and only test these 
empirically, when one cannot explain behavior otherwise (cf. Mayntz & Scharpf, 
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1995: 66). In particular composite actors are operating within institutional settings 
in which they are much less free in their actions than autonomous individuals might 
be; as a consequence, these actors are likely to find themselves in relatively stable 
‘actor constellations’ that can be analyzed with the help of game theoretic concepts 
(Scharpf, 1997: 12).
 Composite actors are further divided into ‘collective’ and ‘corporate’ actors. 
Collective actors are highly dependent on and guided by the preferences of their 
members, while corporate actors have a high degree of independence from the 
ultimate beneficiaries of their actions, and their activities are carried out by staff 
members whose own private preferences are supposed to be neutral (cf. Coleman, 
1974). Collective actors may be further differentiated by two dimensions. The first is 
the degree to which critical action resources are either controlled individually by the 
members or have been collectivized and are controlled at the level of the collective 
actor. The second dimension refers to the action orientation. Unlike individual or 
corporate actors, collective actors are not autonomous in their choices but dependent 
on the preferences of their members. But these members’ preferences may either 
be related to the separate goals of these members or refer to purposes that can 
only be defined at the level of the collective (Scharpf, 1997: 54-56).
 Corporate actors are typically ‘top-down’ organizations under the control of an 
owner or hierarchical leadership representing the owners or beneficiaries. Even if 
they have ‘members’ in the formal sense, these are not actively involved in defining 
the corporate actors’ course of action but rather have at the most the collective 
power to select and replace the leaders. Strategy choices are disengaged from 
the preferences of membership, and corporate actors may thus achieve identities, 
purposes and capabilities that are autonomous from the interests and preferences 
of the populations they affect and are supposed to serve (Scharpf, 1997: 56-57).
 Figure 2.2 gives an overview of the actor types and characterizes them along 
a number of dimensions: the level that undertakes the actual action; the level of 
the purpose that the action seeks to serve; the level where important resources 
are controlled; and the mechanism through which strategic decisions are made and 
held accountable:
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Figure 2.2: Aggregate, Collective, and Corporate Actors
Source: Scharpf (1997), p. 57
It is important to note that there are no sharp dividing lines separating the 
analytically defined categories of actors (cf. Scharpf, 1997: 58). But the distinctions 
are useful in alerting us to the fact that the degree and method of integration of 
composite actors varies widely, and that it is necessary to identify the conditions 
that may justify the simplified assumption that a plurality of individuals could, for 
certain purposes, be treated as composite actors. Therefore, the previous typology 
of actors is not comprehensive, in the sense that there are solutions that separately 
institutionalize structures of collective and corporate actors and combine these 
to serve complementary purposes. The prime example is the democratic state, 
which uses the associative structure of general elections, party competition, and 
parliamentary responsibility of ministers to control the power of a bureaucratic 
machinery, which is largely immunized against immediate interventions from 
political processes in its day-to-day operations (Scharpf, 1997: 57). At that level, 
state departments largely operate as a top-down organization – and hence resemble 
a corporate actor, with the Minister or Secretary heading the department as its 
‘owner’5. At the same time, however, this Minister is restricted by parliamentary 
control.
2.2.5.2 Actors’ capabilities and action orientations
The view on actors and their orientations within actor-centered institutionalism 
differs from rational choice theories such as neoclassical economics (Scharpf, 
1997: 19-22). Actor-centered institutionalism avoids the extreme assumptions of 
neoclassical economics. Neoclassical economics (in its purest form) assumes actors 
to be exclusively motivated by economic self-interest (maximization of profits for 
firms, maximization of wealth for households). It also assumes actors to perceive 
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the economic environment in the same way as the researcher; to have complete 
information on the situation they face; and to have computational capacities good 
enough to select the course of action that will maximize their self-interest. But it 
is not realistic to think of human actors as being omniscient and single-minded 
self-interest maximizers who will rationally exploit all opportunities for individual 
gain regardless of norms and rules. So in contrast, actor-centered institutionalism 
assumes:
•	 that actors do not act on the basis of an objective reality but on the basis of a 
perceived reality and of assumed cause-and-effect relationships operating in 
the world they perceive;
•	 that they do not only act on the basis of objective needs, but also on the basis 
of preferences reflecting their subjectively defined interests and valuations and 
their normative convictions of how it is right or good or appropriate to act under 
the circumstances;
•	 that, more often than not, they will not have complete information on the 
 situations they face;
•	 and that their computational capabilities are limited.
Intentional action therefore cannot be described without reference to the subjective 
‘meaning’ that this action has for the actor in question (Scharpf, 1997: 20; 60).  But 
actor-centered institutionalism simultaneously seeks to avoid the opposite extreme 
of a ‘social construction of reality’ (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) that ensures the 
convergence of cognitive orientations through social norms and institutionalized 
rules that shape and constrain the motivations or preferences of all participants in 
social interaction (Scharpf, 1997: 21-22). Actor-centered institutionalism does not 
see these two extremes as mutually exclusive. Human action cannot exclusively be 
explained by reference to cultural beliefs and institutionalized rules of appropriate 
behavior – people are intelligent and have views, interests and preferences of their 
own, which sometimes brings them to evade or violate the norms and rules they 
are supposed to adhere to. So the rational-actor paradigm may indeed capture 
the basic driving force of social interaction. Simultaneously, human knowledge is 
limited and human rationality is bounded, and much human action is based on 
culturally shaped and socially constructed beliefs about the real world. Most human 
action will occur in social organizational roles with clearly structured responsibilities 
and competencies with assigned resources that can be used for specific purposes 
only. Action within a role is practically impossible to explain without reference to 
cultural and social definitions of that role and to the institutionalized rules governing 
it (Scharpf, 1997: 21-22). Role definitions and self-interest maximization can 
therefore best be seen as two poles simultaneously shaping actor’s choices; more 
precisely, it is the actor’s perception of both role expectations and his self-interest 
maximization that drives his choices6. 
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 In actor-centered institutionalism actors (both individual and composite) are 
characterized by specific capabilities and action orientations (Scharpf, 1997: 43-
44). Capabilities are all action resources that allow an actor to influence an outcome 
in certain respects and to a certain degree. They include personal qualities, physical 
resources, technological capabilities, and privileged access to information. As 
mentioned in section 2.2.4, particularly important here are action resources that 
are created by institutional rules defining competencies and granting or limiting 
rights of participation, of veto, or of autonomous decision. Action orientations are, 
roughly, the characteristic perceptions and preferences of a particular actor. They 
can be subdivided into three components: unit of reference, cognitive orientations 
and preferences (Scharpf, 1997: 60-66). 
 As individuals will not always act on their own behalf, but often in a representative 
capacity for of from the perspective of a group (family, state), it is important to 
relate individual behavior to the appropriate unit of reference on whose behalf action 
is undertaken and from whose perspective intentional choices can be explained 
(Scharpf, 1997: 61). Such role positions are associated with role-specific norms 
and expectations that will generally be supported by effective sanctions, ranging 
from social disapproval to criminal prosecution. In role-related action, perceptions 
and preferences will be derived from the perspective of the social unit on whose 
behalf the action is performed7. We must of course remain alert to the possibility 
that individual self-interest may become so important in the case at hand that 
explanations will fail if we do not to take them into account (Scharpf, 1997: 61). 
Even binding rules may sometimes be violated by actors who are willing to pay the 
price or who think they can get away with it (cf. Scharpf, 1997: 42).
 Actors have cognitive orientations for which actor-centered institutionalism 
generally assumes that their perceptions of directly observable facts will be 
empirically correct and that their hypotheses about what they cannot observe as 
well as causal linkages will be shaped by theories prevailing at the particular time 
and in the particular institutional setting (Scharpf, 1997: 62-63). Actor-centered 
institutionalism only departs from this assumption when there are specific indications 
that this is not the case; then, however, it is of the greatest interest to know to what 
extent the available courses of action, their likely outcomes, and their impact were 
(in)correctly perceived. Over the course of interaction, cognitive orientations may 
change due to learning processes. Here, the working hypotheses are that policy-
oriented learning, even if not diffused universally, is nevertheless likely to be shared 
in identifiable subsets of actors.
 Preferences consist of interests, norms, identities and interaction orientations 
(Mayntz & Scharpf, 1995: 52-58; Scharpf, 1997: 63-66). The (self-) interest 
component describes the basic preference of actors for self-preservation, autonomy 
and growth. It is defined in a quasi-objective way. The strategic implications of 
self-interest will, however, depend upon the institutional environment – they are, 
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for example, different for firms in a highly competitive market than for a union. 
Normative role orientations are also defined in a quasi-objective way, relating to 
normative expectations facing occupants of a given position. They need not have 
the formal quality of legal rules, and effective sanctions may be no more than social 
disapproval. Norms may define either the preceding conditions of a particular action 
(as when they require or prohibit certain acts) or the purposes to be achieved 
thereby (cf. Luhmann, 1966).
 There is no reason to think that either self-interest or norms should form a 
hierarchically integrated, logically consistent system, so we cannot rule out conflicts 
between the courses of action each suggests (Scharpf, 1997: 65-66). On the other 
hand, there will be situations for which neither provides clear guidelines; and actors 
have the capacity to adopt  own interests and follow self-defined rules. A partial 
solution to this problem of indeterminate preferences is provided by the formation of 
a specific identity. Actors have the possibility of defining specific interest and norms 
for themselves, and may selectively emphasize certain aspects of self-interest as 
well as certain rules and normative purposes from among those that generally 
apply to their ‘type’. A clearly defined identity will simplify choices (and so reduces 
search costs internally) and, when communicated, reduces uncertainty for other 
actors (and so reduces transaction costs externally) and hence tends to increase 
efficiency. To be effective this way, identities have to be relatively stable over time, 
and restrict the range of choices further than quasi-objective self-interest and norms 
would have done. This may come at a price when the environment becomes volatile 
and a high degree of flexibility is required. Changing identities implies discarding a 
large investment in moral commitments and cognitive certainties, which (as many 
a case study of firms attempting to change their corporate identity will show) is 
not easy. The other side of that coin is that such identities can be a powerful 
explanatory factor, in particular when choices are underdetermined by more general 
considerations of interest and norms.
 Finally, there is a relational dimension to actor orientations, labeled interaction 
orientations (Scharpf, 1997: 84- 89). The standard assumption within actor-centered 
institutionalism as well as rational choice theories is individualism: actors are only 
concerned with their own gains and losses. Contrary to conventional rational choice 
theories, actor-centered institutionalism allows for the fact that actors are not 
always entirely unconcerned about the payoffs received by other actors involved. If 
gains to another party objectively increase or decrease the expected payoffs to one 
actor, there is no need to conceptualize this dimension separately: it can simply be 
included in the payoff specification. The concept of interaction orientations is used 
for subjective redefinition of the ‘objective’ interest constellation. A relationship 
may assume a character of its own for an actor that affects the valuation of ‘real’ 
gains and losses and that distinguishes this relationship from others that are 
objectively similar. Examples are: solidarity (gain to another actor is positively 
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valued), competition (another’s loss is equally valued as one’s own gain), altruism 
(own gain is irrelevant, only the others’ gain is considered a positive outcome) and 
hostility (own gain is irrelevant, only the others’ losses are considered a positive 
outcome).
2.2.6 Actor constellations in actor-centered institutionalism
After identifying the problem and  interaction central to our analysis, the first step 
is to map out the problem as it is identified by substantive policy analyses into actor 
constellations among the actors involved (Scharpf, 1997: 48). The basic idea is that 
the solutions (as identified by substantive policy research) to a given policy problem 
must be produced by the interdependent choices of a plurality of actors with specific 
capabilities and with specific perceptions and preferences regarding the outcomes 
that could be obtained. Since the choices are interdependent, it is likely that no 
single actor will be able to determine the outcome unilaterally. What matters is the 
actor constellation (Scharpf, 1997: 69).
 In the most general sense, anything that a person considers desirable (or 
undesirable) may become a policy problem if changes in the desired direction are 
possible in principle but cannot be achieved by that person acting alone because 
others are causing the problem or have control over some action resources that 
are necessary for its resolution (Coleman, 1990). This does not imply that all of 
these problems need to be resolved through public policy, or through any kind of 
supra-individual agreement (Scharpf, 1997: 69-70). They may be resolved through 
noncooperative or cooperative interaction among the actors involved, and in the 
market. But not all problems can be resolved in this fashion, and the market itself 
may cause problems.
 Focusing on the interaction aspect of policy problems, three distinct groups 
of policy problems may be distinguished (Scharpf, 1997: 70-71). Problems of 
coordination may arise if individual actors would benefit from exchanging goods or 
services, from producing goods or services that are compatible, or from collaborating 
in the joint production of goods or services that neither party could produce by 
itself. Though individual actors should in principle be able to resolve coordination 
problems through voluntary agreements amongst themselves (in other words, free 
markets would suffice), public policy may nevertheless play a crucial role in reducing 
distrust and the transaction costs of such agreements, for example by defining and 
protecting property rights, by defining a law of contracts and a legal machinery for 
the enforcement of contractual obligations, and by defining technical standards that 
ensure the compatibility of products. Externalities and collective goods problems 
may arise if individual action produces negative or positive effects for others that 
will be disregarded by purely self-interested actors. It may result in a ‘Tragedy of the 
Commons’ (Hardin, 1968), in which common resources are exploited and ultimately 
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destroyed by rational self-interest seeking actors. If property rights are well 
defined, and if external effects are concentrated on small numbers of other actors, 
contract law may permit satisfactory solutions to be reached through negotiations. 
As the number of affected parties increases, however, negotiated solutions will 
incur exponentially rising transaction costs. Public policy could intervene to correct 
externalities through regulation or by imposing incentives, or collective goods, or 
to produce collective goods through organized collective action or through public 
provision. Redistribution problems may arise under two conditions. First, there may 
be situations in which (otherwise attractive) policy purposes can only be attained 
at the expense of identifiable individuals or groups. Here, the issue will necessarily 
have to be resolved in the policy process. Second, the existing distribution of assets 
may itself become a policy issue. Societies differ greatly in the extent to which 
(market-generated) inequalities are made a policy issue; but in each of them, 
the state’s power to tax and regulate is at least to some extent used to help the 
weak.
 The concept of actor constellations serves two purposes (Scharpf, 1997: 45). 
First, it allows us to describe and compare, at a very high level of abstraction but 
with great precision, extremely diverse real-world constellations, and the ways in 
which the actors diverge or converge in their preferences over the range of feasible 
outcomes. Second, it provides the crucial link between substantive analysis and 
interaction-oriented research. It is important to realize that (policy) interactions 
usually do not take place among the (individual) actors that are ultimately affected 
but among specialized actors. A particular policy problem could be described in 
game-theoretical terms; but the substantive policy problem then will have to be 
mapped onto the constellation of policy actors involved. This will never be a perfect 
one to one representation, as the policy process will ultimately deal with problems 
that differ from the substantive problems at the societal level (Scharpf, 1997: 45-
46). In translating policy problems into actor constellations we need to show how 
particular actors with specific orientations and capabilities will or will not include 
societal interests in their own action orientations (Scharpf, 1997: 72).
 Actor constellations are meant to represent what we know of the set of actors 
that are actually involved in particular policy interactions – their capabilities 
(translated in potential strategies), their perceptions and evaluations of the 
outcomes obtainable (translated into payoffs), and the degree to which their payoff 
aspirations are compatible or incompatible with one another (Scharpf, 1997: 72). 
Scharpf (1997) emphasizes the potential of the analytical power of game matrices 
to portray actor constellations. One important distinction is between noncooperative 
and cooperative actor constellations or games. A cooperative game is one in which 
binding agreements among the actors are possible before they choose their strategy 
(Scharpf, 1997: 8). For noncooperative games, one must first distinguish between 
simultaneous and sequential games. In a simultaneous game, each actor must 
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select his strategy before knowing the strategy choice of the others. In a sequential 
game, however, one player must choose first, and the next will proceed in the 
knowledge of that choice (Scharpf: 9).
 Scharpf (1997: 73) argues that the theory of noncooperative games can help 
us in identifying potential equilibrium solutions even when we know that in fact 
modes of interaction such as negotiations or voting are used, because they define 
the ‘logic of the situation’. The most simple noncooperative game constellations are 
those of pure conflict (one side must lose what the other side gains) and of pure 
coordination (all actors can maximize their own payoffs by agreeing on concerted 
strategies) (Scharpf, 1997: 73). Both are rare in the real world as compared to 
so-called mixed-motive (or variable sum) games in which the preferences of the 
players are partly harmonious and partly in conflict. Four archetypical mixed-motive 
games are: ‘Assurance’, ‘Battle of the sexes’, ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ and ‘Chicken’. 
Each involves two players, who can each choose between two strategies (cooperate 
or defect), resulting in four possible outcomes that can be ranked 1 (low) – 4 (high) 
to the payoffs for each of the players.
The most famous of these games is the ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’, the game matrix for 
which is presented in figure 2.3. It is exemplified by two robbers caught red-handed 
and each locked up in a separate cell, unable to communicate. The district attorney 
offers to reward each of them with a reduced sentence for confessing unilaterally. If 
one confesses and the other doesn’t, the latter gets the maximum sentence, while 
the ‘rat’ gets the mildest sentence. Jointly, they would be best off by cooperating 
(which here means: not confessing), for then each gets the second best payoff. The 
‘tragedy’ here is that for each them, regardless of what their partner does, they 
will be better off by defecting (confessing); it is the ‘dominant’ strategy (Scharpf, 
1973). So the expected (equilibrium) outcome is not the welfare-superior one: they 
will both be tempted into confession. 
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Figure 2.3: Prisoner’s dilemma game matrix
C(ooperate)   D(efect)
C
                                      
  3
                                    
  1
D
                                      
  4
                                    
  2
Source: Scharpf (1997), p. 75
2.2.7 Modes of interaction
Actor constellations describe the level of potential conflict, but do not yet include 
information about the mode of interaction through which that conflict is to be 
resolved (Scharpf, 1997: 72). There are four basic modes of interaction: ‘unilateral 
action’, ‘negotiated agreements’, ‘majority vote’, and ‘hierarchical determination’ 
(Scharpf, 1997: 46).
 These modes of interaction are shaped by institutional rules regulating their use, 
for instance, the procedures according to which issues can be brought to a vote 
(Scharpf, 1997: 46). But they are also affected by the larger institutional context 
in which they are used, even to the extent that there may be a limited variety of 
institutional arrangements that minimally permit a specific mode of interaction to 
be employed (Scharpf: 46). It is assumed that modes of interaction differ in their 
demand on the institutional capacity for conflict resolution and that institutional 
structures differ in their capacity to support different modes of interaction (Scharpf: 
4
2
3
1
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47). ‘Unilateral action’, for instance, requires minimal institutional support, as it can 
even be undertaken in a completely anarchic field. ‘Majority voting’, however, requires 
identification of the voters (a group), the establishment of voting procedures, and 
some way of ensuring that the outcome of the vote is put into effect. Majority voting 
cannot be the mode of interaction in anarchic fields, as it requires more substantial 
institutional support8. If the institutional context is an organization (a corporate 
actor or an association), however, all four modes of interaction may apply to actions 
of their members. A manager, for instance, will sometimes be acting unilaterally 
(e.g. deciding to lay-off a worker); he may be negotiating an agreement (e.g. on the 
details of a merger of his department with that of a colleague; he may have been 
voting in the board of managers (e.g. on the merger proposal before); and he may 
be acting out a direct order from a superior, or give a direct order to a subordinate. 
Also, the same mode of interaction may change its character within a different 
institutional context. Negotiations, for instance, will have a limited problem-solving 
capacity in a minimal institutional context, which lacks sanctions to ensure that 
agreements reached will be kept; they will have more chance of success when, for 
instance, they take place in an environment where there is a state that has come up 
with a law of contracts, and a system of law enforcement to ensure compliance.
 To show how and why separately distinguishing modes of interaction matter 
for the analysis, it is helpful to see how these different modes of interaction lead 
to a different dynamic in the analysis of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Unilateral action 
was the assumed mode of interaction in the previous discussion of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma: there were no rules allowing for interaction, and each prisoner could only 
act on his own.
 Allowing communication would change the mode of interaction to ‘negotiated 
agreement’. Sometimes it is suggested that the dilemma would cease to exist if the 
prisoners were allowed to communicate, for rational self-interested actors would 
agree to cooperate rather than confess. Scharpf (1997: 76) correctly points out 
that in a noncooperative game such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma (and as would be 
the case in the anecdotal version in which it is depicted) such agreements would 
not have any binding force. In the absence of binding agreements, communication 
would remain ‘hollow talk’ that cannot eliminate the possibility of mutual defection, 
particularly in the light of substantial stakes such as long-term jail sentences.
 Axelrod (1984) has shown that the dilemma may indeed be solved if this game 
is played as a sequential game. If the game is repeated between the same actors, 
each player can reward or punish the previous move of the other. Axelrod has shown 
that if both players then employ this sanctioning capacity in ‘tit-for-tat’ strategies 
(a previous defection by the other is punished by your own defection in the next 
round, while previous cooperation is rewarded), rational self-interested actors are 
in fact able to achieve stable cooperation in an (indefinitely) reiterated two-person 
Prisoner’s Dilemma.
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 But if the number of actors is more than two, the tit-for-tat solution ceases to 
work (Scharpf, 1997: 76). The most important reason is that in that case, the next 
interaction will almost certainly not be with the same actor as the previous one – 
meaning the sanction cannot be applied to the culprit. Here, the dominant strategy 
for each individual actor is still defection. In the social sciences, this is known as the 
problem of ‘free riding’, that, if adopted by all participants, must lead to suboptimal 
outcomes in the production of public goods (cf. Olsson, 1965; Hardin, 1968). In 
order to stabilize cooperation in multi-actor Prisoner’s Dilemma constellations, 
noncooperative games will not be enough. What is needed are structures and 
processes of interaction that permit the adoption and enforcement of collectively 
binding decisions (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1994).
 When binding agreements are possible, agreement in the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
seems easy – at least in the theoretical model, as rational actors would agree on 
cooperating (i.e. not confessing). Scharpf (1997: 77), however, correctly notes 
that this Prisoner’s Dilemma matrix offers a rather extreme assumption. Real-world 
constellations often allow for not one but several cooperative solutions that may 
differ significantly in their distributive consequences. In that case, the common 
aversion to the outcome associated with mutual defection is not necessarily sufficient 
to ensure agreement on one of the competing cooperative solutions. Peace talks 
such as those in Northern Ireland or in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict show that 
conflicting ideas over the content of a negotiated settlement may long frustrate a 
settlement even if both parties want peace desperately.
 By contrast, when decisions can be taken by majority vote or by hierarchical 
rule, outcomes will be reached much more easily (Scharpf, 1997: 77). However, 
now the danger is exploitation: whoever is able to impose his preferred solution 
will be tempted to choose maximizing his own self-interest at the expense of the 
other(s), over the welfare-superior outcome which implies his second-best payoff, 
as well as the other’s9.
2.3 Markets for intermediate skills
2.3.1  Introduction 
Having introduced the actor-centered institutionalist framework, it is time to 
link it to the research topic at hand: the operation of markets for intermediate 
skills, and the regimes that govern them. At first glance, the problem at hand is a 
typical coordination problem. Young people need skills training in order to acquire 
(attractive) jobs, and they need someone to teach them these skills. In this vital 
sense, markets for intermediate skills are part of the general problem each society 
has to solve in how to educate and socialize its youth. 
 As we saw in section 2.2.6, individual actors should in principle be able to resolve 
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coordination problems through voluntary agreements amongst themselves; in other 
words, contracts concluded in free markets would suffice. But public policy may 
nevertheless play a crucial role in reducing distrust and transaction costs of such 
agreements. And externalities and collective goods problems as well as redistribution 
problems may arise that enhance the call for public policy to combat such problems. 
Section 2.3.2 will discuss education markets, the extent to which they may give rise 
to the aforementioned problems, and the extent to which contemporary economic 
theory sees grounds for public education policy.
 Section 2.3.3 will then direct the discussion from education markets in general 
to markets for intermediate skills in particular. One important distinction between 
markets for intermediate skills and general education markets is that there are 
different organizations that can provide these skills. While general education is 
offered through (public or private) schools, it is not just schools that provide 
VET training: firms themselves are responsible for possibly the majority of skills 
acquisition in our societies.
 That simple fact significantly alters the discussion of the potential role for public 
policy in this area: why would firms and (future) workers not be able to meet 
each other’s demands (for qualified workers and relevant skills with matching jobs, 
respectively) in a ‘free’ market? Section 2.3.4 discusses this particular question, 
starting with Becker’s famous human capital theory (Becker, 1993), and resulting in 
the assertion that externalities (and, hence, prisoner’s dilemma type constellations 
as analyzed in actor-centered institutionalism) are keys to markets for intermediate 
skills.
 Section 2.3.5 will discuss relevant aspects of labor market theory, which are 
particularly relevant when analyzing training, skills and qualifications. It starts 
with an analysis of the concept of qualification. It continues with an analysis of 
the reasons why labor markets are not as competitive as one may think. The 
specialization which vocational education and training causes is one reason, and 
geographical boundaries another. In addition, it is the very existence of firms, and 
the longer-lasting relations between most workers and their firm, which makes the 
labor market one in which the governance mechanism market is not the only one. 
Firms themselves govern an internal labor market, which implies that hierarchical 
governance significantly intervenes with the operation of (external) market 
mechanisms. This is reflected in labor market theory by the distinction between 
internal and external labor markets.
 Section 2.3.6 focuses on the connection between education and labor markets. 
It first discusses the concept of the school-to-work transition. It subsequently 
discusses the differentiation of both education systems and labor markets, and 
mismatches that may arise between education and labor. And it concludes with 
a discussion of governance regimes, actors, and specific types of institutional 
configurations that can strengthen the link between education and labor.
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 Section 2.3.7 discusses national differences in markets for intermediate skills in 
general, and between the Netherlands, Germany and the U.S. in particular, based 
on available international comparative statistics.
 Section 2.3.8 will extensively discuss a body of qualitative comparative research 
at the firm level. The reason to discuss it so extensively is that it provides a much 
better grasp of the connection between work organization, firms’ human resources, 
and training policies than statistics do. It reminds us, first, of the importance of 
including the sector level into the analysis. Amount and quality of training are related 
to production requirements, and these will obviously differ between sectors. Focusing 
at the sector level controls for that factor. Second and even more importantly, 
however, these studies show remarkable differences in work organization, human 
resources and training policies between similar firms in different countries. This 
fundamentally rules out the naïve idea that production requirements would simply 
dictate one unilateral type of work organization and (therefore) skills patterns. 
It also attunes us to relevancy of the relations between work organization, the 
institutionalization of education and training and firms’ skills strategies.
 As such, this section will pave the way for the introduction of the concept of 
skills equilibriums in section 2.3.9. Skills equilibriums are the final concept for the 
analysis of markets for intermediate skills in this book: a specific type of equilibrium 
concept used to label and analyze such markets.
2.3.2 Education markets
Scientific interest in the market as a coordination mechanism goes back as far as 
1776, to the work of Adam Smith (1975). The market is the place where supply and 
demand meet, and result in coordination as if through an ‘invisible hand’ (Smith, 
1975) rather than through a great deal of (state) regulation. The hand, however, is 
not that invisible: it’s the price mechanism. As Holton (1992: 61) puts it:
 “The essential feature of  the price mechanism is its capacity to regulate and 
bring into equilibrium the demand for and the supply of  commodities. The 
behavior of  prices (…) gives both information and incentives to producers 
and consumers. Producers will be guided in their decision about what to 
produce and how much to produce by the demand for commodities as 
expressed through the price mechanism. Similarly, consumers will be guided 
by decisions about what to consume and how much they can afford to 
consume through the price mechanism. What matters (…) is the relative cost 
and benefit involved in different courses of  action as expressed through the 
relative prices of  different commodities. (…) If  the demand for a particular 
commodity is considerable but the supply highly limited, prices will tend 
to be high relative to other commodities. Such a situation gives producers 
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an incentive to seek cost reductions in order to lower prices and secure 
greater profits from the ensuing switch by consumers to cheaper versions of  
the same product. Alternatively, the same initial situation gives consumers 
the incentive to look for substitutes for the original expensive commodity. 
If  a cheaper substitute can be found, the lower price gives consumers an 
incentive to switch to the alternative product.”
In principle, markets could in this way lead to an optimal production and distribution 
of goods and services. Not all goods and services, however, can be adequately 
supplied by the market. There are two important requirements regarding their 
nature: excludability (is it possible to exclude persons, who do not pay the price, 
from consumption) and rivalry (does my consuming one unit imply that there is 
one unit less to consume for others). Smith (1975) himself recognized so-called 
‘duties of the sovereign’ that do not meet these requirements, such as national 
defense; nowadays we would call them collective goods. Goods that do meet both 
requirements are called private goods.
 While there are claims that education is a collective good, the communis opinio 
is that education is a private good. In an exploration of education markets, the 
Dutch Education Council argues that individuals can be excluded from education, 
and that there is rivalry in the sense that a teacher’s attention to one student does 
not go to the others (Onderwijsraad, 2001a: 21). While we agree that education 
can best be analyzed as a private good, both these arguments are not as convincing 
as they may appear. First, to the extent that most societies have a basic education 
system combined with compulsory school attendance, excludability becomes a 
moot point, empirically, as far as using it to establish the private or collective 
nature of the service: while it of course remains theoretically possible to exclude 
individuals from consumption, it empirically becomes irrelevant for the part of the 
education system where government policy actually forces consumption upon its 
youth and their parents10. Second, while one may indeed characterize a good or 
service as excludable or not, characterizing them on rivalry requires a gliding scale. 
If someone eats my chocolate bar it’s completely gone. But if a teacher teaches 
my fellow student how to add and subtract, he can still teach me – and, possibly, 
simultaneously.
 In the end, it is not the characteristics of the good per se that by definition 
make it private or collective; it is the specific institutionalization of its provision 
in a particular society that matters. From a sociological perspective, markets 
themselves are in fact institutions. Hodgson (1988: 174) defined the market as 
a set of social institutions in which a large number of commodity exchanges of a 
specific type take place regularly, and to some extent are facilitated and structured 
by those institutions. Exchange involves contractual agreement and the exchange 
of property rights, and the market consists in part of mechanisms to structure, 
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organize and legitimize these activities. Hodgson points out that some institutions 
within the market are associated with exchange and contracts in an elemental 
sense (such as the legal system and the customs, which govern the contract), and 
would be present even if a formal market did not exist. In fact, such institutions 
are considered crucial for the historical emergence of markets as coordination 
mechanisms over the last few centuries; in particular the institutionalization of 
private property rights, giving individuals or organizations effective control over 
economic resources, is considered a primary factor behind this (North & Thomas, 
1973). Other institutions are specifically concerned with the development of the 
market and the coordination of a large number of exchanges in an organized 
manner. Furthermore, there is the ‘embeddedness’ of markets in the wider social 
context; Granovetter (1985: 481-482) has argued that (economic) behavior and 
institutions are so constrained by ongoing social relations, that to construe them 
as independent is a serious misunderstanding. Analyzing markets without an eye 
for their institutionalization would be as misguided as analyzing ‘systems’ without 
an eye for the operation of market mechanisms, even in state-dominated sectors 
such as defense. The question whether a good is private or public is therefore, in 
the end, irrelevant. Market mechanisms and (other) institutions (some, but not all, 
created by the state) will always jointly influence provision and consumption; and 
their precise interplay should be empirically established for each individual good 
or service in each individual country (or even region thereof). The reason that we 
prefer to treat education as in principle a private good is that this explicitly leaves 
open the alternative of market provision, which is particularly important in markets 
for intermediate skills, as we will see. Vice versa, treating education as a private 
good does not rule out a (large) role for the state.
 Economic theory poses various requirements to guarantee maximum efficiency 
through market provision of private goods (Onderwijsraad, 2001a: 18-19), most of 
which are not met in education markets (Onderwijsraad, 2001a: 19-20):
•	 competition is often limited to those suppliers meeting various government 
requirements; (in particular state sponsored) suppliers are often not completely 
free to determine their service, use production means, and set prices, but are 
constrained by government requirements in each respect;
•	 consumers are usually subject to compulsory participation in subsequent, 
specified types of education up to a certain age, and thus are not completely 
free in their choice;
•	 consumer choice is often further limited by the limited number of local suppliers; 
since transaction (in particular transportation) costs increase relatively fast with 
distance from the supplier, local suppliers have a distinct competitive advantage 
over others;
•	 education is an ‘experience good’, meaning that quality often only becomes 
apparent during consumption, rather than being satisfactorily determined up 
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front through its price; transaction costs of switching suppliers are relatively high 
as one often cannot get full credit at the new school for education completed at 
the previous one;
•	 the state often pays suppliers (to a large extent) directly from tax funds; 
remaining further prices for individuals are often also set (and reimbursed) by 
the state, and do not cover the costs of related consumption.
Education markets are thus generally considered quasi-markets (cf. Le Grand & 
Bartlett, 1993; Woods et al, 1998), and the fact that not all theoretical criteria for 
optimal market operation are met may result in market failure. This in turn may 
induce state intervention. There are two main arguments for state intervention in 
markets in general and education markets in particular (Onderwijsraad, 2001a: 21-
23). The first is efficiency: the state may intervene to achieve ‘optimal investment’ 
in a market. Two situations can be pointed out where investment can be less than 
optimal. The first is the existence of external effects: effects that go beyond the 
individual benefits of the good or service. As individuals will base their consumption 
solely on the individual costs and benefits it will present them with, the threat is 
that the market by itself may result in lower investment levels than is considered 
desirable from a collective point of view. The second situation that can lead to less 
than optimal investment is uncertainty on the returns to investment. This may either 
make consumers themselves (or capital providers that they need for loans in case 
they lack the necessary investment means themselves) more risk averse than is 
desirable. The second main argument for state intervention with markets is equity. 
Again, there are two situations that may lead to less equity than is considered 
desirable. First, individuals may not have equal access to (essential) goods or 
services. Second, the market may not provide what is considered necessary for 
each individual, as individuals may not value a particular good or service (so-called 
‘merit goods’, cf. Barr, 1998) enough as they would be wise to do.
 These four specific arguments all more or less apply to education (Onderwijsraad, 
2001a: 21-23). First, while hard evidence is hard to find, the general estimation is 
that education contributes to economic growth as well as other societal goals such 
as social cohesion and democracy (cf. Oosterbeek, 1998). If consumers do not take 
these external effects into their individual cost-benefit analysis, state intervention 
may be required to achieve a both quantitatively and qualitatively adequate level 
of education investments (cf. Groot & Maassen van den Brink, 1995). Second, the 
individual benefits of education are not known up front, which may make either 
consumers themselves, or capital providers they turn to for loans, risk averse 
regarding education investments, an additional reason why market-generated 
education investments may be lower than states want. Third, the inclination to 
invest in education in the first place is positively correlated with family factors, 
while different attainment levels in the education system are positively correlated 
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with subsequent income differences later on. Governments may therefore want to 
intervene to make education participation and/or future income distribution more 
equal. Fourth and final, some individuals (or their parents) may underestimate 
the value of education, and governments may paternalistically want to intervene 
to ensure each individual participates to a required minimum level; education can 
easily be seen as a merit good (cf. Barr, 1998). For all these reasons, government 
intervention tends to be more pronounced in education markets than in most other 
markets.
2.3.3 Markets for intermediate skills
While it is hard to argue against state intervention with education systems in 
general, this does not necessarily imply that states should intervene with each 
particular segment of the education system, much less that they should do so in 
the same way. Our modern societies require all of their citizens to be able to read, 
write, and calculate; and (general) educational achievement is a powerful predictor 
of future labor market prospects and earnings. Both the external effects and the 
‘merit good’ nature of education is therefore most easily demonstrated for primary 
and (lower) secondary education, which is why school attendance is compulsory 
at these levels. While there is no compulsory university attendance, states also 
intervene in university education. Even in the U.S., where there is an abundance of 
private universities and colleges, states fund their own public university systems. 
Important arguments for government intervention in university education are the 
fact that a university education should not be exclusively available to those who can 
foot the bill themselves, and the importance of published academic research for the 
accumulation and dispersion of knowledge throughout society.
 Vocational education is somehow stuck in between the bottom (primary and 
lower secondary general education) and top (tertiary education at universities) of 
the education hierarchy in our society. It is located at the upper secondary or 
tertiary level in education systems; and it may be organized as a separate segment 
within education systems with a separate type of schools primarily dedicated to 
this task (as is the case in the Netherlands and Germany), or it may be included as 
an option offered by schools that primarily offer general education (as is the case 
in most American high schools). This alone makes it harder to demarcate clear 
boundaries of VET markets than those of either primary and secondary general 
education or university education.
 But a more important cause of this demarcation problem is that, while there 
is no adequate functional equivalent to general education at (public or private) 
schools at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels, there is one for school-based 
vocational education: work-based training provided by firms. While an analysis of 
markets for general education can limit itself to schools on the supply side and 
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students (and their parents) on the demand side, an analysis of VET markets will 
have to incorporate firms on both the supply and the demand side. On the supply 
side, because a lot of workers’ skills are actually acquired in the workplace, through 
formal training or informal learning on-the-job. And on the demand side, because 
it is not just the workers themselves (in terms of higher wages), but also firms that 
benefit (in terms of higher productivity) from skills their workers have previously 
acquired through VET. Obviously, firms also benefit from general skills such as 
reading and writing, which their workers have acquired in general education. But 
general education and the skills taught there serve more causes than just an 
adequate operation of the labor market, and it is not as specifically targeted to 
firms’ needs as VET is. And as firms are, in principle, perfectly capable of teaching 
VET skills themselves, this provides states with an alternative to state-sponsored 
school-based provision of these skills that does not exist for general skills: leaving 
it to firms themselves.
 The important role of firms on both the supply and the demand side of VET 
means that it is located at the crossroads of two larger markets: the education 
market and the labor market. Rather than to speak of vocational education and 
training markets, we prefer the term market for intermediate skills: those above 
routine skills but below professional ones, implying that the category of intermediate 
skills is still heterogeneous in content and imprecise in its boundaries (Ryan, 1991: 
2). Ryan (1991: 2-3) traces back the relevancy of intermediate skills for economic 
performance to three distinctive attributes. First, they are costly to develop, 
which distinguishes them from routine skills. Second, they are transferable across 
employers, which is what distinguishes them from firm-specific skills. Third, they 
have traditionally been developed predominantly through workplace-based training 
programs. It is in fact the combination of the first two characteristics that explains 
why markets for intermediate skills (and the role the state has to play there) have 
attracted significant attention from scientists and policy-makers: costly transferable 
skills are the ones for which market failure is liable to be the most serious (Ryan, 
1994: 3).
2.3.4 Firms and their training investments
2.3.4.1 Becker’s human capital theory
The fact that costly transferable skills are the ones for which market failure is liable 
to be the most serious, is a hypothesis that deserves closer scrutiny. As firms need 
new, adequately skilled workers, and young people need skills training, why would 
a ‘free’ market, with new labor market entrants seeking training and firms offering 
it, not simply solve this coordination problem?
 The seminal work in economic theory on firms’ training investments has been 
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Gary S. Becker’s ‘Human capital’ (Becker, 1993; first published 1964). Economic 
theory assumes profit-maximizing firms to be in equilibrium when marginal receipts 
equal marginal expenditures, or, in symbols when marginal products (MP) at a 
particular point in time (t=0) equal wages (W). Training might lower current receipts 
and raise current expenditures, yet firms could profitably provide training if future 
receipts were sufficiently raised or future expenditures sufficiently lowered because 
of it (Becker, 1993: 32). Training not only costs money in the sense of trainer’s pay 
and learning materials (what Becker calls the outlay on training), but also entails 
opportunity costs because trainees spend time in training that could have been 
used to produce current output. The general rationale for firms to invest in training 
is captured in the equation MP0’ + G = W0 + C where G (the excess of future 
receipts over future outlays) is a measure of the return to the firm from providing 
training, C is the sum of opportunity costs and outlays on training, and MP0’ stands 
for the fact that the current marginal product will actually be lower than it would 
have been if the trainees had not been trained but had been working productively 
full-time (MP0) (Becker, 1993: 33).
 Becker distinguished between two types of firm-provided training: general 
versus specific training. Perfectly general training would be equally useful in many 
firms; completely specific training has no effect on the productivity of trainees 
that would be useful to other firms. Becker (1993: 40) realized that much training 
is neither completely general nor completely specific, but nevertheless chose 
for a sharp demarcation between these two categories. Training that increases 
productivity more in the firms providing it than in other firms is specific training, 
whereas training that increases productivity by at least as much in other firms is 
general training.
 Becker (1993: 40) correctly noted that workers, not firms, command the 
property right for their skills, as a skill cannot be used without permission of the 
person possessing it. As this `human capital’ has feet and is free to walk, firms’ 
investments in it are liable to a certain risk: workers may leave before the firm has 
recouped any investments in their training. As general training is useful in many 
firms, marginal products would rise by the same extent in all of them because of it. 
A firm that does not train itself could therefore offer another firms’ trainee the same 
wage as the training firm itself, without having had to spend outlays on training itself, 
and without incurring opportunity costs of missed production time from workers in 
training. Becker concludes that firms providing their training could not capture any 
of the return. No firm would be prepared to invest in general skills training, since 
after training, either the firm pays its workers the market wage (in which case it 
would be cheaper to directly recruit already skilled workers from the external labor 
market rather than train your own), or the firm pays its trained workers less than 
the market rate, in which case they workers will quit and seek similar employment 
elsewhere at the market wage (cf. Soskice, 1994: 29). The problem here is what 
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economists have tended to call ‘poaching’ and sociologists ‘free riding’: some firms 
may opt not to train themselves, but settle for recruiting trained workers from 
other firms. The imminent threat is a ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ (Hardin, 1968), in 
which common resources (here: the supply of skilled workers) are exploited and 
ultimately destroyed by rational self-interest seeking actors (here: firms that prefer 
to recruit trained workers from other firms rather than train them themselves). 
The tragedy here threatens to be that, as firms that train will not always be able 
to amortize the training costs and recoup the benefits (by retaining their trained 
workers), the long term equilibrium result would be that no firm would invest in 
general training.
 Becker immediately finds a solution for this potential problem, however, as he 
concludes that firms will thus only provide general training to the extent that the 
trainees would bear the costs of general training, and profit from the return. They 
would be willing to pay these costs since training raises their future wages. But 
the initial price they pay for this is that the wage of trainees would not equal their 
opportunity marginal product (the marginal product in case they would be working 
full-time rather than spending some time in training) but would be less by the total 
costs of training: workers, in other words, pay for general training by receiving 
wages below what they could receive elsewhere. The basic notion underlying this 
solution is the same one we saw in our discussion of the private or public nature of 
education (cf. section 3.2). A Tragedy of the Commons will occur if a good is truly 
collective; but skills that workers command are not. Property rights in skills are 
automatically vested, for a skill cannot be used without permission of the person 
possessing it. Workers’ skills are excludable and rival: if a worker makes his skills 
available to one employer, that employer’s competitor will not be able to benefit 
from them. The basic freedom of labor in our societies guarantees workers they can 
use this property right freely to their discretion11.
 As regards specific training, however, the situation is different. The wage that 
an employee could get elsewhere would be independent of the amount of specific 
training he had received. An employee who paid for his own specific training and 
was laid off would suffer a loss because he would not find an equally good job (that 
is, one in which he is paid for his specific skills investment) elsewhere. No rational 
employee would therefore invest in his own specific training, Becker concludes. If 
he were to invest in training, we would add, he would be wise to invest in general 
training rather than in specific training for which he would find only one employer 
willing to pay extra – because that one employer then would have monopoly power 
over that specific skills and would therefore not have to pay the full extra, if any 
at all. Becker therefore initially stipulates that firms would be willing to invest in 
specific training themselves. As this type of investment in a worker’s productivity 
would not raise his productivity in other firms, firms will be able to reap the benefits 
of specific training investments themselves.
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 In its simplest form, Becker’s theory shows that firms should be willing to invest 
in specific skills and reluctant to invest in general skills. As long as we assume 
perfectly rational actors that have perfect information about future returns to 
training investments, there would be an optimal equilibrium where individuals 
acquire exactly the kind of general training they want, and (predominantly) firms 
would ensure the specific training they need. The existence of considerable skills 
mismatches in modern labor markets indicates that this equilibrium is rarely 
achieved in the real world. So we need to look for an improved theory that more 
adequately represents what happens in real labor markets.
 Becker himself already offers an important suggestion to refine the analysis. 
On the one hand, Becker (1993: 44) suggests an `ultimate step’ to his analysis 
of specific training in which firms would shift some costs of specific training as 
well as some returns from it to workers, in order to bring supply and demand 
for training more in line. On the other hand, Becker (1993: 91-94) acknowledges 
that the idea of individuals sufficiently investing in general education is more 
problematic in practice than in the core version of human capital theory presented 
above. First, there is considerable uncertainty regarding the returns from such 
investments (Becker, 1993: 91-92). There is uncertainty over the length of life 
(the older one gets, the higher the return from an investment can be); there is 
uncertainty over one’s abilities, particularly among younger people; and there is 
uncertainty over the returns because they depend on numerous events that are 
not predictable (e.g. future wage levels in different occupations). Second, there 
is the problem of financing human capital investments (Becker, 1993: 92-94). 
Financing human capital investments may prove more difficult than tangible capital 
investments, and appears to be so in practice. The traditional explanation for this 
is that human capital, contrary to intangible capital, cannot be offered as collateral 
for a loan. The more expensive the investment (e.g. a college education), the more 
affected it would be by this fact. Another implication is that, given the difficulties 
in acquiring capital from external sources, internal financing would be common, 
and consequently richer families would tend to invest more than poorer ones. 
Becker himself, however, doubts that this traditional explanation for the difficulty of 
financing human capital investments is the right one, because the same obstacles 
could apply to tangible capital investments, in particular for young people with an 
unproven track record as an entrepreneur. As most human capital investments 
are made by people who are younger than those investing in tangible capital, 
another reason to explain underinvestment in human capital has been that younger 
people will typically be less aware of their abilities and of attractive investment 
opportunities and will therefore be more likely to err in their investments. Becker, 
however, stresses the fact that human capital investments are more costly to 
postpone, because early investment means one can collect the return over more 
years (cf. Becker, 1993: 91). While postponing investments is generally a good way 
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to gather more additional knowledge about the return from the investment and 
possible alternatives for it, human capital investments would be made earlier and 
presumably with less knowledge than other investments (because of the cost of 
postponing) and would therefore be more likely to err.
 Becker (1993: 22) himself points out a possible solution for the financing 
problems with human capital provision: government loans. As governments are in 
fact active in promoting human capital investments by both individuals and firms, 
it seems necessary to include other, macro-level actors, and the rules that govern 
them as well as the rules that they set themselves, to understand and explain 
(firms’ and individuals’) training investments; and this is in fact one of the main 
themes in this book. We will continue this avenue later in this section. First, we will 
propose an alternative training concept to the bipolar pair of specific versus general 
training as developed by Becker.
2.3.4.2 The concept of transferable training
It is debatable whether labeling training as either (completely) general or (completely) 
specific is an adequate representation of most training that occurs in the real world. 
While this distinction is analytically helpful, as shown by the abundance of human 
capital theory that has developed in Becker’s wake, most training in reality will 
actually occupy a middle position between both extremes. Hardly any training is 
either equally relevant for all firms, or only relevant in one firm. To be sure: Becker 
(1993: 40) himself was aware of this, and proposed to analyze such training as 
a composition of two components: one completely general, the other completely 
specific (Becker, 1993: 44).
 Training that exclusively provides skills that are exclusively relevant for the 
training firm seems to be an exceptional case. Most skills workers acquire - even 
those they acquire through informal on-the-job learning rather than formal training 
- will usually be at least somewhat relevant in at least one other firm – such as 
the direct competitor of their current employer. Likewise, it seems just as hard 
to imagine on-the-job training that is purely general. Even if the explicit purpose 
of such training would in fact be to supply purely general skills, workers will very 
likely pick up some relevant but purely firm-specific skills –for instance, learn which 
of their colleagues they had best turn to for advice. When an experienced worker 
quits, an outside recruit with exactly the same general skills will still need some 
time to pick up these firm-specific skills, and thus will not instantaneously provide 
a full equivalent. How relevant such firm-specific skills are, will depend upon the 
specific nature of the job.
 Stevens (1994a; 1994b) reformulates the Becker model, transforming the 
dualism of general/specific training to a contrast between the extreme of completely 
general training, and a continuum of types of training distinguished by the extent 
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to which the training is transferable to other firms. She proposes the concept of 
transferable training as the basis for this continuum. Transferable training is defined 
as ‘training for skills which are of some value to other firms, but for which there is 
no presumption of perfect labor market competition’ (Stevens, 1994a: 408). Thus, 
the other extreme, completely specific training, corresponds to no competition 
(for this skill) in the labor market (Stevens, 1994a: 408), implying that training 
becomes transferable as soon as training is of some use to a least one firm besides 
the training firm (Stevens, 1994b: 540; 557). General training is training for which 
there is perfect competition in the labor market (Stevens, 1994a: 408), which 
requires that ‘the external market is very large’ (Stevens, 1994b: 557).
 With (completely) general training, it is usual to presuppose a perfectly 
competitive labor market – and according to Becker, individuals would themselves 
bear the costs of general training. With completely specific training, we have a 
situation of pure monopsony, as there is by definition no competition for a skill useful 
to only a single firm; and, as Becker has shown, firms would pay for such training. 
In both cases, (poaching) externalities would not arise. If we would follow Becker 
in analyzing training which is neither completely general nor completely specific as 
consisting of both a general and a specific component, we might again conclude that 
externalities would not arise (Stevens, 1994b: 539-540). Stevens’ reformulation of 
the Becker model, however, shows that the concept of transferable training leads to 
a different conclusion. With transferable training, we should explicitly consider the 
possibility that the labor market is not perfectly competitive. Stevens (1994a: 408) 
notes that ‘training may be regarded as a process which differentiates workers, and 
restricts the set of potential employers to those who require his skills’, and that 
therefore her ‘approach is a natural one’ (as compared to the Beckerian typology 
of two extremes). The consequence is that ‘there is a natural link between training 
and imperfect competition, in that the acquisition of skills, and skills requirements, 
differentiate workers and firms’ (Stevens, 1994b: 557). There are two ways to 
conceive of this. Either there is oligopsony (some but not perfect competition due 
to a limited number of competitors), and/or competitors have differentiated skills 
requirements, meaning that the skills of a particular worker will have a different 
value for each of them (Stevens, 1994b: 540). In addition, Stevens’ points to the 
fact that a lack of worker mobility (caused by high costs of moving house, and 
family attachments) will further restrict the effective level of competition: even if 
their skills themselves would be very general, the set of employers considered will 
usually be reduced to a particular region (Stevens, 1994b: 541). We will have more 
to say on imperfect competition in general and, specifically, the role of training in 
this, in the next section.
 For our purposes here, we need to explore the borders of the concept of 
transferable training a little further than Stevens (1994a, 1994b), who was 
specifically interested in on-the-job training, which is of value to a small number 
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of firms, and used the concept for this category. We argue that her concept is an 
appropriate analytical category to serve as the basis for an analysis of all VET. Key 
to her analysis is the limited competition for vocational skills; as (school-based) 
vocational education entails specialization just like on-the-job training does, the 
scope of the concept of transferable training can easily be expanded to cover all 
VET – rather than just on-the-job training. 
So we may indeed consider Stevens’ concept of transferable training as the 
ideal starting point for an analysis of all VET. In a nutshell, the advantage of the 
transferable training concept is that it focuses on the gray middle of training that 
contains general as well as specific elements, and thus provides the opportunity to 
base the analysis of the extreme poles (purely specific and purely general training) 
upon a single foundation. One clear advantage is that we now have one training 
concept that adequately corresponds with the scope of markets for intermediate 
skills (as outlined in section 2.3.3), and hence can cover the entire range of 
vocational education and training – not just on-the-job training. Second, while in 
the simplest and most extreme version of Becker’s analysis externalities (negative 
or positive effects for others that will be disregarded by purely self-interested 
actors) would not arise (cf. 2.3.4.1), the concept of transferable training makes 
externalities an apparent threat for all training, save the extreme case of training 
solely relevant for one individual firm. As long as a skill is transferable, both worker 
and training firm are uncertain about if and how long the worker will remain with 
the firm after training; and imperfect competition in the labor market may enable 
‘poaching’ firms to pay a wage less than the marginal product - thus capturing part 
of the total expected return to the training investment done by the other (training) 
firm. This means that joint return of training to the worker and training firm may 
be smaller than the social return (which includes the return to the poaching firm); 
in other words, there is an externality associated with transferable training, which 
may lead to underinvestment (Stevens, 1994b: 541). Stevens demonstrates that 
any source of imperfect competition leading to wages below marginal products, 
combined with any uncertainty about labor turnover, gives rise to this externality. 
It only disappears for training which is either perfectly general or perfectly specific 
(Stevens, 1994b: 542); but such cases are the exception, rather than the rule, as 
was the case in the original Becker model.
This way, Stevens’ analysis helps us to show one of the key elements in our previous 
definition of markets for intermediate skills (cf. section 2.3.3): costly transferable 
skills are the ones for which market failure is liable to be the most serious (Ryan, 
1994: 3). The decision to invest in transferable training has all characteristics of the 
classic prisoner’s dilemma (Finegold, 1991, also cf. section 2.2.6): while all firms 
would benefit from an adequate supply of transferable skills, for each of them it 
appears rational not to (substantially) invest in them themselves. This may lead to 
an underinvestment in more transferable skills (Finegold, 1991; Ryan, 1991), and 
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an overinvestment in more specific skills (Stevens, 1994b). The importance of this 
prisoner’s dilemma is one key reason why actor-centered institutionalism (which 
excels in analyzing this and similar types of problem constellations) will serve as an 
adequate backbone for our theoretical approach to markets for intermediate skills 
here.
2.3.5 Labor markets
The conceptual difference between Becker’s analysis and Stevens’ reformulation 
regarding training, as outlined in the previous section, stems from different labor 
market assumptions. Becker has become famous for his excellent analysis of two 
cases with radical assumptions (perfect competition and no competition). Stevens 
has been able to connect these two extremes into a continuum that can be analyzed 
by one training concept (transferable training) rather than two separate ones, by 
taking the intermediate (and more realistic) case of limited competition as the 
starting point for her analysis. It is worthwhile to explore the operation of the labor 
market from a skills perspective more extensively, because its conceptualization 
in this book does not use the strict assumptions of neoclassical economics in this 
respect, and because the departure from those assumptions is, in many ways, 
essential to the theme of the book and the type of analysis it receives.
2.3.5.1	 Qualifications
Labor market analysis, in general, has tended to focus on wage-setting processes, 
and the institutions that influence them. Wages are, however, only one side of the 
trade that takes place in labor markets. A labor market contract does not only 
specify the wage level, but also (more or less precise) the tasks the worker will be 
performing. Such contracts will only be concluded if the employer trusts the worker 
to either command the skills necessary to perform the job, or to be capable of 
acquiring them after a (preferably brief) initial period of learning (be it informally 
on-the-job, or through a formal on- or off-the-job training program). Obviously, 
there is a strong relation between job contents and the wage associated with it. 
There is also a strong relation between skills level and previous acquired educational 
credentials.
 The key concept here is that of ‘qualification’. In practice, the term qualification 
is used in many different ways: it may refer to characteristics of a person, to 
characteristics of a situation, or to the relation between a person and a situation. 
Hövels (1993) brings order to this potentially confusing concept by distinguishing 
available qualifications (skills the worker supplies), required qualifications (tasks 
the employer wants performed) and realized qualifications (the result of the 
interaction between both). With Hövels, we prefer to limit the use of the term 
44
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
qualification to this latter sense: it refers to the relation between a person and a 
situation, rather than merely to the person or the situation (Hövels, 1993: 25-26). 
Qualifications are the result of the interaction between supply (the skills a worker 
commands) and demand (the tasks a job - and, therefore, the employer - requires). 
Instead of ‘available qualifications’, we will use the term ‘skills’. The term does not 
merely imply abilities, but also knowledge and dispositions that enable workers 
to perform certain jobs (cf. Van Hoof & Dronkers, 1980)12. We will use the term 
‘job requirements’ instead of ‘required qualifications’. And we will reserve the term 
‘credentials’ to refer to diplomas from educational institutions – another purpose for 
which the term qualification is used in much of the literature.
 Qualifications are never fully defined. Labor market contracts are limited in their 
specification of tasks to be fulfilled. Their main function is to certify that a worker 
puts his labor potential at the disposal of his employer for a specified period of time 
(Hövels, 1993: 26). The contract does certainly imply a certain direction of the kind 
of tasks to be fulfilled by the worker (e.g. an employer cannot have a manager 
sweep floors routinely), but remains far from fully specifying the exact extent and 
nature of these tasks13. Particularly in larger firms, management may have created 
job descriptions that are much more specified than labor contracts, but even they 
will not fully define all actual day-to-day tasks. Workers (and their supervisors) have 
at least some room to maneuver. The other side to the incomplete specification of 
job requirements is that the exact extent and nature of a worker’s skills are never 
fully known - not to himself, let alone to his employer. These can only be discovered 
in the actual performance of a specific job, and even then only to some extent. 
Each labor process, no matter how fragmented, entails non-formalized and non-
formalized knowledge that influences job performance and work organization (so-
called tacit skills).
 
This leaves us with the following scheme, inspired by Hövels (1993: 34):
Figure 2.4: Qualifications
Source: Adapted from Hövels (1993: 34)
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The scheme may be applied at various levels: an individual worker/job, a firm, a 
sector, or a national labor market. If we use the single ‘qualification’, we have to 
realize that behind it lies a plurality of different skills/job requirements. In addition, 
such a plurality will have a specific structure with a sort of horizontal dimension 
(a list of separate skills that are relevant) as well as a sort of vertical dimension 
(skill X needs to be commanded top-notch, skill Y only at a basic level). A similar 
observation holds at other levels of aggregation. For a national labor market, for 
instance, a certain qualification might be identified as a particular occupation. The 
horizontal dimension then consists of various economic sectors to which different 
occupations belong, while the vertical dimension refers to a particular ‘level’. That 
level might either be identified as an educational level (ranging from no diploma to 
university graduate) or the place in the job hierarchy of a firm (from floor sweeper 
to CEO).
 Qualifications are dynamic rather than stable (Hövels, 1993: 27). Workers 
improve current skills and/or acquire new ones over time, while the actual job 
requirements (in practice, not necessarily those in the print of a labor contract or 
job description) will also change over time. The latter may be a result of conscious 
organizational choice, but can also be an outcome of the informal accommodation 
of the job requirements to the (increased) skills of the worker – and vice versa.
 Skills are acquired both through formal and informal learning processes. They can 
be acquired at school, on the job or even in other spheres of life14 (Hövels, 1993: 31). 
Formal learning is always intentional; informal learning may be intentional but can 
also occur unintentionally. It is important to realize that neither formal nor informal 
learning is confined to a particular organization. Obviously, schools concentrate on 
formal learning, but this does not imply that they do not simultaneously provide 
many occasions for (unintentional) informal learning, particularly where it comes to 
social and communication skills. Firms may send their workers to formal education 
and training programs; they may intentionally create circumstances for informal 
learning (e.g. assigning a supervisor to a new worker); and they cannot prevent 
unintentional informal learning (nor would they want to).
 A related theme is whether and how qualifications are certified. A curriculum 
vitae is in essence a form of written certification of one’s skills, but as it is drawn up 
by the worker himself, it is not entirely convincing evidence. Therefore, applicants 
usually have to include (the most relevant) diplomas (credentials) of education 
and training programs they have graduated from, as well as references to former 
employers. The former provide a more trustworthy written documentation of skills 
previously acquired, while the latter will lead to oral information on how those skills 
interacted with the job requirements of the applicant’s previous job(s) – as it is that 
interaction, rather than the skills themselves, that defines a worker’s performance. 
Just like learning processes, certification may therefore also be (more) formal or 
informal. The two are related; schools, for instance, are generally considered as 
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providing (predominantly) formal learning processes and formal certificates. But 
learning processes and certification may still vary in their level of formality. For 
instance, if a school diploma is based upon some national form of examination, 
the certificate received should be considered more formal (and more informative) 
than when each school develops its own school exams. And, often formal school 
diplomas cannot only be acquired through completion of the entire program, but 
also through more or less direct participation in a final exam or an assessment 
procedure. In these latter instances, informal and/or formal learning processes 
elsewhere are considered to have provided an adequate functional equivalent to 
(parts of) the school curriculum – provided the candidate succeeds in passing the 
final examination. We will explore this topic more extensively when we discuss skills 
standards systems.
2.3.5.2 A segmented market for a heterogeneous commodity
More fully incorporating the concept of qualification into labor market analysis has 
consequences for the perspective on such markets. Competition obviously is a 
crucial element of labor markets. Workers compete with each other for the same 
job; and employers compete with another to recruit the best workers. In macro-
level economic analyses, labor is sometimes treated as a homogenous commodity. 
Closer scrutiny, however, makes it worthwhile to take the heterogeneity of labor 
as a starting point. This was already noted by 19thcentury economists like J.E. 
Cairnes and J.S. Mill (Kerr, 1954; Wolfs, 1992). They pointed to he existence of 
non-competing groups in the labor market. An unskilled worker in Los Angeles, for 
instance, does not effectively compete with a manager in New York.
 There are two dimensions to this non-competitiveness. The first is qualification. 
As Cairnes (1874) put it:
 “What we find, in effect, is, not a whole population competing indiscriminately 
for all occupations, but a series of  industrial layers, superimposed on one 
another, within each of  which the various candidates for employment 
possess a real and effective power of  selection, while those occupying 
the several strata are, for all purposes of  effective competition, practically 
isolated from each other.”
Different employers offer different jobs; different jobs require different skills; and 
different workers differ in the mix of skills they command, as well as in the extent 
to which they command particular skills. Each worker has a specific history of 
education, training and informal learning. This experience will make him a qualified 
candidate for some jobs, but not for others. One reason for imperfect competition 
in labor markets is, therefore, the concept of qualification itself. On the one hand, 
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the existence of differentiated employers’ preferences limits competition: they want 
workers with a specific set of skills, and generally prefer applicants whose skills 
best match this set. On the other hand, the preferences of workers themselves will 
also work to limit competition. Their job preferences as young men and women 
will have led to them to (try and) acquire certain skills rather than others; and 
having acquired certain skills and not others, one will (other things being equal) be 
able to command a higher wage in jobs that require those skills than in those that 
require other skills. Obviously, other things are never equal in actual labor markets 
and wage differentials (amongst many other things) may stimulate job and career 
switches. However, from a market perspective, the number of new transactions 
(new labor contracts) in labor markets in any given period is substantially smaller 
than the number of previous transactions continuing: workers’ careers show a 
substantial level of stability in the jobs they subsequently hold. Most workers stay 
with a firm for a number of years; and even if they move on to another firm, they 
often end up in jobs more or less similar to their previous one(s).
 As a consequence, there effectively is not one homogeneous national labor 
market where everybody competes with everybody, but a heterogeneous labor 
market consisting of different labor market segments, whose incumbents will 
(in principle) compete with one another, but not (or rather, to a lesser extent) 
with others. Kerr (1954) even spoke of a ‘balkanization’ of labor markets. He lists 
five reasons for labor market segmentation: besides employers’ preferences and 
workers’ preferences, there are actions by the community of workers (unions), 
those by the community of employers (employers’ associations), and those of 
the government (Kerr, 1954: 96). He interprets the effects of the last three as 
‘institutional rules’, and the first two as ‘free choices’ of individual citizens. We will 
discuss such ‘institutional rules’ later in this chapter; for now, we will limit ourselves 
to non-institutional reasons for labor market segmentation.
 Besides qualifications, a second reason for imperfect labor market competition 
and labor market segmentation lies in the existence of regional barriers to 
competition. As with occupational boundaries, these may be crossed in some cases. 
But, again as a general rule, a Los Angeles waiter will look for a job in the Los 
Angeles metropolitan area and not in the New York area. And again, there is an 
economic rationale for this. While there may be a wage differential for waiters in 
both areas that make a New York waiter’s job a little more rewarding, there are 
also transaction costs involved in relocating from Los Angeles to New York. These 
may exceed the expected benefits from the wage increase. In addition, there will 
often be a social rationale (family & friends) that promotes a job search within 
a limited geographical area. Employers, on the other hand, will generally have 
similar reasons for a regionally limited search for workers. If there are numerous 
adequately qualified waiters available in New York, there is no point for them 
to advertise a job nationwide, as this will be substantially more expensive than 
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just advertising locally. And while they will generally prefer a very good waiter, 
they rarely want the single best in the country. They will have certain minimum 
qualifications requirements in terms of skills and credentials in mind. Provided that 
minimum is met, the employer will hire one of the applicants, and preferably the 
best one. Only in some labor market segments (e.g. top managers or professional 
sports athletes) do employers as a rule recruit nationwide or even globally, as they 
expect the economic returns to finding the single best candidate for such a job to 
be substantially larger than for a waiter job. But as a general rule, and certainly for 
the intermediate/subbaccalaureate level that concerns us in this book, ‘satisfying’ 
rather than ‘optimizing’ is the adequate description of employers’ recruitment 
strategies for most jobs.
 It is important to realize that both employers’ and workers’ preferences are not 
stable. Kerr (1954: 93) notes that they vary from person to person, and from time to 
time for the same person. An individual waiter from Los Angeles may indeed prefer 
an assembly line job in Los Angeles or a waiter’s job in Cleveland at a particular 
point in time; and he may limit his job search to Los Angeles restaurants today, but 
expand it to include San Francisco or even Seattle as his current unemployment 
continues. Hence, the aggregate result of such individual preferences is not a 
number of sharply demarcated and non-overlapping market segments. As Kerr 
(1954: 93) summarizes:
“Most labor markets are (….) indefinite in their specification of  the sellers 
and buyers. Such a labor market is merely an area, with indistinct geographical 
and occupational limits within which certain workers customarily seek to 
offer their services and certain employers to purchase them. But any single 
worker or any single employer may decide to go elsewhere. This might be 
identified as the ‘free choice’ market or the ‘natural market’, for which the 
individual and changing preferences of  workers and employers set the hazy 
limits.”
This way, we have pointed out the segmented and heterogeneous character of 
markets for intermediate skills. We have done this so far by stressing segmentation 
as a logical result of the free choices of individual workers and employers, and have 
not yet included institutional reasons for such segmentation. For both parties, skills 
requirements and skills supply importantly shape these choices, and narrow the 
range of viable options considerably. Vocational education and training therefore, 
by its very nature, works to limit labor market competition below the neoclassical 
theoretical optimum. And neither legislation nor other regulations are responsible 
for this: it is simply the specialization that is the collective results of individual 
workers’ and firms’ preferences. In addition, we have pointed out that regional 
barriers add to this segmentation process. These interact with skills requirements 
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and skills demand; as a general rule, the scarcer particular skills are, the more 
expansive the geographical area in which employers will actively look for applicants, 
and workers for jobs.
2.3.5.3 Uncertainty and information
The other important element in modeling the labor market in general and markets 
for intermediate skill in particular is the concept of uncertainty. Even without other 
employers explicitly looking to poach the workers you trained, human capital is 
different from physical capital in that it has feet and may subsequently walk (as 
already noted by Becker, cf. section 2.3.4.1). Worker mobility therefore has a 
paradoxical relation with training, which is particularly intriguing given the fact 
that both mobility (or, more broadly speaking, flexibility) and training serve as 
separate contemporary slogans for labor market reform (cf. Van Lieshout & Van 
Liempt, 2000). On the one hand, more transferable training is generally thought to 
stimulate both mobility and flexibility, because it stimulates worker employability 
in more jobs and with more employers. The more transferable the training, the 
stronger this effect will be. On the other hand, however, the more transferable 
workers’ skills are, the greater the chance that they will leave one employer for 
another one. Since Becker, we have known that the more transferable the training, 
the less likely employers will be to invest in it. In sum: flexibility/mobility may have 
a negative effect on the level of training investments, at least by employers.
 The point we want to stress here is the basic uncertainty that this implies for 
both employers and workers. As employers do not know if and when a particular 
worker will leave, they may be inclined to limit their training investments because 
of it. But uncertainty does not only apply to employers’ training choices, but also to 
the recruitment of outsiders. Katz & Ziderman (1990) elaborated on the vital role of 
information in labor markets. The problem is that, when considering applicants, the 
full extent of their skills is by definition unknown - by an employer, but even by the 
worker himself (cf. section 2.3.5.1). Katz & Ziderman (1990) distinguish between 
the ‘net present value’ of training and an ‘options value’. The first relates to the 
skills needed for the adequate performance of the current job; the latter relates 
to skills not immediately needed for the current job right now, but which might 
be relevant for the employer in the future. Katz & Ziderman’s ‘options value’ is in 
fact the perfect mirror image of the notion of ‘functional flexibility’ that Atkinson 
(1985) put forward in his typology of the types of flexibility employers want: the 
extent to which workers can be employed in different jobs and for different tasks. 
This is an important step forward, as this concept of an options value captures the 
essence of how and why more general training is considered of more importance 
in times when future skills demands - even within specific labor market segments 
- are more uncertain than ever. Katz & Ziderman (1990: 1148) mention various 
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components of this options value to employers. For instance, previous transferable15 
training may be used as a basis for advanced training; it may enable employers to 
employ a worker for other tasks; and it may enhance a worker’s ability to deal with 
certain types of new technologies. Katz & Ziderman point out that it is already very 
difficult for employers to judge the net present value of applicants that have had 
transferable training, in particular as there are of course all sorts of such training, 
and employers need a recruit with exactly the type of training for their specific 
job opening at hand. In addition, work-based training is often offered in a non-
standardized and/or informal form. It is, however, even more difficult to judge the 
options value: this will only show itself - even to the worker - when he is given other 
jobs, so that his performance in them can be judged. Katz & Ziderman also point 
out why this uncertainty is crucial: placing a worker without the (proper) training 
in a position that requires such training may be directly wasteful and destructive, 
all the more so because one worker’s inadequate performance may hamper that of 
others.
 On the other hand, workers face uncertainty as well. If they invest in transferable 
training of their own accord, recouping the investment is contingent upon finding 
subsequent suitable employment, and the risk is always there that they will not 
be able to find such employment. In section 2.3.4.1, we have already discussed 
possible limitations of external financing for human capital investments, as well as 
Becker’s analysis that pointed out that human capital investments would be made 
earlier and presumably with less knowledge than other investments. To the extent 
that workers find a firm offering a job connected with training, this uncertainty can 
be reduced; the more so, if they come with labor contracts for a considerable period 
of time, and/or including training rights.
 If uncertainty is an important consideration regarding training investments, its 
logical consequence is that information is an important aspect to be considered 
as well. We have already noted the relevancy of information for employers; for 
individuals, trustworthy information may reduce uncertainty and thus stimulate 
their training investments. Two kinds of information seem relevant here for workers: 
information on wages for various jobs and information on the kinds of training needed 
to successfully apply for such jobs. For employers, reliable information on the skills 
workers actually command is important. And, apart from trustworthy information, 
we have touched upon the possibility of (labor and/or training) contracts specifying 
rights and obligations of both employer and worker regarding training investments 
and (future) employment.
2.3.5.4 Labor contracts between markets and hierarchies 
So far we have discussed the free choices of employers and workers as a non-
institutional reason for labor market segmentation, and mobility/uncertainty as 
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possible roadblocks to training investments. We have arrived at a basic institutional 
solution to reduce such uncertainty: contracts. North (1981) has shown that the 
basic institution that constitutes markets is the institution of the contract, which 
attributes property rights to specific actors. Markets can only function if it is clear who 
has the ownership of a particular good or service. The state ultimately guarantees 
the fulfillment of these contracts by its monopoly on the use of legitimate force.
 But labor contracts differ from spot-market contracts for goods such as lemons, 
in that they do not entail an instantaneous permanent shift of ownership. Labor 
contracts regulate a different kind of exchange, in which workers will make their 
labor available to a particular employer for a period of time, in exchange for a wage 
and other benefits. A minimum contract version is that of an on-call worker or of a 
worker employed through a temporary employment agency, in which the transaction 
is limited to the availability of work, and the relation between worker and firm will 
typically be short-lived. Most contracts, however, offer the worker employment for a 
limited or even an unlimited period. While such contracts can be ended prematurely 
by both parties, restrictions usually apply, such as a minimum period of notification, 
external review (by courts or other parties) of the legitimacy of a dismissal, and/
or severance packages. These conditions vary, primarily in relation to national 
labor legislation, a topic we will discuss later in this chapter. Also, labor contracts 
are usually less specified than other contracts, in the sense that they consciously 
leave some room to maneuver as to the exact tasks to be fulfilled by the worker 
(cf. section 2.3.5.1). Instead of documenting an instantaneous transaction, the 
conclusion of a labor contract implies the start of a cooperative effort for a period 
of time.
 While we often speak of the labor market, the majority of that market consists 
of firms: one employer is simultaneously engaged in labor contracts with several 
workers. The relevancy of the firm for economic analyses was already stressed 
early last century (Coase, 1937). Besides occupational specialization and regional 
segmentation (cf. section 2.3.5.2), the mere existence of firms limits - or, rather, 
changes - the operation of the market mechanism for labor. Perfectly competitive 
markets require open access to new entrants, on the supply as well as on the 
demand side. But at any given point in time, the majority of all jobs are not open 
to new entrants. As Kerr (1954: 101) put it:
 “Not all jobs are open to all bidders except in the structure-less market. 
Even in the absence of  institutional rules, most employers consider a job 
not open for bid so long as the incumbent fills it satisfactorily; and employers 
generally prefer to promote from within to canvassing the outside market.”
Williamson (1975; 1985) has built his transaction cost economics upon this insight, 
and elaborated the distinction between markets and hierarchies (firms) as forms 
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of economic coordination (Williamson, 1975; 1985). Transaction cost theory in fact 
offers an economic explanation for the existence of firms by introducing transaction 
costs into the analysis. To satisfactorily engage in market transactions calls for 
extensive monitoring of the appeal of the offers of various suppliers, and of the 
satisfactory fulfillment of concluded contracts. When such costs are high, it may 
be more efficient to provide the products or services in-house, under one’s own 
(hierarchical) authority. Hence, transaction cost economics introduces hierarchies 
(firms) as an alternative governance mechanism for economic activity to markets – 
rather than exclusively seeing firms as actors in an external market.
 In terms of actor-centered institutionalism, firms are a clear example of a 
composite actor (cf. section 2.2.5). On one level, the firm has certain resources that 
it employs in strategic action vis-à-vis other, external actors. But on another level, 
that same composite actor is an institutional structure (or governance mechanism) 
that coordinates activity of several individual actors within their ranks. In labor 
market theory, this is reflected in the distinction between external and internal 
labor markets. While firms routinely do recruit workers in the external labor market, 
they also tend to operate internal labor markets (cf. Doeringer & Piore, 1971). At 
any point in time, only a limited number of jobs within a firm are in fact open to 
outsiders. First of all, most jobs are currently not vacant. And even in a relatively 
competitive labor market, employers are not consistently looking for a better (or 
cheaper) worker to replace an incumbent worker in a given job - let alone for all jobs 
at the same time. External recruiting activity is primarily triggered by the occurrence 
of vacancies. These arise because of an expansion of production or because of the 
(in)voluntary departure of an incumbent worker from that job. Second, even when 
a vacancy arises, the employer may first look to promote another incumbent worker 
to this vacancy - which implies that the job is still not open to outsiders. This will not 
always or necessarily be the case; there may be specific reasons why an employer 
does prefer to hire an outsider. A lack of adequate candidates for the job within 
the firm is one, the wish to influence the firm’s culture by bringing in an outsider 
another.
 Assuming stable employment, one person’s departure will indeed open up a job 
sometime somewhere for an outsider. This job opening, however, is not necessarily 
the same as the job that was vacated. Obviously, few if any jobs exist that will always 
by definition be fulfilled by an internal candidate (or, alternatively, an external one). 
This will depend upon the situation at the time. But even if each job is at least once 
in a while fulfilled by an outsider, there may be structural patterns in the chances 
of that job being fulfilled by an outsider or an insider as compared to others. Some 
jobs are more (often) open to outsiders than others. Entry jobs - ‘ports of entry’, 
according to Kerr (1954) - serve as the connection between internal and external 
labor markets. Given the expected substantial tenure and upward mobility for many 
workers on internal labor markets (and given the impossibility of internal upward 
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mobility to the lowest rung), a disproportionate share of these ports of entry tends 
to lie at the lower rungs of firms’ job ladders.
 Wolfs (1992) discusses six theoretical approaches to internal labor markets16. 
The radical approach (cf. Reich, Gordon & Edwards, 1973) interprets internal labor 
markets as an instrument for management to gain control over their workforce. 
Control would increasingly be institutionalized in hierarchical power, work criteria, 
rules and procedures as a conscious divide-and-rule strategy to divide a potentially 
homogeneous labor force in separate groups and treating each of them a little 
differently (Wolfs, 1992: 21-23). We have already discussed the main lines of 
transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975; 1985) above. It suggests that internal 
labor markets can be more efficient in a situation of imperfect information or firm-
specific skills investment. Labor can be hired without exactly specifying all tasks to 
be performed. Instead, a worker is assigned to a job, which is related to a particular 
wage. This implies lower transaction costs in wage bargaining, motivates workers 
by offering internal promotion opportunities, and allows investment in specific skills 
without the risk of exploitation by the other party (cf. Wolfs, 1992: 26). Implicit 
contract theory (cf. Azariadis, 1975) stipulates that workers and employers agree on 
a mutually advantageous unwritten long-term contract. Because they are uncertain 
over future conditions, both are inclined to limit their risk by preferring contracts 
with fixed, situation-invariant wages (Wolfs, 1992: 28-31). Efficiency wage theory 
(cf. Akerlof, 1984) points to information problems stemming from the fact that 
individual productivity cannot be perfectly measured. Therefore, employers are 
inclined to pay higher wages to attract better workers (adverse selection), to prevent 
shirking, to reduce turnover and the associated costs, to boost worker morale, or 
to prevent unions from entering the firm (Wolfs, 1992: 32-33). Insider-outsider 
theory (cf. Lindbeck & Snower, 1988) stresses labor turnover costs, instead of effort 
and productivity. It distinguishes three kinds of turnover costs: 1) costs of hiring, 
training and firing; 2) costs of co-operation between workers and harassment of 
new workers; 3) costs of effort responses to changes in job security. For this reason 
it is unprofitable for a firm to replace insiders by outsiders.
 The sixth theoretical approach to internal labor markets that Wolfs (1992: 26-
28) discusses is of particular interest, as it puts skills and training at the heart 
of the explanation of internal labor markets: human capital theory (Oi, 1962; 
Becker, 1993). The assumption is that the total expenditure (investments) of both 
parties equals total revenue not at each point in time, but over the time span of 
the employment relation. Specific training increases the productivity (and, thus, 
according to standard economic theory, the wage) a worker can earn with his 
current firm, but not with other firms. This gives them a reason to share both the 
firm-specific training costs as well as the gains of extra productivity stemming from 
it in later years, and gives both an advantage in long-term employment relations 
(Oi, 1962). The basic reason for this is that specific skills are a ‘sunken’ investment. 
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Oi (1962) therefore has labeled labor a quasi-fixed factor: past investments in 
firm-specific skills creates an incentive to maintain an employment relation. If one 
worker departs, the firm will have to make a similar but new investment in his 
successor. And the worker will have to make a new investment in the firm-specific 
skills of his new employer.
Similar insights stem from Thurow’s job competition model (Thurow, 1975). 
In this model, productivity depends on the job, wages are coupled to jobs, and 
workers compete for jobs – instead of for wages, as in wage competition models. 
Markets clear in the short run through adjustments in labor demand and supply, not 
through wage fluctuations. At the firm level, wages are coupled to jobs and thus 
sticky. Thus, hiring standards rather than wages are adjusted to clear markets. 
Employers would rank all applicants according to expected training costs, and 
hire those with the lowest costs. New recruits subsequently receive training from 
incumbent workers. Seniority rules protect the latter from outside competition. The 
result of this is internal labor markets with limited ports of entry.
 These theories are to some extent overlapping, and to some extent complementary. 
Wolfs (1992: 16) concludes that there is much agreement on the broad description 
of internal labor markets, but that the descriptions used are vague and general, 
and that there is no clear-cut definition or framework which adequately reflects the 
internal labor market.
 For our purposes, the following four aspects of internal labor markets are 
important. Following Kerr (1954), the first thing is the restricted nature of access 
to many jobs where incumbents are generally preferred over all competitors, and 
(for vacancies) insiders are generally preferred over outsiders. The second is the 
existence of long-lasting ties between firms and many of their workers. The third 
is the existence of some sort of internal promotion mechanism for workers. This 
may be in the form of formal promotion to a different (often, higher) job, but also 
informal, when workers remain within the same job for years but receive wage 
increases along the way, as a result of their growing seniority (cf. Wolfs, 1992: 
18-19). Two types of promotion mechanisms can be distinguished (Hondeghem, 
1990; Van Veen, 1997). With ‘rank-in-the-man’ systems, allocation is triggered by 
individual characteristics of the employee, whereas with ‘rank-in-the-job’ systems, 
it is triggered by an arising vacancy along the lines discussed above. The fourth 
and last is the existence of some form of ‘bureaucracy’ to govern the internal labor 
market: formal, but possibly also informal rules and procedures that govern access 
to the firm and specific jobs within it, the related (direct and indirect) benefits, and 
workers’ (opportunities for) career advancement.
 These four things go a long way in distinguishing internal from external labor 
markets. The distinction between internal and external labor markets is important, 
as different rules and mechanisms apply to both, and as they relate to two different 
dominant governance mechanisms (hierarchies and markets, respectively). The 
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market mechanism dominates external labor markets, albeit within the context of 
national labor legislation. Internal labor markets are, in addition, governed by rules 
and procedures set by the corporate hierarchy (firm), that effectively limit the ‘free’ 
operation of market mechanisms within the firm. As Osterman (1994: 303) puts 
it:
“It is by now apparent to even the most market oriented economist that 
many of  the rules that determine economic outcome and social welfare 
originate within the firm and are in a nontrivial sense chosen by the firm. 
Because many workers spend long stretches of  their career within the shelter 
of  enterprises, understanding these rules is very important.” 
Incorporating the relevancy of firms’ governance of their own internal labor markets 
also helps us to broaden our perspective on their options regarding qualification 
and training issues. Much analysis focuses on two alternative options for firms: 
train or hire. The first implies training your own workers, the second hiring already 
qualified workers on the external labor market. In the short run, these are indeed 
the two most relevant options. But in the intermediate run, there is an intriguing 
third. For the first two options simply assume that a firm’s labor demand is given, 
and show two main directions to fill that demand once vacancies arise. However, 
in the intermediate run, labor demand is not given, but can be influenced by firms 
in changing job descriptions and job ladders. Internal labor market governance is 
not just limited to allocating incumbent workers and outside recruits to a ‘given’ 
job ladder; the definition of such job ladders itself is another key element of firms’ 
governance of their own internal labor market. So in our analysis in this book, we 
will follow Hövels (1993: 35) in distinguishing three main options for firms in their 
qualification policies:
•	 reallocating workers (incumbent workers and external workers) to  jobs;
•	 training workers;
•	 restructuring work organization.
2.3.6 Two markets and their relations
Having discussed important aspects of both education and labor markets, we 
move on to discuss the relations between both markets. We will first discuss the 
concept of the school-to-work transition (2.3.6.1). Subsequently we will turn to 
institutional differentiation within both markets, and the possibility of mismatches 
between education and labor (2.3.6.2). And we will conclude by discussing various 
institutional configurations that can strengthen the relation between education and 
labor (2.3.6.3)
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2.3.6.1 The school-to-work transition
Over the course of their lives, young individuals will first participate in educational 
systems. This participation is obligatory in each modern society, because education 
participation is thought to be a necessary preparation for citizenship in our societies. 
One of the various more specific goals education systems should serve in this 
respect, is to lay a foundation for a productive labor market career. At some point 
in time, young adults will leave the education system and start their participation in 
the labor force. This transition is mostly referred to in the literature as the school-
to-work transition; transitional labor market theory (Schmid, 2000; Schömann & 
O’Connell, 2002) labels this the education-to-employment transition. The societal 
goal would be to ensure that young adults enjoy a smooth transition from education 
to employment. The ‘natural’ linear transition would be from primary into general 
secondary education, to continue in higher education (university or polytechnic) 
or alternatively in upper secondary vocational education, to finish training for an 
occupation/a profession there, find subsequent suitable employment within the 
occupation/profession of choice, and enjoy a productive career there, in combination 
with occasional further training, up until a well-deserved retirement.
 In practice, however, this education-to-employment transition is not always easy, 
as is evidenced by the fact that in most OECD countries, youth unemployment tends 
to be substantially higher than overall unemployment, in general, and even more 
so in times of economic recession, when slumping labor demand leaves few job 
openings for the new generation of labor market entrants. And, such unemployment 
is regularly not just a one time problem when leaving the education system, but for 
certain groups (and, in some countries more than others, cf. section 2.3.7) can be 
a recurring problem over the first years of their labor market career. Instead of a 
linear transition, many young adults experience what have come to be called ‘yo-yo’ 
transitions (Pais, 1996; Peters & du Bois-Reymond, 1996). The transition process 
from education on to the labor market, instead of a logical linear progression, 
may often be fragmented and reversible, with relatively short spells of education/
training, jobs, and unemployment alternating one another in no particular order.
 In order to understand how problems may emerge regarding the education-to-
employment transition, we have to understand the institutional differentiation both 
within and between education and labor markets, and the various discrepancies 
that may arise as a consequence.
2.3.6.2 Institutional differentiation and discrepancies between   
  education and labor
Institutional differentiation between and within education and labor markets
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In history, education and labor have gradually developed into separate societal 
(sub)systems/markets, and this is the core source of structural tensions between 
both. Hövels (1993: 10-11) distinguishes three particular sources of tension. 
 First, both education and labor markets have evolved as different subsystems 
with their own goals and own dynamics over time, which is a technical source for 
structural tensions between education and labor (Hövels, 1993: 10-11). Education 
systems have, over the last few centuries, evolved from voluntary ‘primary’ schools 
for children into a large system with different levels and types of schools, each 
of these types usually entailing a further differentiation within their ranks, and 
intending to cater for very young children up to and including young adults in 
their twenties, as well as specific adult education offerings; also, these systems 
have become quite autonomous in their operation, and their current structure co-
determines their subsequent evolution (cf. Archer, 1979; 1982; De Swaan, 1988). 
The labor market is also highly differentiated (cf. section 2.3.5), and is subject to 
constant changes as a result of technological (and other) developments that change 
the nature and specific requirements of jobs. The institutionalization of each market 
following a logic and pattern of its own, both will seldom offer a perfect match – and 
if they actually did, it would be a matter of pure chance.
 Second, education systems serve more goals than just delivering adequately 
skilled workers for the labor market. Hövels (1993: 11) distinguishes three separate 
goals that compete in the development of VET: preparation for work, social and 
cultural socialization, and personal development. The same goals, however, both co-
exist and compete in the institutionalization of entire education systems (cf. Bakker, 
2001 on the case of the Netherlands), which is a political source for tensions between 
education and labor. Different positions on the necessity and role of specialized 
VET tracks as an alternative to general education tracks, for instance, generally 
stem from different views on the relative importance of these goals. Obviously, 
the differentiation in education systems between general/academic and vocational 
subsystems is important for our comparison, and labor market preparation is 
relatively more important for the latter than for the former. Still, it is worthwhile 
to note that the difference between both is not as absolute as it may seem. At the 
level of secondary education, the difference is most noticeable. (Upper) Secondary 
VET tracks are shaped predominantly in a way that should facilitate subsequent 
transition into a specific labor market segment; but they often simultaneously offer 
the alternative of further education and training within the education system. General 
secondary education tracks, on the other hand, are primarily shaped to facilitate 
transition in other (upper secondary or tertiary) education; and internally, general 
tracks tend to be organized according to an academic (rather than a vocational) 
logic. In practice, however, there are always general education students that opt for 
employment over further education, and at least some career orientation tends to 
be part of general education tracks.
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 However, it is important that VET not only differs from (upper secondary) 
general education, but simultaneously also from purely job-specific training, which 
is much more narrowly focused on the skills requirements of one specific job. 
VET, on the contrary, has a broader focus, namely on a particular range of related 
jobs17. And, the other goals besides labor market preparation (social and cultural 
socialization, and personal development) are never completely absent from VET. 
Generally, both courses in general academic topics (e.g. mathematics) as well 
as a course preparing for social citizenship, tend to be included in them. At the 
tertiary level, the difference is less marked. To begin with, European countries such 
as the Netherlands and Germany also have specialized VET tracks at the tertiary 
level (hoger beroepsonderwijs (hbo) and Fachhochschulen, respectively). But, 
more importantly, even academic tracks will generally prepare their students for 
particular labor market segments (cf. Van Lieshout, 1995). It is hard to see how and 
why university law schools, for instance, would be less targeted to a very specific 
labor market segment than a carpentry track at the upper secondary level.
 To sum this point up: while these different goals compete, they also continuously 
co-exist, in the architecture of the overall education system as well as within each 
of its segments. Not just in the minds of educational administrators, but also in 
the opinions of firms and their interest associations, and most importantly in the 
minds of the young people going through these tracks. While preparation for work 
is certainly not always the most dominant motive for the latter’s participation and 
choices, it is one of their concerns, and the motive will generally become stronger 
in the latter phases of their educational career. The tensions between these goals in 
shaping the education system, as well as the individual choices made within their 
context, are a second source of tension between education and labor market.
 A third and last source of tension between education and labor is the hierarchical 
structure of both education and labor, which is a distributive source of tension between 
education and labor (Hövels, 1993: 13-14). At this point, it is important to further 
differentiate the specific goal of labor market preparation. Fend (1974) has noted 
that education does not solely qualify people for work; it also (pre-)selects them 
for particular labor market segments, and to some extent legitimizes the resulting 
distribution of people over (in terms of status) differently valued jobs associated 
with different wages. To some extent, the differentiation of education in various 
hierarchically arranged levels reflects the differentiation of work in various hierarchical 
levels, which range from entry-level shop floor jobs to CEOs. The higher jobs are 
generally better rewarded, because they are considered to be more demanding – in 
terms of responsibility and/or skills requirements. Or, as economists would prefer, 
the required skills for such jobs are scarcer than for other jobs. Either way, the fact 
that their occupants tend to have higher educational credentials (which are scarcer to 
come by) lends credibility to higher wages accompanying the better jobs. Screenings- 
and credential theories (cf. Spence, 1973; Collins, 1979) have in fact emphasized the 
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selective function of education over the qualifying function18. Either way, the point 
here is that both education and labor are hierarchically structured. The numbers of 
students graduating at the various levels of the education system, however, will not 
necessarily exactly match the labor market demand at each corresponding level.
Discrepancies between education and labor
The vertical differentiation of labor is, however, not the only source for distributive 
problems; the horizontal differentiation of both labor and education in terms of 
occupational specialization is another: the number of graduating nurses may be 
higher than the labor demand for them, while the number of graduating engineers 
might fall short of the demand. We will therefore take a closer look at the distributive 
source of tensions between labor and education in this section, and possible 
discrepancies between education and labor it may result in.
 Discrepancies between education and labor will always show up as discrepancies 
in the labor market (unemployment or vacancies), but not all labor market 
discrepancies are caused by a mismatch with the education system. De Grip (1987: 
10-15) gives an overview of all possible labor market discrepancies from economic 
theory. Quantitative discrepancies arise if labor supply is higher or lower than labor 
demand at the macro level. Of course, supply and demand will hardly equal one 
another exactly, which is why economic theory allows for friction unemployment in 
a narrow sense: short-term unemployment that may arise if people switch jobs. 
A certain minimum of such friction unemployment is deemed unavoidable for an 
adequately functioning labor market, as job switching is necessary and may take 
some time. Qualitative discrepancies arise because of the heterogeneity of both 
workers and jobs – with both the vertical and horizontal differentiation between 
them as causes of heterogeneity. This heterogeneity may result in the simultaneous 
co-existence of unemployment for certain types of workers/jobs, and open vacancies 
for other types of workers/jobs; unemployed nurses cannot (immediately) fill 
engineer vacancies.
 Following De Grip, there are different types of qualitative discrepancies. 
Geographical discrepancies exist if one region has unemployed workers of a 
particular type, while another region has a shortage of them. Search discrepancies, 
as De Grip calls them, are in fact an extension of the aforementioned friction 
unemployment in a narrow sense. The idea is that certain institutional factors such 
as high unemployment benefits might cause friction unemployment to lie above the 
aforementioned minimum that is deemed necessary for an adequate operation of the 
labor market. Distinguishing friction unemployment in a narrow sense from search 
discrepancies is at best a highly theoretical matter, and at the worst a political-
normative one. Only the third category of qualitative discrepancies deals explicitly 
with education, training and skills: training and experience discrepancies.
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 Training and experience discrepancies can be of both a horizontal and of a vertical 
nature. Horizontal discrepancies deal with differences in the occupational/educational 
specialization of open jobs and unemployed workers; vertical discrepancies with the 
educational level/job rank that supply and demand represent. De Grip distinguishes 
three types of vertical training and experience discrepancies. First, vertical 
discrepancies may arise primarily because of the distribution of graduates and jobs 
over general school levels/types (e.g. an oversupply of lower secondary education 
graduates versus a shortage of upper secondary VET graduates). Second, vertical 
discrepancies may arise primarily because of such distribution problems within a 
certain occupational group: there may be enough bank clerks, but a shortage of 
loan approval officers. Third, vertical discrepancies may arise at an even more 
detailed level, as experience discrepancies: for example, enough carpenters, but 
none of them experienced enough to act as foreman at the construction site. In 
practice, vertical occupational training discrepancies and experience discrepancies 
will usually be strongly related.
 One interesting debate regarding vertical discrepancies is the debate on potential 
over-education of young people. The debate centers on vertical discrepancies regarding 
general school levels and it is of interest because the thesis would seem to contradict 
the prevailing argument of skills shortages and the need for (lifelong) training. In 
the seventies, such a debate took place in the U.S. (cf. Freeman, 1976), where it 
since then has given way to a debate about skills shortages and the ‘missing middle’ 
in the American labor market. A similar debate, however, still props up with regular 
intervals in other countries. Among countries included in this study, the Netherlands 
is the prime example19. There, a recurring over-education debate has been triggered 
by reports from a research group that compares change over time in job demand at 
a number of hierarchical job levels to changes in the number of graduates from the 
education system at various levels. Such a comparison indicates that educational 
participation and, hence, the skills level of the workforce, has been growing more 
rapidly than changes in the job structure in the labor market would seem to warrant 
(cf. Conen et al., 1980; 1983; Huijgen et al., 1983; 1998; Huijgen, 1989; Asselberghs 
et al., 1998; Batenburg et al., 2003). In other words, younger generations might 
generally be overeducated. The latter inference has met with substantial criticism 
(cf. Wielers & Glebbeek, 1990; 1995; Groot, 1998). One important counterargument 
is that measuring shifts in labor demand over different job rungs and comparing 
them to shifts in initial education levels fails to measure the increased skills demands 
of jobs within such job rungs. For one, the educational shift indicator is limited to 
formal initial education levels, and excludes participation in further training. More 
importantly, even if formal skills demands for such jobs have not risen, this does not 
preclude a better initial skills acquisition from paying dividends (in terms of higher 
productivity) even if formal job qualifications had remained stable. There is evidence 
that productivity may be higher if a job is dome by a better-educated person (Van der 
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Meer & Glebbeek, 2002: Hartog, 2000: Groot & Maassen van den Brink, 2000). Third, 
both general education and VET mean to provide a basis for a productive career, 
rather than just a first job. While a frontline worker today may formally be working 
on the same job rung as his ancestor in the sixties, one can hardly argue that the 
skills demands for the job have not risen substantially in comparison. The hypothesis 
that overeducation may be concentrated among young people, who will subsequently 
move on towards jobs matching their education level, is known as the ‘waiting room 
hypothesis’ (De Grip et al, 1990), and has been confirmed by empirical research 
(Dekker et al., 1995; Groot & Maassen van den Brink, 1996; Groeneveld & van 
Kooten, 2001). However, there is still some value in the over-education argument as 
it pertains to the job rungs. Educational participation has indeed risen so rapidly over 
the last few decades, in particular at the higher levels, that those education levels do 
not to the same extent guarantee an elite job the way they used to. Employers can 
respond to this increased skills supply with changes in work organization that make 
full use of this potential; but alternatively they may and do respond to it by increasing 
skills (credentials) demand for jobs at the lower rungs. Given employers’ preferences 
for (ceteris paribus) higher credentials, many young people prefer to pursue higher 
credentials (at least until suitable employment opportunities open up) and stay out 
of the labor force, rather than be perceived by employers as someone working in a 
low-skilled job (Crouch et al., 1999: 230). 
 One source of confusion in discussing discrepancies is that sociologists have 
tended to label all the aforementioned types of training and experience discrepancies 
as quantitative rather than qualitative (cf. Van Hoof & Dronkers, 1980). They have 
reserved the term ‘qualitative discrepancies’ for differences between workers’ 
capacities and the requirements for an adequate fulfillment of their current job. To 
avoid confusion, De Grip (1987) proposes to label the horizontal and vertical training 
and experience discrepancies he distinguishes as open discrepancies, as they show 
up as either unemployment or unfilled vacancies in the labor market. Discrepancies 
between a worker’s capabilities and the requirements of his current job could then be 
labeled hidden discrepancies.
 It is nevertheless helpful to look at another typology of potential problems than 
that put forward by De Grip, as it points out various relevant but different perceptions 
of such problems by different actors. Van Hoof (1987: 108-112) and Hövels (1993: 
15-17) distinguish five types of skills mismatches:
•	 absorption problems: there is a mismatch between the total number of job openings 
and the number of school-leavers, resulting in (long-term) unemployment;
•	 personnel supply problems: employers have problems in filling vacancies: they 
cannot find an adequate candidate - implying that the problem has a quantitative 
nature;
•	 qualification problems: employers can fill vacancies, but the workers concerned do 
not command all qualifications required - implying that a quantitative problem is 
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avoided, but in a way that creates qualitative problems;
•	 distribution problems: the chances of a job matching their skills are unequally 
divided across various groups of workers: they differ for groups with different 
educational credentials;
•	 utilization problems: their jobs do not allow workers to maximize the potential 
they have to offer based on their education, training and prior experience.
The relevancy of this typology lies, first, in the fact that it shows that matching 
problems occur at different levels. Absorption, personnel supply and distribution 
problems show themselves primarily in the labor market, by means of unfilled 
vacancies and/or (long-term) unemployment. Qualification and utilization problems 
primarily show themselves within firms and specific departments and jobs within 
them. Second, the typology shows that there are various sides to such problems. 
With personnel supply and qualification problem, the (dominant) perspective is that 
of the employer; with distribution and utilization problems, the dominant perspective 
is that of the worker; and with absorption problems, the dominant perspective is 
that of the state. Third, and as a logical result, the different types in this typology 
are not mutually exclusive. They overlap, for instance, where an imperfect match 
between a worker’s skills and his job requirements may be interpreted both as a 
qualification and a utilization problem. And they are - at best - only separated by 
a very thin line, when we distinguish personnel supply problems from qualification 
problems. An employer that cannot find an adequate candidate to fulfill a particular 
vacancy may do two things: he may hire a less qualified candidate, or he can leave 
the vacancy open for the time being. For the employer, the problem is one and the 
same; but depending on his choice of action, the problem will end up showing itself 
as either a qualification problem or a personnel supply problem.
 An overview of (skills-related) labor market discrepancies should include 
an important caveat. While avoiding labor market discrepancies is obviously a 
worthwhile cause, it is unrealistic to expect a world in which they are completely 
absent. To begin with, education serves more goals than training for employment; 
and important segments of the education system (general and academic education, 
for instance) do not have labor market preparation as their official top priority. 
Even VET systems are often not expected to offer perfect training for the student’s 
first job; rather, the goal is to prepare them for a successful career (a topic we will 
discuss more extensively in section 2.3.6.3). More importantly, to the extent that 
each job will have some firm-specific skills requirements, some amount of on-the-
job training will always be required for VET graduates, even if their first job actually 
fits their specialization.
 Furthermore, the evolution of time is important. Education and training take 
time. A student may choose a particular VET track based upon the good job market 
for that particular occupation at that pointing time. By the time he graduates from 
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this track, however, he may find that the job market has turned sour for that 
occupation. In fact, Boudon (1981: 142-145) offers an interesting theoretical 
elaboration how such rational education choices based upon current labor market 
prospects may even work as a self-denying prophecy. Suppose in year T there is a 
high number of vacancies for teachers, which causes more young people (∆N) to 
opt for a teacher education in that year. Also suppose that ∆N would be enough to 
satisfy the number of teacher vacancies in year T. The problem is, however, that it 
will take the new teacher students four years to graduate and actually be allowed 
to fill those vacancies (T+4). So in year T+1, the number of teacher vacancies will 
be as large as the year before – again attracting ∆N extra teacher students. By the 
time this second generation graduates (T+5), however, the previous generation will 
already have solved the teacher shortage – and at T+5, ∆n students will not find 
schools fiercely competing for their services – but find themselves unexpectedly 
unemployed instead. Obviously, this particular example is based on quite unrealistic 
assumptions (stable labor market demand, for instance, and no alternative sources 
of labor recruitment than education), but such pig cycles actually occur in student 
choices vis-à-vis labor market demand (cf. Batenburg et al, 2003: 31). If such 
labor market shortages would indeed lure more students into the related education 
tracks, it will take at least a couple of years before they can meet this demand and 
achieve an optimal equilibrium. And, rather than achieving a stable equilibrium, the 
collective result of such (at the time) rational choices may be the opposite extreme: 
from an unfilled vacancy problem to an unemployment problem. Stable equilibriums 
in the school-to-work transition are, thus, much harder to achieve than a casual 
first impression might suggest. The fact that labor demand is not stable over time 
might increase the problem: chances are these vacancies are long gone by the time 
even the first generation of extra students graduates. Actually, this is quite likely, 
as there are other sources to meet labor demand (e.g. recruiting trained teachers 
that had left the labor market), and schools can hardly afford to wait four years to 
fill such vacancies. 
 This typology of matching problems and discrepancies was presented to familiarize 
us with the various problems that may occur at the crossroads of education and 
labor market. Policy concerns about an adequate quantitative and qualitative supply 
of graduates, and an optimal matching with demand for them, are an important 
background for this book. The research itself reported upon in this book, however, 
does not analyze the occurrence of matching problems in the various countries and 
sectors in any depth. Instead, it focuses on the specification of the institutional 
order that influences supply of and demand for intermediate skills. But evidence of 
matching problems and discrepancies from other research will figure in the analysis 
of the pros and cons of the performance of various markets for intermediate skills.
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2.3.6.3 Institutions and the school-to-work transition 
Institutional differentiation, both between education and labor markets, as well as 
within each of them, calls for institutions to achieve a favorable equilibrium, both in 
the short and the long run. The market obviously is one important institution that may 
go a long way towards achieving such goals; but as any coordination mechanism, it 
is not without its flaws, and various potential ones have been pointed out earlier in 
this chapter. We need to include other general governance mechanisms, as well as 
various specific institutional configurations shaping VET and labor markets, in the 
analysis. We will first consider general coordination mechanisms and the governance 
regimes they constitute, and will subsequently discuss various specific institutional 
configurations shaping VET and labor markets.
Coordination mechanisms, actors and governance regimes
That the market is not the only relevant coordination mechanism for markets for 
intermediate skills, and most likely not by itself sufficient, has already been argued 
by showing the relevancy of two other, alternative coordination mechanisms for 
these markets. First, we listed arguments for state intervention with education 
markets in general (section 2.3.2) and markets for intermediate skills in particular 
(section 2.3.3). Second, we pointed out the important contribution of transaction 
cost economics in sharply distinguishing between market mechanisms and firms or 
hierarchies as an alternative coordination mechanism. The success of capitalism 
is the success of the evolution of not just markets, but also of (large) firms as a 
historically distinct economic coordination form, different from (for instance) the 
important role of guilds in European economies of the Middle Ages, or of families 
and clans in agricultural economies.
 Transaction costs economics itself has, however, also met with substantial criticism 
(cf. Hodgson, 1988; Lindberg et al., 1991). These critics consider the typology of 
governance mechanisms within transaction cost economics still incomplete, and 
its conception of human choice still too rational and efficiency-driven, as it sees 
the balance between hierarchies and market as the necessarily efficient result of 
a selective competitive process. This has inspired a body of literature that Mayntz 
& Scharpf (1995) refer to as institutional economics, but that is also referred to 
as the ‘governance’ approach (Streeck & Schmitter, 1985; Campbell et al., 1991; 
Hollingsworth, 1991; Hollingsworth et al., 1994a; Van Waarden, 1997; Van 
Lieshout, 1999). These authors share the view that transaction costs economics 
still underestimates the role of cooperation, socialization and institutions. The 
argument goes two ways. First, the three-part typology of market, state and firms 
as governance mechanisms is still not comprehensive enough, and should be 
expanded by others; most importantly, associations and networks. Second, while 
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the bounded rationality used by transaction cost economics is an improvement 
over the neo-classical assumption of more or less unbounded rational choice, 
it is not enough. This latter criticism is similar to that put forward by Mayntz & 
Scharpf (1995, p. 52-53) and Scharpf (1997: 19-22; cf. section 2.2.5). We have 
already outlined the theoretical approach underlying the analysis in this book, 
actor-centered institutionalism, in section 2.2, including its treatment of actors and 
actor orientations, and will therefore limit ourselves to the first element of the 
aforementioned criticism here: an expanded typology of governance mechanisms.
 This governance approach has been criticized for failing to clearly demarcate 
the various types of governance mechanisms. Mayntz & Scharpf (1995: 60) state 
that governance theory suffers from the multi-dimensionality of the underlying 
classification. They certainly have a point here, which is illustrated by the fact that 
different authors have in fact proposed different typologies. These differ both in the 
number of governance mechanisms proposed, their names and definitions, and the 
underlying dimensions - if any - from which they are derived.
 Streeck & Schmitter (1985) distinguish four types of governance mechanisms: 
community, market, state and association. They list twelve dimensions of difference 
between them. The core difference is that each has a distinctive guiding principle 
of coordination and allocation: spontaneous solidarity (community), dispersed 
competition (market), hierarchical control (state) and inter- and intra-organizational 
concertation (association). What their typology lacks, however, is the separate 
coordination mechanism of hierarchies (or firms), whose relevance has been shown 
by transaction cost economics.
 Lindberg et al. (1991) list seven governance mechanisms. Six of these are derived 
from two underlying dimensions: the degree of formal integration (low, moderate 
or high) and the range of interaction (bilateral or multilateral). In addition, they 
devote much attention to the state. But as this does not fit in their scheme based 
on the aforementioned two underlying dimensions, they choose to conceptualize 
and theorize on the state in its own terms. Their typology has, however, two 
weaknesses. First, they do not base the coordination mechanism of the state on 
their two underlying dimensions, which deprives their typology of much of its 
first glance theoretical elegance. Second and more importantly, their distinction 
between bilateral and multilateral forms of coordination is highly problematic, in 
particular with the interpretation of markets and hierarchies. This way, markets 
are reduced to bilateral contracts, whereas the crucial aspect of markets from a 
governance viewpoint is indeed the multilateral coordination between actors that 
can be achieved through their engaging in bilateral contracts. Similarly, hierarchies 
- also interpreted as bilateral - typically coordinate the behavior of more than two 
individuals as most firms employ more than one person.
 Most authors have opted for a five-part typology (cf. Hollingsworth et al., 1994a; 
Van Waarden, 1997; Van Lieshout, 1999). In the words of Hollingsworth et al. 
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(1994b: 5-7) these are markets, states, hierarchies, associations and networks. 
But there remain differences between these authors in their specific terminology 
and definitions.
 Van Lieshout (1999) has specifically applied this frame of analysis to the field 
of VET. For the purposes of this research, however, only four of the coordination 
mechanisms have been explicitly included in the analysis. Networks were not 
specifically included in the research design. While network elements do play some 
role within the three countries analyzed, and will be pointed out when relevant in 
the country chapters, this research (as outlined in chapter 1) specifically intends 
to focus on including associations as a distinct fourth coordination mechanism 
relevant for markets for intermediate skills – a necessity for the German market 
for intermediate skills (cf. Streeck et al., 1987) and empirically also essential in 
the Dutch market for intermediate skills (cf. Dercksen & Van Lieshout, 1993). The 
theoretical ambition for this project was to use the empirical research to come 
up with a theoretical framework for comparative VET research that included the 
distinct role of associations, whose absence can be considered a weakness of other 
general theories applied to VET analysis (Dercksen & Kamps, 1992; cf. chapter 1). 
Having established the relevancy of markets, hierarchies and the state for such an 
analysis earlier in this chapter, we have yet to pinpoint associations as a separate 
governance mechanism.
Associations
Governance theory stresses the role of associative behavior in general and of 
associations in particular. Not surprisingly, an important share of its roots lies in 
the neo-corporatist tradition of the nineteen eighties, but attention to the role of 
associations in labor market governance dates back to earlier days. Kerr (1954), 
for instance, explicitly listed the collective actions of the community of employers 
(employers’ associations) and workers (unions) as formal rules causing additional 
labor market segmentation beyond that which stems from individual employers’ 
and workers’ preferences. But it was in particular Streeck & Schmitter’s work that 
put forward associations as an important alternative form of governance (Schmitter 
& Streeck, 1981; Streeck & Schmitter, 1985). Streeck & Schmitter (1985) see 
‘organizational concertation’ as a fourth guiding principle of interaction and 
allocation, next to `dispersed competition’, ‘hierarchical control’ and `spontaneous 
solidarity’. Cohen and Rogers (1992: 424-425) name four useful functions that 
associations can fulfill for societies. First, they can provide information to policy 
makers on their members’ preferences. Second, they can help remedy inequalities 
in material advantage by permitting individuals with low per-capita resources to 
pool these through organization. Third, they can function as ‘schools for democracy’ 
in that they can help citizens develop competence, self-confidence and a broader 
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set of interests than they would acquire in a more fragmented political society. 
Fourth (and this is the crucial point for governance theory) they can provide a 
distinctive form of social governance, alternative to markets and hierarchies, that 
permits society to realize the important benefits of cooperation among citizens.
 At first glance, associations may appear similar to hierarchies. But the prime 
difference with hierarchies is that associations have members. These members in 
fact provide the core reason for the existence of associations. Management and 
workers of associations are supposed to serve their needs, and to adhere to the 
outcome of collective decision processes between those members (what Streeck & 
Schmitter (1985) called ‘organizational concertation’). Also, as these members are 
considered equal peers, associations are basically horizontal rather than vertical. 
While management prerogative should dominate governance in hierarchies, some 
form of democracy should enable the members’ collective voice to dominate 
associational strategies, which should then be implemented by an association’s 
management and staff. But associations are not exclusively horizontal; not only 
do they have a `logic of membership’ but also a `logic of influence’ (Schmitter & 
Streeck, 1981). In the words of Streeck (1992: 105):
“The ‘logic of  membership’ is governed by the values and interest 
perceptions of  the groups and individuals that an association undertakes 
to represent, and in particular by both the sense of  collective identity and 
the ‘rationality traps’ that emerge in collectivities of  a given size, spatial 
distribution, internal composition, resource base and ‘primary’, informal 
social structure. The ‘logic of  influence’ consists of  the constraints and 
opportunities offered to associations by their institutional environment, and 
it is experienced by associations as a set of  strategic imperatives, rules of  
political prudence and norms of  reciprocal political exchange that collective 
actors in a given institutional context have to obey, and to internalize in their 
structural make-up, in order to be successful.
To achieve sufficient ‘relative autonomy’ for effective intermediation, 
interest associations have to build internal structures that respond to 
both logics equally and simultaneously. An association dominated by the 
‘logic of  membership’ resembles a social movement in that it is likely to 
be organizationally unstable and incapable of  formulating and pursuing 
long-term political strategies. Similarly, an association ruled by the ‘logic of  
influence’ is likely to become so closely entangled with the state apparatus, 
and so strongly identified with its characteristic means of  control, that it 
will appear to its constituents like a state agency; as a result, its capability to 
mobilize active support from them will decline. The problem is, however, 
that striking a balance between the two logics is not easy, as they may not 
always be compatible, and in some cases may even contradict each other.”
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In terms of actor-centered institutionalism, therefore, associations are an excellent 
example of composite actors in general and collective actors in particular. They 
are composite actors as they are a constellation in which the ‘intent’ of intentional 
action refers to the joint effect of coordinated action expected by the participating 
individuals; they intend to create a joint product or to achieve a common purpose 
(Scharpf, 1997: 54). Associations build the context for action for these individuals, 
in the same way as the institutional environment builds the context for the 
association’s actions. They therefore have to be analyzed from two perspectives: 
from the outside as a composite actor that can unilaterally respond to external 
incentives, and from the inside as an institutional structure (or coordination 
mechanism) within which internal actors interact to produce the actions ascribed 
to the composite actor (cf. section 2.2.3). In line with the principle of diminishing 
abstraction (Lindenberg, 1991), scientific analysis may concentrate on the former 
as long as that serves to offer an adequate explanation of their behavior; if not, one 
has to more explicitly focus on their internal dealings20. We will discuss the specific 
types of rules that employers’ associations and unions may develop that help shape 
markets for intermediate skills in the next part of this section.
Schools
When analyzing markets for intermediate skills (or education markets in general), 
there is one obvious additional type of actor that has to be incorporated in the 
analysis: schools. We will discuss them as an actor alone, not as a separate type of 
coordination mechanism. But it is a peculiar actor in the sense that it is distinctively 
shaped by different coordination mechanisms. The first and most obvious one is the 
state. In particular for countries with public (i.e. state) school systems dominating 
the initial education system, it appears tempting to simply treat schools as a 
particular type of actor within the state apparatus. In comparative perspective, 
however, other countries stand out, where most primary and secondary schools 
are private rather than public organizations. A relevant case in point here is the 
Netherlands. While there are public primary and secondary schools, the majority of 
them is private, and they are typically run by a school association21. In the sense 
that they are private, one might then be tempted to treat them as a specific type 
of hierarchy. At least in the context of this study, one has to be aware of the joint 
effect of both types of governance mechanism. State regulation also applies to 
private schools, and as far as schools in the initial education system are concerned, 
this tends to be almost as detailed as regulation for pubic schools; regulation for 
post-initial training institutions tends to be looser. Furthermore, while it is important 
to realize that schools share certain characteristics with firms/hierarchies (e.g. they 
compete for market share), it is just as important to be aware of the differences 
between schools and firms. Firms employ workers whom they may or may not train 
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themselves; schools, however, train (future) workers to be gainfully employed by 
other firms, not for themselves22. In terms of markets for intermediate skills, firms 
will typically operate on both the demand and the supply side of that market, while 
schools operate exclusively23 on the supply side.
A governance approach to markets for intermediate skills
To sum up: we have identified four coordination mechanisms (market, state, 
associations and hierarchies) and six types of actors (individual workers, individual 
employers, the state, employers’ associations, unions, and schools) to be employed 
in our analysis of markets for intermediate skills. In analyzing these markets, our 
aim is to identify the specific governance regime governing particular national 
(and, within them, sectoral) markets for intermediate skills. Regimes of economic 
governance differ in the way in which these coordination mechanisms are configured 
(Hollingsworth & Streeck, 1994: 270). The object of comparative empirical 
research is to determine the relative importance of the various types of governance 
mechanisms in different contexts, to describe how they are articulated with one 
another, and to assess the extent and direction of change in regimes over time 
(Hollingsworth et al, 1994b: 8). Regimes of economic governance vary with spatial-
territorial location as well as between functional-economic sectors (Hollingsworth 
& Streeck, 1994: 271). Variance by location is a consequence of the fact that 
social institutions are rooted in local, regional and/or national political communities. 
Variance by sector is caused by the fact that each sector has specific technological 
and economical characteristics which influence its industrial organization. Just as 
sectoral differences in technology and market conditions give rise to differences in 
industrial order within countries, national differences produce different governance 
regimes within similar sectors in different countries.
 This being one part of the analysis in this book, the other part entails analyzing 
the effect these governance regimes have on the relevant strategic choices made 
by the aforementioned actors within markets for intermediate skills. The focus here 
is on the choices of individual (future) workers (what types of training and jobs 
they pursue) and employers (work organization, train and/or hire). On this level, 
in particular state regulation and possibly regulation by employers’ association and 
unions will provide an incentive structure within which these individual actors operate. 
But the analysis is explicitly multilevel. For one, this means we will also attempt to 
explain obvious differences at the sector level, either within or across nations. For 
another, it is not just macro and meso level regulation that shapes the choices for 
individual actors; the relatively stable choices of individual workers and employers 
(e.g. for German ones, to train apprentices on a large scale) simultaneously shape 
choices at the meso and macro levels. A state faced with firms up to now massively 
neglecting their apprenticeship system faces a different opportunity structure from 
70
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
a state faced with massive participation by firms in such a system.
 To further illuminate this approach, we want to point out the similarity with 
Fligstein’s (1996) political-cultural approach to markets. He uses “...the metaphor 
‘markets as politics’ to create a sociological view of action in markets” (Fligstein, 
1996: 656). This metaphor has a double meaning. First, it sees the formation 
of markets as part of state building. Second, it sees markets as reflecting two 
kinds of political processes: within the organizations that participate on the market, 
and across these organizations. Fligstein proposes the concept of a ‘conception of 
control’ to summarize the core orientation of actors in a market (Fligstein, 1996: 
658): 
“...understandings that structure perceptions of  how a market works and 
that allow their actors to interpret their world and act to control situations. 
A conception of  control is simultaneously a worldview that allows actors 
to interpret the actions of  others and a reflection of  how the market is 
structured. Conceptions of  control reflect market specific agreements 
between actors in firms on principles of  internal organization (i.e. forms 
of  hierarchy), tactics for competition or cooperation, and the hierarchy or 
status ordering of  firms in a given market.”
The term ‘conception of control’ will prove useful in analyzing national (and sector-
level) differences in actor’s choices in markets for intermediate skills.
Differentiation of education and labor markets and the role of associations
Having identified relevant institutions at the macro level (coordination mechanism) 
as well as relevant actors to be included in the analysis of market for intermediate 
skills in this book, what remains is to identify some specific relevant institutional 
configurations shaping these markets.
 We have identified labor market differentiation (segmentation) as the result 
of the individual preferences of employers and workers (section 2.3.5.3), and 
differentiation of education markets in general and VET in particular as both a 
logical consequence of labor market segmentation, and (once established) a new 
reinforcing cause of this (section 2.3.6.2). Earlier in this section, we hinted at the 
role of associations (employers’ associations and unions) as potential additional, 
institutional causes for such differentiation. Employers’ associations and unions 
may try to formulate standard job descriptions for their markets. For employers’ 
associations, this may be a tool to enhance effectiveness and efficiency for training 
in their sector, by achieving economies of scale and/or scope beyond what individual 
firms may achieve, and/or by trying to help prevent underinvestment in training 
by their members because of the prisoner-type dilemma they face in training 
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decisions. For unions, this may be a way to strengthen their workers’ employment 
security. There are alternative ways to achieve this. Craft unions, for instance, 
have often tried to capture particular types of skills markets, and limit outsiders’ 
access to those markets. Industrial unions, alternatively, try to organize workers 
across a broader range. While some specialization among their constituents will 
still be necessary, they will (other things being equal) have a lesser incentive to 
put up strong boundaries between various skills market niches (as that would 
exclude some of their own members from these niches), and a stronger incentive 
to therefore ensure the existence of sufficient general training elements, to provide 
their workers with the potential for cross-occupational mobility, at least within the 
sector.
 Based on the German case, Streeck et al. (1987: 4) distinguish four basic ways 
in which associations can be involved with initial VET and post-initial training: 
•	 regulation: the determination of objectives, subjects and standards of training;
•	 financing: the mobilization of financial resources for training;
•	 implementation and administration;
•	 supervision and control.
In addition, employers’ associations and unions are indirectly involved in the 
operation of the German VET market. They jointly negotiate binding minimum wage 
levels for their members in collective bargaining agreements, which are typically 
extended to non-members in the same sector. Soskice (1994) points out that it is 
exactly these high wages that necessitate larger and internationally competing firms 
to effectively train their new recruits in order to allow them to acquire a high level 
of productivity that warrants these high wages. At the same time, comparatively 
low apprenticeship/trainee wages make it worthwhile to direct an important share 
of firms’ training investments to apprentices rather than to regular workers, as the 
formers’ lower wages help to keep down training costs.
 Collective bargaining agreements thus are an important tool at the discretion of 
these associations to pursue such goals, since they can provide regulation for their 
members that is just as binding as state regulation. And when bargaining agreements 
are extended by the state, they will even bind non-members. Prominent, specific 
types of arrangements that may be included in collective bargaining agreements to 
pursue the aforementioned strategic goals are:
•	 occupation and/or job descriptions, which may or may not include specific 
binding entry requirements for such occupations/jobs;
•	 workers wage scales and apprentice/trainee wage scales, which jointly influence 
the training costs for various categories and may therefore influence training 
decisions by both firms and (future) workers;
•	 apprenticeship or other sector training systems, the former usually in congruence 
with relevant state legislation;
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•	 links between apprenticeship or other types of education credentials and 
minimum pay levels;
•	 sector training funds or other financial arrangements stimulating training.
It is important to note that these same arrangements could in principle be created 
by the state. While direct state interference with (private sector) wage setting 
is rare, job entry requirements still function in specific market niches – medical 
professions being a prime example. And France provides an example of national 
state regulation forcing firms to invest a certain percentage of their means in worker 
training.
Occupations and types of labor markets
Having outlined some important options for collective action through associations in 
markets for intermediate skills, we have to revisit the topic of internal labor markets 
discussed in section 2.3.5.4. Or rather, having sufficiently discussed internal labor 
markets there, we have yet to discuss an alternative type of institutional labor 
market configuration discussed by a vast body of literature: occupational labor 
markets.
 The occupation, in itself, is an important institutional labor market concept with 
two important but different connotations. On the one hand, it reflects the fact that 
labor market mobility by workers across their careers is generally not confined to 
the boundaries of one specific type of job (e.g. a milling machine operator), but to a 
substantial share takes place within broader boundaries (e.g. the field of machining, 
with workers routinely moving between milling and turning operator jobs). This 
fact is generally taken to imply that (initial) VET should not be as specialized to 
exclusively train for either milling or turning jobs, but aim training at a group of 
related jobs – an occupation. Occupation, therefore, denotes a range of similar jobs 
between which horizontal worker mobility tends to be relatively easy and prevalent. 
On the other hand, the concept of occupation is simultaneously used to reflect on 
vertical worker mobility. Workers do generally not remain on the same job rung 
throughout their career, but will occasionally move to another (usually and ideally, 
higher) job rung. Again, this type of mobility tends to occur between somewhat 
related jobs (e.g. a machinist will more often be upwardly mobile to become a 
foreman in a metalworking plant than at a construction site). In relation to VET, 
the concept of occupation then is taken to imply that (initial) VET should not just 
exclusively prepare youths and young workers adequately for their first job, but 
simultaneously strive for a more ambitious goal: to lay a promising basis for a 
fruitful career, including the potential for upward mobility to related jobs.
 The concept of occupation has a different meaning in different languages and 
different states. Stooß (1994) points out that the German ‘Beruf’ can hardly be 
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translated in other languages, because the German concept simultaneously implies 
various dimensions. The literal translation of ‘Beruf’ in other languages (occupation, 
‘metier’, ‘beroep’) hardly ever implies all these dimensions. ‘Beruf’ implies five 
dimensions in German (Stooß, 1994):
•	 ‘Berufe’ are bundles of personal skills and experiences that exist in society, 
between which young persons have to choose for the development of their 
labor capacity;
•	 ‘Berufe’ are frameworks for the structuring and steering of the labor market, and 
as such, they are a model for the exchange of labor for reward, social security 
and social integration;
•	 ‘Berufe’ are representations of social reality and of organizational forms of 
labor;
•	 ‘Berufe’ offer individuals the chance to develop a personal identity, to accomplish 
their interests and find satisfaction in their work;
•	 ‘Berufe’ are activities aimed at income acquisition; simultaneously, individuals 
contribute to the national economic product through these activities.
These dimensions are not a matter of language alone; they stem from/are reflected 
in institutional realities. In Germany, for instance, the use of the word ‘Beruf’ is not 
limited to traditional economic sectors (as is the case in many other countries), 
but expands across all economic sectors. And it not only has meaning for the 
organization of economic activity and the labor market, but also plays a vital role in 
the organization of VET and social security (cf. sections 3.5.2 & 3.6).
 The concept of occupation to conceptually organize jobs has a direct relation to 
the notion of so-called key qualifications24 to organize skills. Mertens (1974: 40) 
introduced the concept as follows:
“Key qualifications are those that relate to such knowledge, abilities and 
skills, that do not have a direct and limited relevance to specific, separate 
practical tasks, but much more a) achieve the capability for a large number 
of  positions and functions as alternative possibilities at the same time, and 
b) the capability to master a sequence of  (mostly unforeseeable) changes in 
requirements over the life course.”
Sengenberger (1987) has incorporated the possibly important role of occupations 
in labor market careers and labor market governance in a distinction between three 
types of labor markets. Besides distinguishing internal labor markets from external 
ones, he distinguished two different types of external markets. One is unorganized 
labor markets, which come close to the ‘structureless market where all jobs are open 
to all bidders at all times’ that Kerr (1954) mentioned. In the other, occupational 
labor markets, jobs are not open to all bidders but (formally or informally) require 
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an occupational qualification that allows workers to move to another firm while 
remaining within their occupational specialization. As with internal labor markets, 
there are a host of alternative definitions of occupational labor markets, and there 
are labor market typologies with more types than those three, and/or different 
definitions of these types. As we will limit ourselves to the three types as put 
forward by Sengenberger in this book, we abstain from discussing that body of 
literature here.
Linking education and labor markets: intermediate arrangements
Collective bargaining agreements and types of labor markets, while quite relevant 
for markets for intermediate skills, have in common that they are more general 
institutional configurations governing labor markets. We now turn our attention 
to institutional arrangements specifically aimed at bridging the institutional 
differentiation between education and labor in two separate systems. Such 
institutional arrangements have been labelled ‘intermediate arrangements’ in Dutch 
literature (Van Wieringen, 1984; Kraayvanger & Van Onna, 1986). Kraayvanger 
& Van Onna (1986: 5) distinguish between a formal and a strategic approach 
to intermediate arrangements. The first simply asks whether there isn’t some 
coherence behind the variety of intermediate arrangements that have developed 
empirically. The strategic approach goes beyond that, and asks whether the effects 
sought through intermediate arrangements shouldn’t be achieved through the 
regular education system or labor market; it moves the discussion to the level 
of separate and shared responsibilities of state, employers, workers, schools and 
other actors.
 Kraayvanger & Van Onna (1986: 6-8) present two definitions of intermediate 
arrangements, one more narrow, the other more broad. Their narrow definition 
of intermediate arrangements is: “those training arrangements that are not part 
of the regular education system or labor market. (…) Intermediate arrangements 
in the narrow sense are the whole complex of arrangements that try to create 
supplementary possibilities in the direction of further/different qualification or 
specific vocational training”. Examples are courses for unemployed workers, short 
courses and private courses. This narrow definition has the advantage of including 
relatively limited types of arrangements. But as these are quite heterogeneous, the 
small number doesn’t really help. And an important weakness is that the relations 
between such intermediate arrangements and both education system and labor 
marker remain largely invisible. Kraayvanger & Van Onna therefore prefer a broad 
definition of intermediate arrangements, in which they distinguish three additional 
complexes of arrangements:
•	 qualification arrangements, that may be part of the regular education system 
or labor market, such as school-based VET, apprenticeship, firm-based training 
and adult education;
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•	 measures aimed at the reduction of unemployment, such as subsidized 
employment;
•	 the complex of negotiation, counseling and coordination structures regarding 
education, training and labor market, such as regional and sector-wide multi-
party organizations and forums (e.g. collective bargaining settings).
The analysis in these books does not specifically deal with measures aimed at the 
reduction of unemployment. It does deal with the other two complexes, but sets 
some specific accents that have already been pointed out in chapter 1, and will 
be discussed below. Regarding qualification arrangements, the focus is on work- 
and school-based VET, their mutual relations, and linkages to the labor market. 
Regarding negotiating, counseling and coordination structures, we have already 
pointed out the relevancy of collective bargaining agreements in general; we have 
yet to discuss specific types of such structures targeted at VET exclusively, in 
particular, skills standards systems.
Sequential and parallel institutionalizations of the school-to-work transition
School-based VET and apprenticeship represent two basically different approaches 
to the school-to-work transition, with different roles for firms and schools. With 
school-based VET, schools train young persons that enter firms upon graduation. 
With apprenticeship, youths (apprentices) work in a firm (usually for four days a 
week) where they simultaneously receive training, while receiving related instruction 
at a school (usually for one day a week). This causes a different type of school-to-
work transition than with school-based VET. Young people here seek employment 
with a firm before the start of a training program rather than after their graduation 
from it. Instead of the sequential institutionalization of the transition from education 
to employment as an (instantaneous) transition from full-time school participation 
to (typically) full-time employment, as implied by general secondary education and 
school-based VET, apprenticeship therefore implies a parallel institutionalisation of 
labor market and school participation (school-based related instruction, usually for 
one day a week). This way, apprenticeship in itself constitutes a separate transitional 
labor market, in line with transitional labor market theory (cf. Schmid, 1992; 1998; 
2000; Van Lieshout & Wilthagen, 2002). Transition from education to employment 
through apprenticeship is thus a two-step process. First, there is a transition from 
(general) secondary education into the apprenticeship (‘first threshold’); second, 
there is a transition from apprenticeship into ‘regular’ employment (‘second 
threshold’). Transitional labor markets (TLMs) should ease the second transition, 
and apprenticeship is generally found to do so for the education to employment 
transition, and is applauded for it (cf. Schmid, 1992).
 Both models not only entail different roles for schools, firms, and young people 
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(full-time students in sequential models, part-time students but more predominantly, 
workers in a typical apprenticeship system), but also for states. For instance, 
most states fully sponsor full-time VET schools, while firms sponsor a large part 
of apprenticeship training. And unions and employers’ associations usually fulfill 
important governing roles in apprenticeship systems that they generally do not (or 
at least not to the same extent) fulfill in school-based VET.
 While these differences between sequential and parallel models are important, 
one has to note that apprenticeship and (completely) school-based VET in fact are 
just two extreme poles between which various alternative combinations of work- 
and school-based VET components are possible. One relevant example is provided 
by the Netherlands, where all school-based upper secondary VET currently has to 
include a work-based internship component of at least 20%. The difference between 
Dutch interns and Dutch apprentices is that the former are (mostly) formal workers 
of their training firms, covered by collective bargaining rules, while the former ‘just’ 
enjoy trainee-status, and remain full-time (school) students.
Skills standards systems and examination
As mentioned in chapter one, one important trend that stands out in countries 
as different as the Netherlands, the U.S., the U.K. and Australia is the creation or 
improvement of so-called national skills standards systems. These are systems 
that distinguish groups of jobs that require similar skills, and define a set of basic/
typical skills required for the adequate performance of (and admission to) such 
jobs. Beyond this basic similarity, national skill standards systems show a wide 
range of variation along a number of dimensions (cf. Wills, 1994d; Finegold, 1997). 
For instance:
•	 they may be related to one specific training system (e.g. an apprenticeship 
system) or not;
•	 (as a consequence) their scope may cover an entire economy or just some 
general levels of qualification (i.e. intermediate) and/or economic sectors;
•	 they may or may not be binding for (some) training providers;
•	 they may or may not be related to a specific type of assessment;
•	 they may be developed by different bodies and through different processes.
Skills standards systems make information on the contents of training programs 
and the skills required for jobs readily available, and link the two. Skills standards 
are not only relevant for (future) workers, but also for firms. If skills standards are 
linked to certain training programs, and even more so if the completion of such 
programs is reliably certified, this may reduce the information problem firms face 
when screening outsiders. When they have ascertained what particular certificate 
(best) matches the job for which they have a vacancy, they can make an important 
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first step in the selection of all (potential) recruits by limiting them to those who 
have such a certificate. And when the certificate comes along with some kind of 
reliable indication of how well a particular person has performed in training, and 
has acquired various specific sets of skills, it also helps them to rank all those with 
the same certificate. Hence, besides skills standards, examinations/tests as well as 
the extent to which their results are reliable and comparable across all people that 
have a similar certificate, are also important.
2.3.7 International differences in markets for intermediate skills:  
  statistics
Comparing countries, one finds surprising differences in terms of the qualifications 
of the workforce, the dominant pathways to the acquisition of intermediate skills, 
and patterns in the school-to-work transition. Surprising, because these differences 
can be relatively large between countries on a roughly similar level of socio-
economic development – such as the U.S. and Germany. We will explore some 
of these differences below. Data25 are generally presented for the mid nineteen 
nineties, to ensure the closest correspondence with the time of the fieldwork in the 
various countries.
We will start with the differences in unemployment performance of the three 
countries (table 2.1). It is common knowledge that the U.S. has had very low 
unemployment figures across the nineties, while Germany on the contrary suffered 
from persistent unemployment problems after reunification. Dutch unemployment 
decreased across the same decade, bringing it closer to American figures in the 
latter half of the decade. 
 But behind these general unemployment differences lie very different patterns 
for the distribution of unemployment over age groups. Germany has a distinct 
advantage in the relative share of youth unemployment in total unemployment 
over the U.S., both for young people in their late teens and for young adults in 
their early twenties. The difference would have been even more pronounced had 
we included data for former West-Germany rather than for reunified Germany. The 
Netherlands occupies a middle position, except for males in their early twenties, 
where it performs a little worse than the U.S. These data help explain the broad 
international interest in the German apprenticeship system (chapter 1), exactly 
and primarily because comparative youth unemployment figures indicate that it 
provides a remarkably adequate school-to/work transition.
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Table 2.1: Unemployment percentages for different age groups in Germany, the 
Netherlands and the U.S., 1994
Source: OECD (1996b), p. 198 (column 1) and p. 114 (column 2-4).
1Data on Germany apply to reunified Germany and the year 1993; unemployment 
data applying to just the territory of former 
West-Germany would be lower.
2The youngest age group is comprised of 16-19 year olds in stead 
of 15-19-year olds.
Table 2.2 compares data on participation in upper secondary VET. Data for the 
U.S. are listed as missing by CERI, as clearly separated general and VET tracks 
are the exception in American high schools. But with national data estimating the 
participation in something resembling a substantial VET track in upper secondary 
education at 9% (NCES, 1994: 65)26, it is safe to say that American upper secondary 
VET participation lies substantially below that in both Germany and the Netherlands. 
Between the last two countries, the most pronounced difference is in the particular 
type of tracks in which most VET students participate: in Germany, most of them 
are enrolled in the apprenticeship system, while most Dutch students are enrolled 
in primarily school-based (MBO) programs.
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Table 2.2: Percentage of upper secondary students participating in upper secondary 
VET, 1994 (student counts)
x: Data missing due to the lack of clearly defined tracks.
Source: CERI (1996: 123).
Looking at upper secondary graduates, comparing them to the theoretically possible 
number of such graduates, and limiting the analysis to the first track (students may 
graduate from more than one upper secondary track over their educational career), 
the general pattern is confirmed (table 2.3). The additional data provided are first, 
that Germany also outperforms both the Netherlands and the U.S.27 in the general 
graduation rate. And second, we find a more pronounced difference between the 
Netherlands and Germany in VET graduation than we did in VET participation. Drop 
out rates are indeed higher in Dutch VET than they are in German apprenticeship 
(cf. chapter 3 and 5).
Table 2.3: Relation between the number of upper secondary graduates and the total 
population at the theoretical graduation age per education type, 1994; first tracks 
exclusively
Source: CERI (1996: 175)
Differences in school-to-work transition patterns cannot only be observed at the 
aggregate national level, but can even be observed for similar jobs/occupations 
in different countries. Take, for example, the typical route to becoming a bank 
clerk in the U.S., Germany and the Netherlands in the early 1990s, as evidenced 
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by interviews with sector experts in those countries. An American bank clerk will 
typically have received most of his occupational training from the firm that hired 
him, through on-the-job instruction and some additional short training courses from 
specialized training institutes in the banking sector. A German bank clerk will have 
undergone three years of formal apprenticeship training from a firm and a public 
school for related instruction. And a Dutch bank clerk will have graduated from a 
four year vocational education track that is primarily school-based (and supplied by 
a public upper secondary college), but includes an internship component at a bank. 
It is important to note that such differences are for an important part explained 
by differences in work organization between banks in different countries. Keltner 
(1995), for instance, relates the lesser initial qualification of American bank clerks to 
the lesser performance of American banks in capturing the growth niche of financial 
advice, as compared to German banks. We will look at international differences in 
work organization and training in similar firms more closely below.
 Besides differences in educational participation and graduation, we also observe 
differences in firms’ training investments in general and particularly in more general 
types of such training such as apprenticeship training. Of course countries differ in 
their employment mix, and this will explain part of the difference. German firms, 
for instance, invest more in formal work-based training than American firms, and 
a large share of their investments is used to sponsor apprenticeship training for 
youths (Hilton, 1991). In fact, there is no remaining difference in statistical data on 
the participation in job-related continuing education and training for the adult labor 
force between both countries (CERI, 1996: 133, table P8)28. Comparable data on 
the Netherlands have not been listed.
2.3.8 International differences in markets for intermediate skills:  
	 	 firm	comparisons
But the most important line of research shedding light on international differences 
in firms’ skills and training strategies is provided by the work of the (British) 
National Institute for Social and Economic Research (NIESR) and a network of 
international colleagues (cf. Prais, 1995a; 1995b for an overview). It has hosted 
a continuing research program to measure and explain differences in output per 
capita between Britain and other industrial countries, and to explore their relation 
to training and education. Its object is to “…estimate differences in manufacturing 
productivity between Britain and other industrial countries, measure differences 
in their workforce skills, elucidate the essential differences in their systems of 
education and training, and, finally, to see what the UK might learn from the way 
things were done abroad.” (Prais, 1995a: i).
 The first individual projects within this research program compared the 
qualifications of the labor force as a whole, and training standards for various 
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occupations, between Germany and Britain, with unfavorable results for Britain 
(Prais, 1981; Prais & Wagner, 1983). As a next step, in order to trace the effects 
of more training on productivity in realistic detail, a series of Anglo-German 
comparisons at the level of individual plants was undertaken in four industries. 
 The first series of so-called matched establishment comparisons (MECs) 
exclusively concerned Britain and Germany, and consisted of four separate studies. 
The first study focused on the metalworking trades (Daly et al., 1985). Its central 
object was to cast light on how present-day productivity is affected by differences 
in the type of machinery used and by differences in the skills and qualifications 
of the workforce on the factory floor. The researchers visited 16 mainly small and 
medium size (between 50 and 500 workers) metalworking plants in each country, 
producing relatively simple products: screws and nuts, small coil and leaf springs, 
cutting drills, hydraulic valves, and motor parts. Choosing simple products makes 
it easier to understand the efficiency factors at work on the factory floor than 
would be the case with complex products like internal combustion engines. In 
addition, it eliminates the problem of variations in product quality between plants, 
and makes it easier to measure productivity in physical terms. Besides these 32 
plants, they also visited 13 suppliers of machine tools. The matching occurred in 
several rounds, in order to match as closely as possible. Approximately half of the 
firms approached who were in comparable trades agreed to participate. In the end, 
six pairs of plants were found sufficiently similar to warrant a comparison of labor 
productivity. Calculations were based on actual (not standard) output of machines 
per unit of time (including downtime). Depending upon how the production process 
was laid out and on how records were kept, the researchers sometimes only took an 
important single part of the production sequence, sometimes a series of operations, 
and sometimes the total number of completed products. The sizes of the batches 
were broadly similar in both countries. But in all six firms the German firms showed 
a higher labor productivity varying from a mere 10 percent to as much as 130 
percent. The average differential was 63%. While the researchers were prepared to 
find only a small part of the total productivity differential between both countries 
to be evident at this shop floor level (especially when looking at relatively simple 
products), the figures they found in fact corresponded to figures derived from 
national Censuses of Production. In addition to the higher quantitative productivity 
of the direct German labor inputs, the researchers also discerned a tendency for 
the German products to be technically more advanced and of a higher quality. In 
explaining these differences, the researchers found workforce skills to be more 
important (at all levels) than machinery. About half of the German workers on 
the shop floor had an apprenticeship-type qualification, as compared to a quarter 
in Britain. British machinery was not older than that found in German plants, but 
it more often lacked ancillary feeding devices, proper maintenance and advanced 
numerical control devices; and breakdowns were more frequent. The faults caused 
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by poor maintenance, poor production control, and poor diagnosis of faults have their 
origins in the technical skills of foremen and operators. Whereas British firms were 
using less advanced machinery, or were installing more advanced machinery with 
undue delay, the problem usually lay in a lack of technically qualified management. 
In sum, skills at both supervisory and shop floor levels were found to contribute to 
a better choice and utilization of machinery, and higher productivity in Germany.
 A second study compared a part of wooden furniture industry in both countries: 
the production of fitted kitchens (Steedman & Wagner, 1987). Their reason to choose 
this industry is that, while it relies on skilled workmanship and skilled design, it 
does not so obviously require the high degree of precision and technical complexity 
involved in metalworking. No country can be good at everything, and Germany 
just may have inherited a comparative advantage in precision engineering. So the 
underlying question was whether the German insistence on formal apprenticeship 
training of all workers also works to the advantage of Germany with a simpler 
manufacturing process. Within the industry, there is an important difference in the 
quality of fitted kitchens. The products of typical German manufacture differed in 
three ways from its British counterpart. The German manufacturer almost exclusively 
concentrates on the higher quality end of the market. Even the top range of British 
producers did not match their German counterparts in quality or variety of color and 
finish. And the larger German manufacturers (contrary to their British counterparts) 
were so organized as to be able to make individualized parts to customers’ precise 
dimensions and specifications. Output per employee was known to be about 66% 
higher in Germany based on national censuses of production. To try to understand 
this gap, the researchers focused on the central stage in the production process for 
further examination: the four main operations involved in making the basic panels 
for the carcass of a kitchen cabinet. They found average output per line and per 
shift of machined panels not to be significantly different between the two countries, 
with an average gap of only 6% in favor of Germany. The important difference was 
in manning levels, which were just over twice as high in Britain as in Germany. 
Consequently, output per employee on these processes taken together was about 2.3 
times higher in Germany. The Germans seemed to have better exploited the potential 
for economies of scales in this particular part of the industry, while simultaneously 
producing a more varied product. Again, machinery in Britain was often as new as 
in Germany, but not as technologically advanced. Fears of maintenance problems 
and breakdowns inhibited British manufacturers from linking together a series of 
machines. In addition, German firms had a more systematic approach to the timing 
of the production of components and machine loading. 90% of German workers had 
vocational qualifications as compared to a mere 10% in Britain. These provided the 
seedbed for introducing advanced machinery and advanced production methods, 
putting them into smooth operation, and fully exploiting their potential. So even 
with simpler products than in precision engineering, there are advantages to high 
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levels of skill to take advantage of new production technology.
 The third study concerned clothing manufacture, which was chosen for similar 
reasons as the wooden furniture industry: do the broadly similar conclusions from 
the previous two studies hold good for even simpler industries (Steedman & Wagner, 
1989)? Clothing seemed an appropriate industry for this purpose, as the basic 
sewing machine is cheap, has only made modest technological progress, and basic 
operations can rapidly be mastered even by school leavers. Within the industry, 
the researchers confined themselves to the production of women’s outerwear, and, 
as far as possible, on plants producing skirts, jackets, suits and blouses. German 
manufacturers were found to rely on producing small batches of high quality 
goods in great variety; British firms to a very great extent on manufacturing very 
long runs of standard items. The typical length of a production run was 150-300 
garments in Germany, and a hundredfold larger in the majority of British plants. 
As in wooden furniture, German products were typically more stylish and of higher 
quality: they often consisted of more separate pieces, were made of a checked or 
patterned material, and had more decorative stitching and other detail. The number 
of garments produced per worker per day varied greatly over all 22 plants, from 
just over one per day to as much as 14. On average, very little difference was 
apparent, with British firms producing just under, and the German just over 5. But 
the German plants thus incorporated a higher quality in work-content in the same 
number of garments a day. And when comparing average output per employee in a 
sub-sample of plants producing more closely comparable garments in similar batch 
sizes, German plants produced roughly twice as many garments per employee. 
Despite the fact that machining is the most labor-intensive part of the process and 
there are limits beyond which machining speeds cannot be increased, the average 
machinist output was 40% higher in the German sub-sample29. German machines 
were on average younger than British ones. But it seemed that it was not so much 
these newer machines, as their specialized adaptation in Germany, presumably 
due to the greater involvement of plant maintenance mechanics and technicians in 
production planning, which explained the difference. Over 80% of German machinists 
had completed two- to three-year vocational training courses, while there was not a 
single machinist that was qualified in the British sample. This was evidently a major 
reason for the German productivity advantage: German trained machinists reached 
full productivity more rapidly, required fewer fault-finders, and less unpicking of 
bad work. There were similar differences at higher levels of qualifications too.
 The fourth and final study of this first series presented a first attempt to examine 
a branch of the services sector: hotel-keeping (Prais et al., 1989). The first goal 
was to establish whether there actually are international productivity differences in 
a service industry similar to those previously observed in manufacturing. And, as 
this turned out to be the case, the second goal was to see whether education and 
training in apparently simple and straightforward activities involved in hotel-keeping 
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(reception and housekeeping) contribute to higher productivity. This question is 
particularly relevant, as various observers on the German apprenticeship system 
have conceded that this has its advantages in manufacturing and construction, but 
doubt whether it is suited or necessary for (simple) service industries. Researchers 
concentrated on the central range of hotel sizes (10-100 rooms), and to hotels 
in large towns. The samples were not only matched for hotel size, but also for 
quality. The researchers had to ensure that German and British hotels didn’t offer 
substantially different standards of service, and that differences in their restaurant 
sides were not of different average importance in both countries. They controlled for 
quality by following the grading of the Michelin guide (and limited the sample to two 
medium quality grades of this) and eliminated employees involved in the provision 
of all meals except breakfast. Average labor requirements were about 50% higher 
per guest night in London, and about twice as high in large English provincial towns 
than in Germany. Findings thus are that the productivity difference in this service 
industry is not lower but (if anything) slightly higher than in manufacturing as a 
whole. The main difference again stems from qualified manpower. In the German 
sample, 35% of all workers had craft-level qualifications, as compared to 14% in 
the British sample. Almost all German workers in management, reception and at 
the supervisory level in housekeeping had such qualifications. In Britain, it was less 
usual in management, rare in reception, and hardly ever apparent in housekeeping 
supervision. And the greater breadth and practical content of German vocational 
qualifications in this area as compared to British qualifications proved to be better 
suited for the middle range of hotels, where flexibility is an essential part of the 
daily work for all personnel. Chambermaids in both countries were unqualified. 
But thanks to better work organization by their (in the German case vocationally 
qualified) supervisors, their productivity was higher in Germany. Differences in total 
spending on capital equipment were less important. The most important differences 
found were more appropriate computer packages in reception areas, the greater use 
of chambermaids’ trolleys, and a better choice of labor-saving fixtures and fittings. 
These reflected the greater practical element in managerial training in Germany.
 The interesting findings of this first series of MECs triggered more to come. Having 
established the inferior British performance relative to Germany in four different 
industries, one logical step was to extend the method to encompass other countries. 
The first of these was the Netherlands; two Anglo-Dutch MECs were carried out, 
one in engineering, the other in food processing (Mason et al., 1992; Mason & 
van Ark, 1996). This engineering comparison was later extended to include the 
U.S. (Mason & Finegold, 1995), while the food processing comparison was extended 
to include France and Germany (Mason et al., 1993). Secondly, new and different 
industries have been added. Besides food processing in the aforementioned studies, 
this particularly concerns the service sector: insurance firms, and banks lending to 
mid-corporate (‘middle market’) business customers. And, interestingly enough, the 
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method has also been applied to various manufacturing industries (engineering; 
food, drink and tobacco; clothing; furniture) in two regions of one (reunited) country: 
East- and West-Germany (Hitchens et al., 1996).
 In the food-processing comparison, which concentrated on the production of 
biscuits, the original Anglo-Dutch comparison showed a Dutch comparative advantage 
(in terms of tonnage) of 21% per man-hour. But researchers also observed that 
the British plants produced a higher proportion of simpler undecorated varieties 
and a smaller proportion of more complex (filled or chocolate-coated) varieties, 
which involve more production processes; those varieties that account for the most 
expensive 15% of the tonnage produced in the Dutch sample accounted for only 5% 
in the British sample (Mason et al., 1992: 51; 60). As such differences were found of 
even greater significance in the extension of this study to France and Germany, this 
led the researchers to develop an explicit measure for the quality of biscuits. When 
differences in quality were neglected, the Dutch plants had an output that was some 
25% higher than in British and French plants; these in turn had a 25% advantage 
over Germany. But the detailed information gathered enabled researchers to classify 
the outputs of all 29 plants that were visited in the four countries into three different 
grades of product defined in terms of technical characteristics such as the number 
of processes involved in their production and the types of ingredients and packaging 
materials used. These enabled them to estimate inter-country differences in average 
levels of product quality, by weighting the different quality-grades produced in each 
country by the retail price ratios. And when adjusting for quality differences this way, 
quite different results emerged. Productivity was found to be highest in Germany: 
on average, German productivity was about 15% higher than in the Netherlands and 
France, and 40% above the British levels (Mason et al., 1993).
 In the Anglo-Dutch-American precision engineering comparison, potential 
quality differences were addressed differently, by exactly that step that Daly et al. 
(1985) chose to forego: looking, not at matched simple products, but at matched 
manufacturing processes in the countries (Mason & Finegold, 1995). In each country, 
firms were identified that produce a particular type of product: centrifugal liquid 
pumps, industrial hydraulic valves and cold-coiled compression springs. Because 
each establishment still produced products to a wide range of physical dimensions 
and other specification, it proved impossible to obtain meaningful measures of 
total output and labor productivity. Instead, Mason & Finegold (1995) moved on 
to compare direct labor inputs involved in specified sequences of operations in the 
manufacture of similar individual products: i.e. the coiling and grinding phases of 
spring manufacture, the machining of key components of pumps and valves, and 
their subsequent assembly. Detailed information was obtained on actual output 
rates and direct labor inputs, which led to estimates of the average outputs per 
direct person-hour. In the end, one compares for example for the machining of a 
key component of a pump the average machine operation time for that part, divided 
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by the average number of individual machines a worker operates. Mason & Finegold 
(1995) have found marked international differences in the organization of work 
and the qualifications of workers in those key occupations. For instance, American 
operators on average operate 2 machines, but British and Dutch operators only 1.5; 
and the percentage of the workforce with no formal educational qualifications and 
only on-the-job training is roughly 70% in the U.S., 59% in Britain, but only 22% in 
the Netherlands. The American establishments held a productivity advantage over 
both their Dutch and (even more so) British counterparts. But these predominantly 
stem from larger batch sizes and higher automation levels in American firms. In the 
case of matched machine set-up operations, for example, the actual times required 
to carry out given sequences of tasks in the U.S. were found to be on average 
much the same as in the U.K., and about 50% longer than in the Netherlands. The 
American establishments lacked craft-skilled shop floor workers and supervisors 
as compared to the U.K. and (even more so) the Netherlands. But the larger scale 
of production implies that American shop floor workers need much less flexibility 
(i.e. between different machines and products) than their European counterparts. 
And, contrary to the lower skills level of frontline workers and their supervisors, 
American firms have a number of college-trained manufacturing engineers that 
fulfill a key role in work organization and in remedying day-to-day problems. In 
addition, a more systematic approach to formal and/or informal on-the-job training 
in some U.S. firms counters the lack of initial craft training.
 The NIESR was not the only one to compare firms within an industry over 
different countries. Another important line of research concerns the International 
Assembly Plant Study, carried out by the International Motor Vehicle Program 
(IMVP) at M.I.T. IMVP originally was a five year research program sponsored by 
virtually every automotive company in the world, leading to the influential “The 
machine that changed the world” (Womack et al., 1990). It continued as a center 
for the study of industrial competitiveness sponsored by the Sloan Foundation, and 
has since then hosted several waves of the International Assembly Plant study (cf. 
MacDuffie & Kochan, 1995; MacDuffie & Pil, 1996). Firm choices about production 
strategy emerge as the primary determinant of training. In particular, training 
is linked to the overall organizational logic of production, and not just to human 
resources policies. Technology (measured by a robotics index) does not influence 
training level. Limited support is found for national differences in training level 
between production locations, apart from differences in production systems. U.S. 
firms do invest more in training than their Japanese and European competitors. 
But ownership seems as powerful a channel for national effects on training levels 
as production location: Japanese-owned American-based plants train more and 
U.S.-owned European-based plants train less than locally owned plants. Japanese-
owned plants appear to train a lot because they rely heavily on flexible production, 
European-owned European plants and plants in the newly industrialized countries 
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train more than their production approach would predict (MacDuffie & Kochan, 
1995).
 Quack et al. (1994, 1995) have compared the developments in recruitment 
and training practices in German, British and French banks, based on a number 
of interviews with personnel and training managers in major banks in the three 
countries. Not surprisingly, these were quite different, reflecting different national 
education and training institutions. More surprisingly, while often similar pressures 
lead to changes in all three countries, change is occurring in different ways in each 
country. Part of this may again reflect traditional differences in national education 
and training institutions. But the important point is that these latter institutions 
themselves are also undergoing change, and that banks are often actively involved 
in getting institutions and regulations adapted to their own needs. Quack et al. 
(1994) conclude that the sectoral level is an important arena where actors negotiate 
changes in regulatory systems between the firm and the national level. However, 
this does not only apply to education and training institutions, but sometimes 
also to key issues in the organization of production/service delivery. This appears 
particularly relevant in banking. Contrary to manufacturing, where each firm is 
solely responsible for the quality of its own products, in banking, product quality to 
some part is crucially dependent upon mutual cooperation. For instance, my ATM 
card will be more valuable to me if I can use it at any banks’ ATM. The history of 
product and process innovations in the automation of financial transactions in the 
Netherlands provides a good illustration of the delicate relations between firms’ 
individual strategies and their joint cooperation (Tijdens, 1992). Banks of course 
pursue their own automation procedures in front- and back-offices, and this has 
been found to affect the qualitative mix of their labor demand (De Grip & Groot, 
1990). But several key product and process innovations, which decisively influence 
changing labor demands, could only be achieved through cooperative efforts at the 
sector level.
 Keltner (1995) interviewed 60 bank executives and managers in Germany and 
the U.S., as well as several industry consultants and representatives of employers’ 
associations and unions. He tries to “…explain the contrast between the stable 
market position of German banks and the declining fortunes of their American 
counterparts…” (Keltner, 1995: 45). While external factors have a role to play (e.g. 
the fact that American banks were only allowed to enter the rapidly growing markets 
for investment and insurance products at a relatively late date), Keltner stresses the 
importance of banks’ own strategies and choices. German banks invested heavily 
in human capital and the organizational capabilities necessary to pursue a strategy 
of ‘relationship banking’. Extensive apprenticeship training and ample opportunities 
for upward mobility of their employees were crucial parts of this strategy. And by 
offering their customers high levels of financial advice, quality service, and the 
convenience of one provider for financial products, they have managed to retain 
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their competitive position relative to other suppliers of such services. American 
banks invested heavily in information technology and rationalizing employment, 
but in the process lost some things that proved to be main sources of competitive 
advantage: advisory quality, and customer contact as a means to generating market 
information. They chose to compete on price and convenience, and their customers 
found that other financial providers could do as well in these areas. One lesson to 
be learnt from this study is that high labor productivity in contemporary tasks, while 
important, is not the only relevant economic performance criterion for a successful 
human resources strategy. In line with Keltner’s analyses, Paauwe & Williams (1998: 
71) see banks gradually turn into labor intensive firms where a large share of the 
employees has an important effect on a bank’s economic performance.
 The importance of this literature, and the reason to discuss it so extensively 
here, is, first, to caution the reader for a naïve technological determinism in thinking 
about the relation between technology, work organization and training. Technology 
does not (completely) determine work organization, which does not (completely) 
determine training. Firms have ample scope in defining their own strategies in 
these areas. Similar machinery allows for quite different forms of work organization 
in different firms, which in turn may lead to quite different structures of firms’ labor 
demand (in terms of workers’ qualifications). This makes for differences between 
similar firms within a country; but of more particular interest to our purposes 
here is the apparent correlation between certain types of work organization, 
institutionalization patterns of training, and firms’ strategies with nations. The 
separate cases of different sectors show such patterns for those separate sectors; 
but the multitude of such studies comparing British and German firms shows similar 
national differences across quite different sectors. National characteristics, such 
as education and training institutions, influence firms’ choices in these respects. 
However, as national institutions do not dictate work organization any more than 
technology does, there will still be substantial variation across firms within a country. 
In particular, we see important differences in the role and operation of internal labor 
markets within firms. Various types of rule such as wage systems, job classifications, 
and rules regarding employment security tend to fit together in a more or less 
coherent system, representing the overall human resource management strategy 
of a firm (Osterman, 1994). Again, to some extent national characteristics seem 
to be involved. German firms, for example, have better job security, a stronger 
influence for employees through workforce councils, lower ratios of supervisors to 
frontline employees, and more emphasis on formal skills-based training than their 
American counterparts. This way, firms and their strategic choices are a crucial 
intermediary variable between qualifications and economic performance.
 Concerning the nations analyzed in this book, the aforementioned literature 
points out that apprenticeship may have an additional advantage for Germany above 
the low level of youth unemployment and the adequate school-to-work transition: 
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it may help German firms in maintaining a high-quality competitive strategy in 
international markets. The U.S. and the Netherlands have, unfortunately been 
included in substantially fewer of such studies. Based upon the material available, 
Dutch (metalworking and food-processing) firms seem to more closely resemble the 
German patterns of well-trained and adequately skilled frontline workers enabling 
a high productivity and high product quality. The overall American productivity 
advantage seems to be caused predominantly by the large scale of production and 
subsequent economies of scale; skills levels of frontline workforce are generally 
below those of their German and Dutch counterparts, although an active approach 
to on-the-job training may counteract these differences.
 Finally, this line of research also provides a nuanced view of the relation 
between training and economic success. Education and training are considered 
of increasing importance for the competitiveness of firms, economic sectors and 
nations. With shrinking trade barriers and increasing international competition, the 
qualifications of the workforce are one of ever fewer remaining instruments to 
enhance competitiveness. Keltner (1995) provides an example of how a lower skills 
level may cause firms to (relatively) miss out on certain market opportunities. 
 Finegold et al. (1994) show work organization and (low) skills levels to be 
factors that played a role in the decline of the competitive position of the once 
superior American machine tool industry over the nineteen eighties. Even while 
this industry itself had come up with the most important technological innovation 
in the sector (computer-numerically-controlled machines), Japanese and German30 
firms came up with more successful productive strategies in using such machines. 
Competition is pretty global in the machine tool industry, and the technology is 
worldwide available. Around 1980, the competitive position of American machine 
tool firms seemed excellent. Surprisingly, the production volume of the American 
machine tool industry then sharply decreased in the early eighties, and stabilized at 
that lower level. Simultaneously, the production volume of the German and, even 
more so, Japanese machine tool industry grew. The American import of foreign 
machine tools rose in just seven years from 24% to 54%! Several factors are 
held responsible for this dramatic collapse of the American machine tool industry; 
international differences in the skills level of frontline workers and supervisors and 
work organization figure prominently among them. Finegold et al. (1994) list four 
factors that particularly caused Japanese and German firms to opt for a ‘high skills’ 
strategy: a well functioning general education system; labor market structures and 
industrial relations that discourage poaching of skilled workers; a high skill level 
among workers of client firms using the machine tools (that stimulate machine tool 
firms to develop tools that use those skills); and high labor/dismissal costs that 
discourage them from a ‘low cost’ strategy.
To balance the picture somewhat: while the German institutionalization of markets 
for intermediate skills is held responsible for the relative success of its machine tool 
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industry over the eighties, it has not prevented its own crisis over the mid-nineties 
(Herrigel, 1989; 1994; 1996). Herrigel (1996) makes the controversial statement 
that apprenticeship itself now hampered these firms to adapt to new competitive 
challenges. Specifically, the high degree of specialization of skilled workers and the 
narrow functional orientation of managers from different disciplines hamper the 
establishment of multi-functional and integrated product teams. As I did my German 
interviews with metalworking firms in the same German state around the same time, 
I witnessed that establishing multi-functional and integrated product teams was 
indeed a key and problematic issue there at the time. But the apprenticeship system 
itself did not appear to be an important cause of the problem. Herrigel neglected 
the important broadening of metalworking training occupations as early as the 
seventies, when the number of occupations had already been drastically reduced, 
and a common first training year across the new occupations was established (cf. 
chapter 3). If anything, necessary changes in this direction within apprenticeship 
significantly preceded this crisis, so apprenticeship rigidity can hardly be blamed 
here. The problem as I perceived it was more one of workers identifying with their 
current jobs, and hesitant to organizational/occupational change. Finegold & Wagner 
(1997) confirmed that German pump manufactures were slow to adapt to the new 
work organization, but also point out that they have come up with alternative ways 
of work reorganization that may prove equally successful.
The point here was, therefore, certainly not to argue the overall superiority of 
high skills strategies over low cost strategies; but just to show that skills strategies 
may have their consequences in terms of economic performance, which may or may 
not offset differences in labor costs; and, perhaps even more importantly, to show 
that the success of various strategies may vary over time. It is wise, therefore, to 
distrust analyses that argue that economic conditions force firms/workers/nations 
to pursue one and only one particular type of strategy in order to be successful.
2.3.9 Skills equilibriums 
Having outlined relevant actors and institutions that jointly constitute different 
governance regimes, the cream on the pie is still lacking: a concept to identify 
broad differences between various markets for intermediate skills, in the sense of 
a field-specific concept with which to label broadly different outcomes of different 
governance regimes for such markets.
 Finegold & Soskice (1988) have introduced the concept of a skills equilibrium 
to analyze national markets for intermediate skills, and the differences between 
them. The term equilibrium refers to a self-reinforcing network of societal and state 
institutions, which interact to influence the demand for improvements in skills levels 
(Finegold & Soskice, 1988: 22). This network includes the organization of industry, 
firms and the work process, the industrial relations system, financial markets, the 
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state and political structure, as well as the operation of the education and training 
system. Two kinds of skills equilibriums are distinguished. In the aforementioned 
article, Finegold & Soskice analyze the U.K. as a low-skills equilibrium: a country 
in which the education and training system has delivered badly educated and 
minimally trained school-leavers to an economy which has been geared to operate 
with a relatively unskilled labor force (Finegold & Soskice, 1988: 49). Soskice 
(1994) uses the concept to analyze the most famous counter-case: the German 
high-skills equilibrium. These analyses do, obviously, not preclude that individual 
firms or citizens succeed in taking different paths; there are highly skilled British 
workers and low-skilled German firms.
 The most important merit of the concept of a skills equilibrium does not lie in 
the exact ‘measurement’ of the performance of markets for intermediate skills. 
Labeling national VET markets as either a low- or a high-skills equilibrium is not 
very exact31; and Finegold and Soskice were but two in a long line of (in particular, 
British) scholars to observe British weaknesses in skills of the labor force as 
compared to other countries in general and Germany in particular, nor do they offer 
the most compelling evidence of the German advantage in this field32. Instead, 
the most important strength of the skills equilibrium approach lies in its ability to 
offer a comprehensive explanation of how and why a particular equilibrium exists 
within a particular country, and what institutions help to explain its self-reinforcing 
tendency. Its analyses point out how the specific institutionalization of a particular 
national market for intermediate skills (in the low-skills case) discourages or (in the 
high-skills case) encourages firms and citizens to invest in training. In countries 
where institutional incentives to invest in training are low, firms have to work with 
a relatively low-skilled workforce. This fact will bias most of them to production 
or services they can accomplish with those skills; and that fact then creates a 
feedback effect from the current labor market demand on the current training level. 
In a low-skills equilibrium, where most firms do not demand too many skills, there 
is less reason for young people to heavily invest in education and training than in 
a high-skills equilibrium. There, the high supply of skills will have led many firms 
to specialize in products or services in which those skills give them a competitive 
advantage; and the relatively high demand for skills will (ceteris paribus) stimulate 
individuals to embark on more education and training than in the low-skills case. 
The equilibrium notion implies that a change in any single component of the 
aforementioned institutional network that constitutes a particular skills equilibrium, 
without corresponding shifts in the other institutional variables, may result in only 
small long-term shifts in the equilibrium position. For instance, a state investing in 
improvements in its education and training system may not be able to reap the full 
benefits of this if it does not simultaneously address issues in the labor market or 
the industrial relations system.
 One important caveat about this skills equilibrium approach is that it sometimes 
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has occupied the gray border area between a typology of markets for intermediate 
skills, and an overall typology of entire national labor markets (including lower and 
higher skills levels). The reader should be fully aware that, in this book at least, it 
is exclusively employed to analyze markets for intermediate skills. In labeling, for 
instance, the American market for intermediate skills as a low-skills equilibrium, 
we imply no more than what has otherwise been noted as the ‘missing middle’ in 
the American labor market. We will focus the analysis in the three country chapters 
exclusively on their markets for intermediate skills. In evaluating the benefits and 
pitfalls of these markets for national economic and social performance, we will pay 
attention to the other skills levels. To again use the American case as an example, 
in evaluating their ‘missing middle’, one has to be keenly aware of the bipolar 
development of the American labor and VET market: employment growth and, 
correspondingly, training, are concentrated both at the higher (college) and lower 
levels. At least in terms of general economic performance, the U.S. seems (up to 
now) not to have decidedly suffered from this bipolar approach and its relative 
neglect of markets for intermediate skills.
 Another important caveat is the stability of skills equilibriums. While their short-
term stability is essential for the paradigm, and backed up empirically by the relative 
stability and path-dependency of different national cases of both high- and low-
skills examples, the concept would be relatively useless from a policy perspective if 
it would entirely preclude the possibility of changes to or shifts of such equilibriums. 
And it does not, nor does it imply that such changes or shifts would necessarily spin 
a country into disequilibrium. At the turn of the last century, Crouch et al. (1999: 
22) have discussed apparent changes to the British low-skills equilibrium. They 
point to recent initiatives to improve work skills and the skills equilibrium in Britain, 
the stereotypical low-skills example of the eighties. However: they simultaneously 
pointed to the lowering of wage and non-wage costs there, in order to enable 
British firms to better follow the logic of the low-skills equilibrium. Balancing both 
developments, their actual challenge here is the underlying message in Finegold 
and Soskice (1988) that countries that would fail to achieve a high-skills equilibrium 
could find themselves spinning into disequilibrium33. As the U.K. was not included 
in the research portrayed in this book, I will abstain from a discussion of the British 
case. It is, however, worth noting that, regardless of the empirical developments 
in the U.K., such an underlying message would have been inconsistent with the 
skills equilibrium concept to begin with: for it would have implied that, in the long 
run, only high-skills equilibriums would prove stable, and low-skills equilibriums 
would not. In that case, why would one even introduce the concept of a low-skills 
equilibrium?
 The finer and more interesting point here is therefore that using the notion 
of equilibriums does not preclude gradual (long-term) change. If one accepts the 
possibility of multiple equilibriums, it makes perfect sense for at least the theoretical 
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possibility that the one (low) may evolve into the other (high), or vice versa. While 
most economic analysis in one form or another is based on the notion of an economic 
equilibrium, it does not preclude the possibility of economic change, either into 
disequilibrium or into another type of equilibrium, and there is no reason to proceed 
differently when analyzing markets for intermediate skills with the concept of skills 
equilibriums. The relative stability of national skills equilibriums over the past 
decades provides us with an excellent reason to approach international comparisons 
in this field from an equilibrium perspective. At the same time, these institutional 
regimes do constantly change in one aspect or another; and while each individual 
change may indeed result in only small long-term shifts in the equilibrium position, 
there is no reason to assume that the self-reinforcing nature of institutional regimes 
shaping such equilibriums will always be as strong as to preclude a particular 
combination of small changes to result in a shift from a low-skills equilibrium into 
a high-skills one – or vice versa. An additional advantage of the skills equilibriums 
concept in international comparisons of the status quo in national markets for 
intermediate skills is in fact that it identifies particular (combinations of) crucial 
institutional arrangements that tend to stimulate skills investments (or not), which 
implies that, at least in principle, a (targeted combination of) changes in these 
arrangements might influence the previous equilibrium position of a country. The 
reason for most scholars’ substantial skepticism towards swift fundamental change 
is based on the realization that the actual emergence of a coherent combination 
of the various individual institutional changes that would be necessary to rapidly 
shift a low-skill equilibrium into a high-skill one is highly unlikely. To sum up: the 
use of the notion of skills equilibriums does not preclude the possibility of such 
equilibriums changing over time, but goes to show that such change – if it occurs at 
all – will typically be slow and gradual. And focusing on the institutional causes for 
the self-reinforcing inclination of such equilibriums is in fact the most fruitful way to 
study the possibilities and limits of policymakers’ reform attempts in this area.
2.4 Epilogue
The proof of the pudding is, as usual, in the eating, in this case the consumption 
of the remaining chapters. In chapters 3 through 5, we will use the concepts of 
governance regimes and skills equilibriums, in conjunction with the more specific 
range of actors and relevant institutional arrangements identified throughout section 
2.3, to analyze and compare the institutionalization of markets for intermediate 
skills in Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands. Chapter 6 will then reflect back on 
the reletive merits of using a governance regime approach to analyse markets for 
intermediate skills.

95
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
Notes chapter 2
1 The term ‘market for intermediate skills’ should of course in no way be taken as an 
implicit reference to an overriding importance of the coordination mechanism ‘market’. 
‘Market for intermediate skills’ it is simply the accepted description for the social field 
that is the object of this study in the international literature. Cf. section 2.3.3.
2 Steinmo et al. (1992) use the label ‘historical institutionalism’ to distinguish another, 
additional type of neo-instutionalism: historical-interpretative institutionalism, which 
they distinguish from rational choice institutionalism. The label draws attention to 
another important institutionalist critique of rational choice theories: their neglect of the 
influence of history on social behavior and events. We will return to this issue later in 
this chapter.
3 Cf. the criticism on the old institutionalism in section 2.3.1.
4 The QWERTY layout of typewriters and keyboards is the celebrated example of a Pareto-
inefficient equilibrium outcome: we all have come to use it, though better layouts were 
available (David, 1985).
5 Note, however, that a closer look at, for instance, daily operations of an association, 
such as a union, may reveal that it actually operates along these same lines as 
separately institutionalized collective and corporate actors. We will return to this topic 
when discussing associations in section 2.3.6.3.
6 Of course, it is the ‘real’ situation (as perceived by a hypothetical fully informed 
observer with unlimited computational capabilities) and not a perception thereof that 
codetermines the outcome and payoffs of the actions chosen (cf. Mayntz & Scharpf, 1995: 
58-60).
7 Individuals often assume several roles on behalf of different reference units. Normally, 
it will be clear on whose behalf they are acting, but there may be situations where they 
may evaluate actions from the perspective of more than one reference unit (Scharpf, 
1997: 61).
8 Of course, nothing prevents me us from spontaneously calling a vote in a random 
crowd. But it would have to be interpreted by the scientific observer as a unilateral 
action on my part. That act would not suddenly change the mode of interaction in 
that random crowd from ‘unilateral action’ to ‘majority voting’, not even if the crowd, 
surprisingly enough, would instantaneously comply. In the unlikely event it would, what 
we have is a case where individual actors all suddenly act the same. In the light of this 
evident empirical evidence of a sudden similarity of individual choices, actor-centered 
institutionalism then allows a simpler description of the event in terms of an aggregate 
actor (‘the crowd’) and would search for an explanation for the event, in particular the 
sudden spontaneous similarity (e.g. a shared grief we may have tapped).
9 This, by the way, explains why in mob movies it is always the little crooks that do not 
rat on their bosses and go to jail for them, while bosses do rat on other bosses in return 
for a lighter sentence.
10 In the Dutch case, in particular private schools for primary and secondary education 
have room to exclude individuals. This implies that excludability remains relevant as far 
as it may result in student selection in better and worse performing schools. But this is 
a different level of analysis than applied in the main text.
11 Non-competition clauses in labor contracts may sometimes infringe upon this freedom, 
but they are the exception rather than the general rule in labor markets.
12 This definition fits the view on actor’s orientations in actor-centered institutionalism 
(cf. section 2.3). Skills are not only a matter of cognitive (and manual) aspects, but 
include motivational and relational aspects. Together, they form some sort of worker 
identity, which includes norms and interests stemming from their self-orientation as well 
as different system-orientations, including those on their firm and their department/
work group.
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13 There are two theoretical approaches to this theme in labor law. There is a contractual 
approach, focussing on the contract both parties agreed upon, which precludes 
subsequent unilateral change of job descriptions. And there is an institutional approach, 
which focuses on the fact that the worker has voluntarily joined a firm when concluding 
the contract, and that management prerogative may require unilateral changes even if 
the worker disagrees – provided the changes are just and fair. So even within this second 
approach, the prerogative is not unlimited.
14 And these can be quite relevant; take the example of how computer games kids 
play provide an important basis for their computer literacy that is highly relevant for a 
growing number of jobs.
15 Katz & Ziderman (1990) themselves actually use Becker’s concept of general training. 
We have previously outlined why we prefer the concept of transferable training. As their 
analysis equally applies to transferable training, we prefer to use that term in the main 
text.
16 In the main text, we discuss internal labor markets as if they would consist of one 
single job ladder. As Osterman (1994) notes, over time sensitivity has been heightened 
to the fact that a firm is not a unitary employment system but rather consists of a set 
of subsystems that may operate on quite different principles. For example, there often 
is a distinction between at least a subsystem for clerical workers and one for production 
workers in a factory. Van Veen (1997) provides a comprehensive empirical study of the 
internal labor market of a large Dutch industrial firm consisting of a detailed analysis of 
internal mobility patterns between jobs, and shows the existence of several job ladders 
even within production departments.
17 This is where the institution of occupation comes in; we will discuss it extensively in 
section 2.3.6.3.
18 In their most radical versions, such theories have proposed that education does not 
increase the productivity of students. Instead, more talented individuals will just have 
more success in education systems, and employers simply use credentials from the 
education system to select the more talented from the rest of the crop. While this 
version overstates the case for a selection perspective, it is important to be aware of the 
fact that education systems in fact do serve all three functions (qualification, selection 
and legitimization). While the theme of legitimization will not explicitly be a factor in our 
analysis, we will analyze markets for intermediate skills with our eye on both qualification 
and selection processes, and how they relate.
19 Other European countries where such a debate continues are France and Italy. 
Compare Crouch et al. (1999: 114; 126) for an overview and further references for both 
countries.
20 The same multi-level character applies to both the state and hierarchies. On the one 
hand, they are a coordination mechanism that coordinates preferences of individuals into 
joint decisions and actions. On the other, they operate as composite actors that can act 
unilaterally vis-à-vis external incentives and organizations. Both state and associations 
share a distinctively democratic shape of their internal make-up; while hierarchies also 
have one form or another of corporate governance to ensure its actions somehow reflect 
the interests of its constituents (capital holders and workers), management prerogative 
within firms generally extends beyond that experienced by Secretaries of State and state 
department officials, and of managers and staff of associations.
21 Cf. chapter 5 for a more extensive overview of the organization of the Dutch education 
system.
22 With the obvious exception of teacher training colleges, which are not covered in this 
book.
23 Obviously schools operate on the demand side in terms of hiring teachers, but as 
these are supplied by higher education, they fall outside of the analysis of markets for 
intermediate skills in this book.
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24 There are various related terms with similar but somewhat different interpretations. 
We abstain from a discussion of these here. 
25 Data are not without their flaws. First, the labeling of various national education types 
according to various levels is not as perfect as one might hope for. While there certainly 
is some method to it, debate is possible. For instance, the labeling of Dutch HBO has 
been upgraded one level between different years of the CERI publication that is the best 
available source for such statistics. The most important caveat is that such comparisons 
have to follow the internal logic of national systems. This means, for instance, that 
(participation in and graduation of) American two-year (community/technical) colleges 
is interpreted as tertiary level, while the relevant tracks seem to more closely resemble 
Dutch (upper secondary) four-year MBO than Dutch (tertiary) HBO, in comparison. We 
leave it at that; the general point here is to show why the U.S. is generally perceived as 
a low-skills equilibrium and Germany and the Netherlands as high-skills equilibria, and 
they serve that purpose regardless of such limitations.
26 As mentioned in the previous note, American two-year colleges are counted as tertiary 
education institutions while the tracks they offer seem more comparable to the three- to 
four-year upper secondary VET tracks in the Netherlands and Germany. Including their 
participants in the count of upper secondary tracks for the US would somewhat narrow 
the gap, but far from close it.
27 Note, however, that the percentage of Americans in age groups 25-34, 35-44, and 
45-54 with at least an upper secondary education diploma is more than 10% higher 
(CERI, 1996: 36). The probable explanation is that a substantial share of Americans 
acquires that qualification when they are a little older than the theoretical graduation 
age; the institutionalization of the General Equivalency Diploma might play a role here 
(cf. Chapter 4).
28 Both countries also show a similar difference in such participation across groups with 
various levels of educational degrees, with participation for those with just a primary 
education not over 15%, and that for those with a university education around 50% 
(CERI, 1996: 133). Participation for those with upper secondary education is a little 
higher for Germany (28%) than for the U.S. (24%).
29 Though variability was too great for this difference to significant beyond the 10%-
level.
30 The Italian machine tool industry was even more successful than the German one, and 
offers an intriguing case because of the relative lack of formal VET. Cf. Finegold et al. 
(1994) and Crouch et al (1999: 83-84; 100).
31 To be sure: exact ‘measurement’ of the performance of national VET markets is far 
more difficult than the availability of comparative data on education systems and labor 
markets would seem to indicate, as discussed in the previous section.
32 In particular the series of matched plant comparisons performed by the London 
National Institute for Social and Economic Research, discussed in the previous section, 
offers more compelling evidence of British-German differences. Cf. Prais (1995a; 1995b) 
for an overview, and section 2.3.8.
33 Crouch et al (1999: 22) also list several recent changes they observe in the international 
economy, which raise doubt even on the stability of high-skills equilibriums.
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3  The German market for intermediate skills
3.1 Introduction
Germany has served as a best case scenario of the institutionalization of markets 
for intermediate skills since at least the 1980s, with the German apprenticeship 
system as the key institutional figuration to attract this international praise (cf. 
Chapter 1). While the German economic problems of the 1990s (persistent long-
term unemployment in particular), as well as the (so far) unsuccessful attempt 
to build an apprenticeship in former Eastern-Germany, have jointly dimmed the 
shine of its success, it still stands as an attractive and intriguing example of the 
institutionalization of markets for intermediate skills.
This chapter will analyze the governance regime that rules the German market 
for intermediate skills, and the way in which various actors respond to the incentive 
structure it poses, which has culminated in a seemingly stable high-skills equilibrium. 
The chapter is based on extensive field research in Germany in 1994-1995. The 
analysis is limited to the territory of former West-Germany, since our primary goal 
for the German case study in the context of this international comparison was to 
analyze the constitution of a persistent high-skills equilibrium there. The tale of 
economic transition in the former German Democratic Republic is a different one, 
and one that implies that the institutionalization of the market for intermediate 
skills would have to be in a radical transition. While an analysis of such a transition 
is certainly intriguing, we have decided not to risk our goal of a thorough analysis 
of the West-German market for intermediate skills by a limited excursion into a very 
different and unsettled Eastern market.
The fieldwork in Germany began with an extended stay at the ‘Bundesinstitut 
für Berufsbildung’ (BIBB) for desk research (a review of literature and statistical 
information) and a first round of expert interviews there. It continued with interviews 
with experts at the federal level (representatives of the federal government, national 
peak employers’ associations and union federations) as well as at the national 
sector level (employers’ associations and unions in construction, metalworking and 
banking, cf. Chapter 1). The final stage focused on the state of Baden-Württemberg 
and included interviews with representatives of state departments, VET schools, 
employers’ associations and unions (state peak organizations and those in 
metalworking), metalworking firms and various other relevant local organizations. 
In all, 73 interviews were conducted. The German case study was reported on in a 
separate report (Van Lieshout, 1996a).
Section 3.2 will portray German socio-economic order, industrial relations and 
some key aspects of labor market governance and operation. In section 3.3 we 
will portray the German education system and its various components. Section 
3.4 will depict German school-to-work transition patterns. In section 3.5 we will 
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take a closer look at the governance regime that covers the majority German 
school-to-work transitions: apprenticeship. Section 3.6 will elaborate on the 
reasons why apprenticeship attracts so many German youth. In section 3.7 we 
will elaborate on the reasons why German firms are inclined to provide so many 
apprenticeship opportunities. Section 3.8 offers some conclusions on the German 
skills equilibrium. 
3.2 Socio-economic order, industrial relations and labor  
  market governance in Germany
Among our three countries, the socio-economic regimes in Germany and the 
Netherlands show a much closer resemblance than either of those with the U.S.. 
This section will therefore portray the German socio-economic order in general, 
and industrial relations and labor market governance in particular, from an 
implicit comparative perspective with their American counterparts. Similarities 
and differences between Germany and the Netherlands in these respects will be 
discussed in chapter 5.
3.2.1 The German state and socio-economic governance
Germany, to begin with, is a federal state, like the U.S., and like the U.S., much 
authority is located at the level of the individual states (‘Bundesländer’). The 
German constitution strongly divides authority between the federal government 
and the individual states; the latter exercise primary powers in areas such as 
education, environment and the supervision of local government. In contrast to 
American federalism, however, where the federal government and the states each 
cover specific policy fields which they administer largely independently from each 
other, German layers of government to a large extent share power (Katzenstein, 
1987). On most policy initiatives, the German parliament (‘Bundestag’) must reach 
agreement with the ‘Bundesrat’, a council composed of representatives of each 
individual state. In addition, the German term ‘Politikverflechtung’ (interlocking 
politics) indicates that federal, state and local governments tend to cooperate 
horizontally and vertically in bilateral or multilateral political networks.
 Germany has a multi-party political system as opposed to the prevailing 
American political system where two parties alternate in forming federal and 
state governments. In practice, two German parties (the Christian Democratic 
CDU/CSU party and the Social Democratic SPD party) have also dominated the 
political landscape. The difference is that these have tended to govern in coalition 
governments which generally consisted of one of them and the smaller, liberal 
FDP. Coalition governments as well as the structure of German political parties (cf. 
Katzenstein, 1987: 39) reinforce consensus building, centrist political solutions, 
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and incremental change much more strongly than in the U.S., where one or the 
other party has full executive power. The important exception to the typical German 
coalition government was the so-called ‘grand coalition’ of CDU/CSU and SPD from 
1966-1969 – a period in which, not coincidentally, the German apprenticeship 
governance regime was modernized into its current form.
 The role of the state in Germany is larger than and different from its American 
counterpart (cf. CPB, 1997: chapter 5). The role of the American state is limited; 
economic adjustment is primarily left to private actors and market processes, and 
there is considerable skepticism towards government intervention in the economy. 
The American Constitution strongly protects individual rights and strictly separates 
legislative, executive and judiciary bodies. The primary role for the American state 
is to safeguard economic competition and to protect universal individual rights 
through strict application of control measures. This makes relationships between 
the state and companies somewhat adversarial (cf. Van Waarden, 1997). It also 
causes interest associations (such as employers’ associations and unions) to act 
primarily as lobbying organizations in their relationships with the state. This then 
feeds a perception of such associations as rent seekers, and reinforces (the call for) 
strict enforcement of regulation by the state.
 In Germany (and the Netherlands), cooperation and negotiation between the 
state and private agents within an elaborate institutional environment, as well 
as collective adaptability, are more strongly developed than in the U.S. (cf. CPB, 
1997: chapter 5). Interest associations in general, and employers’ associations and 
unions in particular, play prominent roles in this respect – the latter are often jointly 
referred to as ‘social partners’, a practice completely alien to the U.S.. Central and 
sectoral employers’ associations and unions traditionally fulfill important roles: not 
only do they negotiate wages, but they also fulfill other socio-economic roles, such 
as in the implementation and supervision of social security, and –as we will see- 
in the organization of VET. In these latter instances, these roles are defined by 
legislation in which the state delegates certain functions to the ‘social partners’. The 
roles of interest associations and the state are, however, more clearly defined and 
separated in Germany than they are in the Netherlands (as we will see in chapter 
5). The German Constitution, for instance, prohibits active participation in public 
policy formation.
3.2.2 German industrial relations
Wage formation, on the other hand, is an autonomous affair of employers’ 
associations and unions, who bargain over wages without any intervention by 
the government: they have bargaining autonomy (‘Tarifautonomie’), and are not 
constrained by (minimum) wage regulations imposed by the government.
 The organization of business interests in Germany consists of three tiers (Streeck 
102
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
et al., 1987: 7-9). First, there are employers’ associations that represent business 
interests in the field of social policy, and engage in collective bargaining with 
unions. Second, there are trade associations that focus on the economic, technical 
and commercial interests of their members. Both of these are normally organized 
nationwide on a sectoral basis, whereby the system of employers’ associations is 
less fragmented than that of trade associations. Some associations act as trade 
and employers’ associations at the same time. Third, there are various Chamber 
systems. Chambers are regional business associations that organize all firms in their 
region in a broad economic sector. These Chambers are a remarkable mixture of a 
semi-government organization representing public interests and a private interest 
organization representing business interests (Jäkel & Junge, 1986; Streeck et al., 
1987; Streeck, 1992). They see themselves as fulfilling the functions of interest 
representation as well as self-government for their member firms (Streeck et al., 
1987). In addition, the state has transferred a number of public responsibilities to 
them. One of the areas in which this is the case is vocational training (cf. section 
3.5.1). Membership of these Chambers is compulsory. Industry and commerce form 
the largest Chamber sector.
 The craft sector (‘Handwerk’) is another one, with a special status (Streeck, 1992: 
108-1134). Most of what is called ‘small business’ in other countries in Germany 
falls within the legal category of ‘Handwerk’. Its legal basis is the Statute of Artisans 
(‘Handwerksordnung’). German law defines ‘Handwerk’ as a particular mode of 
production in which only specifically licensed establishments or self-employed 
individuals are allowed to engage. The Statute of Artisans and a number of court 
rulings specify criteria that distinguish ‘Handwerk’ from other sectors, in particular 
from industry. The Statute lists 125 trades in which artisanal production may occur 
(‘handwerksfähige Gewerben’). Not all production in these trades is necessarily 
artisanal; it is only considered so if the firm is operated ‘in an artisanal fashion’. The 
operationalization of this requirement is not defined in the Statute, but is delegated 
to the courts. There is no single criterion that decides on the issue - not even size. 
As for the licensing of establishments and individuals, the ‘Handwerk’ license equals 
a Master certificate (Streeck, 1992: 111-112). The latter is acquired through first 
serving and completing an apprenticeship in the trade, subsequently working for a 
couple of years as a journeyman to gain work experience, and finally passing the 
final examination of a Master course at special Master schools (cf. section 3.3.6). 
Either (one of) the owner(s) or the production manager has to be a certified Master 
for a firm to obtain a license.
 On both the employers’ and the workers’ side, there are several peak associations 
(cf. Streeck et al., 1987; Visser, 1995; Van Waarden, 1995a). Since each tier of 
representation of business interests has its own peak association(s), their number 
is largest among employers; these have, however, created a special body for the 
coordination of the representation of business interests in training across all three 
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tiers: the Joint Committee of German Business for Vocational Training (‘Kuratorium 
der Deutschen Wirtschaft für Berufsausbildung’ or KDW). On the union side, in 
practice the German Trade Union Federation (`Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund’ or 
DGB) has been dominant, because it organized 81% of all union members in 1990 
in only seventeen sector-based unions (Visser, 1995). German unions are, in the 
typology presented in chapter 2, typical examples of the industrial union model.
Whereas in the U.S. collective bargaining at the firm level is predominant, in 
Germany (and the Netherlands) this is the case for sector level bargaining. As an 
exception to this general rule, however, there are about 4,000 firms in the entire 
German federation (including former East Germany) that negotiate independently 
with unions (Schnabel, 1995). Volkswagen AG is a prime example of a firm-level 
agreement, but generally firm-level agreements in Germany concern small firms 
that closely follow sectoral agreements (CPB, 1997: 316). Sectoral collective 
agreements are usually not concluded at the federal level (an exception being the 
construction sector) but at the level of one state or even a part of one state (such as 
in metalworking). Regional negotiations within one sector are closely coordinated 
within the national unions and the employers’ associations for the sector, so that 
regional variations are small (Schnabel, 1995). Separate but identical agreements 
are concluded if more than one union represents the workers of that particular 
industry. Different agreements with different durations are concluded for different 
aspects of collective bargaining. Negotiations on wage increases mostly take place 
on a yearly basis, while general labor conditions (including the wage structure) are 
usually fixed for several years (CPB, 1997: 306). Bargaining agreements specify 
minimum conditions regarding wages.
 Collective bargaining agreements can be extended through two types of extension 
mechanisms. Firm-level extension makes a collective bargaining agreement 
binding for non-unionized workers within a firm. While this mechanism is not legally 
institutionalized in Germany, in practice it nearly always holds, through a voluntary 
clause in the collective agreement or the individual labor contract (Jacobs, 1993). 
Collective extension makes an agreement legally binding for the entire industry 
(for the entire country or its relevant region), including employers who are not 
affiliated with the employer’s organization. German labor law specifies that the 
national or state Secretary of Labor can declare a collective bargaining agreement 
to be ‘generally binding’ if firms employing at least half of the workers in the sector 
have signed it, and if the extension ‘serves the general interest’ (Freeman; 1994b: 
20; Freeman & Katz, 1994: 51; CPB, 1997: 310). Usually, however, the state does 
declare collective bargaining agreements generally binding for all firms in the 
sector and region covered (Van Waarden, 1995b), which extends their application 
beyond mere members of the unions and the employers’ associations signing the 
agreement.
 In 1990 trade union density was twice as high in Germany (33%) as in the 
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U.S. (16%) CPB, 1997: 307). This unionization rate has held steady in Germany, 
while it has dropped significantly in countries such as the U.S. and the Netherlands 
(Freeman & Katz, 1994: 53, CPB, 1997: 307). Strikes, however, occur much less 
frequently in Germany (and the Netherlands) than in the U.S. (cf. CPB, 1997: 311). 
Employers’ organization density is, at 90%, much higher than union density (CPB, 
1997: 307). American figures are lacking, and less relevant due to the fact that 
American collective bargaining is predominantly firm-based. 90% of all German 
employees in 1990 were covered by a collective bargaining agreement, whereas 
only 18% were in the U.S. (CPB, 1997: 307). Only 3% of all  German employees 
were covered due to the collective extension discussed above. 95% of workers in 
the metalworking sector and all construction workers were bound by sector level 
collective bargaining agreements (Van Waarden, 1995a). 
 While rankings of national industrial relations systems in terms of centralization 
of wage setting vary1, it is safe to say that the German system is rather centralized, 
particularly when compared to the U.S.. As in the Netherlands, national confederations 
of trade unions and employer organizations perform supportive and coordinating 
roles in the sector level bargaining process, but do not participate directly. Contrary 
to the Netherlands, however, peak level organizations of employers’ and workers’ 
organizations lack a formal system of joint discussions at the national level (Soskice, 
1990) and do not interact on a regular basis. Overt coordination between sectoral 
bargaining units in their peak level organizations is weaker than in the Netherlands, 
while covert coordination is relatively strong, with collective bargaining in key 
sectors (in particular metalworking) setting the stage for other sectors (CPB, 1997: 
314; Katz, 1993).
 German industrial relations are, however, not only strongly institutionalized at 
national, regional and sector levels, but also at the local level. German works councils 
enjoy a wide variety of information, consultation and co-determination rights; but 
they cannot call strikes. One important example is co-determination rights on 
individual staff movement, which includes hiring, evaluation, redeployment and 
dismissal (Rogers & Streeck, 1994: 101). German works councils are elected by the 
entire work force in workplaces with five or more employees, every four years on 
a nationwide election day, with a turnout averaging 90% (Rogers & Streeck, 1994; 
104, 113). The fact that roughly 80% of all seats nationwide tends to be won by 
affiliates of the largest German union confederation (DGB) is an important source 
of its strength, legitimacy and pride (Rogers & Streeck, 1994: 105). German works 
councils in practice function as an extension to unions (Visser, 1995). The German 
Works Constitution Act forbids councils to bargain over basic wages and holds them 
legally responsible to uphold and supervise the implementation of any collective 
agreement applicable to their firm (Rogers & Streeck: 105), thus stimulating 
congruency over competition between national and sector-level collective bargaining 
and workplace democracy in a major area. Works councils have safeguarded the 
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presence of unions in the workplace, and enabled them to represent their matters 
on ‘qualitative’, non-wage matters (Rogers & Streeck, 1994: 117, 149). In addition 
to works councils, there are two other mechanisms of collective representation in 
large German establishments. Plants with a strong union presence have a caucus 
of union delegates, elected by union and members; and German company law 
entitles work forces in large corporations to elect one half of the members of the 
supervisory board (Rogers & Streeck, 1994: 114).
3.2.3 Labor market governance in Germany
Moving from the roles of various actors (state, employers’ associations and unions) 
in socio-economic governance in general and industrial relations and labor market 
governance in particular to the nature of the regime itself, it is again helpful to 
contrast stylized models of the American and German labor market (cf. CPB, 1997: 
268-271). In the competitive model, of which the U.S. is a key example, (labor) 
market failure is reduced by supporting competition through the reduction of entry 
and exit barriers. This model relies on external labor market flexibility, tailor-made 
solutions at a decentralized level, diversity of labor conditions, and financial incentives 
to promote the allocative efficiency of the labor market. The specific institutional 
model into which this notion of labor market policy translates consists of easy hiring 
and firing of workers, school-based education, modest levels of job and income 
security, firm-level wage formation, and ample room for managerial autonomy. 
Germany, in contrast, is a key example of the cooperative model. This model relies 
on the commitment of employers and workers to keep implicit agreements in labor 
relationships, internalization of external effects into the bargaining objectives of 
interest groups, the creation of economies of scale through centralized agreements 
between relatively homogenous interest groups of labor and capital, and solidarity 
between workers as well  as between insiders and outsiders. This translates into an 
institutionalization of the labor market distinguished by a high level of employment 
protection, dual education, income protection through more than modest social 
security benefits, centralized collective bargaining, and co-determination by worker 
representatives at the firm levels as a limit to managerial prerogative.
 Employment protection is strict in Germany in comparison with the U.S., 
where periods of notice or severance payments are not obligatory. For individual 
dismissals, German employers have to consult the works council. If it disagrees, the 
worker has the right to remain employed until he has appealed at the labor court. 
On the other hand, if the works council agrees, the worker can still appeal at the 
labor court. Employment protection is limited for workers in small firms, however, 
as these generally do not have a works council, and do not have the possibility 
to appeal in court. Compensation varies from 1 to 18 months of pay, depending 
on the type of job, tenure and age. In the case of collective redundancies, the 
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state employment office has to be informed in addition to the works council; and 
the involvement of the latter becomes more extensive, as it will influence which 
persons will be dismissed and negotiate a social plan with the employer, including 
severance pay (15-25 weeks) and retraining measures (cf. CPB, 1997: 285-288). 
Even when Germany weakened its employment protection laws over the eighties, 
this resulted in very little change in German employment practice. The strength of 
German unions and works councils and the importance of apprenticeship meant 
that firms continued to hire people under permanent contracts, whereas similar 
legal changes in Spain at that time led to a situation in which most new workers 
were hired under temporary employment contracts (Freeman, 1994c: 237).
 From the late seventies to the early nineties, the job turnover percentage in 
Germany hovered in the low teens, which is lower than in the U.S. (around twenty, 
but with a declining trend towards fifteen in the late eighties) and higher than in the 
Netherlands (around ten, but with a rising trend around fifteen by the early nineties; 
OECD, 1996b: 165).  Charts relating job turnover and employment protection 
show the U.S. as a clearly contrasting case among our three countries, combining 
extremely low employment protection with high job turnover. The relative German-
Dutch difference is nevertheless of interest, as Germany has managed to combine 
slightly higher employment protection with slightly higher job turnover (OECD, 
1996b: 174).
 Of more interest is the labor turnover, which measures the movements of 
individuals into and out of jobs rather than the net change in employment in 
firms between two points in time. Though there are comparability issues with the 
data, labor turnover is by far the highest in the U.S. (126.4) and the lowest in 
the Netherlands (22.0), with Germany occupying an intermediate position (62.0; 
OECD, 1996b: 166). A large part of mobility differences is actually concentrated 
among youths and young adults. 25-year-old German men had held on average 2.6 
jobs in the previous 10 years in 1984 (women 2.0) as compared to 7.7 jobs (women 
6.8) for 25-year-old American men in 1988 (OECD, 1996b: 126).
 Vice versa, average tenure with a German firm is long: 9.7 years in Germany 
as compared to 8.7 in the Netherlands and 7.4 in the U.S. (1995-1996 figures 
from OECD, 1997, cited in Crouch et al. 1997: 37). And the percentage of German 
workers who have been with the firm for less than one year is low: 16.1%. The 
Dutch percentage is almost identical with 16.3%, while the American figure is 10 
percentage points higher at 26.0% (1995-1996 figures from OECD, 1997, cited in 
Crouch et al. 1997: 37)2.
 The wage distribution in Germany is relatively equal. Freeman (1994b: 13, 27) 
has calculated that the bottom decile of American workers earned just 45% of what 
their German counterparts earned in 19923. As in most developed countries, wage 
inequality (overall inequality and differentials by education) had dropped significantly 
over the 1970s; but over the 1980s, when it grew in many countries, there was 
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no noticeable change in Germany (Freeman & Katz, 1994: 38-40). The U.S., on 
the contrary, experienced a pronounced increase in earnings inequality over the 
seventies and eighties (Lerman & Lane, 1994; Abraham & Houseman, 1994). Wage 
differentials across German educational groups have remained relatively constant 
(Abraham & Houseman, 1994). The main contributor to overall higher inequality 
in the U.S. is the much higher inequality within groups themselves (Lerman & 
Lane, 1994). The wage differential in Germany between college graduates and 
apprentices is much smaller than the American college wage premium, but within 
these groups, variation is larger in the U.S., suggesting lower chances of German 
apprentices to penetrate the highest wage scales (Winkelmann, 1997: 167).
 The role of collective bargaining and the extension of bargaining agreements 
are one obvious explanation offered for the low wage inequality. Another one is the 
fact that German firms treat college-educated and non-college-educated workers 
as much closer substitutes in production than American firms, which reduces the 
effect of technological change on relative skill demand and lowers pressure for 
wage structure changes (Freeman & Katz, 1994: 56). While German unions have 
generally followed a high-wage strategy and have been willing to back it up with 
strikes, there have also been some attempts at wage moderation of the Dutch 
variety – such as in 1993, when the unions offered a ‘social pact’ to control the 
growth of real wages (Freeman & Katz, 1994: 52).
3.3 The German education system
3.3.1 Main characteristics
The structure of the German education system is influenced by the federal 
structure of the German state. Most state authority for educational affairs resides 
with the individual states.  Federal authority is mostly limited to the regulation 
of apprenticeship and training in firms, stimulating scientific research, framework 
legislation for higher education, as well as for educational staff. Responsibility for 
the school system resides with the individual states. This decentralized division of 
state responsibility results in some differences in the educational structures in the 
individual states.
 To guarantee a mutual recognition of diplomas and the accessibility of state 
educational systems to pupils from other German states, the individual states have 
concluded the so-called ‘Hamburger Abkommen’ in 1964, in which they agreed on 
a common basic structure of the education system. Additional common agreements 
have been made in the ‘Ständige Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland’ (KMK - Standing Conference of the Ministers of 
Education and Cultural Affairs of the States in the Federal Republic of Germany). 
Individual state governments cooperate in the KMK. While the federal government 
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is not involved, KMK cooperation extends to areas where the federal government 
draws up framework legislation, to be elaborated upon by the individual states 
(KMK, 1994). Federal government cooperates with state governments in the ‘Bund-
Länder Kommission für Bildungsplanung und Forschungsförderung’ (BLK), where 
they discuss educational planning and research stimulation.
 Figure 1 shows the basic structure of the German education system. Both figure 
and text depict the situation in June 1994.
 Primary education is unsegmented. Subsequently, pupils can opt for different 
school types (tracks) in lower secondary education. Higher secondary education 
consists of both general education that prepares its pupils for higher (tertiary) 
education, as well as VET. While apprenticeship accounts for the large majority of 
German VET, there is also a variety of school-based VET types. Tertiary education 
consists of both universities and higher vocational education colleges.
 
Compulsory education starts at the end of the sixth year for each child. It typically 
lasts 12 years, the first nine of which (in four states: ten) demand full-time school 
attendance, whereas the latter three demand part-time school attention. Many young 
people are trained as apprentices in those latter years, with its relevant school-based 
component (supplied by the local ‘Berufsschule’ that provides related instruction for 
apprenticeship training) as their fulfillment of the part-time requirement (typically 
two days a week). The exact form of the part-time school attendance requirement 
is usually geared to the length of their apprenticeship training. In the state of 
Baden-Württemberg, for example, the part-time requirement ends in principle, at 
the end of the school-year in which one completes one’s 18th year; but youths who 
start their apprenticeship training are required to attend the Berufsschule (BS) until 
the completion of their training4 (Hochstetter & Muser, 1992). Young people who 
are neither an apprentice nor enrolled in school full-time are required to attend BS 
to fulfill the requirement of partial attendance. In some states, they can fulfill their 
part-time requirement by completing an extra year of full-time school attendance 
(KMK, 1994).
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Figure 3.1: The German Education System
Source: KMK (1994)
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3.3.2 General secondary education
Lower secondary education offers three basic tracks: ‘Hauptschule’, ‘Realschule’ and 
‘Gymnasium’5. All three offer general education; (preparatory) VET does not exist 
at the lower secondary level. The first two years of these tracks are an orientation 
phase (KMK, 1994).
 Hauptschule typically lasts five years, upon a successful completion of which 
a diploma is awarded (‘Hauptschulabschluss’) that gives access to various types 
of full-time school-based vocational education (‘Berufsfachschulen’ - BFS) and 
the vocational basic training year (‘Berufsgrundbildungsjahr’ - BGJ), which will be 
discussed in the next section. This diploma is also an entry requirement for access 
to some ‘Fachschulen’ (FS), that provide school-based continuing VET for trained 
apprentices with additional relevant work experience (KMK; 1994).
 Realschule typically lasts six years, and successful completion is awarded 
with the intermediate diploma (‘mittlerer Abschluss’ or ‘Realschulabschluss’). 
This gives access to additional further school-based education tracks than the 
Hauptschulabschluss, such as BFS that offer full-fledged (rather than introductory) 
VET, and schools that will give access to tertiary education (see the next section).
 The Gymnasium offers the main route to tertiary education. It lasts nine years, 
and consists of two phases. The first phase is completed after six years, and 
(for those who pass all subjects) gives access to the second phase (‘Gymnasiale 
Oberstufe’), which lasts three years. This is completed by means of a final exam 
(‘Abiturprüfung’), which awards a diploma (‘Abitur’) which gives access to all types 
of tertiary education. There is a different form of this second phase, which is called 
‘Berufliches Gymnasium’ in some states and ‘Fachgymnasium’ in others. Contrary 
to a regular Gymnasium, there is no first phase preceding this type; access is 
granted to those who have achieved the intermediate diploma with good results, or 
other diplomas equivalent to that (KMK, 1994)6.
 Young people have opportunities to acquire diplomas from another track than the 
one they originally enrolled in. At the end of the fifth year of Realschule, students can 
achieve the Hauptschulabschluss. In most states, Hauptschule students can enroll 
in a voluntary additional sixth year, to be completed with an extended Hauptschule 
diploma or (under certain conditions) even the intermediate diploma. In addition, 
various types of upper secondary education offer second chances to achieve these 
diplomas. The Abitur, however, can only be achieved at Gymnasiums. Those who 
achieve an intermediate diploma or an equivalent diploma from higher secondary 
education, and meet certain performance criteria, gain access to the second phase 
of the Gymnasium (and acquire the Abitur there). Various additional opportunities 
to achieve these diplomas exist in upper secondary education (section 3.3.4).
 The division of young people over the different tracks has changed significantly 
over the last decades. The percentage of secondary school-leavers with (at best) 
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the Hauptschule diploma decreased from 75% in 1960 to 38% in 1991, while the 
percentage with the intermediate diploma grew from 16% to 35%, and that with 
the Abitur from 9% to 27% (Tessaring, 1991: 138). If we account for the fact 
that some lower secondary school-leavers achieve higher diplomas at a later stage 
(such as in upper secondary education), the declining relevancy of the Hauptschule 
diploma is even more remarkable, with only 31% ultimately ending up with no 
more than this diploma in 1991. The percentage of people who ultimately achieve 
an Abitur is of course higher, at 34% in 1991 (Tessaring, 1991).
3.3.3	 Apprenticeship:	a	first	introduction
Most general secondary school-leavers (primarily, but not exclusively, those from 
Hauptschule and Realschule) opt for subsequent apprenticeship training. The 
German apprenticeship system is definitely a youth apprenticeship system. In 1992, 
the average age of apprentices was 19.0 (BMBW, 1994). Almost all apprentices start 
training between the ages of 16 and 19, directly after finishing general secondary 
education. The number of apprenticeship training contracts typically corresponds 
to two thirds of the German population in the relevant age group (BMBW, 1993a; 
Tessaring, 1993: 136). 
 The German apprenticeship system is also known as the ‘dual training system’. 
Remarkably, at least three ‘dualities’ concerning apprenticeship can be distinguished 
here (Arnold & Münch, 1994). The first one is the duality of school and firm. In the 
apprenticeship system, apprentices receive related instruction for a minimum of 
twelve hours a week in a school for related instruction (‘Berufsschule’ - BS), while 
receiving work-based training at their training firm for the remainder of the week7. 
A second duality is that between theoretical and practical education and training. 
This duality correlates to some extent with that of school and firm, but should not be 
equated with it. Not only do schools supply theoretical education, they also provide 
practical training. At the same time, firms not exclusively provide practical training 
but also have to introduce (or repeat) theoretical instruction. Finally, a third duality 
is embedded in the constitutional division of state responsibility for apprenticeship: 
it is shared between the federal and state governments. The federal government 
is responsible for the regulation of the work-based component of apprenticeship, 
whereas individual states are responsible for the regulation of its school-based 
component.
 The last duality is the only pure one. Both in terms of the location of training 
provision and its contents, the term ‘plurality’ better captures reality than ‘duality’ 
(Münch, 1994). Apart from BS and firms, more organizations are often involved in 
the provision of apprenticeship training. The most important example are the so-
called ‘überbetriebliche Ausbildungsstätten’ (ÜBS – regional apprenticeship training 
centers). These centres have been created since 1973, with the state financing up 
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to 90% of the founding costs, and the goal of 77,000 ÜBS training positions was 
reached in the mid-1980s (Koch & Reuling, 1994; Johannson & Schuler, 1994). 
Firms can contract out training components that they cannot perform themselves 
(e.g. because they lack a particular type of machinery) to these ÜBS8. Second, 
within each of the training organizations, several places for instruction and learning 
can be found. Not only do firms train apprentices on-the-job, they also do so in 
in-company training schools (with classrooms for practical as well as theoretical 
instruction) and/or instruction corners. Schools for related instruction (BS) have 
classrooms for both theoretical and practical instruction. Theory and practice are 
not clearly separable categories; they are, in fact, two poles within a multifaceted 
continuum.
 Furthermore, the term ‘dual’ should not be meant to imply a lack of cohesion 
in apprenticeship training. Apprenticeship training offers substantial vocational 
education and training in relevant occupational skills and knowledge through an 
ordered track. Training is organized in officially recognized training occupations 
(‘anerkannte Ausbildungsberufe’). This concept promotes a cohesion to the 
tracks that encompasses theory and practice, and school- as well as work-based 
components. We will elaborate this point in section 3.5.2.
 The legal basis for an apprenticeship is provided by the 1969 Vocational Training 
Act (‘Berufsbildungsgesetz’ or BBiG) and the ‘Handwerksordnung’. Apprenticeship 
training is based on a private apprenticeship contract (‘Berufsausbildungsvertrag’) 
between an individual firm and an apprentice and/or his legal representative 
(BBiG paragraph 4; KMK, 1994). Apprenticeship contracts are thus a separately 
institutionalized type of labor contract. They are concluded for the duration of 
training (BBiG paragraph 5), which varies between two and three-and-a-half years, 
depending upon the training occupation. Apprentices receive an apprentice wage that 
is raised at least every year of training (BBiG paragraph 10). Firms also have to pay 
apprentices for hours spent in related instruction, examinations, and for any other 
training outside the training firm (BBiG paragraph 12). Apprenticeship contracts 
expire upon graduation (BBiG paragraph 5). Contracts that bind the apprentice 
to the firm for the period after apprenticeship graduation are explicitly forbidden; 
only during the last three months of the training period may the apprentice enter 
into an agreement with the training firm for the period after graduation. Outside 
the probationary period9, contract termination is limited to (unusual) situations 
where there are compelling reasons (BBiG paragraph 15). Beyond that, only the 
apprentice may terminate the contract when he wants to start training in another 
occupation or stop training altogether (with an advance notice of four weeks). There 
is a possibility of claiming damages if the other party ends the contract prematurely 
outside the probationary period (BBiG paragraph 16).
 The only formal entry requirement for apprenticeship is that young people have 
fulfilled their full-time compulsory education requirement (KMK, 1994). There are 
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no official academic requirements that limit entry into apprenticeship. However, a 
prerequisite for entrance is that one finds an apprenticeship position with a training 
firm. And most firms do set academic requirements of their own when recruiting 
new apprentices. They may deviate from them when a particular applicant that 
does not meet them nevertheless seems promising, or when they cannot fill all 
their vacancies if they stick to their original requirements. Academic requirements 
differ strongly between training occupations (and, within each occupation, between 
individual firms). For instance, in 1992 56.1% of bank clerks (‘Bankkaufmann’) 
apprentices had finished the Gymnasium, whereas only 1.8 percent of them had 
merely acquired a Hauptschule diploma. But in the same year only 3.5% of the 
bricklayer (‘Maurer’) apprentices had finished Gymnasium, whereas 51.9% of them 
had acquired the Hauptschule diploma10.
 Without an apprenticeship contract with a firm, participation in apprenticeship is 
not possible. The only exception is apprenticeship training for youths with learning, 
language or social problems. These may start training in separate, specialized 
organizations (‘überbetriebliche Einrichtungen’). While the goal is to have them 
continue training with a firm after the first year, they may complete their training 
in these specialized institutions if transition to a regular firm proves impossible. 
The number of apprenticeship positions in these specialized organizations is only a 
fraction of total apprenticeship enrollments: 16,000 in 1993 (Heidelberger Institut 
Beruf und Arbeit, 1993). Others who fail to find a (suitable) apprenticeship position 
have the option to enroll in certain forms of school-based upper secondary VET 
that provide an equivalent to the first year of apprenticeship training (cf. section 
3.3.4). Upon graduating from these school-based equivalents, however, they will 
again need to find a training firm to complete training for this occupation; there are 
no school-based equivalents for the later training years of apprenticeship training 
occupations. If they do find a training firm this time, they will receive full credit for 
the school-based year, and start in the second year of apprenticeship training with 
their firm.
 Graduation from apprenticeship requires passing a final examination 
(‘Abschlußprüfung’) that consists of both a practical and a theoretical component. 
Passing these exam awards a vocational certificate (‘Berufsabschluß’) whose exact 
name depends upon the training occupation (‘Facharbeiterbrief’ for those in the 
industry and commerce sector). Acquisition of this certificate is the central goal of 
apprenticeship training. Apprentices who progress at a faster pace than the official 
training duration may participate in the final examination early (BbiG paragraph 
14). Apprentices who fail the final exam have the right to continue as an apprentice 
with their training firm for up to a year and get two re-examination opportunities 
(Onstenk & Hövels, 1995).
 Before taking a more detailed look at German apprenticeship and its governance 
in section 3.5, the remainder of this section will briefly review the other upper 
secondary and tertiary education options.
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3.3.4 School-based upper secondary vocational education
In Germany, apprenticeship training is the straight path for he labor market (except 
for those who enter tertiary education). German upper secondary education 
is based on the philosophy that, as long as sufficient supportive measures are 
provided, each youth can be trained to be a skilled tradesman (‘Facharbeiter’) 
through apprenticeship training (Malkmus, 1994). Contrary to the Netherlands (cf. 
Chapter 5), however, Germany has very few school-based VET tracks that offer a 
full equivalent to apprenticeship training. It does have a wide variety of school-
based VET, but those tracks fulfill different roles than that of apprenticeship.
 Part of these roles is aimed at helping young people make a successful entry 
into the apprenticeship system. This is the case for the ‘Berufsvorbereitungsjahr’ 
(BVJ – preparatory vocational training year), ‘Berufsgrundbildungsjahr’ (BGJ – 
vocational basic training year), and some ‘Berufsfachschulen’ (BFS – various types 
of full-time school-based VET). These do not offer a fully equivalent alternative to 
apprenticeship, but provide a bridge towards it. BVJ offers school-based education 
for young people that (because of learning difficulties or social handicaps) are not 
yet capable of meeting performance standards as expected in apprenticeship. It 
usually lasts one year, sometimes two years, and prepares students for VET or work. 
Sometimes students can simultaneously achieve a Haupt- or Realschule diploma. 
BVJ does not amount to any credit towards apprenticeship training, however. BGJ 
offers a year of basic vocational training across the span of an occupational field 
(rather than a single occupation). If students subsequently move on to related 
apprenticeship training, students get full credit towards the first year of that 
training, so they can immediately start with the second year. We can find BGJ in 
two forms: full-time school-based (BGJ-s) and a dual or cooperative form (BGJ-k). 
Many firms, however, do not consider BGJ-s an adequate alternative for the first 
year of apprenticeship training, and do not hire its graduates (Malkmus, 1994). 
Roughly half of the 30,000 (1992) BGJ-s participants can be found in one state, 
Niedersachsen (BMBW, 1993: 40; 1994: 185). 80% of the 49,000 participants in 
BGJ-k are located in another state, Bavaria (BMBW, 1993: 40; 1994: 185). BGJ-k 
students have a training contract with a firm just like apprentices, but spend more 
time in related instruction at a Berufsschule than regular apprentices do11. The 
various types of BFS will be discussed at the end of this section.
 The other part of school-based upper secondary VET is primarily aimed at achieving 
a higher general diploma than the one with (or even without) which young people 
have left lower secondary education. These higher general diplomas then give them 
access to additional upper secondary or tertiary education options beyond their 
previous diploma. This applies to ‘Berufsaufbauschulen’ (BAS – vocational progress 
schools), some BFS, and ‘Fachoberschulen’ (FOS – vocational upper schools). The 
last two types combine general education with vocational education, but (apart 
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from a minority of BFS) they are not perceived as a fully equivalent alternative for 
VET as provided by apprenticeship. Those who are primarily interested in acquiring 
a higher general diploma opt for these schools; those primarily interested in labor 
market entrance through VET opt for apprenticeship training. 
 Together with the ‘berufliches Gymnasium’ and other second chances at an 
Abitur (section 3.3.2), BAS and FOS comprise the so-called second education 
avenue (‘zweite Bildungsweg’) in German education. BAS offer general and 
vocational education for a minimum of 1,200 hours and 1 year, and their diploma is 
equivalent to the intermediate diploma that graduates from the Realschule acquire. 
It can be attended part-time next to the apprenticeship training, or full-time for 
those that have completed apprenticeship training or have multiple years of work 
experience (KMK, 1994). FOS offer two-year tracks that combine general education 
and theoretical and practical VET. Those who have finished apprenticeship training 
in the same occupational field can skip the first year. Upon completion, the so-
called ‘Fachhochschulreife’ is awarded, which grants access to higher vocational 
education, although it does not do so to university (KMK, 1994).
 BFS themselves constitute a wide variety of tracks. Their common ground is that 
they offer school-based upper secondary education in both general and vocational 
subjects. They differ in the length of the track (1-3 years), entry requirements 
(from Hauptschule diploma to Abitur) and diplomas rewarded (Malkmus, 1994). 
Five types of BFS can be distinguished (Malkmus, 1994; StBa, 1994).
 The first three types have in common that they do not offer a complete 
vocational qualification comparable to the Facharbeiter qualification provided by 
apprenticeship training, but merely offer a basic vocational qualification in one of 
the official apprenticeship training occupations (section 3.5). They differ in their 
entry requirements and the opportunity to acquire a general secondary education 
diploma. The first type offers basic vocational education for youths with or without 
a Hauptschule diploma. Students can also acquire a certificate equivalent to the 
Realschule diploma. Tracks mostly last two, occasionally three years. The second 
type of BFS offers basic vocational education for youth with a Realschule diploma. 
Some of these schools offer the opportunity to acquire the Fachhochschulreife that 
gives access to higher vocational colleges. Tracks mostly last one to three years. The 
third type of BFS offers basic vocational education with both the entry requirement 
and the exit level below the level of the Realschule diploma. Students can also 
acquire a certificate equivalent to the Realschule diploma. Tracks nearly always last 
one year, occasionally two or three. In 1992 156,000 students participated in one 
of these three types of BFS, with two-thirds of them enrolled in the first year (StBa, 
1994: 93-94)12. A large part of these students continues their education in the 
apprenticeship system. Legal arrangements (so-called Berufsgrundbildungsjahr-
Anrechnungsverordnungen) usually entitle them to years of credit towards 
apprenticeship training, provided it is in the same occupational field (Münch, 1994). 
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A good example of this is the one-year BFS (1BFS) in Baden-Württemberg. These 
BFS offer a year of school-based vocational training equivalent to the first year of 
apprenticeship training (comparable to BGJ-s, which hardly exist in that state). 
Firms in Baden-Württemberg thus have the option to skip offering the first year of 
apprenticeship training themselves and recruit 1BFS graduates as apprentices to 
continue with the second year of training. Some firms offer preliminary contracts 
promising an apprenticeship position upon successful 1BFS graduation and/or a 
small scholarship or exam premiums during 1BFS.
 The other two types of BFS have in common that they do provide training aimed 
at a full vocational qualification. The fourth type offers a complete training towards 
occupations for which there is no apprenticeship training. These are called school 
occupations; they are located in the socio-cultural sector, or concern training to 
be a state certified technical assistant in the medical-technical, natural science, 
technical and economic-administrative sectors. Tracks here last two or three years 
and require a Realschule diploma. Often, an additional program will award the 
Fachhochschulreife, and thus grant access to higher vocational colleges (KMK, 
1994; Malkmus, 1994; Münch, 1994). In 1992, 98,000 students were enrolled in 
this type, while 33,000 graduated from them (StBa, 1994: 99). The fifth type offers 
complete training for official apprenticeship training occupations through school-
based tracks that generally take three years (Malkmus, 1994; Münch, 1994). 
These are in fact the only full-time school based tracks that directly compete with 
apprenticeship tracks. Enrollment in these tracks is very low, however. In 1992 
roughly 8,000 students were enrolled in this type of track, while 3,000 graduated 
from them with an official vocational diploma (StBa, 1994: 95; 99). In the same 
year, about 433.000 students achieved such a diploma through apprenticeship 
training (our own calculations based on BMBW, 199413), so the direct competition 
for apprenticeship from this fifth type of BFS is indeed practically negligible.
 In an indirect sense, apprenticeship gets competition from the fourth type 
of BFS, because they also offer full vocational training, although they do so in 
different occupations. The case is therefore one of (labor and training) market 
segmentation rather than competition; and again, enrollment in this type of BFS 
is very low when compared with the number of apprentices. Most BFS students 
are enrolled in one of the first three types. There, they continue their general 
secondary education but combine it with basic vocational training for which they 
will receive credit in subsequent related apprenticeship training. Most students from 
these BFS, however, do follow it up with apprenticeship training (Münch, 1994). 
The only available figure relates to both BFS and BA, but is pretty compelling: 52% 
of BFS and BAS graduates continued with apprenticeship training, while only 13% 
continued with a regular job (Parmentier et al., 1994). In sum, these first three 
types of BFS function as a preparatory track for apprenticeship training. Some 
of these students enroll in such a BFS because they have not found a suitable 
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apprenticeship position; others because they still want to acquire a higher general 
secondary diploma, which will give them access to other school-based tracks (FOS, 
higher vocational colleges, health care tracks14) and/or raise their chances of a 
more attractive apprenticeship position later on (as firms do screen apprentices on 
previous educational performance, cf. section 3.3.3).
3.3.5 Tertiary education
Germany had a so-called specialized system of higher education (cf. OECD, 1985). 
In such a system, higher vocational education is offered at a level below university 
education15. In Germany, university tracks lasted four years (Münch, 1994). Higher 
vocational education is offered by the ‘Fachhochschulen’ (FHS - higher vocational 
education colleges). The tracks they offer differ from university tracks in their strong 
focusing on vocational practice, and on the application of scientific knowledge in 
that practice (rather than on the development of scientific knowledge itself). FHS 
tracks last three to four years. Internship components may or may not be included, 
depending upon the state, and the type of track (Münch, 1994).
 Three types of certificates regulate entry into tertiary education16. The general 
college certificate (‘allgemeine Hochschulreife’) gives access to all university and 
FHS tracks. The field-specific college certificate (‘fachgebundene Hochschulreife’) 
gives access to university and FHS tracks in a particular field. The vocational 
college certificate (‘Fachhochschulreife’) only gives access to FHS tracks. The first 
two certificates are typically achieved through a successful Abitur exam after (at 
least) 13 years of general education (cf. section 3.3.2). The ‘Fachhochschulreife’ is 
achieved at a FOS (section. 3.3.4), after at least 12 years of education.
 Adults without the Abitur can gain general access to tertiary education 
through assessment procedures - either the ‘Abiturprüfung fur Nichtschüler’ or 
‘Begabtenprüfung’ (Dybowski et al., 1994; KMK, 1994). Adults that have completed 
apprenticeship training can gain access to tertiary education at an evening 
Gymnasium (‘Abendgymnasium für Berufstätigen’ or ‘Kolleg’) (KMK, 1994). In 
addition to these options that are part of the second education avenue, there is 
a third education avenue (‘dritte Bildungsweg’) that consists of roughly twenty 
arrangements for people with a VET diploma to gain access to tertiary education 
(Dybowski et al., 1994). These vary from trial study periods, admission exams, and 
direct access upon completion of a Fachschule (section 3.3.6).
 In addition to the regular options of FHS and university, there is an intriguing 
variety of special higher education tracks (‘Sonderausbildungsgänge’). These 
are (typically) three year, work-based education tracks that require at least a 
‘Fachhochschulreife’ (Kramer, 1994; Münch, 1994)17. The most famous example is 
the vocational academies (‘Berufsakademien’ – BA). These originated in the state 
of Baden-Württemberg in 1974, and their example has been copied in a number 
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of other states18. BA in the Baden-Württemberg model offer work based higher 
education programs that are jointly supplied by a firm and state vocational colleges 
(‘staatliche Studienakademien’). Entry requirements are an entry certificate into 
higher education, as well as a training contract with a firm that participates in 
the state vocational college. Recognition of these tracks was not regulated at the 
federal level, but five individual states have recognized the final three-year diplomas 
(‘Diplomgrad-BA’) as equivalent to those of the FHS19 (KMK, 1994). Besides these 
BA, there are three other types of special tracks (Kramer, 1994). The first type 
are internal firm training tracks, of which regular apprenticeship training is one 
component, but is combined with additional training and additional examination(s) 
with a local Chamber. Second, there are tracks that combine apprenticeship 
training with an education at a ‘Verwaltungs-’ or ‘Wirtschaftsakademie’. The latter 
provide scientific training for future managers in the economy or in administration. 
Third, there are tracks whereby a work-based component (often, that of a regular 
apprenticeship training) is combined with related instruction at a FHS or university. 
An important difference between all these special work-based tracks and the regular 
apprenticeship tracks is, that the former all share formal entry requirements, 
whereas the latter don’t.
3.3.6 ‘Fachschulen’
‘Fachschulen’ (FS - continuing school-based VET) are a special type of VET. They 
offer a combination of initial vocational education and further training. They are 
categorized as level five (below-university tertiary education) according to the 
International Standard Classification for Education (ISCED) (CERI, 1995). They 
cater for trained apprentices from the apprenticeship system. Entry requirements 
into FS are an apprenticeship diploma as well as the related instruction diploma 
from the BS, and additional work experience in the relevant occupational field (KMK, 
1994). Tracks vary from one to three years, and can be followed full-time or part-
time. In the German labor market, FS graduates occupy an intermediate position 
between trained apprentices and FHS graduates. Their function is either that of a 
highly specialized tradesman, or one that includes management tasks besides the 
skilled labor component.
 One type of FS is ‘Technikerschulen’ (technician schools) whose diplomas 
come with state certified titles such as state certified technician. Another type is 
‘Meisterschulen’ (master schools). In the German craft sector (‘Handwerk’), the 
‘Meister’ title is a requirement for founding (and operating) a new firm (cf. section 
3.2.1)20. It simultaneously gives the right to train apprentices. More recently, ‘Meister’ 
tracks have also been developed for industry – but the title is not a requirement 
for founding a new firm. The ‘Meister’ examinations are organized by the relevant 
Chambers.
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3.4 The school-to-work transition in Germany
3.4.1 Apprenticeship participation
The German apprenticeship system accounts for the majority of school-to-work 
transitions in Germany. Apprentices account for over two percent of the entire 
German population; and 45.7% of 16-19 year olds in 1991 was an apprentice 
(StBa, 1993b). Table 3.1 presents participation data in German apprenticeship 
since 1975.
Table 3.1. Apprenticeship demand and supply in West-Germany, 1974-1999
Sources: Casey (1986), p. 65; BMBW (1994), p. 16; (6); Tessaring (1993), p.136
 
Apprenticeship is a market, which implies that there will be shortages of either 
apprentices or apprenticeship positions, rather than a perfect match. The number of 
unplaced apprentice candidates peaked in the early eighties due to demographic21 
and economic factors. The apprenticeship system did prove capable of a rapid 
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expansion, however, when faced with this demographic and economic challenge: 
the number of new apprenticeship contracts grew by over 50% between 1975 and 
1984. On the other hand, the number of unplaced apprentices in table 4.1 does 
underestimate the nature of the problem. Particularly in the late seventies and 
early eighties, 30,000 to 35,000 wannabe apprentices were placed in BVJ, BGJ or 
‘Berufsvorbereitungsmaßhmen, while 40,000 to 50,000 returned to school full-time, 
when faced with the shortage of apprenticeship positions (Casey, 1986). These 
numbers should be added to the number of unplaced apprentices listed in table 4.1 
to find the total number of wannabe apprentices unable to find an apprenticeship 
position in those years. In the late eighties, the problem rapidly changed altered 
from a shortage of apprenticeship positions to a shortage of apprentices. Again, 
demographic factors were to a large degree responsible, as the number of 16-19 
year olds has rapidly decreased since 1981.
 Most apprentices transfer directly from a full-time school: 85% in 1988. 5% 
were previously employed that year, and 1% was previously unemployed (our own 
calculations based on Tessaring, 1993).
 The ‘Industry and Commerce’ sector accounts for almost half of all apprentices. 
‘Handwerk’ is the second largest sector. It trains relatively many apprentices as 
compared to the level of regular employment in the sector. In 1980, for instance, 
40% of apprentices was registered with an artisanal chamber, whereas only 17% of 
all dependent employees worked in the artisanal sector (Casey, 1986: 69).
3.4.2 Apprenticeship graduation
The German apprenticeship system shows a high graduation rate. There are some 
technicalities in interpreting available data, but the most reliable estimate is that 
88% of those that start apprenticeship training graduate as apprentices – though 
not necessarily in the training occupation they first chose (Althoff, 1994b). About 
6% leave apprenticeship prematurely, and another 6% fail the final exam for the 
third and final time.
 Behind this general average hide various sectoral differences. The number of 
premature contract endings, for instance, is twice as high in ‘Handwerk’ than in 
Industry and Commerce. And more than half of all hairdresser apprentices end their 
training prematurely, as compared to less than 4% of banking apprentices (BMBW, 
1994).
3.4.3 Labor market prospects
The combination of high level apprenticeship participation and a high graduation 
rate implies that only a limited number of German youths do not complete their 
vocational (or higher) education: in 1990, this applied to only 14% of German 
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youths between 20 and 24 (Davids, 1993). Half of this group has not sought an 
apprenticeship position, their primary motive being money.
 Unemployment among those who have not completed VET was 14.0% in 1991, 
as compared to 4.3% among those who had completed either apprenticeship or 
BFS (Tessaring, 1993). Unemployment levels per qualification level have been 
remarkably stable over time. While apprenticeship thus decreases the chances of 
unemployment, it does not lead to large increases in income: about 150 DM a 
month in 1988 (Tessaring, 1993).
3.4.4 Discrepancies between apprenticeship and labor market
In an apprenticeship system, the school-to-work transition consists of two separate 
transitions. The first is from a full-time school into apprenticeship; the second is 
from apprenticeship to (preferably related) regular employment.
 While discrepancies between school-based education and labor show themselves 
exclusively at the transition from school-based VET to the (regular) employment 
market, with an apprenticeship system, an important share of such discrepancies 
will actually show up at the transition from full-time school into apprenticeship. 
Discrepancies between young people’s occupational preferences and the firms’ labor 
demand will show up in the apprenticeship market (Steedman, 1993). While school-
based VET systems may have an unlimited training capacity, training capacity in 
an apprenticeship system is dependent upon the yearly supply of training positions 
made available by firms. Young people thus have no guarantee that they will find 
an apprenticeship position (cf. section 3.4.1). Of course, the opposite is also true: 
no firm is guaranteed an apprentice, particularly in times when the birth-rate drops. 
In 1993, for instance, only 24% of training firms had sufficient qualified apprentice 
candidates, while 51% complained about a shortage of candidates, and 25% about 
mostly unqualified candidates (Parmentier et al., 1994).
 As in any good market, however, there is room for supply and demand to 
mutually adapt. Apprenticeship training generally starts in September, and firms 
and apprentices start looking months before. Information exchange on the original 
demand and supply will result in a process of mutual adaptation. Some firms will 
find they have to lower their skill requirements, while some youngsters will have to 
opt for another occupation than their original preference. The mechanism of firms 
gradually lowering their skills requirements if needed explains why the percentage 
of apprentices with the lowest diploma (Hauptschule) is inversely correlated to 
the number of apprentice candidates: when demographic and economic problems 
translate into shortages of apprenticeship positions, it is the weakest group that 
suffers most (Tessaring, 1993).
 At this first transition, the ‘Handwerk’ sector acts as a kind of sponge in relation 
to the relative supply of apprentices (Casey, 1992). ‘Handwerk’ firms have a hard 
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time finding apprentices when apprentice supply and demand are at a comparable 
level, and even more so when the supply of apprentices is low. Youths generally 
prefer an apprenticeship in Industry and Commerce. But when the supply of youths 
rises, it is primarily the ‘Handwerk’’ sector that provides extra apprentices positions. 
‘Handwerk’ thus was important in meeting the demographic and economic challenges 
of the early eighties. In 1971, 33.1% of apprentices was employed in ‘Handwerk’; 
this percentage grew to 41.1% in 1979, and then decreased again to 32.2% in 1991 
(our own calculations, based on BMBW, 1993; 1994). Apprenticeship in ‘Handwerk’ 
grew by 66% from 1970 to 1980, while total employment in the sector grew by only 
2% (Casey, 1986).
 Shortages of apprenticeship positions also correspond to increases in school-
based VET participation. This is called the waiting room role of school-based VET 
(Grünewald et al, 1994). The apprenticeship system itself has, however, absorbed 
far more of the extra supply of youths over the first half of the eighties than full-
time schools (Casey, 1986). To be sure: state subsidies have played a role in 
this. The individual states sponsored apprenticeship training with extra subsidies 
of DM 730 million in 1985, mostly for disadvantaged groups and disadvantaged 
regions (Streeck et al, 1987). These subsidies were abolished when the shortage 
of apprenticeship positions decreased (Koch & Reuling, 1994). In addition, the 
‘Bundeskanzler’ as well as representatives of the social partners have repeatedly 
called on firms to supply (extra) training positions.
 While the large demographic and economic challenges of the early eighties 
have met with some success at the first transition, they were not without their 
consequences even for those who successfully found a position. Some will have 
had to settle for much less attractive apprenticeship positions than they would have 
found in a more relaxed market; and more apprentices than usual were not offered 
a regular labor contract upon graduation (Casey, 1986; 1992). Blossfeld (1990) has 
shown that the German apprenticeship system causes a distinct form of inequality 
between generations of youths, depending upon the labor market situation when 
they look for an apprenticeship position.
 In general, the relatively low level of youth unemployment in Germany is seen as 
an important indicator for an adequate school-to-work transition. The largest effect 
of apprenticeship in this respect, however, seems to lie in participation itself: youth 
unemployment is particularly low in Germany among 15-19 year olds.
 The number of apprentices that become unemployed immediately after 
completing their apprenticeship training is relatively low: it hovers between 12 and 
17% (Parmentier et al., 1994). In 1992, a year in which the economy did not fare 
well, 58% of apprentices received and accepted a permanent labor contract from 
the training firm upon graduation, and another 8% received a temporary contract. 
16% chose to leave the training firm themselves, while 12% had wanted, but did 
not receive, a contract offer from the training firm (Parmentier et al., 1994). Not 
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all contracts offered concern employment as a skilled worker, however, particularly 
in a year of a weak economy. 10% of metalworking graduates, 7% of electronics 
graduates, and 2% of service sector graduates received a contract for jobs requiring 
fewer skills (Schöngen et al., 1994).
  Intriguing is the fact that many apprentices, who are trained in the artisan sector, 
transfer to other sectors at a later point in their career (Von Henninges, 1994). In 
1992, 58% of employed skilled workers that had completed their apprenticeship 
had done so in ‘Handwerk’. However, only 31% were still employed there. Only 
24% of them had been trained in industry, whereas 35% was employed there. 
Von Henninges (1994) thus speaks of a ‘sectoral redistribution’ of skilled workers 
after graduation. The two biggest streams are, on the one hand, of ‘Handwerk’ 
apprentices to the service sector and other sectors (16.5% of all skilled workers); 
on the other hand, from ‘Handwerk’ apprentices to industrial firms (12.0%).
 Still, international comparative data show that the dissimilarity of German 
employment of 15-24 years olds compared with those aged 25 and over is 
significantly lower (.19 in 1994) than in both the Netherlands (.48) and the U.S. 
(.55) (OECD, 1996b: 136). One could argue this is an advantage, as it signifies 
that the education system disperses new labor market entrants adequately across 
economic sectors, roughly equivalent to their employment shares. On the other 
hand, one could argue that a different employment structure for the young as we 
can find in the Netherlands and the U.S. might imply a better adaptation to changes 
in employment structures, with young people predominantly being channeled 
to growing, and preferably high-skill, employment sectors. While they may be 
channeled to growth markets, there are indications that Dutch and American youth 
employment is particularly concentrated in sectors that may have employment 
growth, but are not generally known as high-skill sectors: hotels and restaurants; 
wholesale and retail trade, repair: and personal services (OECD, 1996b: 135). Of 
the sectors analyzed, it is only in construction that this picture is reversed. There, 
young workers are relatively overrepresented in Germany as compared with the 
Netherlands, and even more so with the U.S. (a topic we will revisit in section 
4.4.2). In addition, while structural shifts in employment by industry cannot account 
for changes in young adult employment (OECD, 1996b: 142), the change in young 
adults’ share in employment due to change in the industry mix of employment is 
significantly higher in Germany (3.6) than in the Netherlands or the U.S. (both 
0.2: OECD, 1996b: 143, table 4.17), indicating a higher responsiveness to sector 
employment shifts for the German youth labor market. Data seem to indicate a large 
share of American and Dutch in (relatively) low-skill sectors being institutionalized 
as youth jobs, rather than career jobs for adult workers, due to their lower average 
wages. 
 In sum, the German apprenticeship system does not imply a flawless school-
to-work transition, as a naive view would have it. Its biggest advantage is that it 
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successfully prevents a high level of youth unemployment among 15-19 year olds. 
Furthermore, a dominant apprenticeship system causes labor market discrepancies 
to take on a different appearance than they do in sequential transition models. 
Cases in point are the fact that many labor market discrepancies will show in the 
market for apprenticeship positions rather than in the regular labor market (for 
graduated apprentices); and that inequalities within a generation of young people 
are, to some extent, exchanged for inequalities between generations (cf. Blossfeld, 
1990).
3.5 The German apprenticeship governance regime
The large market share of apprenticeship in the school-to-work transition in Germany 
in combination with low youth unemployment levels has aroused wide international 
interest in the German apprenticeship system. Why do German firms offer more 
apprenticeship positions than firms in other countries do? And why do the German 
youngsters opt for apprenticeship training in such large numbers? The answer to 
these questions is commonly sought in the incentive structures for firms and the 
young provided by the specific institutionalization of apprenticeship in Germany 
(Casey, 1986; 1992; Steedman, 1993; Soskice, 1994; Wagner, 1995; Van Lieshout, 
1996a). The next section will therefore first examine the apprenticeship governance 
regime closely.
3.5.1 Overview: four types of actors, four levels
The regime governing apprenticeship is the joint product of decisions by various 
actors at different levels. To begin with, the federal state is responsible for the 
work-based component of apprenticeship training, while the individual states are 
responsible for the school-based component (cf. section 3.3.3). This obviously 
requires cooperation between them. In addition, there are a large number of 
arenas to provide access to societal groups (in particular, employers’ associations 
and unions) to influence vocational education and training. These arenas derive 
their legitimacy from the state, but state representatives are just one of the parties 
that have a say in them. The result is a complicated governance regime in which 
four types of actor (federal state, individual states, employers’ associations and 
unions) participate, and which expands on four levels. We will confine ourselves to 
an overview of the most important arenas on these at the four levels22.
 In the first place, on the federal level, the Federal Department for Education and 
Science (‘Bundesministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft’ or BMBW) is formally 
responsible for the coordination and regulation of the work-based apprenticeship 
component. In practice, however, the ‘Berufsbildungsförderungsgesetz’ (Vocational 
Training Stimulation Act) delegates most of the tasks at this level to the Federal 
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Institute for Vocational Training (‘Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung’ or BIBB). The 
BIBB advises the federal government and other parties, conducts research on 
developments in apprenticeship training, and coordinates the development of skills 
standards for the work-based component of apprenticeship training (Streeck et al., 
1987; Hilbert et al., 1990; KMK, 1994). Federal government, state governments 
and peak organizations of employers’ associations and unions cooperate as equal 
partners in the BIBB. The most important arena is the central board of BIBB 
(‘Hauptausschuß’). Each individual state has a representative on this board; in 
addition, the federal state, employers’ associations and unions each have one 
quarter of the votes in the committee. KDW and DGB nominate the employers’ and 
workers’ representatives, respectively. At this federal level, there are three types 
of decisions in which these peak organizations of the social partners are involved 
(Streeck et al., 1987). First, the central board provides recommendations regarding 
fundamental issues (such as funding). In this area, consensus is rare. Second, 
the central board produces recommendations on the standardization of training 
among different occupations, for example on the suitability of training sites, or the 
duration of training. Here, consensus often prevails. Last, KWD and DGB nominate 
the experts for both sides that are to draw up the skills standards document for 
specific occupational fields. In practice they tend to follow the proposals of their 
own member association(s) from the sector concerned.
 In the second place, on the level of the individual states, responsibility for the 
school-based component of apprenticeship rests solely with the Department of 
Education of the individual state. These Departments, however, receive advice from 
state VET committees in which state government representatives cooperate with 
representatives of state level peak organizations of employers and unions (KMK, 
1994).
 In the third place, on a regional level, authorized bodies (‘zuständige Stellen’) 
play important governing roles in the dual training system. The BBiG has designated 
eleven Chamber systems which are authorized bodies by the BBiG. This delegation 
dates back to the time around 1900, when the state gave Chambers of Artisans 
the task of supervising and implementing the rules the state had issued for 
apprenticeship training. For the Chambers of Industry and Commerce, regulation 
of apprenticeship has been a task they embarked on voluntarily until the BBiG was 
established in 1969 and legally required them to do so (Jäkel & Junge, 1986). State 
agencies function as authorized bodies for the relatively few occupations that are 
not organized in Chambers, such as the civil service occupations. All authorized 
bodies are legally responsible for registering apprenticeship contracts, deciding 
on requests for a shortening of training duration, judging firms’ ability to provide 
quality training, organizing the (intermediary and final) examinations, supervising 
the training progress of training in general, and advising both training firms and 
apprentices. Each new apprenticeship contract has to be registered with the 
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residing authorized body that has to see if it complies with all the regulations (BBiG 
paragraphs 31-33). Representatives from these bodies visit firms when these want 
to start training in a particular occupation to determine whether the firm is able 
to perform all necessary training. BBiG paragraphs 20-22 stipulate that a firm has 
to have a qualified trainer, and that the firm itself has to be qualified to offer full-
fledged training in the occupation concerned. The former requirement is specified 
in a number of trainer capability ordinances (‘Ausbildungseignungsverordnungen’). 
The latter requirement is flexible, to the extent that firms can still train as long as 
there are satisfactory arrangements to have the apprentices trained elsewhere for 
those elements for which the firm cannot provide training itself. Such arrangements 
then are included in the individual apprenticeship contracts of the firms’ apprentices. 
Firm visits are repeated once in a while to determine whether the firm is still qualified 
to offer full-fledged training.
 Chambers have also been the most important founders of the regional 
apprenticeship training centers (ÜBS). Apart from state subsidies, operating costs 
are covered either from Chamber budgets23, fees of firms that use the facility, or 
a levy imposed on all firms in the region. And lastly, Chambers often voluntarily 
supply remedial teaching courses, further training courses in general, and training 
courses for in-company trainers in particular (Jäkel & Junge, 1986).
 To limit the risk that the Chambers will go too ‘soft’ on the firms (after all, 
their members) they have to supervise in their training efforts, they are legally 
required to install a vocational training committee (‘Berufsbildungsausschuß’). 
This committee consists of six representatives of employers’ associations, six 
representatives of unions, and six non-voting representatives of vocational schools 
(BBiG paragraph 56). This committee decides on all training regulations that the 
authorized bodies issue, and has to be informed and heard on all matters regarding 
training (BBiG paragraph 58). The authority of these committees is, however, 
limited by the fact that they are bound by the financial means that the Chambers’ 
general assembly (‘Vollversammlung’) - which is made up exclusively (Chambers 
of Industry and Commerce) or for two-thirds (Chambers of Artisans) of employer 
representatives – provides for these tasks (BBiG paragraph 58). Committees thus 
cannot autonomously decide to establish a regional apprenticeship training center, 
or substantially enlarge the number of training counselors. The training counselors 
employed by the Chamber, furthermore, report directly to the Chamber executive. 
In all, union influence in this area is therefore still less than that of employers 
(Streeck et al., 1987).
 At the level of individual firms, the decision whether to engage in apprenticeship 
training at all, as well as the decisions on the training occupations in which to train 
and on the number of apprentices, are exclusively the province of management 
(Streeck et al., 1987). But German co-determination legislation24 gives works councils 
various information, consultation and co-determination rights regarding vocational 
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training in general - including apprenticeship training. Works councils enjoy the 
right to information in good time on actual and future staff needs, consultation 
rights on employment trends and anticipatory vocational training measures, and 
co-determination rights on the implementation of vocational training measures 
(including participants in the case of further training for incumbent workers) 
(Schömann, 2002).
3.5.2 Skills standards
3.5.2.1 Training occupations
The important role of occupations (‘Berufe’) in Germany was pointed out in section 
2.3.6.3. One of the institutional configurations underlying/reflecting this importance 
is their role in the organization of apprenticeship training – and, consequently, the 
majority of German VET25. The supply of apprenticeship positions is exclusively 
limited to a number of training occupations that are officially approved by the 
state. BBiG paragraph 28 section 2 explicitly forbids the training of youth under 
age eighteen in other occupations26. The same section further designates that 
training for a recognized occupation must correspond to a training regulation 
(‘Ausbildungsordnung’). This is a skills standards document issued by the federal 
state that lists the minimum level of competencies in various areas, for which the 
firm must train its apprentices in that occupation (cf. section 3.5.2.2).
 (Training) Occupations are much more than just one aspect of apprenticeship 
governance; in fact, they can be seen as a cornerstone for the BBiG (Stooß, 1990). 
Occupations (‘Berufe’) create institutional relations that regulate interactions between 
VET and labor market (Reuling, 1998). Training occupations are not a representation 
of vocational activities as they exist in the labor market, but qualification bundles that 
train for an occupational competence at the level of a skilled worker, independent 
of the individual firm (Benner, 1992). Training occupations fulfill various important 
functions in Germany (Stooß, 1990; Koch & Reuling, 1994; Reuling, 1998). They 
limit the multitude of possible combinations of tracks, tasks and functions to a 
number of legally recognized arrangements for labor market access (Stooß, 1990). 
They serve as orientation points for the socialization of the young by offering them 
the chance to identify with these occupations (Koch & Reuling, 1994; Reuling, 
1998). They offer a basis for the trade of labor for reward in the labor market. They 
reduce the number of occupational labels, and fulfill an informative and exploratory 
function for labor market actors (Koch & Reuling, 1994). Firms require a reliable 
and transparent supply of qualifications in the labor market; training occupations 
enhance reliability and transparency. Training occupations provide a bridge between 
the structuring of work in firms and VET. As such, they function as orientation points 
for curriculum development (Stooß, 1990).
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 The regulation of training occupations on a sectoral and national level has a long 
history in Germany, which dates back to the state regulation of artisanal occupations 
around 1900, and voluntary efforts towards self-regulation in the industry sector 
in the early decades of the 20th century (Hilbert et al., 1990). The number of 
recognized training occupations has gradually decreased over the second half of last 
century, from 901 in 1950 (Münch, 1994) to 606 in 1970 (BIBB, 1992) and 374 in 
1994 (BMBW, 1994). Apprentices are highly concentrated in a more limited number 
of training occupations than the total number of training occupations suggests. 
In 1992, the thirty most popular training occupations accounted for 63% of all 
apprentices (BMBW, 1993). 40% of male and 54% of female apprentices is trained 
in the most popular ten occupations for their gender. Occupations in both top tens 
are surprisingly constant over the years (Malkmus, 1994).
 The decreasing number of training occupations was the result of a conscious 
educational policy, aimed at the improvement of training occupations by making 
them broader27. Work contents have shifted from predominantly stable and 
predictable situations to increasingly open and complex situations. Besides 
sufficient occupational competencies, methodical and personal-social competencies 
have become more important. Methodical competencies refer to abstract-logical 
reasoning and the development of problem solution strategies. Personal and 
social competencies include motivation, decision making, and the willingness and 
ability to cooperate. All such competencies are referred to as key qualifications, 
‘Schlüsselqualifikationen’, in Germany (Koch & Reuling, 1994). Mertens (1974: 40) 
introduced the concept as follows:
 “Key qualifications are those that relate to such knowledge, abilities and 
skills, that do not have a direct and limited relevance to specific, separate 
practical tasks, but much more achieve a) the capability for a large number 
of  positions and functions as alternative possibilities at the same time, and 
b) the capability to master a sequence of  (mostly unforeseeable) changes in 
requirements over the life course.”
In this process, a new definition of training goals has originated over the eighties28: 
apprenticeship must train apprentices to be workers that are capable of planning, 
performing and controlling their skilled work independently (BIBB, 1992; Koch 
& Reuling, 1994). This way, one tries to simultaneously achieve a high level of 
craftsmanship as well as a maximum potential for mobility and flexibility for future 
workers. These improved goals have led to the aforementioned reduction of training 
occupations.
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3.5.2.2 Skills standards development
Since individual states are responsible for schools and the federal state for work-
based training, two separate sets of skills standards apply to each training occupation: 
one for the school-based component, and one for the work-based component. This 
could result in two problems.
 First, if individual states draft up vastly different skills standards for the school-
based component of the same apprenticeship occupation, both diploma recognition 
between states and (consequently) inter-state worker mobility might suffer. To 
prevent this, the individual states together have developed a framework skills 
standards document for the school-based component in their cooperative body, 
KMK29. Individual states’ education Departments then either adopt this framework, 
or develop their own specific versions of it. Generally, these Departments are 
themselves advised by advisory committees with representatives of the social 
partners and VET schools. Individual state skills standards are then translated into 
individual school plans and a specific curriculum by the individual BS.
 Second, skills standards for school- and work-based components of the same 
occupations might overlap or conflict with one another. Obviously, coordination 
between the framework skills standards document for the school-based component 
and the ‘Ausbildungsordnung’ for the work-based component is desirable, since 
both apply to one and the same apprenticeship track. Federal and individual states 
have therefore agreed on a com plex and detailed procedure in which the mutual 
development and adaptation of both sets is institutionalized in the Joint Resolution 
(‘Gemeinsames Ergebnisprotokoll’) of 1972 (Streeck et al., 1987; Benner, 1992; 
KMK, 1994)30. 
 In it, four methods of coordination have been institutionalized:
• Talks between representatives of federal government and state governments;
• A coordination committee consisting of representatives of federal government 
and state governments;
• Expert committees from the federal government;
• Expert committees from the KMK.
For the work-based component firms, sectoral employers’ associations and unions 
work together with experts from the BIBB to develop the ‘Ausbildungsordnung’. 
Formal final approval is the privilege of the federal Minister responsible for the 
sector at hand – usually that of Economic Affairs (Streeck et al., 1987; Hilbert et al., 
1990; BIBB, 1992; Benner, 1992). Until 1969, employers’ associations developed 
skills standards by themselves. They financed an organization that developed draft 
skills standards. The 1969 BBiG installed equal rights for unions in the development 
of skills standards, and created the BIBB as a state financed organization to support 
the development of skills standards and innovative training methods (Hilbert et al., 
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1990). BBiG paragraph 25, section 2 stipulates the minimum components of an 
‘Ausbildungsordnung’:
• The profile of the training occupation;
• Training duration;
• Knowledge and skills that are the subject of training (‘Ausbildungsberufsbild’: 
training occupation profile);
• A manual for the substantial and temporal ordering of that knowledge and those 
skills over the training period (‘Ausbildungsrahmenplan’: training framework);
• Examination requirements for the final exam (‘Prüfungsanforderungen’).
‘Ausbildungsordnungen’ only contain minimum requirements for training firms. 
This has two (intended) consequences. First, it leaves individual training firms 
the freedom to include their own firm-specific accents in their own apprenticeship 
training above and beyond these minimum criteria31. Second, it leaves firms 
the freedom to incorporate new (technological or other) developments in their 
apprenticeship training. ‘Ausbildungsordungen’ therefore usually abstain from any 
reference to specific methods, procedures and technologies – since these particular 
ones may soon have become obsolete and will be replaced by superior ones. There 
are other ways to achieve a certain minimum standard for technology (e.g. a 
precision specification for a certain metalworking operation). This way, not every 
technological change will result in a skills standards revision (Adler, 1994). 
 Experts from sectoral employers’ associations and unions support research of 
the BIBB on developments in labor market demand for qualifications and in training 
practices in their sector. There is a consensus principle regarding the revision of 
training occupation(s) or the development of new ones: only when employers’ 
associations, unions and the federal and state governments agree on a number of 
basic principles can a formal procedure (‘Neuordnung’) to develop or revise skills 
standards for a sector be started (Streeck et al., 1987). There should at least 
be agreement on the number of occupations, name(s), duration of training, basic 
description of occupation(s), training structure and a procedure for the development 
of actual skills standards. As long as such agreement is lacking, nothing will 
change. Once the parties agree, it is again experts from the sectoral employers’ 
association(s) and union(s) that cooperate with experts from the BIBB in the actual 
drafting of a new skills standards document.
 ‘Ausbildungsordnungen’ tend to remain in force for a long period. The most 
important ones in the construction sector date from 1974. And in the metalworking 
industry, there were still some dating from the forties up until the 1987 skills 
standards revision for that sector. Formally, the maximum period for a skills 
standards revision procedure is two years. While this may occasionally last longer, 
the most important reason for delays in skills standards revision lies in the necessity 
to reach consensus before any formal procedure can start. An extreme example is 
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provided by the aforementioned revision of skills standards for the metalworking 
industry. Whereas the social partners began discussing it in the early seventies, 
the new skills standards were not adopted before 1987. At first, social partners 
simply disagreed about basic principles. Subsequently and more importantly, 
however, this particular ‘Neuordnung’ gained prominent strategic importance for 
broader paradigmatic changes in apprenticeship governance (such as reeducation 
and broadening of training occupations; cf. section 3.3). Usually the entire process 
is shorter, but a number of years for broad occupational fields is not unusual.
 Discussions and decision-making processes within the association systems of 
both employers and unions thus contribute significantly to the governance of the 
apprenticeship system (Streeck et al., 1987). First, the organization of both labor 
and business in sectoral associations allows them to translate the various jobs 
that exist in various firms into a limited number of training occupations for an 
entire sector. This ensures a certain broadness to apprenticeship training in each 
occupation and, subsequently, possibilities for future external worker mobility. One 
employers’ association (Gesamtmetall) and one union (Industriegewerkschaft (IG) 
Metall), for instance, negotiated on training occupations for the entire metalworking 
industry. While this does not include the craft metalworking sector, it accounts for 
over half of German industrial employment (Streeck et al., 1987). In 1987, after a 
lengthy negotiating process, they finally replaced 37 old training occupations by 6 
new ones with (in all) 17 specializations (Klein & Schlösser, 1994). Gesamtmetall 
had to coordinate the interests of many more specialized sectoral trade associations 
and their members; IG Metall had to coordinate its activities with other unions, 
as many metalworking occupations are found in firms outside the metalworking 
sector. 
 In sum, the sectoral employers’ associations and unions have strong positions 
in apprenticeship governance due to their vital role in developing skills standards 
for the work-based training component. But it is the peak associations and not the 
sectoral organizations that participate in the formal meeting with the responsible 
federal Minister where a request for the start of a new skills standards development 
procedure is debated. And it is the peak associations that are asked for their formal 
opinion on the draft version of both skills standards documents for the occupation, 
and who can later use their influence in subsequent meetings on the topic in the 
central (and other) board(s) of the BIBB (Streeck et al, 1987; BIBB, 1992; Benner, 
1992). So far, disparate developments between sectors are scarce (Streeck et al., 
1987). This indicates an effective coordination across sectors, be it through voluntary 
restraint by sectoral organizations or through the informal use of influence through 
peak associations.
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3.5.2.3 Examination
Graduation from apprenticeship requires passing a final examination 
(‘Abschlußprüfung’) that consists of both a practical and a theoretical component. 
Passing these exams awards a vocational certificate (‘Berufsabschluß’) 
whose exact name depends upon the training occupation (‘Facharbeiterbrief’; 
‘Fachangestelltenbrief’, ‘Gesellenbrief’). Acquisition of this certificate is the central 
goal of apprenticeship training. Before this, apprentices take part in at least one 
intermediate examination during their training. Its only aim is to ascertain whether 
the apprentice is on the right track. If not, the authorized body can undertake 
action to help him back on track (Münch, 1994).
 There are, however, two other certificates that apprentices can (and, ideally, 
will) acquire simultaneously with the ‘Berufsabschluß’. First, those who successfully 
complete their BS attendance gain a BS certificate that – if certain performance 
standards have been met - includes the Hauptschule or even Realschule diploma 
(KMK, 1994). But this BS certificate is not a requirement for the aforementioned 
final examination. Second, the apprentice will get a certificate from his training firm 
upon completion of this training. This certificate, too, is completely independent 
of the other two. Together, these three independent certificates constitute a 
‘triple certification system’ (Reisse, 1996). We must reiterate, however: the 
‘Berufsabschluß’ is the only proof of apprenticeship graduation. The other two 
certificates are bonuses.
 Both the interim and final examination are organized and developed by the 
individual authorized bodies. These develop their own ‘Prüfungsordnungen’ to 
regulate their exams. They constitute examination committees with an equal 
number of employer and union representatives (usually one each), plus (at least) 
one BS teacher (Münch, 1994). This decentralized organization of exams implies 
that the national skills standards for the work-based component cannot completely 
guarantee the same qualification level nationwide for each occupation. The 
examination requirements for the final exam (‘Prüfungsanforderungen’), which are 
contained in the ‘Ausbildungsordnung’, however, tie the authorized bodies to similar 
conditions. In addition, in a number of important sectors, all authorized bodies use 
the same exams. The ‘Prüfungsaufgaben- und Lehrmittelentwicklungsstelle’ of the 
Industry and Commerce Chamber in Stuttgart has developed examinations for over 
100 technical industrial occupations that are used nationwide. And an institute in 
Nürnberg has developed examinations that are used nationwide for a number of 
economic-administrative occupations. The ‘Handwerk’ sector, however, sticks to a 
decentralized organization of exams. Even there, however, a committee at the level 
of an individual state may develop a specific exam, or a pool of exam questions 
from which individual Chambers can choose.
 It is possible to take the final examination without previously completing 
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apprenticeship training, as a form of assessment. Participation in this 
‘Externenprüfung’ generally requires work experience in the relevant occupation for 
a period of twice the training duration. If one can show to have acquired relevant 
knowledge and skills elsewhere, the required work experience may be shorter. And 
if one has completed school-based VET similar to the apprenticeship, no additional 
work experience is required. Various organizations offer courses that prepare 
for participation in the ‘Externenprüfung’ (Hecker, 1993). Participants are mostly 
employed, and over half has already completed apprenticeship training in another 
occupation (Hecker, 1994).
3.5.2.4 External and internal differentiation
External differentiation
Three types of training occupations can be distinguished (Adler, 1994): mono-
occupations (occupations without specializations), occupations with specializations 
and multi-tiered occupations (‘Stufenausbildung’). Mono-occupations have 
one single training occupation profile and one single training framework for all 
apprentices in that occupation. Specialized occupations have specializations 
based on differentiations in training occupation profile and/or training framework. 
There are two types of specializations. Firstly, ‘Fachrichtungen’ within a training 
occupation, which differ in both training occupation profile and training framework. 
Secondly, ‘Schwerpunkten’ share the same training occupation profile, but have 
different training frameworks (Adler, 1994).
 Multi-tiered occupations (‘Stufenausbildung’) are occupations from which formal 
graduation is possible after two (or more) different stages. Contrary to other 
occupations, such a stage itself may be shorter than two years. The last important 
sector that still has multi-tiered occupations is the construction sector. The training 
occupations consist of two stages, the first of which lasts two years, the second one 
year. The first year is a joint year for all construction apprentices, and contains 20 
weeks’ of training in a ÜBS. The second year they are trained in one of three broad 
areas (e.g. road or water construction), and still attend a ÜBS for 13 weeks. After 
this second year, apprentices may take a final exam and graduate in each of these 
areas/occupations (Johannson & Schuler, 1994). But the majority of apprentices 
completes an interim exam and proceeds to the second stage/third year, in which 
they can choose from (in all) eleven other occupations to graduate in. This year 
concludes with a four-week training period at a ÜBS just before the final examination 
(Johansson & Schuler, 1994).
 The transparent and elaborate horizontal external differentiation in training 
occupations in German apprenticeship coincides with a very low level of vertical 
differentiation across different qualification levels, which dominates VET in many other 
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countries (Reuling, 1998). And the reduction of independent training occupations 
has further reduced the level of external differentiation in the apprenticeship 
system. Formally, all apprenticeship tracks are equivalent and train for one and 
the same qualification level (i.e. that of skilled worker). This even goes for both 
stages of a ‘Stufenausbildung’. In practice, graduates from just the lower stage will 
obviously find themselves in different jobs and different labor market segments 
than graduates from the upper stage do32. Therefore, one can speak of external 
differentiation of occupations in the case of a ‘Stufenausbildung’. In addition, 
external differentiation could be perceived to exist in situations where different 
but somewhat similar training occupations with a different training duration co-
exist. A case in point is the continuation of the former two-year training occupation 
‘Teilezurichter’ in the metalworking industry, next to the new, three-and-a-half year 
occupations. Such shorter occupations are unpopular with apprentices, and have 
low enrollments33.
 There are different ways through which the reduction of the number of training 
occupations and external differentiation has occurred. Firstly, where previously 
tracks at different qualification levels existed, these have often been integrated. 
Secondly, related training occupations have been merged. This often implied merging 
previously independent mono-occupations in a new specialized occupation, with a 
joint first year, and specialization opportunities in later years. The most famous 
example in this respect is the new industrial metalworking occupations that were 
set up in the eighties. 37 former training occupations were replaced by six new 
ones. Five of those are specialized occupations with ‘Fachrichtungen’, the sixth is a 
mono-occupation. Training duration is three and a half years for each occupation. 
All six occupations share a joint basic training component; training in the particular 
occupation starts afterwards (Streeck et al, 1987; BIBB, 1992; Klein & Schlösser, 
1994).
 Although most employers’ associations agree on the necessity of broad 
apprenticeship training, most pressure in this direction has actually come from the 
unions. German industrial unions do not try to restrict access to training in order 
to keep up the price of skilled labor (as craft unions may do), but press for an 
apprenticeship system that guarantees high quality training for all (future) workers 
(Streeck et al., 1987). They try to strengthen their power through maximizing 
the homogeneity of the workforce they represent, which explains their interest 
in keeping the level of both horizontal and vertical external differentiation low 
(cf. Streeck et al, 1987; Reuling, 1998). The ‘Stufenausbildung’ therefore grew 
unpopular with unions, in particular because of negative experiences in with the old 
metalworking industry occupations in the seventies. Not all apprentices that wanted 
to, got access to the second stage of these occupations; and when employers 
proposed to create a lower wage group for stage one graduates, the metalworking 
union (IG Metall) turned against the ‘Stufenausbildung’. This was the prime conflict 
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between employers and unions that long stalled the revision of skill standards for 
the metalworking industry. Unions in general adopted the policy that they would 
no longer accept training occupations of less than three years (Koch & Reuling, 
1994).
Internal differentiation
The low level of vertical external differentiation in German apprenticeship, the 
participation of apprentices with very different (general) skills levels within the 
same tracks, and the resulting high graduation rate, provide a very intriguing 
picture. How do they do that? An important part of the answer lies in the high 
level of internal differentiation (‘Binnendifferenzierung’) of apprenticeship. There 
are three types of internal differentiation: temporal, curricular, and methodical-
didactic (BMBW, 1994).
 The first of these, temporal differentiation, finds its legal basis in BBiG paragraph 
29. Apprentices can get a reduction of training time for one or several six-month 
periods. In some cases (when relevant school-based VET has been completed, 
cf. section 3.3.4) such a reduction is compulsory. (Additional) Reduction can be 
awarded for other relevant previous educational experience (i.e. an Abitur, or 
training in a related training occupation) or because of outstanding progress during 
the training period itself. The authorized body decides in such matters, advised by 
BS and training firm. In 1992, 19% of all apprenticeship contracts contained such 
a reduction (BMBW, 1994).
 The second type, curricular differentiation stems from the fact that the 
‘Ausbildungsordnungen’ contain minimum requirements (cf. section 3.5.2.2). As 
some firms will stick with these minimum requirements, whereas other (more 
innovative) firms will train beyond them, in practice (slightly) different programs 
will co-exist within each training occupation. And as firms with the more demanding 
programs tend to recruit the more talented apprentices, this form of informal internal 
differentiation can compensate for the lack of vertical external differentiation. In 
this respect, the German apprenticeship system resembles the American college 
system. While all apprenticeship diplomas/college degrees are formally equal, 
the training firm/college where they were acquired provides important additional 
information on the quality of training and graduate. Large innovative firms such 
as Mercedes Benz are, in that sense, the Ivy League of German apprenticeship. 
In addition, curricular differentiation may occur in the school-based component. 
In Baden-Württemberg, for example, one or two hours per week are dedicated to 
remedial teaching or further specialization, depending upon the progress of each 
individual apprentice (MKS, 1989).
 The third type of internal differentiation, didactic differentiation, has been 
institutionalized as training counseling support (‘ausbildungsbegleitende Hilfe’), paid 
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for and awarded by local labor offices to apprentices who run into trouble during 
their training. It is targeted on supplemental instruction in occupational or general 
subjects on the one hand, and on social-pedagogical counseling on the other. The 
exact support is targeted to individual needs, and varies between three and eight 
hours a week. Different organizations may offer this support (Heidelberger Institut 
Beruf und Arbeit, 1993). The extent of this type of support has grown rapidly, from 
11,500 instances in 1988 to 55,000 in 1953 (Malkmus, 1994).
3.5.3 Sectoral differences in the governance of apprenticeship
The apprenticeship governance regime is a national regime that provides a framework 
for the governance of apprenticeship throughout the economy. But we have already 
touched upon some instances where sectoral differences occur in the elaboration of 
that general framework. One difference is in the comprehensiveness of sets of skills 
standards for an industry. The organization of employers in different associations 
may or may not result in separate ‘Ausbildungsordnungen’. In construction, both 
the national employers’ association for the craft construction sector and that for 
the construction industry have jointly negotiated with the construction union and 
agreed upon a common structure of training occupations for both sectors in the 
early seventies (Streeck et al., 1987; Hilbert et al.,1990; Johannson & Schuler, 
1994). In the metalworking sector, there are separate training ordinances for the 
craft sector and for the metalworking industry (Streeck et al, 1987; Hilbert et 
al., 1990; Klein & Schlösser, 1994). And in banking, one of the three employers’ 
associations has created its own specific training occupation, next to the general 
training occupation for the sector (Brötz, 1993).
 Furthermore, sectors differ in the extent to which they use regional apprenticeship 
training centers (ÜBS). The use of these centers in construction exceeds that in 
others, since the skills standards explicitly require apprentices to undergo training 
in such centers for a specific number of weeks in each of the three years of training 
(Streeck et al., 1987; Hilbert et al., 1990; Johannson & Schuler, 1994). Employers’ 
associations and unions feared that this requirement would seriously undercut 
construction firms’ propensity to training, because apprentices cannot contribute to 
production while they are in the ÜBS. They therefore agreed on a collective bargaining 
agreement that created a levy system for the sector in the early seventies. All firms 
contribute a certain percentage (1993: 1,75%) of their wage sum into a training 
fund, from which training firms are partially compensated for the costs of their 
apprentices (Streeck et al., 1987; Hilbert et al.,1990; Johannson & Schuler, 1994). 
Since labor demand is highly erratic due to sector’s high susceptibility for seasonal 
fluctuations in employment, a levy system can also help ensure an adequate supply 
of skilled labor over time. Both the peak organizations of employers and of unions 
were, however, opposed to the creation of this levy system in the construction sector. 
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At the time, these peak organizations were involved in a national political fight on 
financing of vocational training (cf. section 3.7.1). The peak labor organizations, 
as well as unions in other sectors, wanted a levy system for the entire economy, 
and nothing less. The peak employers’ associations wanted no levy system at all, 
and considered a levy system in one sector a dangerous precedent (Streeck et al., 
1987; Johansson & Schuler, 1994). The construction sector associations, however, 
in the end were able to have their way.
3.5.4 Conclusion: an associational governance regime
One dominant characteristic of the German apprenticeship governance regime 
is, thus, the prominent role played by associations: employers’ associations and 
unions34. Hilbert et al. (1990) point to the development of ‘private steering capacities’ 
as an important aspect of the historical development of the apprenticeship system. 
At the end of the 19th century, the state dedicated important regulatory tasks for 
vocational training to ‘Handwerk’ employers’ organizations. Employers’ associations 
since then have fulfilled a double role in the governance of apprenticeship (Hilbert 
et al., 1990). On the one hand, the state has equipped them with a number of 
responsibilities. These give them the opportunity to pursue the interests of their 
members by providing regulation that better matches the demands of their 
members than state regulation would35. At the end of the 19th century, certain 
types of production were legally preserved for ‘Handwerk’ (cf. section 3.2.2), 
and the ‘Handwerk’ organization got the privilege to grant firms the right to train 
apprentices – and thus give them access to cheap labor, as well. ‘Handwerk’ thus got 
the chance to protect its position vis-á-vis the growing industry sector. On the other 
hand, the state uses employers’ associations to stimulate firms to train apprentices 
in the desired quantity and quality. A similar pattern emerged in industry, and 
until the end of the 1960s, the state basically enabled employers’ associations to 
regulate training.
 By then, this traditional governance model proved less and less capable of 
satisfactorily integrating individual firms’ interests and the collective interest in 
quality training (Hilbert et al, 1990). Training was increasingly considered below 
par, and firms increasing lacked the skilled workers to meet new challenges. This 
resulted in the 1969 BBiG. The most important changes were the creation of a 
central institute (today’s BIBB) and the incorporation of unions in the governance 
regime, e.g. in the Chambers’ training committees. While this has limited the power 
of individual firms and their associations, they still remain the dominant actors in 
German apprenticeship. Unions now play an important role as guardians of the 
quality and quantity of (the work-based component of) apprenticeship training. By 
demanding reforms and broad skills standards, they pressure firms and employers’ 
associations to ensure a high and rising quality of training. Union involvement, in 
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turn, reinforces the position of employers’ associations versus their member firms, 
since they can now hide behind unions for regulations they may consider necessary 
but which their members oppose.
 Today, German associations of employers and employees are participating in 
apprenticeship policy in four ways (Streeck et al, 1987: 84-85):
• as lobby and interest representatives according to the classic model of pluralist 
interest politics;
• as suppliers in the market for training services (i.e. for training counseling 
support, cf. section 3.5.2.4);
• as vehicles for the formulation and aggregation of interests relevant to training 
policy, both within and between the respective associational systems;
• as vehicles for the exercise of public authority (i.e. as authorized bodies).
In addition to their involvement in specialized governance mechanisms for 
apprenticeship, employers’ associations and unions simultaneously influence the 
governance of apprenticeship through their involvement in other institutions. 
Streeck et al. (1987) mention three types of other institutions that are relevant. 
At the level of individual firms, the system of co-determination grants works 
councils information and co-determination rights regarding the implementation of 
apprenticeship training. Second, employers’ associations and unions participate in 
the various bodies of the Federal Labor Administration (Streeck et al., 1987), where 
they can influence its policy with respect to direct or indirect subsidies to support 
apprenticeship training or further training. Third and most importantly, however, 
employers’ associations and unions influence apprenticeship through their collective 
bargaining agreements.
 Collective bargaining agreements are in two ways relevant for the apprenticeship 
system. First, they determine the apprenticeship wage for the sector and region 
concerned (Beicht, 1994; Van Waarden, 1995b; Van Lieshout, 1996a). A monthly 
apprentice wage rate is established, which rises for each training year as demanded 
by BBiG paragraph 10. These rates apply to all apprentices covered by the bargaining 
agreement, irrespective of their training occupation. In order to make the hiring of 
apprentices attractive for firms, these rates are substantially lower than the wage 
rates for even unskilled workers in the same sector and region. Since there are 
virtually no young unskilled workers, it is hard to find suitable figures (Soskice, 
1994). Casey (1986) presents estimates of apprentice wage levels for the early 
eighties ranging from 20% of the adult worker’s wage for first year apprentices to 
33% for third year apprentices. In 1992, an apprentice in the metalworking industry 
in the north of the German state of Baden-Württemberg earned 31.9% of the wage 
of a skilled worker in his first year, and 37.2% in his third year; an apprentice in 
commerce in the German state Nordrhein-Westfalen also earned 37.2% in his third 
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year, and 26.4% in his first year (OECD, 1994b: 143). For construction, our own 
calculations based on the 1993 collective bargaining agreement indicate that a third 
year apprentice received 60% of the wage of an unskilled worker of his age with 
one year’s working experience, and 56% of a skilled worker (Van Lieshout, 1996a: 
82). Note, however, that construction is the sector with the highest apprenticeship 
wages, and the fact that sectoral apprentice wage differentials are substantial 
(Beicht, 1994).
 Second, collective bargaining agreements link apprenticeship certificates to 
certain pay levels (Steedman, 1993; Van Waarden, 1995b; Van Lieshout, 1996a). 
This makes the benefits of finishing apprenticeship training (in terms of a guaranteed 
pay level if one finds a skilled worker job in the sector) quite transparent for German 
youngsters. In addition, there is a reversed link between collective bargaining and 
apprenticeship: unions and employers’ associations negotiate on the structure 
of training occupations, knowing that more complex training occupations will 
subsequently lead to higher pay levels. Thus, employers’ associations occasionally 
plead for the creation of training occupations at different skills levels, whereas 
the labor movement explicitly aims for one high skills level for all occupations in a 
sector - as is actually the case for most sectors nowadays (cf. section 3.5.2.4).
3.6 Why do German youngsters opt for apprenticeship?
3.6.1 Seven reasons why German apprenticeship is attractive
Seven reasons help explain why such large numbers of German youngsters opt for 
apprenticeship training (Van Lieshout, 1996a: 59-73).
 To begin with, there are no formal academic entry requirements that limit access 
to the apprenticeship system (cf. section 3.3.3). Even general secondary school 
dropouts without any diploma are free to enter into an apprenticeship agreement 
with a firm. Those who have proven not to be very good in school-based learning 
are thus not punished by being denied access to work-based learning. The only 
bottleneck is, of course, finding a firm. And, as compared to school-based systems, 
apprenticeship systems have been and still are more liable to ethnic and gender 
selectivity.
 Second, there are hardly any school-based vocational education and training 
tracks that supply training equivalent to that in the dual system (cf. section 3.3.4). 
For those who can not (or do not) opt for higher education, apprenticeship is 
usually the only opportunity for full-fledged VET. Contrary to other countries (such 
as the Netherlands), German apprenticeship tracks have hardly any competition 
from school-based tracks, which is a very simple but powerful explanation for high 
apprenticeship enrollments.
 Third, apprenticeship also receives little to no competition from regular youth 
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employment. The very large majority of employed German youngsters are current 
or graduated apprentices (cf. Van Lieshout, 1996a: 60). Den Broeder (1995) 
explains the virtual lack of regular youth employment by pointing at the part-
time compulsory school attendance requirement. While this requirement obviously 
stimulates apprenticeship training in some way, it is an insufficient explanation for 
the lack of regular youth employment. In no way are young people forced to combine 
part-time school attendance with the work-based apprenticeship component; on 
the contrary, they are free to combine it with a part-time regular job36. Instead, 
the dominant reason for virtual lack of regular youth employment must be sought 
primarily on the supply side. As apprenticeship wages are significantly lower than 
regular wages, most employers offer entry positions for young people only as 
apprenticeship positions. They find it more attractive to hire youth as apprentices 
and train them on-the job (combined with productive work) for two to three-and-a-
half years, than to hire them as a regular worker at a higher wage, and still having 
to train them on-the-job (cf. section 3.7). Either way, with few regular jobs open 
to young persons, and few full-fledged school-based VET options, apprenticeship is 
often the only real option for German youngsters – other than to continue full-time 
upper secondary and tertiary education.
 Fourth, apprenticeship wages (while substantially lower than regular wages) 
are quite attractive when compared to the scholar ships students receive when they 
atten d full-time (vocational) schools. Apprentice wage rates are mostly established 
in collective bargaining agreements, and therefore may differ not only between 
training occupations, but also within the same occupation. The average 1993 
monthly apprentice wage was 973 DM overall; 853 DM for year apprentices; 968 
DM for second year apprentices, and 1087 DM for third year apprentices (Beicht, 
1994)37. The extreme examples were men’s tailor apprentices in Berlin, who only 
received an average of 270 DM a month38, while scaffolding builder apprentices 
topped the list with an average of 1759 DM. 86% of apprentices that year, however, 
had a monthly apprentice wage of between 750 and 1150 DM (Beicht, 1994). The 
average apprentice wages are higher than the state scholarships that students in 
school-based upper secondary education are entitled to (cf. Van Lieshout, 1996a: 
64-65). The extent to which youth will base their educational decisions upon 
the short-term financial consequences of available options is, however, probably 
negligible in comparison with the previous and following reasons. What is a case 
point, however, is the opposite reasoning: because apprentice wages (while higher 
than scholarships) are still quite low as compared with regular wages, it is difficult 
for young persons to postpone apprenticeship training into their twenties (cf. 
Soskice, 1994; 54).
 In the fifth place, apprenticeship training generally provides good labor market 
prospects to its graduates. On the one hand, apprenticeship is the main port 
of entry into (industrial and service sector) firm’s internal skilled labor markets 
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(Soskice, 1994: 53). On the other, the skilled worker certificate enables the 
graduate to secure skilled employment through the external occupational labor 
market. Apprentices themselves name a future permanent labor contract as their 
primary reason to start apprenticeship training; income expectations and career 
prospects are other reasons (BMBW, 1994). Their expectations are based on facts. 
Unemployment is more than three times as high for those without an apprenticeship 
certificate than for those that do have such a diploma (Davids, 1993; Tessaring, 
1993). In 1992, 74% of metalworking apprentices, 71% of electronics apprentices, 
and 79% of service sector apprentices received a labor contract from their training 
firm (Schöngen et al., 1994). Collective bargaining agreements link apprenticeship 
certificates to attractive pay levels (Steedman, 1993; Van Waarden, 1995b; Van 
Lieshout, 1996a). Even when people apply for jobs in different occupations than 
the ones they were trained in, employers see the acquisition of an apprenticeship 
certificate as a positive element in recruitment and selection. And when those good 
labor market prospects somehow fail to materialize for a graduated apprentice, even 
the social security system has its own ‘rewards’ for them. Occupational unfitness 
(‘Berufsunfähigkeit’) has always been a separate insurance category besides labor 
unfitness (‘Erwerbsunfähigkeit’) in Germany (cf. CPB, 1997: 194; 209). Skilled 
workers are not immediately forced to accept an unskilled job when they become 
unemployed; and they are entitled to financial support for further training or re-
training.
 Sixth, completing an apprenticeship gives people access to interesting 
opportunities for further training. BS themselves, as well as various school-based 
VET forms (BAS, FOS, ‘Abendgymnasium für Berufstätigen’) that can be combined 
with apprenticeship training, provide opportunities to acquire (higher) general 
secondary diplomas (cf. section 3.3.4). But particularly important in this respect is 
the institutionalization of the FS (section 3.3.6). These schools train for interesting 
intermediate positions in the German labor market, and access is granted only 
to those with relevant apprenticeship training and additional work experience. 
Contrary to the Netherlands (cf. chapter 5), where young people have always 
faced a parallel choice between either a dual track for a frontline position, or a 
school-based track for an intermediate position, in Germany these tracks have been 
institutionalized sequentially (Van Lieshout, 1996a: 32). In order to gain access to 
the level for intermediate positions, one has to complete apprenticeship training 
first; so there is no competition between both types of tracks. In addition, there 
are over twenty arrangements for graduated apprentices to gain access to higher 
education (Dybowski et al., 1994; section 3.3.5).
 And last, German youngsters are adequately prepared for their educational and 
occupational choices through a well-organized career advice system. This system starts 
with short internships in lower secondary education (Malkmus, 1994). In addition, 
there are mandatory career preparation classes in secondary schools, organized 
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by personnel from the career information centers (‘Berufsinformationszentren’) 
of the employment offices of the Federal Labor Administration. These are legally 
required to offer free career information to all citizens. For this task 140 local 
career information centers have been set up, and on top of that some mobile ones 
(BfA, 1994a). Following the career prep classes, young people and parents can visit 
these centers for further information or for private career counseling. 70% of all 
lower secondary students arrange a private career counseling meeting with these 
centers (Malkmus, 1994). In addition, the centers play an important intermediary 
role in the matching of supply and demand for apprenticeship. Since this service 
is free, and future apprentices will visit the career information centers at least 
once, most firms make sure to inform the centers of their apprentice openings for 
the coming year. The Federal Employment Office, for instance, recorded 667,238 
apprentice openings in the year 1992/1993 (BfA, 1994a), whereas the number of 
new apprentices that started training in 1993 was 470,971 (BMBW, 1994). And, 
vice versa, the fact that at least a large majority of apprentice openings are known 
at the career information centers stimulates aspiring apprentices to visit them.
3.6.2 Is the appeal of apprenticeship declining?
Despite the massive participation in German apprenticeship, there is some debate 
about the declining appeal of apprenticeship. Steedman (1993) lists three reasons 
for actual and possible future apprentice shortages. First, demographic development 
has resulted in lower numbers of youths since 1981. Second, better-qualified 
secondary students increasingly opt for the higher education route. Third, better-
qualified apprentices increasingly opt for service occupations, resulting in shortages 
in industry, construction and ‘Handwerk’ occupations.
 In absolute terms, apprenticeship participation has grown from 49.4% of 
the relevant population in 1975 to 66.5% in 1990 (Tessaring, 1993: 136). But 
participation in higher education has grown at a faster rate than apprenticeship 
participation (Tessaring, 1993; Parmentier et al., 1994). A growing appeal of higher 
education does, however, affect VET participation to a lesser extent than in other 
countries. Many students first finish their apprenticeship training before starting 
a track in higher education. 36% of first year higher education students in 1992 
had completed VET (BMBW, 1994). Some of these only gained access to higher 
education through their VET completion. But 18% of first year higher education 
students opted for VET although they could have entered higher education directly 
(BMBW, 1993)39. Their motives are that firms often prefer engineers with shop 
floor experience, and that apprenticeship completion opens the opportunity to fund 
higher education participation through well paid vacation jobs (Schöngen, 1993).
 The popularity of this combination shows that the apprenticeship form itself 
is not the problem. Besides the obvious fact that more young persons now have 
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the necessary qualifications to enter higher education (cf. section 3.3.2), it is the 
better labor market prospects that higher education offers that explains its growing 
popularity. Higher education graduates have jobs with higher earnings, higher 
status, and face less unemployment (Tessaring, 1993); moreover, they are more 
satisfied with their jobs in almost every aspect (Althoff, 1994a). Differences in the 
popularity of various training occupations within the apprenticeship system also 
point in the direction that labor market prospects – not the tracks themselves - are 
the primary reason for declining appeal. Construction apprentices shortages, for 
instance, are connected to precarious labor conditions and circumstances in the 
sector (Clauß, 1993; Johannson & Schüler, 1994). And metalworking shortages 
were attributed to recent mass dismissals and apprentices who were not offered 
labor contacts upon graduation. Drexel (1993; 1994b) has pointed at the weakening 
position of the FS as an indirect reason for declining labor market prospects for 
apprenticeship graduates. ‘Meister’ and ‘Techniker’ are increasingly substituted in 
German firms by either top apprenticeship graduates or FHS graduates. While the 
former does obviously not weaken the labor market prospects of apprenticeship 
graduates, the latter does. Part of the attraction of German apprenticeship has 
always been the subsequent opportunity for progress to higher job runs through 
the FS. Thus, the attraction of apprenticeship as an institutional form does not 
appear to be waning. However, the appeal of ‘Facharbeiter’-level employment may 
well be on the decline.
3.6.3 Improving the appeal of apprenticeship
Various possibilities exist to try and increase the appeal of apprenticeship in general 
or a specific training occupation in particular. One alternative is to raise apprentice 
wages. In general, apprentice wages rise when the supply of apprentices decreases: 
between 1989 and 1993, for instance, apprentice wage grew with approximately 
40% (Van Lieshout, 1996a: 64). In construction, high apprenticeship wages are 
presumably a conscious strategy to compensate for the sector’s image problems 
(very demanding employment with health risks) (Beicht, 1993). Second, recruitment 
activity may be intensified such as the creation of eight mobile information centers 
in the metalworking sector (Gesamtmetall, 1993). Third, one can try and make 
occupational employment more interesting by making training occupations more 
interesting and multi-faceted. ‘Neuordnungen’ offer the opportunity to do so (IG 
Metall, 1985; Johannson & Schüler, 1994). Fourth, general policy changes have 
been suggested. Examples are (Arbeitsgruppe Berufliche Bildung, 1994):
• more internal differentiation by allowing the most talented apprentices to 
 gain additional qualifications during their apprenticeship;
• granting the intermediate diploma to apprenticeship graduates;
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• increased access to higher education for apprenticeship graduates;
• increased training opportunities for skilled workers;
• increased upward mobility in firms.
Contrary to metalworking and construction, in banking the problem is not recruiting 
sufficient apprentices, but retaining sufficient apprenticeship graduates, as many 
banking apprenticeship graduates leave their bank for higher education. This requires 
other measures to ensure the lasting appeal of apprenticeship. One possibility is 
to recruit fewer apprentices with an ‘Abitur’ and more with lower certificates, as 
these are less likely to leave in order to pursue full-time higher education. A second 
possibility is to design new tracks that combine apprenticeship with further training 
within the bank and/or a dual higher education track. Various types of this type 
of ‘Sonderausbildungsgänge’ (cf. section 3.3.5) have been developed, in banking 
as well as in other sectors (Van Lieshout, 1996a: 75-77). Third, banks can decide 
to recruit apprentices for different (general economic-administrative) training 
occupations. For those occupations, banking is a very attractive employment sector, 
and they will be less inclined to leave for higher education.
3.7	 Why	do	German	firms	opt	for	apprenticeship?
3.7.1 The collective result of individual choices
The decision to enter an apprenticeship contract is made completely voluntarily 
for both firm and apprentice. We have discussed the appeal of apprenticeship 
training for German youngsters in section 3.6.1. In most countries, however, the 
problem is not so much that apprenticeship is not attractive, but that the supply 
of apprenticeship positions is limited. The most intriguing fact about German 
apprenticeship is therefore the abundant supply of apprenticeship positions by 
firms in all sectors of the economy.
 This fact is even more surprising because other countries often have 
institutionalized more collective institutional supports for apprenticeship training 
than Germany has. The (theoretically) strongest possible institutional support to 
overcome the poaching threat in VET markets is the collectivization of training 
decisions and funding. One option is a law requiring to spend a certain percentage 
of their payroll on training (as in France); another is the creation of a levy system 
in a sector (as in most Dutch sectors, cf. chapter 5); and the state can of course 
organize and pay for VET schools, and/or subsidize apprenticeship training in firms. 
There is no law requiring German firms to train; there is only one (significant) 
economic sector with a levy system (construction, cf. section 3.5.3); and training 
subsidies only play a minor role.
 To begin with the latter, the state pays for the schools that provide related 
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instruction. However, the state does not pay for the in-company component of 
training, so that the individual training firms will have to cover these costs. At least 
as important, however, is the fact that German state policy has always resisted 
the temptation of financing full-fledged full-time school based vocational training 
that could compete with apprenticeship. Only when the supply of apprenticeship 
positions by firms fell short of demand in the early and mid eighties did state 
actors at various levels grant significant training subsidies to firms (Hilbert et al., 
1990; Koch & Reuling, 1994). These were typically linked to specific causes such 
as the supply of apprenticeship positions for weaker groups, or in particularly 
disadvantaged regions. The training subsidies were directly abolished when the 
shortage of apprenticeship positions declined (Koch & Reuling, 1994). In addition 
to such subsidies, training capacity in the existing full-time vocational schools was 
temporarily expanded (cf. section 3.4.4).
 As to levy systems: German firms and their associations have strongly resisted the 
idea of a levy system throughout history, whereas unions promoted such a reform. 
The most prominent example of this debate dates back to the early 1970s. When 
training supply decreased, the left-liberal government proposed serious training 
reform, with significant training components in ÜBS, and a levy system to finance 
them (Hilbert et al., 1990). This way, it would be easier to ensure the quantity and 
quality of training, and training costs would be more equally distributed across 
all firms – or at least that was (and sometimes still is) the perspective of German 
unions and the SPD. But a levy system would mean an increasing role for the state 
(or at least the unions), and German firms fear this would make apprenticeship 
more expensive because of increasing bureaucracy, and because more supervision 
of the work-based component might decrease the room for productive engagement 
of apprentices (KWB, 1985). And, through the levy, firms would still pay these 
higher costs themselves. Moreover, more state (or unions) involvement might 
imply a larger school-based component, and German firms are convinced that a 
school-based system will not offer the same quality training as their apprenticeship 
system. Hilbert et al. (1990) explain the resistance of employers’ associations from 
the simple fact that these cannot condone legislation that would create higher costs 
for a large part of their constituency; and Chambers would face a decreased role 
after the proposed reforms.
 Resistance of the employers’ associations, supported by the political parties CDU 
and FDP has prevented such reforms. But an Apprenticeship Training Stimulation 
Act (‘Ausbildungsplatzförderungsgesetz’) was passed in the late seventies, which 
called for the creation of a levy system in case the supply of apprenticeship 
positions would fall below a certain threshold. The ‘Bundesverfassungsgericht’ 
(constitutional court) annulled this Act in 1980, however, because of technicalities 
relating to procedures. While it did not ban a levy system as such, the successor to 
the annulled act (‘Berufsbildungsförderungsgesetz’) no longer contained the levy-
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system threshold. But the federal government could still create one if it chose to. 
And more than the occasional ‘carrot’ of training subsidies, the German state has 
used the ‘stick’ of threatening to impose a training levy if supply for training should 
fall short of demand (Hilbert et al., 1990; Koch & Reuling, 1994). To keep the state 
from imposing a levy system, individual firms have even been willing to train more 
apprentices than they themselves need, particularly in the early eighties (Hilbert et 
al., 1990). In addition to the federal and individual states, some municipalities have 
used ‘sticks’ of their own, in that they exclusively granted municipal orders to firms 
that trained apprentices (Hilbert et al., 1990).
 But whereas the state threats to impose a levy system and subsequent appeals 
from employers’ associations can help explain why some firms have trained above 
their capacity in the early eighties, they cannot explain why they maintained a regular 
training capacity in the first place. While the state, employers’ associations and unions 
do stimulate the supply of apprenticeship positions by firms through various policies, 
the ultimate fact left to explain is why German firms (contrary to their counterparts 
in other countries) massively opt for apprenticeship training. The high volume of 
German apprenticeship training is, indeed, the collective result of a large number of 
individual choices. We will explore such an explanation in section 3.7.2.
 However, we do need to stress that the role of the German state in shaping 
and enabling apprenticeship is, of course, far from negligible. It has invested 
substantially in creating and maintaining an infrastructure that enables firms in 
general, and smaller and more specialized firms in particular, to keep training 
apprentices. The legal protection that the German state provides for ‘Handwerk’ 
is an important historic foundation for the development of German apprenticeship. 
The 1969 BBiG does not force firms to train, but if they train young people of 
up to 18 years old, they are obliged to train them in an official apprenticeship 
occupation and in accordance with the rules of the corresponding governance 
regime. The German youth labor protection Act (‘Jugendarbeitsschutzgesetz’) that 
forbids particular productive activities for young people, enables exceptions to 
these rules just for apprenticeship training purposes (Van Lieshout, 1996a: 61). In 
the seventies, ÜBS were created to allow the federal minimum skills standards to 
become more challenging, while still allowing smaller, specialized firms that could 
not offer training for every single required skill, to keep training apprentices. The 
training-counseling program (section 3.5.2.4) has had a similar effect, in that it 
helps firms to retain apprentices with learning or other problems. And, again, but 
perhaps most importantly, the German states have continued to shape full-time 
school-based VET as either a gateway into apprenticeship, or as a pathway towards 
a higher general diploma, rather than an alternative for, or a rival to, apprenticeship 
tracks.  These have been preserved as the lone gateway into intermediate labor 
markets.
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3.7.2	 Why	do	German	firms	opt	for	apprenticeship	training?
Becker’s human capital theory of course provides us with a first important clue as 
to how the large volume of apprenticeship training in Germany may be explained: 
German apprentices contribute to the costs of their training by accepting relatively 
low apprenticeship wages (cf. section 3.5.4).
 Research on the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training in Germany 
shows, however, that the low apprentice wages and the productive contributions 
of apprentices jointly do not cover all costs; firms do invest in apprenticeship 
training themselves (Falk, 1982; Noll et al, 1983; Von Bardeleben et al, 1994a; 
1994b; 1995). Depending on the exact type of cost calculation followed40, only in 
6.4% or 19.8% of the firms do apprentices’ productive contributions (more than) 
compensate the costs of their training (Von Bardeleben et al., 1995: 54; 89). For 
all training firms, the average costs per apprentice per year after subtraction of 
their productive contributions (which average 11.711 DM) are 17.862 DM or 6.339 
DM, again depending upon the type of cost calculation (Von Bardeleben et al., 
1995: 70, 91). So while apprentices do pay a substantial part of the training costs 
by accepting the relatively low apprenticeship wages, we still have to explain the 
willingness of German firms to substantially invest in the transferable training that 
German apprenticeship training is.
 That apprenticeship training is transferable is obvious. National skills standards 
regulate the (work-based component of) apprenticeship training (section 3.5.2.2), 
and independent examinations check whether apprentices have mastered these 
skills (section 3.5.2.3). At the same time, these skills are not completely general, 
as firms have room to include firm-specific elements on top of the minimum skills 
standards and/or implement the skills standards in a firm-specific way (section 
3.5.2.2). Machinists, for instance, are trained on the machines of their firm, and 
may encounter different machines for the same type of work (e.g. milling) if they 
switch firms later.
 To explain why German firms themselves invest substantially in a transferable 
type of training such as apprenticeship training, a second factor that springs to 
mind is the level of inter-firm labor mobility. One important factor that tends to limit 
firms’ investments in transferable training is uncertainty whether workers will stay 
on long enough to recoup training costs. Why do German firms continue to train 
their own workers and retain them, rather than try to poach apprentices trained by 
a competitor?
 Stevens (1994b: 557) hypothesized that the problem of a poaching externality 
is nil if training is purely specific, reaches a maximum at some intermediate level of 
competition/transferability, and drops again towards zero as the market approaches 
perfect competition, in which case training is either general, or a combination of 
general and specific. Katz & Ziderman (1990) and others (Stevens, 1994b; Soskice 
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1994) put forward the notion of asymmetric information that enables us to elaborate 
the dynamic behind this hypothesis. They point out that a training firm has better 
information on the skills of a particular worker than an outside firm that considers 
recruiting him. An outside firm can try to gather such information, but this will 
entail costs. Katz & Ziderman (1990) interpret this difference as if a training firm 
could therefore afford to pay the worker a higher wage than another firm does. 
This explains why firms may find it worthwhile to pay for (a part of the general 
component of) transferable training. The uncertainty about a worker’s skills will 
limit the wage offered to him by other firms, and thus will limit the chances of him 
being ‘poached’. Acemoglu & Pischke (1996) found empirical support for such an 
explanation.
 While Katz & Ziderman’s analysis shows how it can be rational for firms to invest 
in (the general component of) transferable training, it also leads them to conclude 
that (other things being equal) certification may lead to less rather than more 
training, as it effectively reduces the extent of asymmetric information between a 
training firm and other firms concerning a worker’s skills (Katz & Ziderman, 1990: 
1157). They thus correctly note that the German case actually provides an anomaly 
as to their general theory, because it combines high firm investments in transferable 
skills that are defined by public skill standards and certified through independent 
examinations.
 They try to briefly explain this anomaly by pointing out that the German 
chambers strongly and effectively discourage competition for skilled workers. While 
there is certainly some peer pressure under German employers to each train their 
own apprentices, this explanation alone is far too weak. How could employers’ 
associations continue to pressure their own members into a training policy if those 
individual members would find it ineffective and inefficient? Sections 3.5.4 and 3.7.1 
offer a much more comprehensive and balanced overview of the roles employers’ 
associations and unions do and do not play; and, in the end, they simply have not 
got the authority to force firms to train against their will.
 Soskice (1994) provides a better explanation for the German high skill equilibrium 
in general, and the willingness of firms to invest in apprenticeship training in 
particular. His explanation continues upon a distinction from previous explanatory 
attempts between two categories of firms, which are believed to train for different 
reasons: medium-sized and larger (industrial) firms versus small (‘Handwerk’) firms 
(Casey, 1986; 1992; Steedman, 1993; Soskice, 1994).
Medium-sized and larger firms
For medium-sized and larger firms, Soskice (1994: 36-49) starts his explanation 
with the German financial and industrial relations systems, which provide incentives 
for firms to operate on internal labor markets for skilled workers. First, the relatively 
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high minimum wage level laid down in German multi-firm collective bargaining 
agreements (section 3.2.2) forecloses a low wage strategy for these firms. And the 
high level of employment protection (section 3.2.3) prevents strategies focused 
on external labor market flexibility and the rapid hiring and firing of workers. The 
only viable alternative for these firms, particularly in the face of international 
competition, is to equip themselves with a workforce with a skills level high enough 
to warrant these high wages through higher productivity levels. As a consequence, 
medium-sized and larger German firms typically aim at product market segments 
for high–quality goods and services. German firms have been particularly successful 
in ‘medium-technology’ sectors such as machinery and retail banking. These 
activities typically require both general and firm-specific skills. While a third or even 
half of their workforce may be semi-skilled, these firms do require a substantial 
core of skilled workers to successfully compete in these markets. And they will 
want to retain this skilled core as long as possible, and thus operate internal labor 
markets. This type of production strategy has been analyzed as ‘diversified quality 
production’ (Streeck, 1992: 1-40). Soskice (1994) seeks an additional factor that 
stimulates this type of production in the German financial system and in the system 
of corporate governance. The strong ties between German financial institutions and 
(large) firms, the high degree of coordination among them, as well as their ability to 
mostly block hostile takeovers, combine to provide a suitable, stable environment 
for the long-term product strategies that diversified quality production is.
 Given this need for skilled workers, apprenticeship offers these firms the cheapest 
route to achieve it. German employers’ associations and unions also set separate 
apprenticeship wages through collective bargaining, and consciously set these at 
levels substantially below regular wages (section 3.5.4). This makes it cheaper to 
hire and train young people as formal apprentices than to hire them as regular 
workers and provide them with extensive informal on-the-job training. Second, 
Soskice (1994:41) also points out that the fact that German youngsters perform 
well in lower secondary education (as evidenced by international test scores) also 
helps keep subsequent apprenticeship training costs low. As the skills standards 
spell out the minimum skills level they have to achieve in their training, the higher 
the initial skills level of the recruits, the lower the costs at which training can be 
accomplished (or the higher the skills level they can attain beyond this minimum). 
Third, Soskice (1994: 42) also interprets the support, advice and monitoring by 
Chambers and employers’ associations as lowering training costs. Much relevant 
advice and information on training issues can be obtained for free from Chambers, 
employers’ associations and unions (either from their staff, or through trainer circles 
that they organize). In a non-financial sense, the fact that monitoring of training 
is done by trustworthy external (Chambers, which are employers’ associations) 
and internal bodies (as unions exert their influence primarily through these works 
councils that tend to have high-trust relations with management) minimizes what 
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might be called ‘distrust’ transaction costs.
 Medium-sized and large firms are, however, left with substantially higher training 
costs than smaller firms at the end of training (Von Bardeleben et al, 1994a; 1994b, 
1995). To recoup their training costs, they therefore need most apprentices to stay 
with them for a while. We have already seen that the average retention rate of 
apprentices is high in Germany; and it is positively correlated with firm size (Soskice, 
1994: table 1.4). Training firms will in principle want to retain their apprentices. 
Apprenticeship is simply too costly to use it as just a screening device. Medium-
sized and large firms screen apprenticeship applicants heavily, exactly because the 
idea is to retain them beyond graduation. Of course, apprentices could leave on 
their own account. But the German collective bargaining system makes inter-firm 
wage differentials relatively low to begin with and larger firms generally pay the 
highest wages. And as long as most firms train (and retain) their own apprentices, 
the number of job openings elsewhere is relatively low to begin with. In 1985, only 
9% of firms with 100-499 workers had no apprentices; and only 0.5% of firms with 
500-1000 workers did (Soskice, 1994: table 1.4).
 The main alternative for firms to consider for training apprentices themselves 
would be to poach graduated apprentices from other firms. Focusing on recruiting 
graduated apprentices from other firms is a risky strategy in Germany for a number 
of reasons. To begin with, Soskice (1994: 45) points to the importance of firm-
specific skills, and gives three reasons why it is cheaper to impart them during an 
apprenticeship, rather than to teach them to graduated apprentices from another 
firm. First, during apprenticeship, they can be taught at little cost since all general 
skills must be taught in the workplace to begin with – apprentices will acquire firm-
specific skills almost by default in this process. Second, it is much cheaper to teach 
them to a low-paid apprentice than to a graduated apprentice earning the skilled 
worker wage. Third, these firm-specific skills are often instrumental in effectively 
employing general skills – which implies that a graduated apprentice from another 
firm may not be very effective (at his skilled worker wage) until he has mastered 
the firm-specific skills with his new employer.
 A second reason why poaching is a risky strategy is that the number of 
apprenticeship graduates that become available in the external labor market is 
limited, as two-thirds of all apprentices stay with their training firm after graduation 
(section 3.4.4). Firms opting for a poaching strategy would risk being unable to fill 
all their vacancies. Consider the fact that the relatively high wage minimum level 
laid down in German collective bargaining agreements effectively limits the scope 
for a (much) higher wage offer to poach a worker; and also the fact that it is the 
larger firms that generally offer the highest wages. Furthermore, the wage raise 
automatically associated with apprenticeship graduation and the related transition 
from apprentice wage to skilled worker wage in a training firm is so substantial, that 
the extra DM occasionally offered by another firm will appear relatively pale (Van 
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Lieshout, 1998). Moreover, works councils monitor firm’s wage structures, and it is 
not in their interest to allow firms to recruit skilled workers from elsewhere at the 
cost of their own apprentices, or at higher wages than the incumbent workers earn 
(Soskice, 1994: 46). Larger firms thus have a great chance to retain apprentices 
and recoup their investments (Casey, 1986; 1992; Soskice, 1994). Most of their 
apprentices are likely to stay with them, with the exception of a limited number who 
wish to leave for personal reasons (e.g. to pursue higher education) and those that 
the training firm does not wish to retain.
 This leads us to a third reason why a poaching strategy would be risky in 
Germany. The quality of the available graduated apprentices will very likely be below 
average, because their absolute number is small, and training firms will retain their 
best apprentices, while letting the weakest go. Therefore, the external market for 
graduated apprentices will to an important extent be a ‘lemon market’ (Soskice, 
1994; Van Lieshout, 1997a; 1998). Non-training firms face the double risk of not 
finding enough skilled workers and/or employing skilled workers of a relatively poor 
quality. Apprenticeship training thus really does make sense in the German context, 
and almost all medium-sized and large firms train their own apprentices.
 Soskice (1994: 47-49) has translated the core of this explanation in a two-by-
two apprenticeship game, where apprentices can stay or quit, and firms can train 
or hire. The options of staying and training correspond to the German situation. 
Soskice distinguishes two conditions under which this combination of options 
constitutes a Nash equilibrium. The first is that apprentices will stay as long as 
the benefits of staying outweigh the benefits of a low probability to find the most 
preferred job elsewhere. The second condition is that firms will train, as long as 
the costs of apprenticeship training are less than the costs of firm-specific training 
for external recruits plus the costs of risking recruitment of a ‘lemon’. As long as 
most firms choose to fill their internal labor markets through training, this high-
skills equilibrium is the only one possible. Below a certain threshold, a low-skills 
equilibrium of quitting and hiring becomes a second possibility.
Small firms
Having explained why medium-sized and larger firms train, it is difficult to use 
exactly the same explanation for small firms and firms from the craft sector. The 
retention rate in firms with 10-49 workers is lower (64%), and significantly fewer 
firms (59%) train apprentices than is common among large firms (Soskice, 1994: 
table 1.4). The net costs of apprenticeship are lower (Von Bardeleben et al. 1994a; 
1994b; 1995), and the previous credentials of apprentices are weaker.
 The traditional explanation is that ‘Handwerk’ firms are primarily interested in 
apprentices as cheap labor, for their productive contributions during the training 
period. (Casey, 1986; Steedman, 1993). Casey (1986) presents three arguments 
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for this theory. First, apprentices stay longer with large firms than with small firms. 
Second, while large firms vary their training efforts pro-cyclically, training capacity 
in small firms fluctuates anti-cyclically: they have trouble finding apprentices in a 
flourishing economy, and much less so in a recession. Third, small and ‘Handwerk’ 
firms train structurally above capacity. In 1980, the apprentice to worker ratio was 
6% for industry and commerce, but 18% for ‘Handwerk’ (Casey, 1986).
 Nevertheless, Soskice (1994: 49-52) is correct in pointing out that apprenticeship 
in such firms is also structured, monitored and certified – so there is no evidence 
that those apprenticeship positions are artificial and just a source of cheap labor. 
He does suggest that, primarily due to the lower retention rate, the net cost of 
training apprentices for such firms is likely to be higher than the cost of hiring 
skilled workers who have already been trained. This begs the question why many 
of these firms still train apprentices. Soskice tries to explain this by hypothesizing 
why the traditional training cost estimates were likely to overestimate training costs 
in small firms (but not in large firms). One reason is the fact that training in small 
firms can often be done in slack periods, so that it will not cost production time 
(e.g. a hairdresser will train an apprentice when there are no customers he/she has 
to attend to). Another reason is the fact that apprentices can often contribute to 
production in these firms by doing un- or semi-skilled work early on (e.g. sweeping 
the floor in the hairdresser’s parlor).
 Since Soskice’s article, new German training cost research (Von Bardeleben et 
al, 1994a; 1994b: 1995) has become available. It shows that, even when the costs 
of part-time trainers are not included, apprenticeship does cost ‘Handwerk’ firms 
and small firms money (DM 1,647 and DM 400 respectively). However, these costs 
are low. To cover these modest costs, relatively small benefits from apprenticeship 
training in the period after training will be due. And, while the retention rate is 
lower than in large firms, still more than half of the apprentices will stay on in small 
firms. Soskice (1994), surprisingly, only includes the retention rate in his analysis, 
not the period of retention. But if one out of two apprentices stays on, and there 
are benefits in employing your own graduated apprentices above employing an 
external recruit, the (relatively small) training costs for all apprentices might still 
be recouped by small and ‘Handwerk’ firms over the first couple of months after 
training.
 Besides the direct benefits (the productive contributions of apprentices), it is 
therefore the indirect benefits of apprenticeship training that help explain why firms 
in general, and small craft firms in particular, are willing to bear (some) training 
costs. Von Bardeleben et al. (1994a; 1994b; 1995) distinguish the following indirect 
benefits for firms that train apprentices:
• lower recruitment and selection costs;
• lower costs of firm-specific training (as this occurs alongside apprenticeship 
training at a low apprentice wage);
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• lower wage costs because one does not have to lure away skilled workers 
elsewhere;
• lower risk of wrong recruitment decisions (as one can screen apprentices for 
three years);
• low turnover costs (as apprentices are relatively faithful to their training firm);
• positive image for training firms41.
In their calculation of apprenticeship training costs and benefits of the large firm of 
AEG, Cramer & Müller (1994) point at additional indirect benefits:
• a flexible deployment of personnel;
• savings on temporal replacements for workers on holiday or sick leave;
• a lower risk on future personnel shortages.
Von Bardeleben et al. (1994a; 1994b; 1995) and Cramer & Müller (1994) have each 
estimated some of these indirect benefits, although they have not estimated all of 
them. Still, they all agree on their conclusion that apprenticeship training pays off 
for firms.
3.8 Conclusions
3.8.1 A high-skills, high-training equilibrium
The German apprenticeship system constitutes a high-skills, high-training equilibrium. 
Within the German institutional (education and labor market) environment, it 
makes sense for the large majority of German youngsters (section 3.6.1) as well 
as German firms to invest in apprenticeship training (section 3.7.2). It is important 
to realize that there are feedback effects between these two separate facts that 
account for the remarkable stability of this high-skills equilibrium over time.
 Soskice (1994: 33) has pointed out that German apprenticeship is a rank-order 
tournament. Not each apprenticeship position is equally attractive, and school-
leavers rank apprenticeship across sectors, firms, and even within an individual 
firm. The situation is similar to prospective American college students that are 
keenly aware of the varying appeal of potential universities and colleges, across 
disciplines, universities and even within colleges. German youngsters actively 
compete for the best apprenticeship positions, as career prospects differ with the 
occupation and firm in which one is trained, and (the more attractive) firms carefully 
screen school performances of applicants, and often administer their own tests as 
well. This creates an important feedback effect: German children are stimulated to 
work hard in school in their early teens, as they will be rewarded for their efforts by 
a more attractive apprenticeship position in their late teens.
 This feedback effect causes another feedback effect, however: because young 
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people tend to work hard in school in the years before apprenticeship, German 
firms get apprentices with a relatively decent (general) skills basis. This helps them 
to keep training costs low, as compared to firms in countries where 16-years-olds 
are less well equipped.
 So the German case shows, that as long as children already start working hard 
in school, and firms reward their efforts with attractive entry jobs with career 
prospects, a stable high-skills equilibrium in the market for intermediate skills is 
possible. Our next case, the U.S., will explore why it is so much harder to achieve 
than this German example might indicate. Before turning to that task, there are 
two points worth emphasizing on the particular nature of the German ‘market’ for 
intermediate skills: firstly, that it is a regulated market, and secondly, that it is a 
labor market where occupational and internal markets overlap.
3.8.2 A separate, regulated youth labor market
VET and the integration of (non-college bound) young people in the German labor 
market occur in a separate youth market for intermediate skills. This separate 
market is regulated by a separate law; but this law lays the basis for a governance 
regime that strongly relies on self-governance through the social partners: 
employers’ associations and unions (section 3.5.4). This separate market is a 
highly institutionalized one, in which several rules limit the range of options open to 
(aspiring) apprentices and firms. What is regulated is in essence the separate status 
of the apprentice, and related conditions for his/her training and employment. But 
it is a market, in the sense that both firms and young people are free to enter, and 
have to find suitable matches themselves.
 The market they can voluntarily enter is embedded in several institutional 
arrangements that enhance its functioning. Market regulation begins with the 
regulation of apprenticeship contracts. Two aspects are particularly important here. 
First, all firms that train young people under 18 are bound to the same basic general 
governance regime as defined by the BBiG, because BBiG paragraph 28 explicitly 
forbids the training of youngsters under eighteen in other training occupations (cf. 
section 3.5.2.1). Second, all firms in Germany that train apprentices in a certain 
occupation are bound by the same, federal skills standards document that defines 
the competencies for which they should train the apprentices, and the minimum 
level of those competencies that they should attain.
 On the supply side of the market, there are some standards that training firms 
have to meet before they are even allowed to train apprentices: they have to have a 
qualified trainer, and be able to offer full-fledged training in the occupation concerned. 
These standards are checked in advance by the various authorized bodies that also 
monitor training progress (section 3.5.1). Training itself is regulated by national 
skills standards that define the minimum knowledge and skills to be taught. And 
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there are standards that regulate the exit from this market, through examinations 
and certification (section 3.5.2.3). Apprentices that pass the exam get an officially 
recognized certificate as a skilled worker, which represent a high value on the labor 
market, as it provides access to occupational labor markets for skilled labor (section 
3.6.1).
 The regulation does not rule out the market mechanism, but supports it in a 
number of ways. First, the fact that apprenticeship training is offered for a limited 
number of training occupations makes the apprenticeship market quite transpar ent 
in comparison with an unorganized labor market, where training tends to be informal, 
and job- and firm-specific. This helps young people to choose their occupation, and 
it helps both employers and apprentices to swiftly recognize relevant job openings/
applicants.
 Matching of supply and demand is further improved by the fact that the 
apprenticeship market is bound to a certain time frame. To begin with, Soskice 
(1994) has noted that the relatively low apprenticeship wage stimulates 16-19-
year-olds to opt for apprenticeship at that time. The investment is much harder to 
make when one grows older, and financial responsibilities for one’s own family and 
home have grown correspondingly. So firms are ensured of a large supply of young 
candidates from which they can choose.
 Second, the precise yearly timing of the apprenticeship market has its advantages 
(Van Lieshout, 1996b). Apprenticeship generally starts in September, with the new 
school year, when the apprentices simultaneously enroll in related instruction at 
the BS. Most of next year’s apprentices are today’s last year students in lower 
secondary general schools. The rank-order tournament nature of apprenticeship 
stimulates both firms and future apprentices to start their search for one another 
relatively early: several months before. But to enable the young to finish the full-
time school they are currently enrolled in, the actual start of apprenticeship training 
only takes place at the beginning of the following school year. This provides both 
parties with a clear time path for their search. Starting early, both parties can first 
pursue their ideal candidates/positions. At the approach of the September deadline, 
firms with remaining vacancies and youth without a contract will have to reconsider 
their preferences. They either decide to settle for a less qualified applicant/a less 
attractive position than they had originally hoped for, or take their loss and postpone 
their search by a full year. The extended search period gives both parties the time 
to explore that year’s market, and to adapt their aspiration level accordingly if need 
be. The advice and mediation of the career centers, through which both parties 
often find another, help ease this process.
 An important precondition for the attractiveness of this separate apprenticeship 
market for individual parties on both sides is the combination of a relatively low 
apprentice wage with national skill standards and certification. While more general 
entry, process and exit requirements are contained in a law, the more precise 
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regulation of apprenticeship through skills standards and apprentice wages is left to 
employers’ associations and unions. While the skills standards bargaining process 
has no formal ties with wage bargaining for regular workers, both parties are quite 
aware of the relations between both processes. Unions, for instance, realize that, 
the higher the skills level is which apprentices achieve, and the more homogenous 
the workers are in their sector, the greater their bargaining power will be in future 
wage bargaining - with relatively higher wages as a likely result (cf. section 3.5.4). 
Thus, these are associations that coordinate the links between the separate youth 
market and the regular labor market for their sector.
 Bargaining on skills standards thus provides employers’ associations and unions 
with a direct grip on the level of training in their sector. Both parties cannot, however, 
raise required skills level indefinitely: the more demanding the standards, the 
smaller the number of firms that is able (or can afford) to meet them, which could 
ultimately result in a shortage of apprenticeship positions (Koch & Reuling, 1994). 
This also explains why it is logical to set minimum standards for apprenticeship 
training: there is no reason to prevent firms that want to provide more training 
from doing so (and many, particularly larger, firms do), but requiring a maximum 
level from every training firm would disrupt the apprenticeship market and leave 
many young people without an apprenticeship position.
 The fact that collective bargaining agreements in Germany relate the completion 
of apprenticeship training to a particular wage level means an important step in the 
reduction of the uncertainty on the part of youngsters. Knowing that apprenticeship 
training will subsequently lead to a high wage level guaranteed by a collective 
bargaining agreement makes it worthwhile to undertake apprenticeship training 
and accept the related low apprenticeship wages. Only because unions succeed in 
negotiating relatively high regular wages can they ask their (future) members to 
settle for low apprenticeship wages; and only because they enable apprenticeship 
training at relatively low costs can they demand high wages from firms for skilled 
workers.
 And only because most firms train most of their own future workers, can they 
rely on being able to retain their apprentices long enough to recover their training 
investments.
3.8.3 Overlapping occupational and internal markets
This way, the apprenticeship systems lay the basis for overlapping internal and 
occupational labor markets. Occupational labor markets are external markets that 
are based on occupational qualifications that allow workers to move to another firm 
while remaining within their occupation (Sengenberger, 1992). Germany is known 
as a country where relative large numbers of workers are employed in occupational 
labor markets (Sengenberger, 1987; 1992; Soskice, 1994; Marsden & Ryan, 1995). 
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These occupational labor markets are solidly founded in the apprenticeship system. 
Skills standards define (training) occupations, while examinations and certificates 
ensure that the apprentice’s skills will indeed be transferable enough to employ 
him in a similar job with a different firm. Apprenticeship graduation serves as 
the entry ticket to the occupational labor market. In the German artisanal sector, 
occupational labor markets are indeed dominant. Due to the generally small size of 
the firms, internal labor markets play a relatively minor role there. But the entire 
regulation of ‘Handwerk’ (cf. section 3.2.2) ensures that artisanal trades function 
as occupational rather than unorganized labor markets, with apprenticeship and 
subsequent ‘Meister’ training as the key organizing principle for such markets.
 In the larger firms in industry and the services sector, occupational markets and 
internal markets exist alongside each other. In fact, as we saw in section 3.7.2, 
the entire basis for apprenticeship training is provided by the choice of medium-
sized and large firms to train apprentices for their own internal labor markets, as 
a part of a more general production strategy. While the method to the ‘madness’ 
of massive apprenticeship training by these firms is thus to train for their internal 
market, they need to do so in the context of the apprenticeship system in order 
to be able to profit from the low apprentice wages. Thus, all youth training of 
medium-sized and large German firms for their internal markets still abides by the 
national occupational skills standards and certificates. While their apprentices will 
usually stick with their training firm for a while, these certificates do ease transition 
to similar jobs in other firms, if need be. The skills standards documents thus link 
jobs in internal labor markets of different firms, and help organize a transparent 
external market. The fact that they are minimum standards (designed with the 
knowledge that enough firms in a sector must be able to meet them in order to 
guarantee an adequate supply of apprenticeship positions) gives firms leverage 
to accommodate their training program to their own specific needs, as does the 
fact that the standards specify levels of competency rather than specific training 
methods (Adler, 1994; Koch & Reuling, 1994; Van Lieshout 1996a).
 This overlapping of occupational and internal labor markets in Germany creates an 
interesting paradox. The national skills standards and examinations for apprentices 
lay a rock-solid foundation for occupational labor markets that ease transition 
of workers from one firm to another. Still, this theoretical possibility is relatively 
seldom realized in Germany. Inter-firm mobility is much lower in Germany than in 
the U.S., for instance. The explanation is that, as long as most firms train sufficient 
workers for their own internal labor markets, which is the case in Germany, inter-
firm mobility will still be limited simply because there is little need for this. The 
American situation is quite the opposite, as we will see in the next chapter.
 To conclude our analysis of Germany, we will have to point out that, while 
occupational labor markets are important, the way their foundations are shaped 
in apprenticeship (in particular since the seventies) also consciously produces the 
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potential for inter-occupational mobility. The creation of overlapping training contents 
among related training occupations has become an explicit policy goal with respect 
to the development of skills standards. This goal is achieved by a persistent expan-
sion of the contents of training occupations and a reduction of the total number of 
occupa tions. Cases in point are the release of new sets of skills standards for the 
construction sector in the late seventies and the metalworking industry in the late 
eighties (Koch & Reuling, 1994; cf. sections 3.5.2.1, 3.5.2.2., 3.5.2.4). Thanks 
to this overlap, mobility in Germany is not limited to the training occupation, but 
can also take place within a firm to another related occupation. Here, we face an 
important additional contribution of the German industrial unions to the governance 
of the apprenticeship system. This policy choice contrasts with those of craft unions 
(such as in the U.S. and the U.K.), who have tended to opt for detailed regulation 
of jobs as one of their prime policies to secure their members’ employment. These 
regulations have subsequently limited firms in the possibilities of flexibly employing 
their employees in other jobs or occupations within the company.
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Notes chapter 3
1 Compare Crouch (1993: 14) and Freeman & Katz (1994) for an overview of some 
(contested) classifications of national industrial relations systems.
2 Other data on enterprise tenure show German-Dutch differences for 1985 and 1991: 
8.5% versus 11.7%, and 12.8% versus 24%, respectively (OECD, 1996b: 168). There 
are underlying differences in data acquisition, however, and Dutch data cited in this 
source show by far the largest difference; so either something has changed structurally 
there, or there may be serious data comparability issues with the Dutch 1991 figure.
3 Average earnings in purchasing power were more or less comparable for both countries 
that year. While the average hourly compensation in purchasing power was 119 in 
Germany as compared to 100 in the U.S., Americans worked more hours than German 
workers to the equivalent of one month a year (Freeman, 1994b: 3; 11).
4 Those who start apprenticeship after age 18 are not required to attend BS, but may do 
so voluntarily, with the same rights and obligations (Hochstetter & Muser, 1992).
5 In most states a fourth type exists: ‘Gesamtschulen’. These combine the three other 
tracks in one way or another; and all three diplomas can be acquired there (KMK, 1994). 
There are some other types of general secondary education, which exist in only one or 
a couple of states.
6 A special educational opportunity at a ‘Berufliches Gymnasium’ are so-called 
‘doppelqualifizierende Bildungsgänge’ that train students simultaneously for access to 
higher education and a vocational qualification. ‘Kollegschulen’ in Nordrhein-Westphalen 
are an example (Münch, 1994).
7 Apprentices are obliged to attend related instruction (as well as any other training 
component provided elsewhere, such as at an ÜBS), and firms are obliged to allow them 
to do so (BBiG sections 7 and 9). The actual alternation between school- and work-
based components can take different forms, but weekly BS attendance is the standard. 
Interviews in 1994/1995 did, however, indicate that BS at the time often lacked sufficient 
personnel to achieve the required hours minimum.
8 An alternative is a training alliance (‘Ausbildungsverbund’) with another firm. In a 
training alliance, firms contractually agree that an apprentice of one firm will take a 
certain part of his training in the other firm. The reason for this usually is that one or 
possibly, both of the firms are not able to provide all training components themselves 
(Koch & Reuling, 1994). A good example is a photographer who does not have his 
own darkroom and therefore contracts with a colleague who does have one to arrange 
darkroom training for the apprentice. In 1987, 7% of training firms participated in a 
training alliance or cooperated in some other way (BMBW, 1989). This relatively low 
number is explained by the availability of ÜBS for similar problems: they are easier to 
find and to contract with than another firm, and they involve less risk of the apprentice 
moving to one of the other firms in the alliance upon graduation. Training alliances 
remain a good solution, however, for training firms in regions or sectors where ÜBS are 
lacking.
9 In the probationary period either party may terminate the contract anytime (BBiG 
paragraph 15). This period shall be at least one month and not more than three months 
(BBiG paragraph 13).
10 Data from the Datenbank BIBB.
11 Outside the realm of the education system, preparatory arrangements 
(‘berufsvorbereitende Maßnahmen’) provided by the federal labor office (Bundesanstalt 
fûr Arbeit) fulfill roughly similar roles as BVJ and BGJ. Cf. Van Lieshout (1996a: 91, 94) 
for more details.
12 Enrollment and graduation figures presented here for the various types of BFS are for 
entire Germany. Of all enrollments in all types of BFS that year, only 10% took place in 
the new Eastern states. For the various types of BFS, alas, such regional specifications 
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were not reported (StBa, 1994).
13 In 1994, 514.500 people took a final apprenticeship exam in (West-) Germany 
(BMBW, 1994: 74). Of those, 4-5% took the exam as an external assessment procedure 
(‘Externenprüfung’), without undergoing apprenticeship training (BMBW, 1994: 75). This 
implies that 491.300 completed apprenticeship training and subsequently took the exam. 
Given the exam’s success rate of 88.2%, this implies that roughly 433,300 apprentices 
acquired the vocational qualification (‘Berufsabschluß’) that year  (BMBW, 1994: 75).
14 Health care education in Germany is a separate case and an exception. This sector 
exclusively has school-based tracks provided by specific health care schools (mostly 
linked to hospitals), that deliver both theoretical and practical training. Tracks are 
classified at a level between upper secondary and tertiary education (CERI, 1995). The 
schools differ, partly because they are regulated at the state level (Münch, 1994).
15 Since the time of this research, both Germany and the Netherlands have further 
developed their higher education systems to implement the bachelor-master model 
according to a European agreement.
16 In addition to these certificates, some (mostly, technical) higher education tracks may 
pose additional entry requirements, such as an orientation internship in the relevant 
occupational field (KMK, 1994).
17 This implies that participants will at least be 18 years old. For young people over 18, 
paragraph 28 section 2 BBiG (which stipulates youngsters can exclusively be trained in 
official apprenticeship occupations) no longer applies. Also, these youth will have met 
compulsory education requirements. This creates the opportunity to create work-based 
tracks, for which the related instruction is provided by other schools/colleges than the 
Berufsschule.
18 To be complete: some other states have types of BA that differ from this model (KMK, 
1994). The Baden-Württemberg model is, however, the dominant one.
19 After two years, students can first achieve an ‘assistant’ diploma.
20 Either the firm owner or the chief executive running it must be a master.
21 The group of 16-19 year olds peaked in 1981 (BMBW, 1993).
22 Cf. Streeck et al. (1987) for an extensive overview.
23 Since Chamber membership is compulsory and the chamber budgets consist essentially 
of membership dues, financing from Chamber budgets ensures that all firms in the 
region contribute to the costs, just like a levy system does. Compulsory membership is 
the advantage Chambers have over other (sectoral) employers’ associations in being in 
a position to demand contributions from all firms, instead of only from firms that train 
(Streeck et al., 1987).
24 These rights stem from both the ‘Betriebsverfassungsgesetz’ and the 
‘Mitbestimmungsgesetz’.
25 Section 3.6 will touch upon other institutional configurations underlying/reflecting the 
importance of ‘Berufe’.
26 Cf. endnote 16 to this chapter.
27 The remaining high number of very small training occupations shows that the policy 
did not follow quantitative targets.
28 To be exact: in the extensive and influential process of the modernization of the 
training occupations in metalworking, which we will discuss shortly.
29 In 1984, they also agreed on framework skill standards for the general subjects of 
economy and social studies in KMK (Benner, 1992).
30 See Benner (1992) for a detailed overview of the procedure; Van Lieshout (1996a: 
42-44) summarizes the procedure in Dutch.
31 These are included in the firm’s training plan (betrieblicher Ausbildungsplan). Firms 
also have the freedom to depart from the substantial and temporal ordering (Adler, 
1994).
32 In the case of construction, the collective bargaining agreement stipulates that 
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graduates from the two-year occupations are classified one wage group below graduates 
from the three-year occupations.
33 For the handicapped, there are opportunities to achieve diplomas at a lower qualification 
level, if necessary. BBiG allows Chambers to issue local training regulations for this 
purpose.
34 Besides the various formal roles and functions we have already discussed in previous 
sections, various employers’ associations and unions also organize networks of trainers 
of various firms (‘Ausbilderkreise’) that exchange information on training experiences. 
Many trainers, and even training managers, are active union members, and meet in 
union trainer circles, or in vocational training committees that develop union policies at 
the regional, state or national level.
35 On the flip side, this authority will occasionally get employers’ associations into the 
position that they will have to confront their member firms, e.g. when a Chamber denies 
a firm the capacity to train for a particular occupation, or when a national association 
agrees to more demanding skills standards for a training occupation.
36 In addition, most states offer a full-time one year alternative to fulfill the part-time 
obligation (Steedman, 1993), so those who want to free themselves for full-time regular 
employment as soon as possible, can do so.
37 Apprentices pay social security premiums from these wages, and are thus insured 
(Tessaring, 1993).
38 The lowest paid apprentices can get supplemental income aid, depending upon their 
parental income (Becith, 1994). 25,000 apprentices received some in 1993 (BfA, 1994b: 
293).
39 Indirectly, a high progression from apprentices to higher education may damage 
apprenticeship because training firms are not able to recoup their training costs for 
apprentices that leave upon graduation (Quack et al., 1994).
40 Measuring training costs and the productive contributions of trainees involves numerous 
theoretical and methodological issues and problems (cf. Von Bardeleben et al, 1991). The 
difference between both methods used by Von Bardeleben et al (1994a; 1994b, 1995) 
depends upon whether one includes or excludes the costs of regular workers that spend 
part of their time instructing apprentices. Both methods have disadvantages. Excluding 
these costs underestimates total costs; including them would, however, assume that the 
time spent on instruction would otherwise have been fully used for productive activity, 
which is doubtful (Casey, 1986). Anyway, the research by Von Bardeleben et al. is the 
best attempt around to measure costs and benefits of training at the firm’s level. It 
generally confirms the findings of previous German research (SKF, 1974; Falk, 1982; 
Noll et al., 1983) while improving the methods applied.
41 German training firms, when asked for their motives, often refer to ‘Kukis’ and ‘Mikis’: 
‘Kundenkinder’ and ‘Mitarbeiterkinder’. The point being, that the apprentices trained are 
often the children of either customers or workers, and either way will enhance the firm’s 
prestige in the community.
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4 The American market for intermediate skills: the case of   
 Wisconsin
4.1 Introduction
After analyzing a high-skills equilibrium in the previous chapter, we now turn to the 
analysis of a market for intermediate skills that has been described as a low-skills 
equilibrium: the American one. The U.S. seems to lack an appropriate alternative 
for apprenticeship to guide the majority of American youngsters that does not 
transfer to a four-year college, to promising starting jobs. Many of them drop 
out of high school (Veum & Weiss, 1993; Lynch, 1993), which implies that they 
enter the labor market without any diploma. Most of them enter the labor market 
without any formal vocational credentials (Büchtemann et al., 1993). And American 
youth unemployment is consistently and substantially higher than in Germany 
(Büchtemann et al., 1993; OECD, 1996b: 114) – though the good news is that 
individual spells of youth unemployment in the U.S. are seldom of long duration, as 
compared to Germany or most other European countries (OECD, 1996b:115).
These and other problems have triggered reform policies to improve American 
VET. American researchers and policy makers have argued for a strengthening of 
dual training tracks in the United States (cf. Hamilton, 1990). While the United States 
has a tradition of apprenticeship systems, participation has been low and declining. 
In addition, American apprentices tend to be in their mid-twenties rather than in 
their late teens, as in Europe. In 1986, from individuals aged 21-29, 2.4% of the 
men and only 0.6% of the women had participated in an apprenticeship program, 
with an average training intensity of 700 hours (Veum, 1993). The first Clinton 
administration announced an initiative to create a national youth apprenticeship 
system, similar to the German one (Büchtemann et al., 1993). While such a national 
youth apprenticeship system was never implemented, the initiative did result in the 
1994 School-to-Work Opportunities Act. This act aimed to improve the transition 
from school to work for American young people through a variety of programs, of 
which youth apprenticeship is one example.
Besides strengthening work-based learning, the creation of a comprehensive 
qualification framework of nationwide skill standards is seen as a key factor in 
American VET policies around that time (Büchtemann & Soloff, 1994). Here too, 
Germany was among the countries that served as an example. National skills 
standards define a minimum level of competency in various skills that German 
apprentices must attain when they are trained in a particular occupation (cf. section 
3.5.2). Training contents in the U.S. are much less general than in the German 
dual training system, and the lack of an accepted national system to recognize and 
certify national skills was seen as an important cause for this (Lynch, 1993); hence 
the attempt to create such a system.
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Because of the size of the U.S., its federal state structure, and the significant 
differences in education and training systems and labor markets between various 
individual states, our study of the American skills equilibrium concentrates on one 
particular American state: Wisconsin. Wisconsin was chosen for two reasons that 
make it an attractive candidate for a comparison with the Netherlands and Germany. 
First, Wisconsin’s two-year colleges (called technical colleges) are a specific, more 
vocationally oriented type of two-year colleges that offer full-time school-based 
VET, related instruction for the apprenticeship system, and adult and continuing 
education. This makes them resemble the new regional education centers in the 
Netherlands (chapter 5). Second, Wisconsin has a somewhat wider experience with 
apprenticeship systems than most other states. It was the first state to pass a 
‘modern’ apprenticeship law in 1911 (Paris, 1985), and it was building a new youth 
apprenticeship system in the 1990s.
The approach used for this case study was similar to that used for the case 
study of Germany (Van Lieshout, 1996a). It consisted of a combination of desk 
research and interviews. The desk research has entailed a stu dy of relevant 
statistical sources, research literature, policy documents and other sources. In 
addition, representatives of organizations involved in the governance of VET and 
labor markets were interviewed: federal and Wisconsin state departments and 
agencies; employers’ associations and unions in construction, metalworking and 
banking, as well as state and federal peak associations; high schools and technical 
colleges; metalworking firms; and academic VET and labor market experts. Due to 
the differentiation of American VET governance across federal, state and local levels 
of government, educational systems, and public and private sectors, a total of 92 
interviews were conducted between September 1995 and May 1996. The Industrial 
Relations Research Institute (IRRI) at the University of Wisconsin-Madison provided 
a stimulating home-base, and the Center on Wisconsin Strategy (COWS) and the 
Center on Education and Work (CEW) provided valuable additional assistance. 
Outside Wisconsin interviews were conducted in Washington, DC (representatives 
of the federal government, national employers’ associations, unions, research 
organizations and a college association), Illinois, New York City and California (VET 
experts). A return trip to Wisconsin in 1997 provided the opportunity for some 
updates.
This chapter has been organized differently than the German one. To begin 
with, while the German market for intermediate skills is pretty much governed 
by one single, coherent governance regime (apprenticeship), governance of the 
American market for intermediate skills is a patchwork of different (sub)systems. 
VET takes place in secondary schools, two-year/community/technical college 
systems, apprenticeship systems, and in private post-secondary schools and 
colleges. Section 4.2 gives an overview of these types of American education and 
training, and the specific versions of them as they exist in Wisconsin. Second, 
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while apprenticeship governs the school-to-work transition in each of the three 
sectors in Germany, the market for intermediate skills is governed quite differently 
in American construction, metalworking and banking. Section 4.3 will illustrate the 
actual workings of the markets for intermediate skills in these sectors. Section 4.4 
will analyze the American low-skills equilibrium and address the question why both 
American youngsters and firms do not invest as readily in broad training as their 
German counterparts do.
The second part of this chapter will subsequently deal with reform policies that were 
pursued at the federal and state levels at the time to improve the institutionalization 
of the American market for intermediate skills. Section 4.5 reviews federal policies 
of this type in general, and the federal school-to-work policy, as well as the federal 
skills stan dards policy, in particular. Section 4.6 deals with similar policies on the 
level of the state of Wisconsin. Wisconsin VET policies are clearly influenced by 
federal policies but are not completely determined by them. The section focuses 
on Wisconsin’s school-to-work policy and on the role of (skills) standards and 
assessment procedures in the various education and training systems in Wisconsin. 
It also portrays the development of a training partnership between a number of 
manufacturing firms and unions in the Greater Milwaukee area, focusing on training 
issues: the Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership (WRTP). Finally, section 4.7 will 
discuss the prospects for reform of the American low-skills equilibrium.
4.2 American VET - the case of Wisconsin
4.2.1 The American education system
Decentralized governance
The American education system is very decentralized. The American constitution does 
not make the federal government responsible for education: it is thus the province 
of the individual states. Only since 1979 has there been a federal Department of 
Education (DOE), whose existence is still occasionally contested by Republicans 
(Münch, 1989: 7). DOE tries to influence state VET policies through programs that 
grant states funds for specific services or policies. Within the states, primary and 
secondary school districts fulfill crucial roles. They decide on expenditures, they 
hire teachers, and draft curricula (Münch, 1989: 18-19; NCES, 1994: 62; CERI, 
1995: 316). In higher education, individual colleges have a considerable amount of 
autonomy (Münch, 1989: 22). Despite this decentralized governance regime, the 
basics of the American education system are alike throughout all states.
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Primary and secondary education
One important characteristic is a sharp demarcation between primary and secondary 
education on the one hand, and post-secondary education on the other. Primary and 
secondary education together is often referred to as the K-12 (Kindergarten through 
to twelfth grade) system. Before grade 1, young children attend Kindergarten 
between ages one and three. Education is compulsory from age 6 (sometimes 7) 
to age 16 (or 17 or 18), depending on the state (NCES, 1994: 62; CERI, 1995: 
316). The precise structure of primary and secondary education varies between and 
even within school districts. One typical pattern is an elementary school comprising 
grades 1-6, followed by a middle school or junior high school comprising grades 7-
9, and a (senior) high school comprising grades 9-12 (Münch, 1989: 20-21; NCES, 
1994: 62). Grade twelve should ideally be completed by age 18.
Contrary to both Germany and the Netherlands, there is no formal differentiation 
of schools types, or of tracks within school types, by the level of teaching or the 
ability level of the pupils. Within schools, pupils are not placed in strict tracks, but 
explore various courses in both vocational and academic areas of the curriculum. At 
the secondary level, states require students to take a certain number of courses, as 
well as certain numbers of courses in specific areas in order to obtain a high school 
diploma. All states have requirements for mathematics, science and English; most 
have them also for history and social studies. Schools offer various courses in each 
of those areas, at both an introductory and advanced level. Thus, American high 
school students have a great deal of latitude in choosing their own programs. The 
combination of this latitude and the informal differentiation among courses within 
each area causes an informal tracking of American high school students. Those who 
plan to enroll in a four-year college opt for many advanced academic courses, while 
the non-college bound will choose more vocational and non-advanced academic 
courses (NCES, 1994: 62-64).
Introductory VET tends to be offered for the first time in grade 7 (NCES, 1994: 
62). Occupation-related VET is usually not offered before grade 10. Vocational 
courses are generally not required for graduation. Still, about 97% of public high 
school graduates in 1990 completed at least one VET course during their high 
school career. 28% of them even completed four or more credits1 in VET. However, 
only one third of the latter group completed what could be considered a coherent 
vocational program: four credits in one area, two of which at an advanced level. The 
number of VET credits earned by high school graduates has declined throughout the 
eighties, and so has the percentage of advanced-level VET credits among all VET 
credits earned (NCES, 1994: 65-66).
Three types of high schools can be distinguished in relation to the specific 
organization of VET (NCES, 1994: 62-63). The typical American public high school 
is a so-called comprehensive high school. It offers both academic and vocational 
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courses, but tends to focus on the former (Oakes et al., 1992). Still, the large 
majority of vocational education in American high schools is offered at this type. 
Second, there are area vocational schools. These are central facilities that offer 
(mostly occupation-related) VET for students of two or more high schools. Students 
attend their home high school for academic courses, and the area vocational school 
for VET courses. Third, there are full-time vocational high schools. Notwithstanding 
their name, these too offer a complete program of both academic and vocational 
courses, just like comprehensive high schools do. The difference is that the full-
time vocational high schools have their primary focus on vocational studies. They 
are often organized around one or a few specific economic sectors.
State legislation in the U.S. also provides for the establishment of private 
elementary and secondary schools. Private schools may receive some government 
support but are mostly financially independent (CERI, 1995: 316). Approximately 
10% of elementary and secondary students attend private schools (NCES, 1994: 
62). Private schools account for a larger share of students at the early grade levels 
than at grades 10-12 (Münch, 1989: 24). And private high schools covering grades 
10-12 tend to be predominantly college-preparatory schools, and thus not very 
important from a VET perspective.
Post-secondary education and training
American post-secondary education shows a large diversity of educational 
establishments. First, there are four-year colleges and universities that offer 
four-year undergraduate programs leading to a bachelor’s degree. Universities 
offer additional programs of one or more year(s) that lead to a master’s degree. 
Professional schools also offer such programs. Finally, universities run three- or 
four-year doctorate programs. All these instutions are the equivalent of the higher 
vocational colleges and universities in Germany and the Netherlands, and fall 
outside our definition of markets for intermediate skills.
Second, there are various types of two-year colleges2. These may be community 
colleges, technical colleges or junior colleges. They offer various types of programs. 
To begin with, they offer parallel programs for the first two years of undergraduate 
programs. These are usually transferable for credits at a four-year college or 
university, and thus enable enrollment in the third year of a bachelor’s program 
there. In addition, two-year colleges offer vocational programs that prepare 
students for the labor market. If these programs last two years and consist of 
college-level courses, they will lead to an associate degree. If they are not college-
level, they can last from a few months up to two years, and lead to a vocational 
certificate or diploma. In the 1960s, most two-year colleges offered predominantly 
transfer programs. However, the share of vocational programs in their offerings 
has increased significantly since (Brint & Karabel, 1991). Both two- and four-year 
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colleges can be private as well as public.
Third, there are public vocational-technical institutes. These differ from two-year 
colleges in that they generally do not award associate degrees and concentrate on 
certificate programs lasting up to one year (NCES, 1994: 63). Fourth, there are 
various private-for-profit technical and vocational institutions that offer programs 
ranging from very short (i.e. six weeks) vocational certificate programs to two 
year associate degree programs. Finally, churches, libraries, business and various 
community groups offer occupational opportunities for adults (CERI, 1995: 316).
At the post-secondary level, only occupation-specific vocational programs are 
offered (NCES, 1994: 64). These can be offered by all of the types of educational 
establishments mentioned above. In 1988-1989, institutions which offered 
programs that lasted less than two years were responsible for 51% of the vocational 
certificates and degrees awarded in the U.S., public two-year colleges for 32% 
and private two-year colleges for 12% (NCES, 1994: 66). Sometimes public and 
private four-year colleges also offer certificates and associate degrees in vocational 
areas; together, these account for 6% of the vocational certificates and degrees 
awarded in 1988-89. Due to the short duration of most programs offered at private 
institutions which offered programs that lasted less than two years, these do not 
account for the majority of enrollments in VET. Public two-year colleges accounted 
for almost half of all enrollments in vocational courses in the fall of 1990 (NCES, 
1994: 66). Almost all students at public and private-for-profit vocational-technical 
institutes, 90% of students at private two-year colleges, and 80% of students at 
public two-year colleges took VET courses (NCES, 1994: 67).
Work-based VET
For the entire U.S., there are approximately 830 so-called ‘apprenticeable’ occupations 
(BAT, 1992). But apprenticeship only accounts for a minor part of American VET. In the 
fiscal year of 1992, there were about 300,000 civilian apprentices, and an additional 
64,000 military apprentices (DOL, 1995: 24). 41,000 apprentices completed their 
training in that year. Contrary to the Netherlands and Germany, apprenticeship is 
located at the post-secondary level instead of at the upper secondary level. Thus, 
American apprentices tend to be older than their European counterparts.
Although in general it only plays a minor role, apprenticeship is important in 
the construction sector. Over half of all registered U.S. apprentices in 1992 were 
trained in the construction sector (DOL, 1994: 23); so had been 60% of the 38,819 
apprentices that completed training in 1988 (DOE, 1993: 3). In addition, the precise 
importance of apprenticeship in the U.S. differs from state to state, with above 
average numbers of apprentices in the north central and east south central areas 
of the U.S. (Gitter, 1994).
Another aspect which differs from state to state is the precise organization 
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of apprenticeship. At the federal level, apprenticeship is regulated by the 1937 
National Apprenticeship Act, also known as the Fitzgerald Act. The Bureau of 
Apprenticeship and Training (BAT), located in the federal Department of Labor 
(DOL), is the federal agency responsible for the administration of apprenticeship. In 
some states, BAT directly supervises apprenticeship; other states have recognized 
State Apprenticeship Agencies or Councils to do so. Currently, there are 27 States 
with Apprenticeship Councils (DOL, 1995: 23), and Wisconsin is one of them.
Most training that American firms do offer tends to be relatively firm specific. 
But the supply of firm-sponsored training is relatively low in the U.S., in particular 
for frontline workers. Hilton (1991) presents estimates of employer investments in 
training of $263 per worker per year in the United States, as compared to $633 in 
Germany. MacDuffie & Kochan (1995) present data that show that American firms 
in the automobile industry invest less in training than their European competitors 
do. 
4.2.2 The state of Wisconsin
The state of Wisconsin lies in the central northern area of the U.S., in what is known 
as the American Mid-West. It is a small state, with a little over 5 million inhabitants 
in 1994 (WLRB, 1995: 777). The state capital is Madison, but the largest city, and 
the state’s industrial stronghold, is Milwaukee, with its urbanized area inhabited by 
over 1.2 million people (WLRB, 1995: 755). Wisconsin traditionally is an industrial 
state. Although its manufacturing industry was hit by a hard recession in the 
early 1980s, it still ranked 12th among American states in the value added by 
manufacturing in 1992, and third in the share of income earned in manufacturing 
in 1993 (WLRB, 1995: 627; 667). The industry group that accounted for the largest 
share of that value was industrial machinery and equipment, followed by food and 
kindred products, and paper and allied products (WLRB, 1995: 628).
Labor force participation rates in Wisconsin are higher than the national averages, 
both for men (77% vs. 75.2%) and for women (65% vs. 57.9%) (1993 figures; 
Dresser et al., 1996). Both the unemployment and poverty rates in Wisconsin 
are below the national average. In 1994, the Wisconsin unemployment rate was 
4.5% as compared to a na tional average of 6.1% (NCEE, 1995: 25); in August 
1995, unemployment in Wisconsin even reached a 25 year low at 2.8% (Dresser 
et al., 1996: 41). The Wisconsin poverty rate was 9.0% in 1994, as compared to a 
national average of 14.5% (Dresser et al., 1996: 24). The 1993 median household 
income in Wisconsin ($31,766) was a little over the national average of $31,241; 
the same goes for the average weakly earnings in manufacturing in the same year 
(NCEE, 1995: 25). Behind these relatively good statewide medians and averages 
hide considerable regional and racial differences. For example, the black population 
falls considerably behind in all such categories (Dresser et al., 1996).
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Further, one should note that median household income (measured in 1994 
dollars) has been dropping between 1969 and 1994, with 2.6% in Wisconsin and 
with 5.8% throughout the U.S. (Dresser et al., 1996: 14). The drop in median 
household incomes coincides with a drop in average hourly wages (in 1994 dollars) 
over the last decade. Between 1979 and 1993, the average hourly wage for 
Wisconsin workers dropped by 8.56% from $12.08 to $11.05; nationwide, the drop 
was only 3.15% over the same period, from $12.41 to $12.02 (Dresser et al., 
1996: 30). This drop has occurred for all levels of educational attainment, except 
for graduates of 4-year colleges (Dresser et al., 1996: 34). Only 14% of the wage 
drop in Wisconsin can be attributed to shifts in employment between sectors; the 
rest is attributable to falling wages within industries (Dresser et al., 1996: 45-47). 
One important dynamic behind this appears to be the relocation of firms away from 
higher-wage regions to lower-wage ones. Most of this effect appears to come from 
relocation within the state itself, although many firms have also relocated toward 
low-wage states in the U.S. or abroad (Dresser et al., 1996, p. 49).
Table 4.1: Educational attainment of persons 25 years old and over, April 1990
Source: Snyder & Hoffmann (1995: 4, Table 1)
Table 4.1 presents an overview of educational attainment in the U.S. and Wisconsin. 
In 1990, the percentage of Wisconsin’s population with at least a high school 
diploma is, at 78.6%, above the national average of 75.2%. This corresponds to 
a 21st rank among American states (Snyder & Hoffman, 1995: 2; 4). At the same 
time, the percentage of the population with some college education or a college 
degree lies below the national average of 45.2%, at 41.5%. Within the latter group, 
the percentage of the population in Wisconsin with an associate degree is relatively 
high: 7.1% as compared to 6.2% nationwide (Snyder & Hoffmann, 1995: 4).
Turning to the production of these credentials, a first important observation is 
that Wisconsin invests relatively heavily in education. It ranks 8th in per capita 
state and local direct general expenditures for education in 1991-92, as compared 
to 14th for total direct per capita expenditures (WLRB, 1995: 654 & 821).
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It is important to note that Wisconsin (contrary to the Netherlands or the German 
states) does not have one Department of Education that governs all public (let 
alone private) education. Public school-based education in Wisconsin is organized 
in three different systems, and each system has its own governance structure. The 
first of these systems is the K-12 system that covers all primary and secondary 
education (section 4.2.3). The other two systems are concerned with education and 
training at a post-secondary level. They are the Wisconsin Technical College System 
(WTCS; section 4.2.4) and the University of Wisconsin System (UW; section 4.2.6). 
The WTCS offers vocational, associate degree and college parallel programs with a 
duration of up to two years. The UW offers four-year bachelor programs, as well as 
subsequent master’s and Ph.D. programs.
Public school-based education does not represent the entire range of education 
and training opportunities available for Wisconsin’s population. A first additional 
option is Wisconsin’s apprenticeship system that operates at the crossroads of 
public and private education (section 4.2.5). Further, there are private schools at 
both secondary and post-secondary levels (section 4.2.7).
Table 4.2 presents an overview of the relative importance of the various school-
based educational systems based on the number of various types of degrees 
awarded in 1991-92.
Table 4.2: Diplomas and degrees earned in Wisconsin, 1991-92
Source: WLRB (1995: 649)
4.2.3 Wisconsin’s K-12 system
Governance and finance
Article 10 of Wisconsin’s constitution provides for the establish ment of “district 
schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable”, that should provide free 
education for all children in the state (WLRB, 1995). The constitution also vests the 
supervision of public instruction in a State Superintendent of Public Instruction. 
This State Superintendent is elected for a four-year term on a non-partisan ballot, 
and heads the Department of Public Instruction (DPI)3. DPI is one of only two 
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Departments that are headed by what is called a constitutional officer (WLRB, 
1995).
In Wisconsin, education is compulsory until the age of 18. Pupils have to attend 
the school in their school district or (if the district has more schools offering 
the grade concerned) their neighborhood4. Wisconsin has 427 school districts5 
that administer the elementary and secondary school programs. This number is 
considerably down from the 2,731 school districts in 1960 (WRLB, 1995: 641). 
The average size of a Wisconsin school district (fewer than 2,000 students) is very 
small; only fifteen states show a smaller average size (Snyder & Hoffman, 1995: 
23). Within Wisconsin, the size of school districts varied considerably6. 88 school 
districts had less than 500 pupils in 1994-95, whereas 10 had over 10,000 (WLRB, 
1995: 650). These districts together operated 2,030 schools in 1992-93, with an 
average school size of 410 pupils (Snyder & Hoffman, 1995: 76). Secondary schools 
tend to be a little larger than elementary schools.
The most important income of school districts does not come from the state 
government, but from a property tax that they themselves are authorized to 
levy. Thus, they are fiscally independent. Income from these local property taxes 
generated 53.3% of the income for K-12 school districts in 1993-94 (Toulmin & 
Bukolt, 1995: 3). In addition to this tax, school districts receive subsidies from 
the state that account for 39.0% of their income. State subsidies come in two 
ways. First, unrestricted general aid is awarded according to a ‘general equalization’ 
formula that compensates poorer school districts for their weaker fiscal capacity 
(Toulmin & Bukolt, 1995: 1)7. Second, the state provides a number of types of 
categorical aid to partially fund costs of certain specific programs. The various 
types of categorical aid accounted for 15.0% of all state aid in 1994-1995 (Toulmin, 
1995: 37). Taken together, all sources of income put Wisconsin school districts 
in a relatively affluent position. Wisconsin ranks 9th where it comes to a small 
pupil/teacher ratio, and 11th in current expenditures per pupil in average daily 
attendance (Snyder & Hoffman, 1995: 18 & 88).
The autonomy of school districts is of course not unlimited. In Wisconsin, twenty 
standards define the essential state rules that govern school districts (Bukolt & 
Toulmin, 1995). But there are more statutory requirements that school districts 
have to comply with8. One of the areas where state standards apply is high school 
graduation. Since September 1988, school boards have only been allowed to grant 
a high school diploma to students that have completed at least 4 credits of English, 
3 of social studies, 2 of mathematics, 2 of science and 1.5 of physical education 
in the high school grades, as well as 0.5 credit of health education in grades 7 to 
12 (Wisconsin Statutes, section 118.33; Bethke, 1990: 84). In addition, school 
districts are encouraged to require an additional 8.5 credits of electives, which 
may be in VET as well as in academic areas (DPI, 1995b: 28). School districts do 
need approval from the State Superintendent of Public Instruction for their specific 
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graduation requirements (Wisconsin Statutes sections 118.33; Bukolt & Toulmin, 
1995: 11). The number of credits that individual school districts actually require for 
graduation ranges from 20 to 29.5 (DPI, 1995b: 29).
The typical public school structure in Wisconsin comprises an elementary 
school that covers grades K-5, followed by a middle school covering grades 6-
8, and a high school covering grades 9-12. The most important alternative is a 
junior high school, which replaces the middle school. A junior high school offers 
grades 7-9, which means that grade 6 is added to the elementary school and grade 
9 taken out of the (senior) high school. In 1993-1994, Wisconsin had 431 high 
schools, 263 middle schools and 81 junior high schools. Nearly all high schools 
in Wisconsin are comprehensive high schools, meaning they offer both academic 
and vocational courses. There is one vocational high school in Milwaukee, but this 
also offers academic courses and thus enables its graduates to meet college entry 
requirements. The largest Wisconsin high school had 1,982, students; the smallest 
had 565 (DPI, 1995b: 18).
VET in secondary schools
The first instance of manual training and general shop courses in Wisconsin public 
high schools was found in Eau Claire in 1884 (Paris, 1985). In 1895, the Legis la-
ture passed a law that encouraged such manual training in high schools. Today, 
vocational skills are one of the educational goals contained in section 118.01 of the 
Wisconsin Statutes (Bethke, 1990: 82). According to this section:
“Each school board shall provide an instructional program designed to  
 give pupils:
1. An understanding of  the range and nature of  available 
 occupations and the required skills and abilities.
2. Preparations to compete for entry-level jobs not requiring post  
 secondary school education.
3. Preparation to enter job-specific vocational training programs.
4. Positive work attitudes and habits.”
Accordingly, section 121.02 of the Wisconsin Statutes requires school districts to 
provide pupils with an introduction to career exploration and planning in grades 
5 through 8, and opportunities to study VET in grades 9 through 12 (Bethke, 
1990: 85-86). The same section requires school districts to have an ‘education for 
employment’ program that has been approved by the State Superintendent (DPI, 
1995b: 14).
But vocational education is not part of the state minimum requirements for high 
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school graduation. Of the 380 regular school districts with high schools, only 61 have 
themselves set graduation requirements in vocational education (DPI, 1995b: 29; 
402-412). And only 8 of them require at least one credit of vocational education. As 
with all courses, school districts are free to develop their own vocational education 
curriculum.
Performance indications
There are indications that Wisconsin’s K-12 system functions better than the 
American average. To begin with, drop out rates in Wisconsin are below the national 
average. In 1991, the state ranked only 33rd among American states. 7.1% of the 
Wisconsin population aged 16-19 is not in school and has no high school diploma or 
General Equivalency Diploma (GED), as compared to a national average of 11.7% 
(NCEE, 1995: 48; Snyder & Hoffman, 1995: 6). Wisconsin primary and secondary 
students also do well in academic tests. Among American states and in the year 
1992, Wisconsin ranks (Snyder & Hoffman, 1995: 14 & 46-48):
• 4th in average proficiency in mathematics of 4th graders in public schools;
• 6th in average proficiency in mathematics of 8th graders;
• 6th in average reading proficiency of 4th graders.
In addition, both the average Wisconsin 8th and 10th grade student rank in the 
73rd percentile nationally for a battery of multiple choice questions in language arts, 
reading, mathematics, science and social studies in 1993-94 (Bukolt, 1995b: 6). 
Their performance in writing exercises is not as good, though: it varies around the 
50th percentile rank. Finally, those Wisconsin 12th grade students that participated 
in the enhanced American College Test (ACT) scored a statewide average of 21.8, 
which is exactly one point above the national average (DPI, 1995b: 7).
School performance does differ tremendously between individual schools and 
school districts. Particularly alarming is the performance of the state’s largest 
public school district, Milwaukee. While accounting for 11.4% of all public school 
enrollments in 1992-93 (Snyder & Hoffman, 1995: 75), it accounts for 46% of high 
school drop outs and 47% of all habitual truants in the state (DPI, 1995b: 23-24). 
The average student score on multiple choice questions in language arts, reading, 
mathematics, science and social studies for Milwaukee ranks in the 38th percentile 
for 8th graders and in the 41st percentile for 10th graders, as compared to a state 
average ranking of 73rd nationwide for both groups (Bucholt, 1995b: 21; 34). 
Typical inner city problems are part of the explanation.
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4.2.4 The Wisconsin Technical College System
Governance and finance
The origins of what today is called the Wisconsin Technical College System (WTCS)9 
lie in 1911. A new law from that year established continuation schools to provide 
part-time education for youth and adults who were not enrolled in either secondary 
or post-secondary schools (Paris, 1985; Bukolt, 1995a). However, some areas of 
the state still lacked vocational schools in 1965. Hence, a new law demanded that 
the entire state be divided in technical college districts, and laid the basis for today’s 
system (WLRB, 1995).
Today’s system consists of 16 technical colleges in 16 technical college districts. 
Most districts operate several campuses and/or regional centers (WTCS, 1995a; 
1995b). Each district is supervised by a nine member district board, consisting of two 
employers, two employees, three public members, a school district administrator 
and an elected official at state or local level (Bukolt, 1995a: 2-3). Local committees 
consisting of county board chairs or school board presidents appoint the district 
board members.
These individual district boards share responsibility for the governance of the 
system with a statewide Wisconsin Technical College System Board that has to 
ensure statewide consistency in the system10. The word ‘share’ indicates that 
the type of governance of the state board towards individual colleges should be 
described as associational, rather than hierarchical. The WTCS Board consist of 
13 members: one employer representative, one employee representative, one 
farmer representative, three ex-officio members (the State Superintendent of 
Public Instruction, the Secretary of Industry, Labor and Human Relations, and the 
President of the University of Wisconsin Board of Regents), six public members and 
one student. All but the three ex-officio members are appointed by the Governor. 
The Board commands an administrative staff that is headed by a State Director, 
appointed by the Board (Bukolt, 1995a: 1).
Wisconsin invests heavily in its two-year colleges. It ranks 20th in expenditures 
for public four-year institutions of higher education, but 6th in expenditures for public 
two-year institutions (Snyder & Hoffman, 1995: 108; 110). And it ranks first when it 
comes to the number of FTE students per faculty member (ibid: 175). 
Just like the public school districts in the K-12 system, the technical college 
districts are fiscally independent. They receive the largest part of their revenue 
from property taxes they levy themselves. These property taxes account for around 
45% of revenue. There is a maximum tax rate for operational costs, and 6 districts 
were at that maximum rate in 1994-95 (Bukolt, 1995a: 7-9)11. The second most 
important source of revenue for the technical colleges is state aid. Since 1980, state 
aid has accounted for approximately 19% of total revenue (Bauer, 1991: 17; Bukolt, 
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1995a: 10). Almost 90% of state aid is general aid, which is distributed through a 
cost-sharing formula which is designed to partially equalize the fiscal capacities of 
the 16 districts (Bukolt, 1995a: 11). The remainder comes from various types of 
categorical aid for specific purposes. Over the last decade, the share of categorical 
aid in total state aid has grown from less than 1% to 11% (Bukolt, 1995a: 12). The 
largest type of categorical aid is the incentive grants program. This program enables 
the WTCS Board to award grants to districts for basic skills programs, programs 
for emerging occupations, programs for technology transfer, or to districts with a 
declining fiscal capacity (Bukolt, 1995a: 12-13). Third, tuition and student fees 
accounted for another 13% of WTCS revenue in 1993-94 (Bukolt, 1995a: 7). The 
law requires the WTCS to set tuition for state residents12 in vocational certificate and 
associate degree programs at a level that generates at least 14% of their statewide 
operational costs (Bukolt, 1995a: 15-16). Tuition for college parallel programs should 
equal at least 31% of statewide operational costs. In 1994-95, tuition for state 
residents in associate degree and vocational programs was $46.10 per credit, which 
amounts to approximately $1,383.00 a year. Wisconsin ranked relatively high (15th) 
among American states in the cost for public two-year colleges (Philippe, 1995: 49). 
Besides tuition, students have to pay a materials fee that ranges from $3 to $30 per 
credit (Bauer, 1991: 52). This may significantly raise the total costs of education and 
training. It should be noted, though, that students can apply for various scholarships 
and grants from the federal or state government. Fourth, federal subsidies account 
for an additional 9.7% of WTCS revenue (Bukolt, 1995: 17). 74% of these funds is 
distributed by the districts as financial aid to students. Fifth and last, the remaining 
13.2% of total WTCS revenue comes from self-financing operations, equipment 
sales, interest and the provision of educational services to companies and other 
organizations on a contract basis (Bukolt, 1995a: 17).
VET and other programs
The core tasks of the WTCS are to provide occupational education and training, as 
well as customized training and technical assistance to business (Bukolt, 1995a: 3). 
In addition, it is to provide courses for high school students through contracts with 
secondary schools, a college parallel program, non-vocational or self-enrichment 
courses, basic skills education, and education and services to minorities, women, 
and the handicapped or disadvantaged. The programs are divided in two main 
categories: post-secondary education and continuing education (Bukolt, 1995a: 3-
4; WTCS, 1995a: 5).
Post-secondary programs are offered full-time, but many students enroll in them 
on a part-time basis. They come in three types:
• college parallel programs that provide the first two years of a baccalaureate 
program. These are offered in three districts only;
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• associate degree programs, which are two-year post-high school occupational 
programs that teach future technicians at the mid-management level the 
manipulative and theoretical understandings, which allow them to operate 
effectively. They have to meet specific requirements. They consist of 64 to 
72 credits. Of those, 15 are required general education credits that are the 
same for most programs. In principle, these 15 credits can be transferred 
to a four-year college. At least 32 credits are occupation-specific courses, 
and an additional 11-19 are occupational supportive courses. Finally there 
are 6 elective credits;
• vocational diploma programs (now called technical diploma programs), 
which are short-term, one- or two-year programs that prepare students 
for work in semi-skilled or skilled crafts. They offer hands-on learning 
of occupational skills in laboratories or shops, in connection with related 
classroom instruction. Their length ranges from 2 to 70 credits. They do 
not need to (but may) contain general education credits. The majority 
of credits will be occupation-specific. In this category are also included 
apprenticeship programs, for which the technical colleges typically provide 
the related instruction; these will be separately discussed in section 4.2.5.
The other main category, continuing education, consists of part-time vocational-
adult programs and of district/community services, such as driver education, adult 
high school courses, and non-vocational courses (Bauer, 1991: 6-7; Bukolt, 1995a: 
3-4).
Some technical diploma and associate degree programs have a work-based 
component in the form of cooperative education or an internship. Many, but not all 
of these, entail pay. At one college, work-based learning is a required element in 
19 program areas, and optional in another 23 (Milwaukee Area Technical College, 
1995: 33). Together, these areas cover roughly a fifth of all program areas.
Enrollment
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 present overviews of headcount and FTE enrollment in various 
types of WTCS programs. Total statewide headcount enrollment is approximately 
7 times higher than the total FTE enrollment (Bukolt, 1995a: 6). The technical 
colleges serve many people: 1993-94 headcount enrollment accounts for 11.7% 
of the estimated adult population in 1994 (our own calculations, based on WTCS, 
1995b: 1 & WLRB, 1995: 783). But most people take only one or a few courses. 
Vocational-adult programs account for the majority of headcount enrollments, but 
(short as they are) only account for 9.1% of FTE enrollments in 1994-95 (WTCS, 
unpublished statistics). The opposite is true for associate degree programs: these 
account for only 19.9% of total headcount enrollments in 1994-95, but for over half 
of FTE enrollments.
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Table 4.3: Headcount enrollment in Wisconsin Technical College System, 1985-86 
and 1994-95
Sources: WTCS (1995b: 1) and WTCS unpublished statistics.
Table 4.4: FTE enrollment2 in Wisconsin Technical College System, 
1985-86 and 1994-95
Sources: WTCS (1995b: 2) and WTCS unpublished statistics
FTE enrollment in the WTCS has been fluctuating around 60,000 since 1981 (Bauer, 
1991: 10; Bukolt, 1995a: 6). FTE enrollment in college parallel programs has 
doubled over that period; that in associate degree and vocational diploma programs 
has slightly increased; that in vocational-adult programs has decreased a little; and 
that in community service programs has decreased significantly, but only in 1994-
95 (WTCS, 1995b: 2; WTCS, unpublished statistics).
       1Students enrolled in more than one type of program are counted only 
 once in the total, which is why the numbers don’t add up to the total. 
        230 credits per year is considered one FTE student (WTCS, 1995b, p.2).
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Table 4.5: Mean, median and modal ages of students in various types of WTCS 
programs, 1994-95
Source: WTCS, unpublished statistics
The students enrolled in Wisconsin’s technical colleges are relatively old as compared 
with Dutch and German upper secondary education students. In 1991, only 11% 
of students leaving high school directly entered the WTCS (WTCS, 1994). Thus, 
most WTCS students are adults that return to school. Table 4.5 presents mean, 
median and modal ages for students enrolled in various types of programs. Note 
that these are the ages based on headcount enrollment, and that correcting for FTE 
enrollment results in lower mean and median ages. For instance, the median age 
for all students then drops from 33 to 24, and that for all post-secondary students 
from 28 to 24 (WTCS, unpublished statistics).
In 1994-95, 60,009 students (13.8% of headcount enrollment) had not completed 
12th grade in high school (WTCS, unpublished statistics). This percentage is highest 
(31.2%) for students enrolled in post-secondary vocational programs. On the other 
hand, 46,489 students (10.7% of total enrollment) had completed 16 grades, which 
amounts to finishing a four-year college education (WTCS, unpublished statistics). 
This percentage is highest among students enrolled in cooperative services (24.3%) 
and vocational-adult programs (12.6%).
Individual technical colleges differ in a number of ways. The largest technical 
college enrolled 64,946 persons in 1993-94, which is 22.3% of total FTE enrollment 
in the state. The smallest enrolled only 9,258 persons and 1.9% of state FTE 
enrollment (Bukolt, 1995a: 6). Colleges also differ in the share of part-time 
enrollments. One college enrolled 4.8 persons per FTE, another 10.2 (Bukolt, 1995a: 
6). And colleges differ in the importance of various types of programs. Continuing 
education programs account for 5.1% of FTE enrollments at one college, but for 
19.4% at another (Bukolt, 1995a: 5). One reason for such differences between 
individual colleges is differences in their policies. Since the largest part of their 
funds is generated through local taxes, individual colleges have a great deal of 
autonomy.
180
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
Performance indications
The internal efficiency of the WTCS is relatively low: few students that enroll in its 
programs actually graduate. Even when compared to FTE enrollment figures, the 
number of students that actually finishes a complete program is low (Table 4.6). 
For short-term (less than one-year) vocational programs, headcount enrollment is 
the proper measure. 14,722 enrolled persons correspond to only 4,562 graduates. 
Together, all programs offered by the WTCS produce only 16,107 graduates in 
1994-95, 548 of which are apprentices to be discussed in the next section (WTCS, 
unpublished statistics). The high non-graduation rate is, however, not seen as a 
major problem in Wisconsin. If a few courses suffice to help somebody get a (better) 
job, student participation has already paid off. In fact, many students are said to 
enroll with the sole intention of taking only a few specific courses.
Table 4.6: FTE enrollment and number of graduates in various types of WTCS 
programs, 1994-1995
Source: WTCS, unpublished statistics.
The external efficiency of the WTCS depends on the success of its former students 
in the labor market. We can catch a glimpse of their careers from the system’s five 
year longitudinal graduate follow-up studies (WTCS, 1996). We should, however, 
be cautious when interpreting their findings: these studies are limited to graduates, 
based on an imperfect sampling method, and response rates vary significantly 
between districts, while averaging a mere 48% (WTCS, 1996: 1). Of the 1989-90 
graduates responding, 72% were still employed in jobs related to the training they 
received (WTCS, 1996: 2). This is approximately the same percentage as for 1993-
94 graduates six months after graduation (WTCS, 1995d: 4). Of those that were 
employed in other fields than they were trained in, 21% gave higher earnings as 
a reason for the switch, 19% their working pleasure, 16% not wanting to relocate 
in order to obtain training-related employment, and 10% upward mobility within 
their firm (WTCS, 1996: 7). Of the responding graduates that were employed, 79% 
of the 1993-94 generation were employed in the same college district where they 
were trained after six months, and the same was true for 68% from the 1989-90 
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generation of graduates after five years (WTCS, 1995d: 5; WTCS, 1996: 3). Only 
7% of the latter were working out of state.
We don’t have accurate data for the wage premium that various technical college 
programs result in for their graduates. For those who have taken 1-3 years of post 
high-school education (a group that includes drop outs from four-year colleges), 
the premium on training seems small: for Wisconsin men, the average hourly wage 
lies only $0.50 higher than that for high school graduates, and only $0,80 for 
women (Dresser et al., 1996: 34). While the wage premium for this group is also 
low in the rest of the country, Wisconsin average hourly wages for them lie below 
the national averages, and the wage difference with high school graduates is also 
smaller than the national average.
The five year follow up of 1989-90 graduates from the WTCS (with all its 
limitations) gives a more detailed picture of wages earned by graduates from 
various WTCS programs five years after graduation (Table 4.7). Two-year diploma 
programs seem an attractive option in Wisconsin, given the high median salary level 
among its graduates. The most remarkable finding is that among graduates from 
the industrial division, those from short-term vocational programs have the highest 
median salary. The most likely explanation for this is that graduates from the latter 
are relatively older and had already been employed in attractive jobs prior to their 
enrollment, as compared to graduates from longer programs. This explanation is 
underlined by the finding that among 1993-94 graduates, those from short-term 
industrial programs already earn more within six months from graduation (WTCS, 
1995d: 16-17). For the 1985-86 generation, after five years graduates from short-
term programs earned less than those from two-year programs when we control for 
hours worked, but still a little more than those from one-year vocational programs 
(Wisconsin Board of Vocational, Technical and Adult Education, 1992: 10). The 
relatively low median salary for graduates from industrial associate degrees is 
based on a small number of graduates/respondents. Remarkable is the relatively 
low median wage for graduates from college parallel programs; among the 1985-
86 generation of graduates, they topped all other graduate categories in median 
monthly salary (Wisconsin Board of Vocational, Technical and Adult Education, 1992: 
11). For these programs, however, the number of respondents is also relatively 
low.
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Table 4.7: Median monthly salary in 1995 of 1989-1990 graduates from various 
types of WTCS programs, for the industrial division and across all divisions
Source: WTCS (1996: 9-10)
Thus, the information on the performance of the WTCS is mixed. On the one 
hand, the number of people (and firms) it attracts as customers is admirable. In 
particular, the WTCS is quite successful in attracting adults. But it is less successful 
in attracting high school graduates directly when they leave high school. Further, 
most WTCS students merely attend a few courses rather than complete an entire, 
rigorous training program. And graduates of WTCS programs do not appear to 
experience the significant wage benefits in the labor market one would expect. We 
will elaborate on the merits of the WTCS in the American context in section 4.4.
4.2.5  Wisconsin’s apprenticeship system
Governance13
Wisconsin had a state apprenticeship law as early as 1849. In 1909, the Wisconsin 
Legislature formed a Commission on Industrial and Agricultural Training (Paris, 
1985). Its most prominent member, Charles McCarthy, traveled to the American 
East Coast and to Europe, where he found inspiration for a new training system 
in Germany. He realized that Wisconsin had a very high proportion of German 
immigrants that would probably respond favorably to the German example. Based on 
the Commission’s report, the Wisconsin Legislature passed the first comprehensive 
continuation school legislation in the U.S. in 1911. It provided for continuation, 
trade and evening schools as the Commission had proposed them (Paris, 1985; 
Münch, 1989). These schools should provide education for 14-16 year old boys 
and girls who had quit high school, and for adults. In addition, they should provide 
related instruction for apprentices (Paris, 1985). In the same year, the Wisconsin 
Legislature issued a new apprenticeship law (Wisconsin Statutes, Chapter 106) that 
regulated the work-based component of apprenticeship training: The Comprehensive 
Apprenticeship Law (Münch, 1989).
Today, Wisconsin’s apprenticeship system is still governed by that same 
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apprenticeship law from 1911, and by the Apprenticeship Rules (part of the Wisconsin 
Administrative Code) that interpret it (BAS, 1987). Wisconsin therefore is a State with 
an Apprenticeship Council that governs its own apprenticeship system (cf. section 
4.2.1). Apprenticeship is administrated by the Bureau of Apprenticeship Standards 
(BAS). BAS is located in the Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations 
(DILHR), and is very small: in 1993, it had a staff of only 15.5 FTE and a budget 
of $750,205 (Vaughan, 1994). BAS is advised by the Wisconsin Apprenticeship 
Council (WLRB, 1995). The Council has sixteen members, with one half representing 
employers and the other half representing labor. Members are proposed by statewide 
trade associations, employer groups and state labor organizations, and appointed 
by the Labor and Industry Review Commission, a three-person quasi-judicial body 
appointed by the Governor with Senate consent (DILHR, 1987; WLRB, 1995).
Apprenticeship training is limited to trades and occupations that BAS has approved as 
apprenticeable (BAS, 1987; Wisconsin Administrative Code Ind. 95.15). There were 
approximately 300 apprenticeable occupations in Wisconsin, but in only 69 of them 
were there any apprentices active in 1990 (BAS, 1992). The 300 apprenticeable 
trades in Wisconsin cover a much smaller share of the labor market than the 
apprenticeship occupations in Germany. For instance, there is no apprenticeable 
trade in the area of banking and insurance. The scope of the apprenticeship 
governance regime has been limited towards the more traditional occupations in 
construction, industry and personal services. More recent and growing employment 
sectors have generally not been incorporated.
The Wisconsin Apprenticeship Law requires that there must be a written 
agreement (an indenture) between the apprentice (and, if under 18, a parent or 
guardian) and the sponsor of the program (Wisconsin Statutes section 106.01.2). 
As in Germany, the Wisconsin apprenticeship law has provisions that require 
everybody in an apprenticeship-type situation to be ‘indentured’ except for short-
term training situations of less than one year (Wisconsin Statutes sections 106.01.1 
through 3). It even gives DILHR the task to make sure the provision is upheld 
(Wisconsin Statutes sections 106.01.9). But it does not forbid training in other than 
the recognized trades, such as the German law does for those under 18.
Every indenture must be filed with DILHR, and must contain an approved ‘Exhibit 
A’ with at least seven provisions (BAS, 1987; Wisconsin Statutes section 106.01.5.; 
Apprenticeship Rules Ind. 95.07):
• the duration of the apprenticeship. Duration differs per occupation (or, as 
they are called in Wisconsin, trade). Barbering requires only a minimum of 
4,000 hours (two years), whereas tool and die making requires no less than 
10,400 hours (approximately five years). Most trades require three to four 
years of training (BAS, 1992);
• length of the probationary period (with a maximum of six months);
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• related instruction. This school-based component is considerably smaller 
than that in the Netherlands or Germany. Apprenticeship programs consist 
for 90% of on-the-job training in firms (BAS, 1987). Apprentices have to 
spend a minimum of 400 hours in related instruction when the term of an 
apprenticeship is more than two years; else, the minimum is 144 hours a 
year (BAS, 1987; Wisconsin Statutes section 106.01.5.). Related instruction 
is typically provided by the technical colleges14. These, however, do not have 
a complete monopoly on the provision of related instruction. Some trades 
have their own facilities that provide related instruction. Examples are 
plumbers and carpenters, who have their own related instruction facilities 
in Milwaukee. But these are exceptions, and concern only a small minority 
(about 2%) of Wisconsin apprentices (BAS, 1987);
• a schedule of processes to be worked. This outlines the basic phases or 
facets of the trade and the approximate time the apprentice will spend 
on each. In the construction sector, state Joint Apprenticeship Committees 
(JACs), consisting of an equal number of employers and employee 
representatives have traditionally issued statewide minima for these (cf. 
section 4.5.3). Outside construction, statewide minimum requirements 
have been lacking, and the schedules thus are firm specific. There is no 
final examination: graduation is based upon the satisfactory completion 
of the related instruction (as decided by the technical college) and the 
minimum on the job work processes (as decided by the sponsor).
• the apprentice’s wage. The state demands that there is a progressive 
schedule for wage increases over the term of the apprenticeship, that 
should average at least 60% of the journeyman rate in that trade and 
area (Wisconsin Administrative Code Ind. 95.04). At the same time no 
apprentice can be paid less than the state or federal minimum wage. This 
makes apprentices relatively more expensive than in Germany (cf. section 
3.5.4). Furthermore, Wisconsin is the only American state that requires 
employers to also pay apprentices for the legally required minimum time 
to be spent in related instruction (DILHR, 1992; Wisconsin Statutes section 
106.01.6.);
• special provisions. One example is additional non-paid school hours that 
sponsor and apprentice may have agreed upon on top of the required 
minimum of related instruction. Other examples are tool purchases on the 
part of either party, and bonuses for apprentices upon successful completion 
of the apprenticeship;
• credit provisions that shorten the period of training when an apprentice has 
acquired prior relevant training or experience.
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Outside the construction sector, apprenticeship programs in Wisconsin are individual 
programs, which means that the sponsor is an individual plant or firm (BAS, 1987; 
1992). Within the company or plant, there may be an in-plant labor-management 
committee that governs the program. Most firms that have more than two or three 
apprentices use such a committee. BAS provides firms with technical assistance 
when they start or modify an apprenticeship program, and firms have to allow BAS 
to monitor the program. In theory each program should be reviewed each year 
(BAS, 1987), but in practice monitoring is less frequent due to a lack of staff.
In the construction sector, the sponsor of apprenticeship programs is not an 
individual firm but a so-called area Joint Apprenticeship Committee (area JAC). 
Such committees have existed since 1918, and by the late thirties they operated 
to a large extent in the same way they do today (BAS, 1987). Area JACs consist 
of an equal number of skilled workers and employers. They select applicants for 
apprenticeship and indenture them. Subsequently, they must assign the indenture 
to an individual area employer (Wisconsin Statutes section 106.01.(5i) (a); 
BAS, 1987). Area JACs monitor the training by employers, and also serve as an 
advisory board to the local technical college, that provides related instruction for 
apprenticeship. Throughout Wisconsin and across all different trades in the building 
sector, there are approximately 100 area JACs. Formally they are merely advisory 
bodies to BAS, since the law does not give them any authority nor can BAS legally 
delegate such authority, but in practice they are the ones monitoring training in 
firms (BAS, 1987)15.
Individuals can be indentured once they are 16 (Wisconsin Statutes section 
106.01.1). However, when they are still high school students (age 16-18) they 
have to have a statement from the school that participating in apprenticeship will 
not aversely affect their graduation from high school, and maintain their status as 
a high school student until graduation (BAS, 1987). Provided a student is on track 
for high school graduation, he/she can enter apprenticeship at age 16. But the 
typical U.S. apprentice is at least 20 years of age (Gitter, 1994), and Wisconsin 
seems to fit this picture: an apprentice in the building trades is typically in his mid-
twenties, and apprentices in industry even tend to be a little older. Specific trades 
may have academic entry requirements; if they do, they typically require a high 
school diploma or a GED.
Enrollments
The size of the Wisconsin apprenticeship system is much smaller than that in 
Germany or the Netherlands. The number of apprentices has grown from 5,039 in 
January 1985 to 8,598 in January 1996 (BAS statistics). Contrary to other American 
states, where there are many unregistered apprentices, the apprentice count in 
Wisconsin is considered reliable since apprenticeship registration is legally required 
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in Wisconsin. There are trades that may have only one apprentice, such as auto body 
repair and boilermaker; the largest trade is electrician, with about 700 apprentices. 
Over half of the apprentices are trained in the building trades (figure 4.1).
Figure 4.1: Apprenticeship enrollments in Wisconsin, 1986-1996
Source: BAS statistics
The number of apprentices would be even smaller if not for certain special legislation. 
A significant number of Wisconsin apprentices is trained in (mostly building) trades 
where binding rules require workers to obtain some sort of a license in order to 
be allowed to work in them. The (quantitatively) most important construction 
apprenticeship trades in Wisconsin are electricians (738 apprentices in 1992), 
plumbing (627 apprentices) and carpentry (622 apprentices) (BAS, 1992). For 
carpenters, the Carpentry Law explicitly directs that anyone who is employed to 
learn to be a carpenter must be indentured (BAS, 1987). However, for those who 
can show experience and pay the union a fee, it is possible to get a journeyman 
carpenter card without finishing an apprenticeship, if there is a shortage of 
carpenters. Plumbing is one of five trades16 for which there are state licensing 
laws. These require an apprentice to be indentured prior to employment and the 
apprenticeship to be completed, before the apprentice may take the licensing 
examination, which he needs to pass before being allowed to work in the trade. 
And for electricians, many communities have passed local ordinances that require 
workers to show evidence of either being an apprentice or having completed an 
apprenticeship in order to be employed in certain jobs. Such ordinances are fairly 
common throughout Wisconsin (BAS, 1987). Together, the seven trades where 
apprenticeship is in some way legally enforced account for approximately 36% of 
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Wisconsin apprentices in July 1990 (own calculations based on BAS, 1992).
Another form of state labor market regulation that helps to explain the relatively 
large number of apprentices in the building trades is the 1931 Davis-Bacon Act. 
This act applies to government building contracts. Workers on those contracts have 
to be paid the so-called prevailing (journeyman) wage rate in the area, unless they 
are apprentices. Most of the government-sponsored contracts fall in the category of 
commercial building, and there the rate of apprentices to journeymen is apparently 
higher than in home building.
Together, these two types of state regulation help account for the relatively large 
number of apprentices in the building trades. An additional explanation lies in the 
fact that the building trades have training funds that pay for apprenticeship training. 
Other sectors lack such funds. Given the relatively low number of apprentices 
outside the building trades, the hypothesis seems justified that at this point in time 
only quite rigid institutional mechanisms succeed in getting a significant number of 
American firms in a sector to embark on apprenticeship training.
4.2.6 The University of Wisconsin System
The State of Wisconsin finances one university system: the University of Wisconsin 
System (UW). The UW has 26 campuses throughout Wisconsin. Two of these 
(Madison and Milwaukee) offer programs leading to bachelor’s and doctoral degrees. 
Eleven others provide merely four-year programs leading to a bachelor’s degree. 
And the remaining thirteen institutions are so-called UW Center campuses. These 
provide two-year courses of study that equal the first two years of a bachelor’s 
program, and allow a subsequent transfer to a four-year campus. They themselves 
lead to an associate of arts and science degree (UW, 1995a). In September 1994, 
the UW enrolled 152,281 students (WLRB, 1995: 642).
Admission policies are developed by the individual campuses of the UW. General 
admission requirements for the UW are a high school diploma or its equivalent 
and 17 high school credits: 4 in English, 3 in mathematics, 3 in social science, 3 in 
natural science, and 4 elective credits (Suchman, 1995: 12). Only a few campuses 
accept vocational courses for some of the elective credits. Further, all applicants 
must submit their ACT scores. The UW admits all Wisconsin high school graduates 
that rank in the top 25% of their class, if they apply for UW admission directly upon 
high school graduation. Irrespective of class rank, a high ACT score can lead to 
direct admission to most campuses. And if both class rank and ACT score fall short 
of the requirements, their composite score can sometimes still be enough to qualify 
for admission.
There are significant differences in admission requirements between the 
campuses. The UW Centers admit students if they were merely in the top 75% of 
their class. Most four year campuses require a high school rank in the top 50% to 
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35%, although some of them in practice enroll significant numbers of students from 
the lowest 50% of their class (Suchman, 1995: 14). The UW top campus in Madison 
simply admits the best students as space permits (ibid: 13). 36% of its admitted 
freshmen ranked in the top 10% of their class, 80% in the top 25%, and 99% in 
the top 50% (Suchman, 1995: 16).
The access rate of Wisconsin high school graduates who immediately enter the 
UW has risen from 24.5% in the late seventies to 32.1% in 1993 (Suchman, 1995: 
1; 7). Not all new students arriving at the UW in a given year are freshmen; some 
are transfer students from other colleges. In 1994-95, 13% of transfer students 
(1,681) came from Wisconsin’s technical colleges, most from the three technical 
colleges with college parallel programs (Rhodes, 1995). However, more students 
travel in the opposite direction: 2,678 students transferred from the UW to the 
WTCS degree, diploma or certificate programs in the same year.
The percentage of the population over 25 with a bachelor’s or advanced degree 
in Wisconsin (1990: 17.7%) lies below the national average (20.3%), meaning that 
Wisconsin ranks 34th among American states in college attainment (NCEE, 1995: 
25; Dresser et al., 1996: 10). This group of four-year college graduates receives a 
substantial wage premium. Male college graduates in Wisconsin earn $6.6 an hour 
more than those with 1-3 years of post high school education, and female college 
graduates earn $ 4.85 more (Dresser et al., 1996: 34). The difference between 
both groups has grown considerably since 1979. Thus, it really pays to graduate 
from a four-year college, and most youngsters hope one day to achieve this.
4.2.7 Private school-based education and training
Section 4.2.1 stated that private educational establishments play a role at every 
level of education in the U.S.. At the primary and secondary level, enrollment in 
public schools in Wisconsin corresponds to 85.5% of the 5-17 year old population in 
1992 (Snyder & Hoffman, 1995: 28). Only one other state has a lower percentage. 
The explanation lies in the relatively high enrollment in private schools in Wisconsin, 
which in 1991-1992 corresponded to 15.1% of the age group as compared to a 
national average of 10.5%. Thus, Wisconsin ranks 7th among American states in 
private school enrollment (Snyder & Hoffman, 1995: 30). In 1994-95, there were 
961 private elementary and secondary schools in Wisconsin, 74 of which were high 
schools and 130 combination schools (DPI, 1995c). Since private high schools tend 
to be college-prep, they contribute little to VET in Wisconsin.
This is different at the post-secondary level. Private-for-profit less-than-four 
year (or: proprietary) schools and colleges are predominantly vocational in what 
they offer. In Wisconsin, they are overseen by an Educational Approval Board 
(EAB) (EAB, 1995). Wisconsin private post-secondary schools and colleges have 
to obtain a license from the EAB, which they have to renew each year. There 
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were 81 proprietary institutions that had an EAB license in 1995. They enrolled 
approximately 15,000 people (half of which graduated) in 1994-95 (EAB, 1995: 5). 
Proprietary institutions serve a relatively disadvantaged, older population and are 
a sort of last-chance training system for individuals who need a quick fix in skills or 
weren’t admitted to technical college programs (EAB, 1995). To make the fix quick, 
proprietary schools tend to cut as much as possible on the general curriculum that 
the technical colleges would include. Most programs they offer are short, but some 
proprietary institutions also offer associate degree programs, and one is developing 
a baccalaureate program. Nationwide, private schools and colleges account for 
almost 17% of the associate degrees conferred in 1991-1992, but in Wisconsin 
they only account for 7% (Phillippe, 1995: 36). Many of the programs offered by 
proprietary institutions are in areas where people are quasi-self-employed, such as 
in real estate and in tax preparation.
Private educational establishments are most important as a competitive threat 
to the UW, as they account for 25% of the bachelor’s degrees conferred in Wisconsin 
in 1991-1992 (Phillippe, 1995: 36). Nationwide, their market share for bachelor’s 
degrees is larger than in Wisconsin: 33%. The private institutions in Wisconsin at 
this level are 3 universities, 4 technical and professional postgraduate schools, 
and 5 theological seminaries (WLRB, 1995: 641). In September 1994, all private 
four-year colleges, technical and professional schools and theological seminaries 
enrolled 51,349 students, as compared to 152,281 students for the UW (WLRB, 
1995: 642-43). The largest private educational establishment in Wisconsin was 
Marquette University, with 10,750 students.
4.2.8 Conclusion
Four-year college attendance really pays off in the U.S., and Wisconsin is no exception. 
As a consequence, the K-12 system’s most important goal is to prepare its students 
for a four-year-college career. But the high schools in the K-12 system also provide 
vocational courses, which are attended primarily by the non-college bound.
The most important source of VET in Wisconsin is, however, the technical college 
system. It offers primarily school-based courses. Some are academic (i.e. in college 
parallel programs and a core in associate degree programs), but most are vocational. 
In addition, it offers related instruction for the apprenticeship system.
Next to this public educational establishment, private establishments account 
for a minor but far from negligible part of education or training at each level. Only 
the post-secondary less-than-four-year private schools and colleges are important 
suppliers of VET. And in Wisconsin, their role is relatively small as compared with 
that of the public technical college system. Most of these proprietary institutions 
operate in market niches where technical colleges do not operate.
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4.3 VET in three economic sectors
The precise pattern of interaction between the various education and training 
systems that were described in section 4.2 differs from sector to sector. This section 
will explore the organization of VET in construction, metalworking, and banking. 
First, however, it will discuss American industrial relations. Not only do these differ 
from those in Germany and the Netherlands, but they also vary across these sectors 
in the U.S.
4.3.1 American industrial relations
Visser (1995) points out that craft unions were more likely to secure an established 
position the earlier an industrial revolution arrived, and the sooner the elite among 
workers won civil and political rights. The U.S. fits this picture nicely. In America, 
the first generation of unions consisted of craft unions that were united in the 
American Federation of Labor (AFL). They rejected unskilled workers and African 
Americans from their ranks. Only in the 1930s a new generation of unions succeeded 
in organizing unskilled, black and female workers in the heavy consumer goods 
industries. They formed a separate peak organization: the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (CIO). Both peak organizations merged in the 1950s and formed 
the AFL-CIO. Significant differences between the unions from both sides have 
remained, however, the construction unions retaining their craft union character 
(Visser, 1995).
In general, American unions are less inclusive than those in Germany are 
(Visser, 1995). Apart from the tradition of craft unionism, this is due to two related 
hallmarks of American industrial relations: the existence of a non-union sector and 
the decentralized institutionalization of collective bargaining. In the U.S., collective 
bargaining typically occurs at the firm level. When more than half of the employees 
of the bargaining unit (a plant or a firm, with the exception of higher management) 
votes for a union, that union will represent all employees of the bargaining unit in 
collective bargaining with management17. In this decentralized collective bargaining 
system there is understandably no room for extension of agreements to other firms. 
Thus, the ‘collective’ aspect of American collective bargaining agreements generally 
only means that they cover all workers in a firm, but not that they cover more firms. 
As an exception, some multi-employer agreements do exist in the U.S., mostly 
in the construction sector. Their number is declining, however. The lack of multi-
firm collective bargaining agreements implies that labor conditions will differ more 
among firms than they do in Germany and the Netherlands. Either a firm has its 
own collective bargaining agreement with a union, or it has no collective bargaining 
agreement at all. The latter is actually the rule in the American labor market. Most 
American workers are employed in the non-union sector, which consists of firms 
191
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
where either there have been no elections, or unions have lost them, and whose 
workers are therefore not represented. Despite the general dominance of non-
union firms, unions may still be important in some sectors and some regions. Even 
if they organize only a minority of workers in a given area and sector, they may be 
able to secure a wage premium. And the fact that unions organize predominantly 
larger firms gives them some strategic power, the effects of which need not be 
limited to these firms themselves.
Since the center of power in the labor movement is wherever collective bargaining 
takes place (cf. Clegg, 1976), the focus of the American labor movement has been 
on collective bargaining in unionized firms (Rogers, 1995). To recruit members, 
American unions have to prove themselves by forcing unionized employers to 
concede higher wages and better employment terms than non-union employers: 
“Provide members with good wages and the unorganized will join up” (Rogers, 
1995). This focus led to a ‘majority-only’ organizing strategy whereby unions aimed 
their efforts at those firms where they had or thought they could get a majority 
vote in their favor (Rogers, 1995). These strategic responses of American unions to 
the decentralized bargaining system they historically face have made the American 
labor movement considerably less horizontally and vertically integrated than its 
German and Dutch counterparts. Collective bargaining is done by local unions, 
giving them a crucial role in American industrial relations. Many of these ‘locals’ do 
belong to national or even international18 unions, but there are also independent 
local unions. Further, there tend to be various competing (inter)national unions in 
a given sector. For example, whereas in Germany one union (IG Metall) represents 
all workers in metalworking firms, in the U.S. the International Association of 
Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAMAW), the United Steel Workers Association 
(USWA), and the United Auto Workers (UAW) all organize significant numbers of 
workers in the metalworking sectors. The sectoral and occupational demarcations 
between them and other unions are less clear than implied by their names. For 
example, the IAMAW also organizes clerical workers, and a union such as the United 
Paperworkers International Union (UPIU) also organizes workers in metalworking 
plants. As a consequence, there is competition between unions to organize workers 
in similar plants and occupations. Finally, many but not all unions are members 
of the AFL-CIO. The United Electrical workers (UE), which also organizes workers 
in some metalworking firms, is an example. This decentralized organization of 
American labor has prevented unions from being a driving force for industry-wide 
definition of occupations such as the German industrial-political unions has been. 
The important exceptions to this are the craft unions in the building trades (section 
4.3.2).
On the employers’ side, the American decentralized collective bargaining process 
does not necessitate employers to organize themselves in associations to bargain 
on a regional, sectoral or national level. Thus, American employers’ associations 
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are mostly trade associations. They predominantly represent social and economic 
interests, although they may also represent some minor functions in the field of social 
policy, such as lobbying the government. Rarely do they concern themselves with 
unions. Furthermore, the system of national peak associations is less coordinated 
than in Germany, since various associations compete for members (Van Waarden, 
1995a). In addition to this decentralized collective bargaining process, the dynamic 
interplay between union and non-union firms in American industrial relations 
(Kochan et al., 1994; Visser, 1995) further complicates the aggregation of business 
interests on a sectoral, regional or national level. Union and non-union firms often 
have different interests and opinions. A case in point is the Davis-Bacon Act in the 
construction sector (cf. section 4.2.5), which offers unionized firms with their higher 
wages some protection to price competition by non-union firms. If associations 
organize merely one group of firms, they only represent the specific interests of 
part of the firms in a given sector, region or nation. And if associations organize 
both types of firms, they face a much more difficult task in uniting their members 
on common ground. This may cause them to abstain from certain policies. For 
instance, they may decide to limit their cooperation with unions as much as possible 
in order not to alienate their non-union members.
There are no works councils in the U.S., and there are no statutory guarantees of 
worker rights to information, consultation and co-determination. Under the “Wagner 
Act model”, the presumptive state of workers is non-union, and unionization is the 
only recognized form of worker representation. Union-management relations are 
viewed largely as adversarial, and to protect worker autonomy, employers uproot 
for organs of worker representation are explicitly prohibited (Rogers & Streeck, 
1994: 139). Labor-management cooperation is thus actually hampered by a labor 
law that treats firm-sponsored committees of workers as illegal anti-union devices 
(Freeman, 1994c: 224). Within these legal barriers, some 30,000 American firms 
had some sort of worker involvement programs in 1990, including 80% of the 
top 1,000 firms (Rogers & Streeck, 1994: 142). In non-unionized settings, where 
workers have no reserved rights, the performance and stability of the programs 
depends on management attitudes. Many of these programs only involve a relatively 
trivial routinization of management access to employee opinion, no substantive 
change of management giving workers autonomy and relinquishing control (Rogers 
& Streeck, 1994: 143).
Obviously, there is labor-management cooperation in unionized firms. But this is 
often hampered by the existence of a non-union sector. Since unionized employers 
face higher labor costs while competing with non-union firms, employers have 
an incentive to resist unions - either by preventing them from organizing their 
workers, getting a union that is already organizing their workers to lose the next 
election, or shifting investments to the non-union sector (Kochan et al., 1994). This 
has not promoted union-management cooperation. American managerial ideology 
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is characterized by a deep-seated opposition to unions (Kochan et al., 1994). On 
the other side, the continuing struggle with management of firms over organizing 
has not led unions to a high level of trust in management, either. A case in point is 
the fact that it took the Committee on the Evolution of Work from the AFL-CIO ten 
years to come out in favor of labor-management cooperation in the workplace in 
1994 (Adams, 1995).
In the U.S., union membership forms a close proxy of the number of workers 
covered by collective bargaining agreements. Since the 1960s, union membership 
in the U.S. has been steadily declining. It peaked in the mid-fifties at about 35% 
of the non-agricultural labor force (Kochan et al., 1994) but has plummeted since 
to 15.8% of American workers in 1993 (Dresser et al, 1996: 12). Within the U.S., 
however, there are major differences. In general, union density is low in the south 
and relatively high in the North East and the Great Lakes area, including Wisconsin. 
In 1993, 19.4% of Wisconsin workers were union members, which meant that 
Wisconsin ranked 11th among American states in the level of unionization (Dresser 
et al., 1996: 12). Within Wisconsin, unions are historically particularly strong in 
the greater Milwaukee area. Their role is much smaller in the scarcely populated 
Northern and Western parts of the state. There are also considerable sectoral 
differences in unionization. The level of unionization is considerably higher in the 
public sector than in the private sector. In Wisconsin, the level of unionization in the 
public sector was 52% as compared to a mere 13% in the private sector in 1993 
(Dresser et al., 1996: 58). Nevertheless, the level of unionization in Wisconsin’s 
private sector exceeds the national average of 11%. Unions are a little stronger 
in the manufacturing sector than in the rest of the industry and service sector. In 
1993 the level of unionization in Wisconsin manufacturing was 27%, versus 20% 
throughout the U.S. (Dresser et al., 1996: 56). 
Finally, American unions are known to have much greater effects on wages 
than unions in other countries, while having roughly comparable effects on other 
measured outcomes (Blanchflower & Freeman, 1992). In 1993, the union premium 
(the percentage improvement over non-union wages that unionized workers enjoy) 
was 24% nationwide and 31% in Wisconsin (Dresser et al., 1996: 55). While there 
was virtually no wage premium for unionized manufacturing workers in the U.S., 
union members in Wisconsin manufacturing received a wage premium of $1.29 or 
11% (Dresser et al., 1996: 56).
4.3.2 VET in the construction sector
Craft unionism in the construction sector is an exception to the general picture 
of American unionism painted in section 4.3.1. Construction unions serve as a 
hiring hall, and supply employers with personnel. If a contractor has a contract 
with the union, he is obliged to hire union-members. In principle, there are strict 
194
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
demarcations between the various building occupations. Each trade has its own 
union: the Carpenters, the Bricklayers, the Plumbers, the Electricians etcetera. 
Hence, these unions are typical craft unions: all of their members are employed 
in the same trade/occupation/craft. A general contractor, who needs several crafts 
to be able to construct a complete building, signs a contract with each union. Most 
unions use a standard contract in a region that most unionized employers will 
sign.
With unions as suppliers of skilled labor, they have to make sure they train 
their members to the necessary skills level. And their character of hiring halls 
makes them directly responsible for securing both employment and high wages 
for their members. This is achieved through extensive apprenticeship training in 
apprenticeship systems that are, in effect, union-controlled. The prime means of 
union control has been through levy systems. Employers pay a certain amount to a 
trust fund for each hour that a union member works for them. These funds are the 
complement to the operation of area JACs that sponsor apprenticeship programs 
(instead of individual firms) in the (unionized) construction sector (section 4.2.5). 
Controlling apprenticeship gives unions the opportunity to restrict the competition 
on the sector’s labor market. By limiting the growth of the skilled labor force, they 
try to prevent unemployment for their members and stimulate the wage level. Also, 
controlling apprenticeship enables them to control the skills level of the trade, and 
prevent its degradation to semi-skilled spheres.
From a labor market perspective, unionized construction in Wisconsin is an 
occupational labor market, for which apprenticeship serves as the gateway19, just as 
it does in Germany. The biggest difference with the German apprenticeship market 
is that area JACs, rather than the individual firm, recruit apprentices. Aspiring 
apprentices apply with the relevant area JAC, which may use an aptitude test and 
interviews to select candidates. There are generally two procedures for actual 
placement of apprentices in training companies. The rank-order list method implies 
that the area JAC creates a list of candidates in order of their performance in test 
and interviews, and then refers the first one on the list to the next employer looking 
for an apprentice. The letter of introduction method implies that those candidates 
who meet the basic requirements get a letter of introduction from the Committee 
with which they can start the search for a training firm themselves (BAS, 1992). 
In the first case, the area JAC regulates the local apprenticeship market, and limits 
competition among prospective apprentices and among training firms as it occurs 
in Germany. In the last case, the practical difference may be negligible: one could 
say that the area JAC then fulfills the thorough screening of apprentice candidates 
that is provided by high school certificates and records in Germany.
The construction sector has traditionally been a union stronghold. Relative to 
many other sectors it still is (certainly in Wisconsin) but the U.S. union density rate 
in the sector has dropped drastically since the 1960s (Kochan et al., 1994: 49-50). 
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The other side of this coin has been a rapid growth of the non-union construction 
sector. During the 1950s and 1960s, non-union firms moved into residential and 
light commercial construction. And since the 1970s, they have penetrated the 
important and until then union-dominated market for heavy construction such 
as major office buildings and large industrial sites. Non-union activity in the U.S. 
construction sector increased in only ten years from 50% (1975) to 75% (1984) 
of all work (Kochan et al., 1994: 49). The consequence of this shift of employment 
to the non-union sector has been declining wages. While employment in Wisconsin 
construction has remained at 4.8% of total employment between 1979 and 1993, 
average real hourly wages have dropped considerably from $16.11 to $12.58 (in 
1994 dollars; Dresser et al., 1996: 46).
Non-union firms were not formally prohibited from participating in the Wisconsin 
apprenticeship system in unionized construction that was governed by area JACs, 
and some did and do. But most non-union firms would not want to have their 
apprentices participate in programs governed by area JACs, half of whose members 
are union representatives, and the other half unionized employers. Further, non-
union firms use a pattern of work organization they call the ‘merit shop’ - as opposed 
to the union shop (ABC, 1995). In the merit shop, there is not one journeyman rate 
for all union workers except apprentices, but there are different pay levels depending 
on the performance and ability of individual workers. This typically means that a 
core of highly skilled workers (possibly apprentice-trained journeymen who could 
no longer find employment with unionized firms) is surrounded by less qualified 
workers that usually have been trained on-the-job.
Since 1986-87, however, the non-union construction sector has had its own 
apprenticeship system in Wisconsin. It is governed by the Wisconsin Chapter of the 
principal non-union employers’ association in American construction: Associated 
Builders and Contractors (ABC)20. The system is part of a national effort by ABC, 
and is governed by a national curriculum. The rise of the ABC system has been 
heavily contested by the unions, but without success. In Wisconsin, this national 
system is fitted in the BAS governance regime for apprenticeship, but has been 
separated from the unionized apprenticeship system. This implies, for instance, 
that there are no area JACS in the ABC apprenticeship system, nor does it have an 
obligatory training fund. A central ABC state committee (not to be confused with 
the state JAC) screens applicants for apprenticeship, and thus fulfills in this respect 
a similar role as the area JACs in the union sector. ABC has representatives on the 
Wisconsin Apprenticeship Council and in the state JACs for the building trades. 
In the latter, they share the seats for employers’ representatives with unionized 
employers, whereas all the employee representatives are union members. In April 
1996, there were 812 apprentices in the ABC apprenticeship system, dispersed over 
ten trades, which accounted for almost 10% of all Wisconsin apprentices. Thus, two 
different governance regimes for construction apprenticeship co-exist in Wisconsin 
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- and hardly in great harmony. For instance, at the start of ABC apprenticeship in 
Wisconsin it was inconceivable that the same technical college instructor would teach 
related instruction for both JAC- and ABC-apprentices. Today, the same instructor 
might teach both classes, but the apprentices themselves are still separated in two 
classes.
The traditionally strong position of apprenticeship in the construction sector helps 
explain that the technical colleges have tended to offer few school-based training 
programs in construction. It is at the same time less necessary and harder to set 
up a new school-based program in this sector than in another. State and area JACs 
do not always welcome school-based programs, particularly if these might compete 
with apprenticeship. They sometimes welcome programs that prepare students for 
apprenticeship. A technical college will not want to risk damaging its relationship 
with a trade and its JAC by developing a school-based program against their wishes. 
This could harm both the college (the trade might decide to create its own facility 
to provide related instruction in the future) and its students graduating from such 
alternative school-based programs (which might find themselves unable to secure 
subsequent employment in the sector).
Vocational construction programs have, however, traditionally been popular 
with high schools. They are relatively cheap, train for a sector with substantial 
employment, and teach skills that one can apply in home improvement for family 
and friends. Construction training programs typically start with shop classes. But 
sometimes they culminate in innovative forms of work-based learning. For instance, 
students have built a house on-site and sold it as a non-commercial community 
project that contributes to inner-city improvement. Such on-site house building is an 
old form of work-based vocational training that appears to have been substantially 
reduced (along with vocational education programs in general) when firms and 
incumbent workers experienced pressure on their markets as a consequence of the 
recession of the eighties. Lately, they have been revived on occasion.
4.3.3 VET in the metalworking sector
We have seen that there are numerous unions that organize workers in the 
metalworking sector, such as the IAMAW, the USWA, UAW, UPIU and UE. Similarly, 
there are several national and regional employers’ associations on the employers’ 
side. In Wisconsin, the National Tooling and Machining Association (NTMA) appears 
to be the most important employers’ association in metalworking. The NTMA has two 
chapters in Wisconsin. This association organizes a small (but important) segment 
of the metalworking industry: relatively small precision tooling and machining firms, 
most of which are non-union. Thus, NTMA is far from representative for the entire 
metalworking sector. Large Wisconsin firms generally do not belong to sectoral 
employers’ associations.
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In construction, we have seen a relatively important role for apprenticeship 
coincide with a relatively strong associational involvement in the governance of 
apprenticeship at regional and state levels. In contrast, associational involvement 
in the governance of apprenticeship has been very low in metalworking. The 
only formal role of associations in apprenticeship governance is to nominate a 
representative to a state JAC. On top of that, unions and employers’ associations 
may fulfill an occasional service for their members that relates to training21. But 
apprenticeship in metalworking (and, manufacturing in general) is predominantly 
governed at the level of the individual firm. Firms can choose from a relatively 
large number of specific trades to train in; and as statewide minimum standards 
have been lacking (outside the construction sector), firms have ample freedom in 
developing their own ‘Exhibit A’ to include in the indenture.
Union involvement in the governance of apprenticeship within firms follows the 
pattern of so-called job control unionism that has characterized American industrial 
unions. Job control unionism means that unions negotiate collective bargaining 
contracts with employers in which workers’ rights and obligations are linked to 
highly articulated and sharply delineated jobs (Kochan et al., 1994: 28). The 
agreement specifies the tasks that a worker in any given job is supposed to fulfill, 
the wage he gets in return, and it typically contains a job ladder. Through seniority 
rules, unions govern the allocation of internal vacancies among internal candidates 
for promotion. Similar rules decide who gets laid off when management has decided 
on a lay-off, and they also decide how the remaining work is allocated among the 
remaining workforce (Kochan et al., 1994: 28-29). Collective bargaining agreements 
in unionized training firms often contain provisions regarding apprenticeship, and 
such firms typically have an in-plant joint apprenticeship committee that actually 
governs the firm’s apprenticeship program. 
Candidates apply directly to the firm. Each firm sets its own entry requirements, 
mostly a high school diploma or GED and a strong basis in reading and mathematics. 
However, metalworking apprentices are not always recruited in the external 
labor market. In many (particularly, but not exclusively larger, unionized) firms, 
apprenticeship training is only required (and offered) for a relatively scarce number 
of elite skilled worker positions. Apprenticeship openings will be posted on the 
internal labor market, where the incumbent semi-skilled workers will compete for 
them. Often, the vacancies will be filled based on seniority with the firm. In these 
firms, apprenticeship serves an entirely different function from that of a school-to-
work transition system in (larger) Wisconsin metalworking firms: it is a work-based 
training system for an elite of incumbent workers. Apprenticeship here does not 
imply the harmonious coexistence of internal and external labor markets we saw 
in Germany; internal labor markets prevail instead. Outsiders (such as young high 
school graduates) have no direct access to such apprenticeship positions. They 
have to find a semi-skilled job with a large metalworking firm first, and build up 
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seniority there, before they can actually apply for an internally posted apprenticeship 
opening.
To be sure: it is not only union firms that train apprentices. Probably more 
than half of the training firms is non-union. Contrary to the construction sector, 
however, there are no separate arrangements for non-union firms. Many of those 
non-union training firms are of the type among which the NTMA recruits many of its 
member firms: smaller, highly skilled precision firms: so-called ‘job shops’. These 
job shops train relatively many apprentices, have a smaller workforce, and thus 
provide a less developed internal labor market. With these firms, outsiders can 
sometimes apply directly for an apprenticeship position, or at least quite soon after 
joining the firm. While such firms are excellent examples that best practice, high 
performance workplaces can exist in the American low-skills environment, Rogers 
& Streeck (1991: 7) noted that they are relatively absent in Wisconsin. In a low-
skills environment, most firms appear to adapt their product and work organization 
strategies to this environment and concentrate on low-skills forms of the latter 
(Rogers & Streeck, 1991: 8). The exceptions that do pursue a high-skills strategy 
are forced to train their own apprentices, even when they “are lucky to hold onto 
one-third of them after graduation” as a tool-and-die shop owner put it (Rogers & 
Streeck, 1991: 9).
A number of these job shops (try to) recruit students from one- and two-year 
technical diploma programs at the technical colleges for their apprenticeship 
positions, either upon their graduation or even before. If a student finishes a two-
year certificate program in machine tool technology at a technical college and then 
enters into a tool-and-die apprenticeship, he is exempted from the required 576 
hours of related instruction and can get credit for approximately a year’s work-based 
training. Thus, the relationship between school-based and apprenticeship programs 
here is quite congenial, and sometimes they are in practice linked in a sequential 
way. Technical colleges do offer more school-based programs in metalworking than 
they do in construction. In machining, there are (besides the already mentioned 
one- and two-year technical diploma programs) also short certificate programs. But 
there are no associate degree programs. WTCS representatives give as a reason for 
this that their programs are bound by a two-year limit, and that machining training 
requires too much practical training to enable a machining program to meet the 
general education criteria for an associate degree program. Instead of associate 
degree programs, apprenticeship programs in trades like tool-and-die maker and 
machinist are the elite programs in the field of machining.
However, students from school-based machining programs at the technical 
colleges are in great demand and short supply. The capacity of the programs seems 
low as compared with that demand. This may be an unintended consequence of 
the fact that technical colleges have the policy of training people that are job-ready 
upon graduation. This forces them to have up-to-par equipment for such programs, 
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which makes them expensive – particularly in a field, which requires expensive new 
machinery, such as metalworking in general, and machining in particular. With most 
technical college districts at the upper limit of the property tax they can levy, this 
may explain the limited capacity for such expensive programs.
The expensive character of metalworking training is even more of a problem for 
high schools. Many of these host metalworking programs because of the importance 
of the metalworking sector, as it employs 15% of Wisconsin’s population (Rogers 
& Streeck, 1991: 4). But it is difficult for them to afford good equipment. Thus, 
metalworking firms “find the present K-12 system deficient in producing job entrants 
with the basic skills needs” (Rogers & Streeck, 1991: 9).
In sum, school-based training in Wisconsin has not been able to offer full 
compensation for the lack of work-based training (as compared to Germany). 
Skilled metalworking labor has been in short supply, and firms experience problems 
implementing changes in work organization and production techniques as a result 
of the low-skills level of their workforce. The lack of skilled labor has recently 
inspired some firms to revive their apprenticeship programs (Rogers & Streeck, 
1991: 9-10); and some have embarked on admirable worker training initiatives (cf. 
section 4.6.4).
4.3.4 VET in the banking sector
The situation in the banking sector is again completely different from that in 
construction and metalworking. To begin with, there are no important unions in 
American or Wisconsin banking, which makes banking almost entirely a non-union 
sector. Moreover, there is no apprenticeship system, either.
This lack of unions and apprenticeship has enabled the most important national 
employers’ organization (American Bankers Association - ABA) to capture the 
sectoral training market on its own. It has developed its own training institute 
(American Institute of Banking - AIB) that supplies training modules at freshman 
and sophomore college level. These are used by most Wisconsin banks to train 
their personnel, and the programs are typically offered through sub-state regional 
chapters of the association.
Wisconsin’s technical colleges and high schools offer programs in financial 
services. The latter train students for teller-positions (e.g. through cooperative 
education in which an estimated 300 students participate). But banks also use 
many four-year college students that may share one teller position as their side-
job. Since teller positions pay very low wages, the technical colleges have the policy 
to aim their training for this sector at higher rungs on the job ladder. They used to 
train for teller positions in the past, but have abandoned all but one of the programs 
concerned. The technical colleges offer various different programs that train for 
specific positions, and sometimes also do so for specific segments of the banking 
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sector (e.g. credit unions rather than all types of banks). The AIB curriculum is an 
important guideline for their programs, which implies that such programs compete 
with the AIB courses.
The intermediate (and lower) level employees in the banking sector seem to form 
a relatively volatile segment of the labor market. Many of the sector’s incumbent 
intermediate-level workers appear to consider their current (often part-time) jobs 
as transitional rather than as part of a career occupation. The exception to this is 
a core of employees that advance on the bank’s internal career ladders. They are 
often trained for promotion through AIB training modules. Employees entering such 
courses (or technical college programs that offer similar curricula) have typically 
started in the teller position, from which these courses seek to help them progress 
to higher rungs of banks’ internal labor markets.
ABA offers the AIB courses a rather wide sectoral validation and legitimization, 
and these appear to constitute a decent training system that in effect seems a 
decent equivalent for apprenticeship. The difference with typical apprenticeship 
markets is that the banking labor market is vertically fragmented into over 20 job 
rungs. Most labor markets constituted by apprenticeship tend to be more vertically 
integrated. Further, the modularized structure of training appears to stimulate large 
banks to poach from smaller banks. Finally, spokesmen from the sector indicate 
that the sector is in need of broader job descriptions and (thus) training (Keltner, 
199522).
4.3.5 Conclusion
Two important lessons stand out in this section. First, the role of the various 
education and training systems described in section 4.2 is very different from one 
economic sector to another. For instance, while apprenticeship is very important in 
the construction sector, it does not even exist in the banking sector. And, whereas 
the relative flourishing of apprenticeship seems to have limited the development of 
school-based technical college programs for the construction sector, both types of 
programs co-exist quite harmoniously in the metalworking sector, where they are 
often linked informally, in a sequential way.
Second, industrial relations at the national and sectoral level have important 
consequences for the organization of VET. These consequences are most direct 
for apprenticeship training, but also significantly influence school-based training. 
In general, American industrial relations do not seem to be very congenial to the 
development of one coherent training system at the national or sectoral level.
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4.4 America’s missing middle
4.4.1 A history of crises-inspired educational reform
American education history is marked by several crises that triggered reform 
efforts. In the fifties, the successful launching of the Sputnik by the Soviet Union 
was a severe blow for American self-conscience. Many feared the U.S. was about to 
lose the ‘race for space’, and attributed this to a lack of rigorous academic training 
in the nation’s K-12 systems. This led to the National Defense Education Act of 
1958, which provided new funds and responsibilities for the federal government to 
improve schools’ performances (Chubb & Moe, 1990: 7).
In the early eighties, a new exogenous shock brought the U.S. educational system 
under close scrutiny, when an economic crisis struck the U.S. a severe blow. Many 
reports have analyzed the performance of American education, but one in particular 
has come to symbolize this crisis. The report’s title, ‘A Nation at Risk’, didn’t leave 
any doubt as to its message (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 
1983). It drew attention to the relatively weak academic performance of American 
students in primary and secondary schools. This relatively weak performance 
was established by two different lines of research (Chubb & Moe, 1990: 8). First, 
student scores on the American Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) declined from the 
mid-1960s through 1980. Second, student results on international standardized 
academic tests showed that U.S. students did poorly in mathematics, average or 
below average in science, and had mixed results in geography as compared to their 
foreign counterparts (Stedman, 1994: 24)23.
In the wake of this report, states initiated reforms that focused on improving 
college preparation. They strengthened graduation requirements and statewide 
testing, and increased teaching standards (DOE, 1993: 16). Education became a 
prime topic in the 1988 presidential elections, with future president George Bush 
declaring his intention of becoming the ‘education president’ (Chubb & Moe, 1990: 
11). Elected, he subsequently met with the American governors on an Educational 
Summit on school reform. The summit was only the third in American history, and 
the first since 1933, where the president met with all governors to work exclusively 
on one particular problem (Chubb & Moe, 1990: 11; 281).
By that time, the focus on academic education was starting to be accompanied 
by growing attention for the problematic school-to-work transition of American 
youngsters. The core problem is a ‘chronic scarcity of career jobs’ (Stern et al., 
1995: 1) available to them. First, American youngsters experience substantially 
higher levels of unemployment than adults. In 1993, 19% of American 18-19 year 
olds was unemployed, as compared with only 5.7% among those between 25 and 
54 (Stern et al., 1995: 5). Second, the scarcity of interesting job openings has 
caused young people to ‘flounder’ for a while on the American labor market before 
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finding a more permanent and promising job. The average American high school 
graduate that does not enroll in post-secondary college education holds six different 
jobs and goes through four or five spells of unem ployment between the ages of 18 
and 27, with a joint average length of 35 weeks (Veum & Weiss, 1993; Stern et al., 
1995: 5).
Klerman & Karoly (1994; 1995) argued that the situation was not as disastrous, 
since they found that the median male high school graduate entered a job lasting 
three years by age 22 - considerably sooner than some had argued. But Klerman & 
Karoly have not looked at the employment conditions of those jobs. Their findings 
still show that:
• American youngsters hold many different jobs during their early labor 
market career, even when not counting jobs they have while attending 
school or college full-time;
• male high school graduates at the 75th percentile (instead of at the median) 
only enter a job that will last three years at age 25;
• a large share of young males are neither in school nor working full-time 
after leaving school.
This concern for the school-to-work transition of American youngsters hooked up 
with other concerns on the development of American society. On the one hand, the 
slipping performance of the American economy (as indicated, for instance, by the 
relatively low growth of productivity) and the growth of international competition 
caused a growing concern that the current skills level of the American workforce was 
not enough for continued high economic growth. The American Society for Training 
and Development was one of many organizations to argue the need for a more 
highly skilled American workforce to compete in the ‘new’ economy (Carnevale, 
1991). On the other hand, the drop in average weakly earnings and the growth of 
the number of working poor showed that American market for intermediate skills 
currently did not enable a growing numbers of citizens to earn a decent wage. The 
William T. Grant Foundation Commission on Work, Family and Citizenship (1988) 
specifically demanded attention for the lack of educational opportunities for that 
half of the American population that does not enter a four-year college. But it is 
the 1990 report by the Com mission on the Skills of the American Workforce that 
is typically credited as a hallmark in translating both concerns into policy issues. 
Again, the title of the Commission's report is a very adequate summary of its 
message: ‘America's Choice: High Skills or Low Wages’. The commission points out 
five important problems:
• the American education system lacks clear standards of achievement and fails 
to motivate large groups of students to work hard in school. The link between 
the two is that in nations with clear performance standards, attainment of 
these standards tends to be directly linked to employment prospects;
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• (as a consequence) drop out rates are high in American high schools: over 
20% overall, and over 50% in many inner cities;
• only a small fraction of non-college bound students is adequately prepared for 
professional work due to the lack of multi-year career-oriented educational 
programs;
• the vast majority of American employers is not moving towards a high-
performance work organization, nor do they invest in training for the non-
managerial workforce;
• the training system for the adult workforce is fragmented, and public policy 
in this field has been largely passive.
4.4.2 Why American labor markets offer little VET for youth
An important cause for the difficulty that American young people experience in 
finding career jobs lies in the functioning of American labor markets. On the one 
hand, occupational labor markets are underdeveloped. On the other, American 
internal labor markets have typically not demanded high skills from new recruits, 
but have relied on unstructured gradual on-the-job learning for incumbent frontline 
workers.
The underdevelopment of occupational labor markets
The small size of apprenticeship is a case in point for the underdevelopment of 
occupational labor markets. Only in unionized construction has apprenticeship 
traditionally laid a basis for occupational labor markets (sections 4.2.5 & 4.3.2). 
Still, even this occupational labor market has been relatively hard for young people. 
In the U.S., the ratio of the share of employment in construction for men aged 15-
24 relative to those aged 25 and over was 0.75 in 1994, as compared with 1.12 
for the Netherlands (OECD, 1996b: 135). Most construction apprentices are well in 
their twenties. Outside unionized construction, apprenticeship positions are either 
completely lacking (as in the banking sector, cf. section 4.3.4) or reserved for the 
training of a small worker elite (as in the metalworking sector, cf. section 4.3.3).
How is it that apprenticeship constitutes a high-skills equilibrium in Germany, but 
has failed to do so in Wisconsin (or, more generally, in the U.S.)? The governance 
regime that constitutes Wisconsin (and more generally American) apprenticeship 
today is quite different from that in Germany, even though the former was based 
on the German governance regime from the early 20th century (Van Lieshout, 
1996b)24. While the German apprenticeship governance regime has significantly 
changed since then, as evidenced by the 1969 Vocational Training Act, Wisconsin 
apprenticeship is still governed by the same 1911 law (cf. section 4.2.5).
Much more important, however, is the fact that Wisconsin (and American) firms 
204
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
simply do not supply many apprenticeship positions, contrary to their German 
counterparts. One important Wisconsin-German difference in this respect is the 
lack of multi-firm collective bargaining agreements that set relatively high minimum 
wage rates across sectors and regions in Wisconsin. A second important difference 
is the fact that American firms face few constraints on lay-offs as compared to their 
German counterparts. The combination of both enables American firms to pursue 
business strategies focusing on low wages and numerical flexibility, as opposed to 
the high-skills strategies of larger German firms. Quite simply put, skills demands 
for a substantial number of jobs in American firms pursuing low-wage and numerical 
flexibility strategies, will be lower than in their German counterparts. Tayloristic 
work organization originated in the U.S. and shaped work organization in American 
firms.
Important evidence for this comes from Parker’s historical research on the attempt 
to create a German-style apprenticeship system in Wisconsin metalworking in the 
Milwaukee district in the first decades of the 19th century (Parker, 1994; 1996). 
We saw that Wisconsin based its VET and apprenticeship legislation to an important 
extent on the contemporary German example in the first decades of the twentieth 
century (cf. section 4.2.5). On the  empirical basis of his historical research, Parker 
argues that when this apprenticeship system collapsed in the depression of the 
nineteen thirties, it was not the depression alone that caused this collapse. Parker 
keenly observed that while these metalworking employers had been active in 
organizing apprenticeship in the nineteen twenties, they were at the same time 
eroding the basis for it by gradually adopting Tayloristic and Fordist production 
methods that would leave the majority of their workforce in semi-skilled jobs. Thus, 
they had less need for intensive apprenticeship training to the journeyman level. 
Even today, the lower levels in the work hierarchy in many metalworking and 
other industrial firms are relatively low-skilled, and the jobs there can easily be 
learned on the job in a relatively small period of time. Second, the large number of 
hierarchical levels in large firms provides for the possibility for workers to move up 
through a large number of small steps. On-the-job training, work experience and 
an occasional short course will enable them to move to a slightly more demanding 
job on the next rung.
In addition, because starting wages for regular workers can be lower in 
Wisconsin than in Germany, and because apprentice wages are relatively higher, 
there is a substantially slighter (if any) benefit (in terms of lower training costs) 
in apprenticing somebody over hiring him/her as a regular worker and training 
that person informally on-the-job. At the same time, higher wage differentials 
make it easier to poach trained workers than in Germany. And the fact that few 
firms provide apprenticeship training in itself reinforces the chances that one’s own 
apprentices will be poached. Thus, the (expected) benefit of apprenticeship training 
is more uncertain – and thus lower. Poaching seems indeed much more common 
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in Wisconsin than in Germany (Rogers & Streeck, 1991: 8-9). ‘Poaching’, to be 
sure, is not necessarily a pirating action by another firm, but may very well be a 
consequence of a worker’s own choice to leave. In fact, some historical explanations 
for the decline of American apprenticeship in the 19th and early 20th century 
blame it on the fact that apprentices left firms before these had recouped their 
training investments. They do not blame a lack of interest in apprenticeship from 
employers and their associations (Elbaum, 1989; Jacoby, 1991; Elbaum & Singh, 
1995). Either way, American firms fear that the profits of their investments in broad 
occupational training may be reaped by their competitors. Thus, they tend to limit 
their training investments to firm- and job-specific forms of on-the-job training. 
Their work organization allows for such a strategy, as new external recruits can 
start in relatively low-skilled jobs and work their way up.
Furthermore, Wisconsin’s technical colleges provide a quality school-based 
alternative to apprenticeship training, whereby the cost of training is at least shared 
by the student and the state. Many WTCS students study part-time while being 
employed, and many firms cover their tuition costs for them. In this sense, one 
could say that they prefer to invest in training under another governance regime 
than apprenticeship.
Finally, one cannot neglect the fact that the image of apprenticeship as an 
institution in the U.S. has always been strongly connected to union involvement. 
The prestige of American unions being much lower than their German and Dutch 
counterparts, and with adversarial industrial relations, this alone will have been 
sufficient reason for many non-union employers to shy away from it (Jacoby, 
1991).
The inadequate supply of broad training on American internal labor markets
Internal labor markets can be seen as a mechanism to prevent poaching, since 
these limit access to the most attractive jobs to those who stay with their firm 
(Sako, 1991). Internal labor markets do not necessarily complicate the school-
to-work transition or lead to less or more narrow training than occupational labor 
markets do. Throughout the international comparative VET literature, Japan is 
the routinely cited case-in-point (Sako, 1991; Rosenbaum, 1996). The Japanese 
culture of (large) firms offering their workers life-time employment keeps inter-firm 
mobility low, and thus enables them to substantially invest in training their new 
recruits. 
Internal labor markets play a dominant role in the U.S., but they have lacked 
lifetime employment guarantees. Furthermore, they have been characterized by 
the Tayloristic and Fordist tradition of work organization in American industry. First, 
jobs on the lower rungs of the internal career ladder are relatively low-skilled. 
The relevant tasks can easily be learned on-the-job fast. Second, promotion is 
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often granted according to formalized job ladders and seniority rules. The relatively 
large number of hierarchical levels in American firms provides the possibility for 
workers to progress by many small steps through a sequence of increasingly skilled 
jobs. Informal on-the-job learning in the current job typically provid es sufficient 
experience for the next rank (Dresser et al., 1996). Apprenticeship positions in 
larger firms (if there are any) tend to be the vehicle for internal promotion to the 
(few) journeyman positions that form the upper layer of those internal markets for 
frontline workers (cf. section 4.3). Outsiders are typically hired only on the bottom 
rung(s) of these job ladders. Since these entry-level jobs are not apprenticeships, 
young people are as expensive to hire for those jobs as adult workers are. This is 
why American employers have generally preferred to hire adults for such posi tions 
(Osterman, 1980). So contrary to Germany, young people have to compete with 
older workers for entry-level jobs that do not include any formal training rights.
Paradoxically, when firms started to steer away from this type of internal labor 
markets by reducing the number of rungs and creating cross-functional jobs, this 
did not solve the school-to-work transition problem, but aggravated it (Dresser et 
al., 1996). Skills levels for entry-level jobs rose, which meant that new recruits 
now needed some initial occupational training in order to qualify for them. As a 
consequence, the discrepancy between the skills level of the average high school 
graduates and the level necessary to qualify for a (promising) job has grown. Within 
the pattern of the traditional American school-to-work transition strategy (hopping 
from a low-skilled job to a to slightly-less-low-skilled job) this implies young people 
will have to progress through more jobs where they can learn informally on-the-job 
before finally attaining a skills level that qualifies them for a semi-skilled entry-level 
job with an attractive (large) firm.
Conclusion
In the words of Harhoff & Kane (1993), the underlying mechanisms of the American 
labor market rewards mobility and job matching, contrary to the German labor 
market which thrives on human capital investments and relative lack of mobility. 
That higher mobility thus coincides with lower training investments from firms is in 
line with theoretical expectations; this section has shown, how institutions, or the 
lack of them, influence this relationship.
4.4.3 Why American schools offer little VET
There are no indications that a lack of apprentice candidates has stalled growth 
of the apprenticeship training volume. Facing a small supply of apprenticeship 
positions on the external labor market, the American youth has two alternatives. 
The first (and most attractive) is to enter higher education, an option chosen by 
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a significantly higher share of a youth cohort in the U.S. than in Germany. In 
Wisconsin, approximately 40% of a cohort transfer to a four-year college after high 
school, and another 6% to two year college parallel programs (Rogers et al., 1991: 
127).
19% transfer into non-college parallel programs in technical colleges and other 
post-secondary schools. The high wage differential between those with and without 
some college education make it attractive to at least enter higher education, since 
college experience (even without subsequent graduation) serves as an important 
signaling tool towards future employers. And the associate degree and vocational 
programs offered by the technical colleges do provide a school-based alternative 
for apprenticeship that does not exist in Germany. In fact, taking such a program 
might very well serve as an important preparation for an apprenticeship later. In 
metalworking, various firms that do recruit apprentices on the external market try 
to recruit students from one- and two-year certificate programs of the technical 
colleges for their apprenticeship positions, either upon graduation or even prior 
to that (section 4.3.3). So theoretically, an ample supply of quality school-based 
training and a massive participation in it could compensate for a lack of work based 
training for young people. But, despite the aforementioned wage differentials, 
American internal labor markets have given young people little reason to enroll in 
demanding school-based VET courses:
• First, opportunities for entering other firms on higher job rungs are scarce, 
so VET certificates do not directly qualify for more attractive occupational 
labor markets; of all workers, a staggering 94.2% of German workers 
indicated they had needed qualifications to obtain their current job, as 
compared to only 55.8% of their American counterparts (OECD, 1994b: 
144);
• Second, entry-level positions in American internal labor markets typically 
don’t require many skills;
• Third, formal general or vocational credentials have typically counted less 
than seniority for promotion to higher rungs on internal career ladders;
• Fourth, pay-rates are based solely on the characteristics of the job, not 
on that of the worker – or his/her credentials. As an indicator, the relative 
importance of human capital variables to industry variables in explaining 
inter-industry wage differentials is substantially lower in the U.S. than in 
Germany (Bellmann & Möller, 1995: 153).
Most non-college bound youngsters have therefore historically opted to directly 
enter the labor market, accept an un- or semi-skilled job as attractive as can be 
found, and slowly work their way up from there.
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High schools
American labor markets do reward high school gradua tion. Male high school 
graduates in Wisconsin earned $3.67 an hour more in 1993 than those who did not 
graduate (Dresser et al., 1996: 34). For women, the difference was $2.58. Both 
differences are larger than they were in Wisconsin in 1979, and larger than they 
were nationwide in 1993.
In 1992, the graduation rate from upper secondary education was 75.7% in the 
U.S. (OECD, 1995, p. 214). While this graduation rate may seem satisfactory, the 
competency levels of graduates are not. Boldly put, the problem is that  (Tucker, 
1994a: 4):
“...the high school diploma requires achieving only a seventh or eighth grade level 
of  literacy, showing up most of  the time and not causing too much trouble. In fact, 
because taking a tough course and flunking it can result in no high school diploma, it 
makes more sense to take undemanding, vacuous coursework and to work only hard 
enough to get a passing grade.”
Apparently, the lack of competency standards lets schools for younger age groups simply 
pass their failures and problems up to the top of the system (Tucker, 1994b: 3).
And this lack is not compensated by rigorous screening of high school records by 
employers when they hire youngsters and young adults. It appears that high school 
certificates serve merely as a general screening device for employers. For first 
employ ers, a certificate in itself tends to be enough. There is no relation between 
school performance and the attractiveness of first jobs in the U.S. (Rosenbaum 
& Kariya, 1991). We have seen that the jobs American youngsters typically start 
their labor market careers with do not require many skills, and that they will not 
hold them for a long time. Thus, graduation will mostly guarantee to the employer 
that a school-leaver has enough basic skills to (learn to) perform the job. The few 
that do not, can easily be fired. And since young people will not stay around with 
the firm for the rest of their careers, it is unnecessary to assess their potential 
to grow towards more demanding jobs. Finally, by the time that the young adult 
finds an employer that offers him a more career-promising entry-level position on 
an internal labor market, this employer will find an applicant’s last job(s) and any 
(technical) college courses taken since high school graduation more informative 
than the students’ high school transcript of a few years back.
While American labor markets thus do not exactly encourage young people to 
work hard in secondary school, four-year colleges do. The fact that the American 
four-year colleges differ in status makes competition to enter them just as much a 
rank-order tournament as competition for the best apprenticeship positions does 
in Germany. This way, the number of high school graduates that transfers to a 
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(prestigious) four-year college has traditionally been the most distinct benchmark to 
measure the performance of American high schools. This, and the fact that American 
youngsters transfer to four-year colleges in much larger numbers than in continental 
Europe, has made college prep the dominant track in American high schools, and 
has allowed an underdevelopment of VET programs. This underdevelopment was 
reinforced by the fact that VET programs are relatively expensive. The small size 
of the average American school district prevents enrollments in specific vocational 
programs from being high enough to warrant the investments in top-notch equipment 
in an area like metalworking. And the American dislike for tracking young people in 
separate tracks has kept the parents of this ‘forgotten half’ from demanding such 
programs.
And, to complete this vicious circle, with few high school students graduating 
from quality vocational programs, firms have had little reason to aim their recruiting 
efforts for their more demanding entry-level positions at high school graduates. 
Recruiting more adult workers with relevant experience in similar jobs will generally 
be the safer route.
Two-year colleges
It is, in this context, easy to understand why America’s two-year colleges, such 
as Wisconsin’s technical colleges, have been a success story (Brint & Karabel, 
1991): they offer quality training in a low-skills environment. The training offered 
by Wisconsin’s technical colleges reach a large share of the population, and both 
employers and graduates are generally satisfied. The system’s strength lies in 
offering quality training to (young) adults and firms.
It does, however, (so far) not supply the large majority of non-college 
bound youngsters with a smooth school-to-work transition the way the German 
apprenticeship system does. Relatively few people enroll in WTCS programs 
immediately after high school. The majority of FTE enrollments in WTCS programs 
is in associate degree programs that are college-level and train the lowest level 
of management rather than frontline workers. They will be too demanding for the 
majority of the ‘forgotten half’ of Wisconsin’s youth. Only about a third of WTCS 
FTE enrollments is in vocational programs that train frontline workers (Rogers et 
al., 1991).
And few people actually complete one- or two-year programs. Most students 
restrict themselves to a few courses. This is plausible in the light of the previous 
analysis of American internal labor markets. If most jobs open to outsiders are on 
the lower rungs of company career ladders, one does not need that much training 
to accomplish the tasks. And, in a low-skills environment where few people have 
substantial formal vocational qualifications, a few courses will suffice to signal 
willingness and ability to learn to the employer, and to beat most competition for a 
job as well.
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4.4.4 Conclusion: the missing middle
In sum, current American school-based VET has not been able to offer full 
compensation for the few opportunities for substantial work-based learning that 
firms have tended to offer to American youngsters. Total quantity of school- and 
work-based VET for youngsters and young adults in the U.S. is low as compared 
with that in other countries. As Berryman et al. (1992: 1) put it:
“...as Europeans have observed, the US education and training system is ‘missing 
the middle’. It has no coherent educational strategy for the many young people who 
now complete high school equipped neither to complete college nor for the training 
required to enter middle-level jobs.”
Further, the lack of national or statewide (skills) standards and assessment 
procedures does not guarantee a certain minimum quality of VET. And, the dispersion 
of VET across various independent and decentralized systems that are only weakly 
linked, does not make the available options very transparent for young persons, 
parents or adult workers. In short, there are problems of too little coordination and 
cooperation in these areas (Rogers & Streeck, 1991: 11).
It is in this context that American and Wisconsin policy-makers have embarked 
on ambitious attempts to ‘build the middle’ (Berryman et al, 1992) in the nineties. 
They have developed reform efforts that generally try to improve the school-to-
work transition for American youngsters through the development of coordinated 
industry-wide VET systems. Specifically, these efforts have included some polices 
inspired by the German example. One is the attempt to increase the opportunities 
for work-based learning for young persons; another, the attempt to develop national 
skills standards and assessment procedures that allow benchmarking of training 
quality in schools and firms.
4.5 Federal reform policies
4.5.1 General directions
The Commission on the Skills of the American Workforce (1990) recommended 
the development of a new skills development system that provides frontline 
workers with world-class skills, and encourages firms to develop high performance 
workplaces. The latter means that firms adopt a competitive strategy that builds on 
the training of the workforce. Traditionally, American business has been dominated 
by Tayloristic/Fordist firms that employ a low-skills strategy. In the view of the 
commission, a high-skills strategy would improve the competitiveness of American 
business, help raise the wages for frontline workers, and thus help address the 
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poverty problem. The Commission specifically recommended to:
• establish a certificate that sets a very high nationwide standard for 
foundation skills to be achieved by American students at age 16;
• make sure that no one is left out of this strategy by establishing alternative 
education and job experience programs that can train drop-outs to achieve 
this standard;
• build a system of employer-recognized occupational skills standards, and 
develop a system of combined classroom work and structured on-the-job 
training to teach these to young people and adults;
• develop policies and programs to promote high performance work 
organization, i.e. by requiring employers to spend a minimum proportion of 
their payroll on the training of frontline workers;
• create a coherent national, state and local labor market system for the 
entire frontline workforce based on the new occupational standards.
This report was certainly not the only one to provide a challenging view of the 
development of American VET, but it quite adequately represents the general 
thrust of most. Rather than discussing other reports that influenced state and 
federal policies, we will concentrate on two specific areas of policy development 
at the federal level. These are, first, policies that aim to improve the school-to-
work transition for young people. Increasing the role of work-based learning is one 
important strategy to achieve this, a strategy we will concentrate on in particular. 
Second, we will discuss the policy that stimulates the development of voluntary 
national skills standards. Both policies have been promoted by the Commission on 
the Skills of the American Workforce (1990) and by the Independent Advisory Panel 
to the National Assessment of Vocational Education (Boesel & McFarland, 1994: 
1-5). They are linked, in that both are considered necessary to address America’s 
greatest weakness in the field of VET: the lack of a comprehensive system of 
workforce preparation (Boesel & McFarland, 1994: 2).
4.5.2 School-to-work policy
“The school-to-work transition initiative is characterized by programs and curricular 
changes which are intended to prepare secondary school pupils to enter the 
workforce, whether immediately following high school graduation or after some 
type of  postsecondary education. Generally, school-to-work programs are aimed at 
encouraging students to plan for a career more thoroughly and at an earlier age; 
acquainting students with alternatives to a baccalaureate degree (such as an associate 
degree and apprenticeships); and forging partnerships between K-12 schools and 
technical colleges, universities and businesses in order to provide distinct pathways 
from school to the workforce.” (Bonderud & Bukolt, 1995, p. 1)
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The goals of U.S. school-to-work policies could not be described in a more focused 
way. These policies derive their name from the federal 1994 School-to-Work 
Opportunities Act. But many of these policies, and the debate surrounding them, 
predate this Act.
4.5.2.1 The debate on youth apprenticeship
Before turning to the 1994 School-to-Work Opportunities Act, it is helpful to discuss 
its roots. The Act can be traced back to a draft for another Act that circulated in the 
early nineties. This draft promoted a much more focused concept than that of school-
to-work programs: work-based learning through forms of youth apprenticeship.
Work-based learning is not something American high schools are completely 
unfamiliar with. Some American (and, for that matter, Wisconsin) high schools 
have always had cooperative education (or: co-op) programs that allow students 
to earn credit for paid work experience. But their size is relatively small: 400,000 
secondary students participate in them nationwide (Boesel & McFarland, 1994). 
And they are not governed by state or federal standards, nor are they tied to 
central examinations that entitle those who pass to receive a recognized credential 
that signals a certain minimum level of competence. This makes it hard for co-op 
graduates to cash in on this training in the labor market. Co-op only results in 
higher student earning when its graduates stay on with their co-op employer (Stern 
et al., 1995). This situation has led many American experts (e.g. Hamilton, 1990; 
1993) to plead for the development of a more rigorous form of work-based learning 
in the form of youth apprenticeship.
The concept of youth apprenticeship is to an important extent based on the role 
model of the German apprenticeship system. The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) 
has sponsored a School-to-Work Transition/Youth Apprenticeship demonstration 
that began in September 1990 with grants to six organizations to develop and 
implement a wide array of programs connecting schools and employers and 
integrating school- and work-based learning (Corson & Silverberg, 1994: ix). The 
Bush senior administration developed a draft for a National Youth Apprenticeship 
Act to be submitted in Congress in the spring of 1992. The School-to-Work 
Transition/Youth Apprenticeship Demonstration continued in the fall of 1992 with 
an extension of funding for five of the original grantees, and ten additional two 
year grants specifically for the development of youth apprenticeship (Corson & 
Silverberg, 1994: ix). The first Clinton administration took over the initiative and 
called for a national apprenticeship system similar to the German dual training 
system (Büchtemann et al., 1993). Some states (among them Wisconsin25) and 
localities started their own experiments with youth apprenticeship. The (true or 
false) promise of youth apprenticeship was an important issue in the debate among 
American VET researchers in those years (i.e. Hamilton, 1990; 1993; Rosenbaum et 
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al., 1992; Shenon, 1992; Bailey, 1993; 1995; Corson & Silverberg, 1994; Zemsky, 
1994).
Achieving one uniform national system is, however, quite difficult in the U.S.. 
The structural reason for this is that the primary responsibility for education lies 
with the individual states. A more time-related reason is that the American political 
tide in the mid-nineties was not very favorable to plans that entail an enlargement 
of the role of the federal government. Thus, it is not surprising that the initial work 
on a Youth Apprenticeship Act in the end has led to a substantially less directive 
Act: the School-to-Work Opportunities Act.
4.5.2.2 The School-to-Work Opportunities Act
The School-to-Work Opportunities Act was passed by Congress and signed by the 
President in 1994. It was authorized through the federal fiscal year of 2001, when 
the initiative was to sunset. The Act is administered jointly by the U.S. Departments 
of Education (DOE) and Labor (DOL).
This act does not confine itself to promoting youth apprenticeship as a vehicle 
for improvement of the school-to-work transition, but incorporates various possible 
institutional mechanisms. And, second, it makes states and local partnerships the 
central actors in VET reform, rather than attempt to develop a national system per 
se. States are required to develop policies to arrive at an encompassing school-to-
work transition system. But they can come up with their own specific proposal for 
such a system, and for the policies needed to develop it. These proposals have to 
contain three core elements:
• school-based learning: classroom instruction based on high academic and 
occupational skills standards;
• work-based learning: work experience and structured training and mentoring 
on job sites;
• connecting activities: activities that integrate classroom and on-the-job 
instruction, match students with participating employers, train job-site 
mentors, and maintain bridges between school and work.
In order to help states get such initiatives off the ground, the School-to-Work 
Opportunities Act has set up the following financial assistance programs for which 
states could submit applications (Bonderud & Bukolt, 1995: 5):
• development grants to assist states in planning statewide school-to-work 
programs;
• implementation grants to assist states in providing sub grants to local 
partnerships to carry out school-to-work programs;
• direct implementation grants to local partnerships;
• national demonstration projects.
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Since 1994, all states have received (relatively small) development grants. Only 
the states with the best-developed policies and plans have received implementation 
grants. Eight states (among them Wisconsin) received the first school-to-work 
implementation grants in 1994, and 19 additional states received such grants in 
1995 (DOE & DOL, 1996). An important part of these federal funds that states 
receive flow to local partnerships to implement plans they have submitted to 
the state government. These local partnerships had to consist of employers, 
representatives of local educational agencies and local post-secondary educational 
institutions, local educators and representatives of union or non-managerial 
employee representatives, and students, and could also include other groups. A 
limited number of local partnerships can receive direct federal funding, irrespective 
of the policies and plans of its state government. In this way, the contents of 
specific school-to-work policies developed at the state and local level, within a 
global federal framework. We will discuss these contents in more detail in section 
4.6, when we describe school-to-work policy in the state of Wisconsin.
4.5.3 Skills standards policy
4.5.3.1 The SCANS reports and the need for standards
February 1990, the U.S. Secretary of Labor set up the Secretary’s Commission on 
Achieving Necessary Skills (SCANS). It consisted of 31 business, labor, education 
and government representatives, and had to foster awareness of the importance 
of enabling students and workers to master the skills associated with quality jobs 
(DOL, 1994: 3). In its initial report, the Commission concluded that students had 
to develop five competencies and a three-part foundation of skills to secure good 
jobs (SCANS, 1991). In its final report, the Commission highlighted four key areas 
of action: reinventing schools, fostering work-based-learning, reorganizing the 
workplace and restructuring assessment (SCANS, 1992). SCANS has been very 
influential in setting the debate on what all students should learn in the U.S.. For 
instance, it has been an important basis for the previously discussed school-to-work 
policies. But SCANS’ clear phrasing of the necessary skills for high school graduates 
has also enabled the subsequent debate to focus on a question that is at least as 
important: the need for national standards in American education and training.
The lack of national standards that define a minimum level of competence to 
be attained in specific education and training tracks is considered an important 
institutional weakness of the American education and training system. Two different 
arguments are used to support this assessment. First, national standards would 
improve accountability of schools, school districts and state K-12 systems. Standards 
confront students, schools, school districts and states with their performance relative 
to others, which should stimulate all, but especially the weak performers, to do better. 
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The second argument does not seek to influence schools, but instead is directed at 
firms. National industry skills standards would confront individuals and firms with 
the prevailing skills standards in high performance workplaces in their industry. This 
confrontation should encourage them to adopt such high skills standards themselves, 
which would imply developing broader job descriptions that require more and higher 
skills. Since many current workers lack such skills, the direct effect would be that 
firms would step up their investments in training and broaden its contents. Also, it 
would enable them to use such standards to guide their selection and recruitment 
policy. And if companies would actually use such standards for recruitment purposes, 
this would indirectly encourage secondary and post-secondary schools and colleges 
to use such standards as benchmarks for their own VET programs.
Academic standards could also improve school and student performance. But 
their effect would most likely be weaker than that of skills standards. The latter 
offer two advantages as compared to academic standards in this respect. First, 
they do not merely influence school-based education for young persons, but also 
stimulate work-based training. This way, they potentially raise the skills level of 
the entire workforce, and not merely that of the new recruits that enter the labor 
market. Second, because academic standards do not (directly) raise the demand for 
skilled labor at the intermediate level, they will be less relevant for the non-college 
bound that plan to enter the labor market directly upon high school graduation. 
And it is exactly this group for which new standards are most important. For the 
college-aspiring majority of students, (four-year) college entry requirements and 
particularly the ACT- and SAT-tests have always been a partial functional equivalent 
for formally articulated standards26. These tests measure performance in academic 
areas, and entail the bonus of getting accepted in a more prestigious college for 
those who perform well.
The remainder of this section is therefore dedicated to the federal policy 
regarding skills standards. As for academic standards, we will confine ourselves to 
two observations. First, nationwide academic standards have been developed in a 
limited number of areas (i.e. in mathematics and history). Second, they have been 
developed separately from skills standards27.
4.5.3.2 Skills standards in the U.S.: practice and gaps
Skills standards have not been completely absent in the U.S. Wills (1994b; 1994c) 
needs two large volumes to describe existing American education and industry 
driven skills standards systems. As to education driven skills standard systems, the 
1990 reauthorization of the federal Perkins Act for the first time provided federal 
fiscal support for national skills standards, as well as for state work on standards 
(Wills, 1994a: 11; 1994b). Several state consortia have been formed to collaborate 
in this field but not one set of skills standards is used by all states, and within states 
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the standards are used by some local districts rather than statewide (Wills, 1994a: 
12; 1994b).
In addition, Wills (1994a: 16; 1994c) identifies 168 industry driven skills 
certification programs. Most are directly related to an occupation or profession 
where government intervention to regulate industry had occurred or had threatened 
to occur (Wills, 1994a: 14). But most offer only one or two certificates and few 
are targeted at the entry-level workforce28 (Wills, 1994a: 18-19; 1994c). And 
only in very few cases is there a single industry association that offers the only 
certification program that is used by the entire industry. Most associations are 
specialty associations, and thus their standards tend to focus on their specialty 
area. Still, competition is often a concern, as when 21 organizations offer nursing 
certification (Wills, 1994a: 18-19; 1994c). Few standards systems have any formal 
links to mainstream secondary or post-secondary programs, which implies they 
have little impact on curricula (Rahn, 1994: 2). Industry driven skills standards are 
lacking for important sectors, such as large portions of the manufacturing sector 
(Wills; 1994a: 14; 1994c). And there was no common framework or language to 
facilitate the debate on standards. In sum, the development of skills standards has 
occurred in as decentralized and dispersed a way as the organization of American 
education and training in general. Wills (1994a: 2) has concluded that this current 
practice entails significant gaps:
• few systems include levels from novice to master in an occupation;
• in some important competitive sectors, there are little or no skills standards 
systems;
• there is no coherent pattern of financing behind the systems, which hampers 
their cost efficiency and effectiveness;
• the systems do not adequately support development and upgrading of 
instructors;
• there is no common agreement on the definition of an industry or an 
occupational cluster.
4.5.3.3 DOL and DOE pilot projects
An important impetus for the American debate on national skills standards was 
the appointment of a National Advisory Commission on Work-Based Learning by 
the Secretary of Labor in October 1990 (DOL, 1994: 4). It consisted of business, 
labor and education leaders, and was to advise DOL on ways to increase the skills 
level of the American workforce, and to expand access to work-based learning at 
all stages of workers’ careers. One of the six strategic action steps this Commission 
advised was the development of a national framework of voluntary skill standards 
and certification. In her second (and last) year of operation, the Commission 
subsequently spearheaded the national dialogue on this issue. As part of this effort, 
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DOL and DOE convened public hearings, initiated research, and planned a series of 
pilot projects to develop industry skills standards (DOL, 1994).
In 1992, DOL and DOE solicited proposals to pilot-test skill standards systems in 
various industries (Bailey & Merritt, 1995: 22-23). Such pilot project were to:
• take an industry-perspective on skills standards rather than an occupation-
based approach;
• focus on an industry of significant size;
• develop standards that cover all non-baccalaureate degree workers;
• match federal funds with industry resources;
• involve all relevant parties: business, labor organizations, workers, trainers, 
educators, and representatives from human resource communities;
• cooperate in a loose network with other pilot projects.
DOE funded seven projects beginning in October 1992 and nine beginning in 
August 1993. These projects lasted eighteen months. DOL funded six twelve-month 
projects that began in December 1992 (Bailey & Merritt, 1995, p. 13). Later, the 
DOE projects were extended for a second eighteen-month period (until April 1996), 
and the contracts for the DOL projects were extended three times to expire in 
September 1995 (Moorhouse et al., 1996: 4).
These 22 DOL and DOE pilot projects were meant as experiments from which 
important policy lessons could be learned. Thus, they were granted considerable 
freedom in their approach. This has led to substantial differentiation among them 
on many dimensions (Rahn, 1994; Bailey & Merritt, 1995; Moorhouse et al., 1996), 
such as:
• the scope of the project, ranging from one specific occupation (hazardous 
materials management technician) to an integration of 64 jobs into four 
broad occupational areas (metalworking/machining); on the other hand, 
there were two separate pilot projects in electronics, led by two separate 
employers’ associations;
• the composition of the partnership, particularly the extent of active 
involvement of unions and educators in it; most partnerships were led by 
employers’ associations or their research/education affiliates;
• the strategic policy pursued by the partnership; some stress publicity, 
others consider a high quality product the most essential prerequisite for 
achieving long-term success;
• the processes used in developing standards and assessment procedures, 
and in validating these;
• the policies concerning the implementation of standards and assessment 
procedures;
• the actual products (occupational skills standards and assessment 
procedures) created.
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4.5.3.4 The pilot project in metalworking/machining
This differentiation implies that the description of any one of the projects can never 
be considered representative of the entire effort. But such a single example may 
improve understanding of the type of projects concerned, and (particularly) the 
large difference with the existing skills standards systems as in Germany and the 
Netherlands.
The partnership for the metalworking sector has been lead by the National 
Tooling and Machining Association (NTMA), but includes four other employers’/
trade associations as well. Unions were a minority partner, involved through a 
representative from the IAMAW and a representative from the AFL-CIO Human 
Resources Development Institute. After a few years, this partnership institutionalized 
into a separate organization: the National Institute for Metalworking Skills (NIMS). 
This is quite exceptional among the 22 projects.
In the initial phase of the project, the skills standards used for German 
metalworking apprentices were an important example. This (and other foreign 
examples) led to an initial skills standards scheme whose basic structure distinguished 
three levels and four occupational areas. The latter were metal forming; machining; 
tool, die & mold making; and machine building and maintenance. Since then, the 
actual scheme has been differentiated within and across the boundaries of this 
basic structure. On level one, there is one comprehensive set of standards for all 
four areas: general metalworking knowledge and machining skills. On levels two, 
three and (the not yet formally recognized level) four, several sets of standards 
are distinguished between and sometimes within the occupational fields. Some of 
the standard sets were ready (i.e. matching levels 1, 2 and 3), others were being 
developed, still others were just planned for some time in the future. NIMS has 
established criteria for firms or schools that want to implement skills standards 
that have been developed. In the fall of 1995, it had 23 implementation sites in 5 
states. An assessment procedure to test persons for competency on level 1 standards 
was being developed and tested.
It is important to realize that this qualification structure developed by NIMS is 
modularized. Firms could only train workers in one or a few of the areas at each level. 
The plan is that people can acquire eight separate credentials at level 1. A special 
ninth credential was awarded to those that acquire all eight separate ones, but this 
was expected to remain an exception. The plans foresaw six written exams for the 
eight credentials. Two of those could be taken at any time. The other four could only 
be taken after the person had produced a metal component that was approved by a 
specific local committee recognized by NIMS.
When the federal DOL grant had expired, NIMS had to finance itself from various 
existing or new sources. First, the participating trade associations paid a $10,000 general 
contribution. Second, each association paid for the development of skills standards in 
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their specific occupational area. Third, NIMS had secured technical assistance grants 
from three states where it was implementing the level 1 machining standards with 
firms and/or schools. Fourth, persons taking NIMS-tests would have to pay a fee.
4.5.3.5 The National Skill Standards Board
Once the pilot projects were on the way, federal policy started to concentrate on a 
more structural institutionalization of the development of national skill standards. 
Wills (1994a: 19) described three models for national skill standards systems:
• the initial preparation model, which focuses on the school-to-work transition 
for young persons (e.g. Germany);
• the craft certification model, which focuses on workers in high-mobility 
occupations (e.g. Japan);
• the comprehensive model, which focuses on both young persons and adult 
workers (e.g. the U.K.).
The comprehensive model has dominated the skills standards debate in the U.S.. 
National skills standards should guide training in various systems and establishments, 
and both for young people and adults. Some believe national skills standards form 
a second tier of standards for broad clusters of frontline jobs, often encompassing 
multiple industries. This second tier would exist between a first tier of general 
education standards for all high school students, and a third tier of standards for 
individual frontline jobs (e.g. Tucker, 1994b).
Federal policy has focused on the creation of an independent National Skill 
Standards Board (NSSB) to guide the development of national skill standards. The 
creation of the NSSB is required by the federal ‘Goals 2000: Educate America Act: 
Title V: The National Skill Standards Act of 1994’. It describes six key functions of 
the NSSB (NSSB, 1995: 7):
• identification of occupational clusters;
• establishment of voluntary partnerships to establish standards;
• research, dissemination and coordination activities;
• endorsement of skills standards;
• coordination with the National Education Standards and Improvement 
Council;
• financial assistance for services to support NSSB work and grants to 
voluntary partnerships.
The NSSB had its first meeting in April 1995. It consisted of 27 members (according 
to the NSSB website). Eight represented business, eight represented labor, two 
were neutral human resource professionals, six represented education, government 
and other societal groups, and three were ex-officio members: the Secretaries 
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of Labor, Education, and Commerce (NSSB, 1995). Of these members, 12 were 
appointed by the President, 6 by the Speaker of the House, and 6 by the President 
on behalf of the House (Wills, 1995).
At the time of the fieldwork for this project, the NSSB was still in the process 
of developing its policy. It appeared to opt for the development of standards for 
specific cross-industry occupations that are found in high performance workplaces. 
The establishment of a more or less overarching set of national industry standard-
setting partnerships did not seem to be high on the agenda at this point in 
time. This, however, might have been a consequence of the fact that the federal 
government had not given the NSSB the financial means necessary to achieve its 
goals. Government has a powerful role to play in sustaining the development of 
skills standards, in particular through fiscal support for the process (Wills, 1994a: 
20). The NSSB received $6 million for the fiscal year of 1995, while $12 million was 
requested for fiscal year 1996 (NSSB, 1995: 11). This was certainly not enough to 
give financial support to national partnerships for all industries to develop national 
skills standards.
In this context, the NSSB has not even offered grants to all DOL and DOE 
pilot projects. Instead, it held a competition that awarded grants to 9 of the pilot 
projects for so-called workforce skills standards pilot projects (NSSB website). The 
lack of funding was not the only reason why the NSSB might have decided not 
to fund all former pilot projects. The DOL and DOE pilot projects were meant as 
experiments from which policy lessons could be drawn. It was unlikely (and given 
the goal of policy learning not even necessarily preferable) that every experiment 
would succeed. The chronological order of the creation of pilot projects and NSSB 
implies that some of these lessons might lead the NSSB to adopt criteria that 
some of the pilot projects would not meet. Either way, this policy choice could very 
likely demand a high toll of some of the DOL and DOE partnerships that have not 
received a new grant. When a partnership dissolves, it may take a while to get the 
stakeholders involved back at the table for a similar task later on.
4.6 Reform in Wisconsin
The success of federal policy programs discussed in section 4.5 will depend on 
their reception at the state and local levels. This chapter therefore describes and 
analyzes the developments in the state of Wisconsin in these areas. Section 4.6.1 
will present a brief overview of the development of Wisconsin vocational education, 
training and labor market policies. Section 4.6.2 and section 4.6.3 will analyze the 
contemporary situation regarding school-to-work and skills standards in Wisconsin. 
Section 4.6.4 will discuss the development of a regional training partnership in the 
metalworking industry.
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4.6.1 A brief history of policy development in Wisconsin
The decentralized governance structure for VET in the U.S. makes state governments 
important actors when it comes to VET reform policies. These have typically not 
been waiting for the federal government to come up with a reform policy, but 
have taken steps of their own to fundamentally improve their VET systems (NCEE, 
1995). When relevant federal policy programs do exist, state governments of course 
try to benefit from the programs concerned and the funds available. The state of 
Wisconsin is recognized for its long tradition of education and training reform and 
innovations. Over the last decade, the state has embarked on the development of 
standards and an assessment system to strengthen the K-12 system (section 4.6.3); 
of a school-to-work policy (section 4.6.2); of improvement of the coordination of 
labor market policy services (section 4.6.2.4 and training policy (section 4.6.4); 
and of strengthening the connection between training strategies and economic 
development policy (NCEE, 1995: 49).
Some of these efforts started as early as the late eighties. At that point in time, 
the State of Wisconsin started to improve the governance structure for training 
of workers and the unemployed (NCEE, 1995: 131). The state provided several 
funds to improve and expand training for workers. It created a network of so-
called workplace education centers in firms that provided basic educations for its 
workers (section 4.6.4). And in 1987, the state established a statewide system of 
Job Centers that provide employment and training services.
Policy development in these areas increased in the nineties. An important impulse 
was when Governor Thompson set up a Commission for a Quality Workforce headed 
by private sector leaders (DILHR et al., 1994: 7). The Commission issued two 
action plans (Governor’s Commission for a Quality Workforce, 1991). The first was 
for building a world-class workforce. It urged the state to expand worker training 
to equip them with the skills necessary for employment in reorganized workplaces 
with new technologies. The second action plan was for educating the workers of 
tomorrow. It proposed the setting of standards for the education system, and the 
strengthening of technical education for the non-college bound.
Another commission appointed by the Governor advised along similar lines 
(Commission on Schools of the 21st Century, 1991). And a joint Task Force of 
DPI and WTCS (which at the time was still called the VTAE system) recommended 
statewide implementation of a coordinated technical preparation (tech prep) 
program by the 1995-96 school year. It also recommended the establishment of 
articulated curricula between high schools and technical colleges that allow high 
school students to gain advanced standing in technical college programs (DILHR et 
al., 1994: 6).
Subsequently, the Governor installed an Executive Cabinet for a Quality Workforce 
to translate these reports into legislative proposals. The legislature accordingly 
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passed legislation in 1991 and 1992. It required reorganization of elementary and 
secondary schools to help students meet academic standards, and it upgraded 
training opportunities at secondary and post-secondary levels. In the same period, 
the state further improved the availability of employment- and training-related 
information and services, and the coordination of federally funded job training 
programs. It expanded the networks of Job Centers and workplace education 
centers. And in 1993, the state created a Governor’s Office of Workforce Excellence 
within DILHR to coordinate the workforce development policies that were pursued 
by a large number of agencies in various state departments (NCEE, 1995: 46).
After this brief historical overview, we will turn to a discussion of Wisconsin 
policies in the two areas discussed in the previous chapter: school-to-work (section 
4.6.2) and standards and assessment (section 4.6.3). It is important to note that 
these policies were not the only reform efforts in Wisconsin that could more or 
less fundamentally alter the operation of its markets for intermediate skills. While 
they were important, and the most targeted at this specific goal, there were other 
prominent, more general debates concerning the governance of Wisconsin’s K-12 
system. First, the State of Wisconsin decided to shift the burden of public K-12 
school finance from the individual school districts to the state level (NCEE, 1995). 
Act 437 created a committee that should develop a plan to have the state provide 
at least 66.7% of the revenue for public K-12 schools by the 1996-97 school year 
(Toulmin & Bukolt, 1995: 4). Second, Wisconsin experimented with the charter 
school concept. Charter schools are exempted from a number of laws and rules 
that govern traditional public schools (Bukolt, 1995c). Third, the state of Wisconsin 
has been experimenting with public subsidization of private school attendance 
by Milwaukee children from poor families through the Milwaukee Parental Choice 
Program. This program was established by Act 336 in 1989 (Toulmin, 1995). If a 
child from a low-income family enrolls in a private school, the share of the state 
equalization aid that would otherwise go to the Milwaukee public school district for 
this child will be awarded to the private school concerned.
4.6.2 Skills for the Future: School-to-work policy in Wisconsin
4.6.2.1 Overview and history
Wisconsin’s school-to-work plan is called ‘Skills for the Future’. Wisconsin was one 
of the first eight states that received a federal school-to-work implementation grant 
(Bonderud & Bukolt, 1995: 4). Prior to that, the state had already received a federal 
school-to-work planning grant from $290,000 to have state and local partnerships 
develop school-to-work plans (DILHR et al., 1994: 9). The federal school-to-work 
legislation in 1994 encouraged Wisconsin to submit an application for a federal school-
to-work implementation grant. This attempt was successful. Wisconsin received 
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a five-year implementation grant of 27 million dollars over the 1994-99 period 
(Bonderud & Bukolt, 1995: 5). In addition, two local school-to-work partnerships 
in Wisconsin directly received federal implementation grants of 1.1 million dollars 
(Bonderud & Bukolt, 1995: 4). While federal funds have thus been an important 
impetus for policy development in Wisconsin, it is important to note that these 
policies were already under way (long) before the School-to-Work Opportunities Act 
was passed in 1994. Beginning in 1987-88, Wisconsin school districts were required 
to provide access to an education for employment program to all students in grade 
Kindergarten through twelve (Bonderud & Bukolt, 1995, p. 2). This program should 
include basic skills instruction, school-supervised work experience, instruction in 
employability skills and attitudes, the study of economics, a one semester course 
providing careers exploration and planning, a vocational education program for 
pupils in grade 9 through 12, the establishment of a business-education partnership 
council, and the integration of other state standards and requirements.
Since then, Wisconsin has substantially expanded its policies in this area to 
its mid-nineties school-to-work policy. Most of the school-to work programs in 
Wisconsin (including its statewide youth apprenticeship program) were created 
through 1991 Wisconsin Act 39 (Bonderud & Bukolt, 1995: 3). Wisconsin Act 
39 from 1993 requires school districts to have their education for employment 
programs incorporate applied curricula, guidance and counseling services, technical 
preparation, college preparation, youth apprenticeship or other job training and 
experience, and instruction in employment skills by the beginning of the 1997-98 
school year (Bukolt & Toulmin, 1995: 14).
All these policies were developed before the federal School-to-Work Opportunities 
Act was passed in 1994, and before Wisconsin subsequently received a federal 
implementation grant. Of course, Wisconsin and other states had anticipated federal 
school-to-work legislation when they were developing these policies. Thus, federal 
policy debates had already influenced the development of school-to-work policies 
in Wisconsin before 1994. An example of this is the development of the Wisconsin 
youth apprenticeship program that would have been a federally approved pilot 
project if the federal Youth Apprenticeship Act of 1992 had been passed (section 
4.5.2.1). And the fact that 75% of the 10.5 million in federal and state funds 
budgeted for Wisconsin school-to-work programs in 1994-95 has federal origins 
shows that the federal involvement is quite relevant (Bonderud & Bukolt, 1995: 
4). And school-to-work implementation grants were not the only federal funds 
available for Wisconsin’s school-to-work programs. For instance, the state received 
21.2 million dollars in funds available through the federal Carl Perkins Act in 1994-
95 for improving secondary, post-secondary and adult vocational programs. Of 
these funds, 2.1 million dollars were provided specifically for tech prep (Bonderud & 
Bukolt, 1995: 6). And the Depart ment of Administration received $290,000 in 1994 
for activities that build up local school-to-work partnerships through the federal Job 
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Training Partnership Act. Even earlier, the state received a three year grant from 
the federal Department of Education (DOE) under its Cooperative Demonstration 
Program (1993); and two Job Training 2000 grants from the federal Department of 
Labor (DOL) to build One-Stop Skill (Job) Centers that included a school-to-work 
transition component and a secondary school partner (DILHR et al., 1994: 8).
Wisconsin’s Skills for the Future effort consists of five major components, 
which  will be subsequently discussed: youth apprenticeship, local partnerships, 
career counseling centers, technical preparation (tech prep), and post-secondary 
enrollment options (DILHR et  al., 1994; Bonderud & Bukolt, 1995).
4.6.2.2 Youth apprenticeship
Wisconsin’s youth apprenticeship program is probably the most notable part of its 
school-to- work policy. Wisconsin was the first American state to enact a Statute 
that called for a statewide system of youth apprenticeships in 1991 (DILHR et al., 
1994). In 1992, the state received a $200,000 grant from DOL to develop and 
implement a youth apprenticeship program (DILHR et al., 1994: 8). The German 
Marshall Fund enabled key government, business and labor leaders from Wisconsin 
to visit Germany to study its apprenticeship training system – eight decades after 
the first Wisconsin VET expert went on such an official study trip there.
As in other states, some Wisconsin high schools had always offered forms of 
work-based learning, primarily in the form of cooperative education programs29. And 
of course, the state already had a Germany-inspired, ‘adult’ apprenticeship system 
(section 4.2.5). Youth apprenticeship tried to improve on cooperative education 
programs by prescribing a statewide curriculum for the school-based component, 
and by stimulating local partnerships between high schools, technical colleges, 
employers and unions. Thus, the training provided should be broader and of a 
higher quality. It tried to improve on adult apprenticeship by ensuring that it should 
ease the school-to-work transition for young adults, while adult apprenticeship 
mainly trains workers in their twenties and thirties (cf. section 4.2.5). Access to 
youth apprenticeship positions was restricted to 16-18 year olds. Only high school 
students could enter a youth apprenticeship position at the beginning of their junior 
year (11th grade), provided they had performed satisfactorily on the 10th grade 
gateway assessment (section 4.6.3.1). 
Wisconsin’s youth apprenticeship program consisted of two-year programs for 
high school juniors and seniors that combined academic classroom coursework 
in high schools or technical colleges with on-the-job training in individual firms 
(Bonderud & Bukolt, 1995: 9). The students spent at least ten hours a week with 
the firm during the first year, and at least fifteen hours during the second year. The 
rest of the time they took classes at their high school. The majority of these were 
regular high school classes in various topics. In addition, they were required to take 
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a specific related instruction class in the program area of their youth apprenticeship. 
This class was either provided by a technical college or by a high school. Students 
were required to maintain good standing in their school performances and complete 
the high school graduation requirements in time.
Specific youth apprenticeship programs were based on statewide skills standards 
for specific industries, and the curriculum for the school-based components was 
developed at the state level. Students that completed a youth apprenticeship 
received an occupational proficiency certificate from the state. This entitled them 
to advanced standing when they subsequently enrolled in related technical college 
programs. The exact number of credits they received depended on the program area 
and the individual technical college involved. Relevant standards and certificates 
will be further discussed in section 4.6.3.3.
Employers selected the apprentices from a number of applicants that were pre-
selected by the participating high schools. They subsequently hired them through a 
training agreement that was signed by themselves, the high school and the youth 
apprentice’s parents. This agreement lasted two years. Over this period, employers 
paid the apprentice at least the minimum wage, or a higher wage level agreed upon 
by the local youth apprenticeship consortium. Through these local consortia, they 
were eligible for a state training subsidy of up to 50% of the youth apprentice’s 
hourly wage or $4 per hour.
At the local level, these consortia were responsible for the administration of youth 
apprenticeship programs. They were partnerships consisting of representatives from 
high schools, technical colleges, unions, employers, community members, parents 
and students. The exact make-up of these local steering committees varied, both 
as to the number of members and the parties represented; not every committee, 
for instance, had union involvement. Later, such committees typically fell under one 
comprehensive local School-to-Work committee that operated sub-committees for 
each local industry for which there is a youth apprenticeship program.
Wisconsin’s youth apprenticeship program started in the printing industry in two 
school districts and with 17 youth apprentices in 1992. Gradually, it encompassed 
625 youth apprentices with 475 employers in 13 program areas, with 99 programs 
offered at 43 local sites in 1995-96. 90 students graduated from the first two 
generations of students in two areas (printing and financial services).
The idea for youth apprenticeship originated in BAS, the agency within DILHR 
that administrates the adult apprenticeship system. Since then, the effort has 
been taken outside of BAS to be embedded in a broader school-to-work context. 
It was transferred to the Office of Workforce Excellence within DILHR (Bonderud 
& Bukolt, 1995). There was a statewide Youth Apprenticeship Council consisting of 
three vocational education instructors, three high school teachers, two business 
representatives, two union representatives, one administrator from a technical 
college and one from a high school. All members were appointed by the Governor.
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The relation between youth apprenticeship and apprenticeship is a complicated 
one in the U.S., and Wisconsin is no exception. An important reason for this is that 
American union representatives have had serious concerns about the development 
of youth apprenticeship (Shenon, 1992). While supporting the general idea of 
developing substantial learning opportunities for the non-college bound half 
of American youth, they feared that youth apprenticeship might undermine the 
existing adult apprenticeship systems and, consequently, their position in governing 
these. Further, since youth apprentices provide cheap labor, they fear that firms will 
substitute them for adult workers. In general, the acceptability of low youth pay 
to adult union members rests upon effective institutional restraint upon employers 
to prevent such substitution (Marsden & Ryan, 1990a: 355), and such restraint is 
usually weak in the U.S. as compared with Germany.
In order to have unions widely embrace youth apprenticeship, it will have to be 
embedded in a broader strategy that also offers substantial training opportunities 
for incumbent workers. Thus, the fact that Wisconsin stepped up its activities in the 
field of worker training as early as the late eighties will have helped to level the field 
for youth apprenticeship. The Wisconsin AFL-CIO was involved in the development 
of the youth apprenticeship program, and the experience indicated a waning 
opposition from union ranks to youth apprenticeship over time. Even in the building 
trades, where opposition was strongest, the development of youth apprenticeship 
was being discussed.
Still, it is important to note that there was no connection at all between youth 
apprenticeship and adult apprenticeship programs at the time of the fieldwork. Youth 
apprenticeships could not be developed in the apprenticeable trades from the adult 
apprenticeship system. It was possible to develop youth apprenticeships for broader 
occupational areas, such as manufacturing/machining. Graduating youth apprentices 
were not entitled to any credit when they entered an adult apprenticeship in the same 
sector.
Youth apprenticeship was not the only new form of work-based learning that was 
promoted in Wisconsin’s Skills for the Future effort. DPI developed a separate program: 
the Wisconsin school-to-work cooperative education skills standards certificate (in 
short, certified co-op) program (DPI, 1995a). Like youth apprenticeship, certified 
co-op tried to improve on traditional co-op through the incorporation of statewide 
skill standards. The program basically mirrored the youth apprenticeship program. 
Students combined related classroom instruction with paid work-experience with an 
employer, with whom they (and their parents and the school) signed a cooperative 
education agreement. The work-based component averaged 15 hours a week, with a 
minimum of 480 hours throughout the year. The most important difference with youth 
apprenticeship was that certified co-op programs only last one year, which begs the 
question why they were not simply one-year youth apprenticeship programs. The 
program enrolled its first students in 1995-96, in three program areas. These are 
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other program areas than those where youth apprenticeship has been developed.
In 1995, 1,600 high school students were enrolled in either form of work-based 
learning governed by statewide skill standards, which means that enrollment in the 
certified co-op program was a little higher than in youth apprenticeship. These 1,600 
students worked with 850 employers in 16 program areas and 215 programs at 110 
local sites.
4.6.2.3 Local partnerships
Besides youth apprenticeship, the creation of local school-to-work partnerships was 
an important strategic policy. These partnerships could include secondary schools, 
WTCS districts, Private Industry Councils, local Chambers of Commerce and other 
groups (Bonderud & Bukolt, 1995: 7). These local partnerships had to establish a 
school-to-work program that met the federal requirements and includes school-based 
learning, work-based learning and connecting activities. They received a subsidy that 
covered 100% of expenses during the first year, 50% in the second year and 25% in 
the third year. After that, partnerships only received money for each youth apprentice 
($400) and certified co-op student ($200).
4.6.2.4 Career centers
A third part of the Skills for the Future project was the development of a number 
of career centers that would provide excellent career orientation and counseling 
for young people. As early as 1987, Wisconsin had developed a statewide network 
of Job Centers to coordinate all employment and training services (NCEE, 1995). 
But these were geared to serving an adult population, and not specifically to career 
counseling for young persons. The need for the latter was established when the 
state found out that high school counselors actually spend very little time on 
career counseling. Their strength is in counseling on college careers, not on direct 
labor market transition. In 1994, Wisconsin received a federal one-stop center 
implementation grant to expand and upgrade the centers (NCEE, 195: 49).
Wisconsin used the money to develop a limited number of so-called career 
centers. The idea for these career centers was inspired by the example of the German 
‘Berufsinformationszentren’ (section 3.6.1). The first four career centers started 
operating in the fall of the 1994 school year. They received declining state funding for 
three years, the total sum of which had to be matched by local funding. After these 
three years, the centers were to be completely funded through local sources. They 
offered comprehensive career development programs that guide clients through a 
series of self-learning steps: career awareness, career assessment, exploration, 
selection and application. The number of centers rapidly grew to eight.
In practice, the eight centers came to represent quite different approaches to 
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career guidance. Among the organizations that created them were a school district, 
a CESA, a Private Industry Council, a Chamber of Commerce and a technical college. 
Mostly these organizations represent wider community partnerships. One center 
was located in a large inner city and hosted groups of 8th and 10th graders of local 
schools. Another center was integrated with a Job Center, located in a technical 
college and served mainly adults. A third career center covered a large rural area 
and therefore ran a ‘roadshow’ and distance learning TV programs. And a fourth 
had no physical but only a digital presence (Bonderud & Bukolt, 1995: 13).
4.6.2.5 Tech prep
Nationally, the term tech prep usually refers to vocational programs that link the 
last two years of high school with the two years of two-year college education, and 
which exist as separate tracks alongside college preparatory tracks. This is different 
in Wisconsin. The state decided that separate tech prep tracks were not desirable, 
since tech prep would offer benefits to all students. Moreover, tech prep does not 
always conform to the 2 + 2 model.
In Wisconsin, tech prep is a statewide effort that exists in all school districts 
(DILHR et al., 1994: 5). The development of tech prep programs in Wisconsin 
started in the early nineties. The federal Carl Perkins Act supplied funds for tech 
prep from 1991-92 onwards. Wisconsin Act 39 required school boards to establish 
a tech prep program in each high school in the district (Bonderud & Bukolt, 1995: 
13). Wisconsin organized 16 School-to-Work/Tech Prep consortia in which a 
technical college teamed up with all K-12 districts within the technical college district 
boundaries to implement the programs. Together, the consortia established a tech 
prep leadership group to provide leadership (Bonderud & Bukolt, 1995: 14).
The programs must consist of a sequence of courses that allows high school 
students to gain advanced standing in associate degree programs upon high school 
graduation. An agreement between a technical college and a high school that 
enables such transfer of credit was called an articulation agreement. The possibility 
to develop such agreements was not new, but it had been used only little before. 
Individual high schools and technical colleges negotiated over 3,000 articulation 
agreements that enabled high school students to transfer from three to twenty 
(technical college) credits to a technical college program. As of July 1994 the WTCS 
Board had to approve courses for tech prep programs (Bonderud & Bukolt, 1995: 
15). The state was hoping to achieve statewide articulation agreements in the 
future. Other activities, such as teacher and counselor training and preparatory 
services, were also included in tech prep programs.
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4.6.2.6 Post-secondary enrollment options
The 1991 Wisconsin Post-secondary Enrollment Options Act grants 11th and 12th 
grade students the opportunity to enroll in post-secondary programs at technical 
colleges, UW campuses or private post-secondary institutions if their own high 
school doesn’t offer training in a particular area they are interested in (Bonderud 
& Bukolt, 1995: 16). This possibility already existed, but few students used the 
opportunity, in part due to cumbersome administrative procedures involved.
With this option, the school reimbursed the college for the program, and students 
received high school credit. They were admitted to the technical college courses 
only if space was available and if they met the college’s admission standards. 
School boards determined if a given course was eligible for high school credit, and 
whether the district itself offered a comparable course. If enrollment in a particular 
post-secondary course equaled the enrollment normally required for a district to 
provide a course itself, and a similar enrollment was expected for the next year, the 
district is required to offer the course itself in the future. With an enrollment of 547 
at the UW and WTCS in 1994-95, the program was still modest in size (Bonderud 
& Bukolt, 1995: 19)
4.6.2.7 Involvement of the UW in school-to-work
In addition to these five prime policy areas, an interesting characteristic of the Skills 
for the Future project was the cooperation of the UW. It is involved in two ways 
(Bonderud & Bukolt, 1995: 3). First, individual UW campuses and WTCS districts 
are negotiating articulation agreements to facilitate the transfer of credits between 
them.
The second kind of university involvement in school-to-work is quite exceptional 
across the U.S.. The UW was the first university system in the country to develop an 
alternative competency-based admissions procedure for those students that have 
been enrolled in school-to-work programs in high school. It was not possible to 
adequately assess the performance and capabilities of students in some school-
to-work programs (e.g. youth apprenticeship) within the limits of the standard 
admission procedure. Thus, it was necessary to develop an alternative procedure 
to allow college-bound students to participate in such programs without damaging 
their chances on admittance to a (prestigious) four-year college. The competency-
based admissions process was implemented as a pilot project with eight Wisconsin 
high schools and all UW colleges in the 1995-96 school year, and continued with a 
second round of pilot projects in the 1996-1997 school year (UW, 1995b).
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4.6.2.8 Governance structure for ‘Skills for the Future’
One of the problems with the governance of American VET was that it was 
scattered over various systems. Wisconsin is no exception, and as a consequence 
school-to-work programs have affected various state departments and agencies. 
To combat this problem, Wisconsin made sure to use its school-to-work effort to 
improve coordination among the state departments and agencies concerned. First, 
the Governor installed a Cabinet for a Quality Workforce, which functioned as a 
coordinating body in this field from 1991 to 1993 (Bonderud & Bukolt, 1995). In 
1993, the Department of Administration briefly provided supervision. And from 
1993 onwards, the Office of Workforce Excellence was created in DILHR to be the 
central coordinating body.
The individual programs, however, were still administered by individual agencies 
and departments. Each of those agencies devoted some of its staff or even an 
entire unit to developing and implementing school-to-work policy. Besides DILHR, 
DPI (with its own Office of School-to-Work) and the WTCS Board were the dominant 
agencies in the Skills for the Future project. But the Department of Administration, 
the UW and the Department of Health and Social Services were also involved. 
Staff of these agencies met every week in a ten-member school-to-work policy 
team (DILHR et al., 1995: 5). This team constituted several more focused teams 
from their ranks, such as a skills standards development team and a work-based 
learning team. At a higher level, the state superintendent for public instruction, the 
WTCS director and the Secretary of DILHR formed the School-to-Work Cabinet. And 
above that, the state was creating a Council for Workforce Excellence consisting 
of representatives of public agencies, business and organized labor. This new 
council would take over the work of the Youth Apprenticeship Council, but also be 
responsible for other school-to-work programs.
4.6.3 Skills standards and assessment in Wisconsin
4.6.3.1 Introduction
Wisconsin has also seen some initiatives to develop or strengthen skills standards 
for VET. But these were generally less developed than the aforementioned policies 
regarding academic standards. Neither do these aim for one overarching qualification 
structure of skills standards that govern all VET. Instead, skills standards are 
debated separately for the three most important systems that provide VET: the 
K-12 system, the apprenticeship system, and the (technical diploma and associate 
degrees programs of) WTCS. Such skills standards were also not connected to 
independent statewide assessment procedures, either.
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4.6.3.2 Skills standards in the K-12 system
In the K-12 system, the development of skills standards has been integrated with 
the development of new work-based learning programs. Wisconsin’s application 
for a federal school-to-work implementation grant promised the approval of skills 
standards by the Youth Apprenticeship Advisory Council for thirty industries by 2000, 
and for fifty by 2010 (DILHR et al., 1994: 57). Such skills standards were developed 
within two different work-based learning programs for high school students: youth 
apprenticeship and certified co-op. Both programs were governed by statewide 
skills standards and led to skills certificates recognized by the state. Jointly, they 
covered 16 industries in the 1995-96 school year.
The youth apprenticeship program was described in section 4.6.2.2. It was 
governed by statewide skills standards or, to be more precise, by a statewide 
curriculum. The curriculum covered both the school- and work-based component 
of the programs. It did not specify the roles of employers and schools; only in 
one area did the curriculum suggest a division of tasks between both parties. The 
curricula were based on a task-analysis by experts, written by technical college 
instructors or sometimes high school teachers, and reviewed by a review committee 
again consisting primarily of technical college instructors and high school teachers. 
Involving employers in the latter proved difficult because of the time-consuming 
character of the task. The plan was to revise the curricula once every three years, 
by having the original authors write a new version and have training companies 
comment on it.
There was no final examination that youth apprentices had to pass. There was a 
checklist of required workplace competencies in the curricula, which firm mentors 
had to use in regularly assessing their apprentices’ progress, and checking off 
competencies they had attained. Both the high school teacher and the firm mentor 
assessed the progress of each youth apprentice each semester, and this added up to 
their final results. When the apprentices had mastered the required competencies, 
they were rewarded a certification portfolio.
Wisconsin tried to align its youth apprenticeship curricula with national skills 
standards whenever these became available - which they typically were not at the 
time of curriculum development. The national skills standards in machining were, 
however, used as a source in the development of the manufacturing/machining 
curriculum. But NIMS had, at the time of the fieldwork, not recognized Wisconsin 
as one of its implementation sites.
Second, the certified co-op program was also governed by statewide skill 
standards - but not by statewide curricula. Employers and frontline workers from 
a specific industry identified and categorized the necessary skills. The subsequent 
listing of competencies was validated by additional employers and secondary and 
post-secondary educators, upon which DPI approved them (DPI, 1995a: 3-4). This 
232
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
served as a basis upon which individualized learning plans were developed (DPI. 
1995a: 7). Firm mentors had to assess the students’ performance on-the-job. 
Students could achieve three scores on each of the proficiencies: 3 (proficient), 2 
(intermediate) or 1 (introductory). They had to score 2 or 3 on at least 90% of them 
to be eligible for the state certificate (DPI, 1995a: 4). Students obviously got high 
school credit for the program.
In 1995-96, some 1,600 students were enrolled in either a certified co-op or 
youth apprenticeship program, and thus covered by statewide skill standards (cf. 
section 4.6.2.2). Since some high schools simultaneously use the curriculum of 
such a work-based program as their new school-based VET program in that field, 
these standards in practice covered training for more students.
4.6.3.3 Skills standards in the apprenticeship system
As for (adult) apprenticeship, BAS has the authority to adopt statewide standards 
covering minimum training requirements, procedures in processing indentures, 
qualifications of applicant employers and apprentices, and other matters (Wisconsin 
Administrative Code Ind. 95.01).
In the construction sector, most apprenticeship programs operate under state 
standards for the occupation concerned (BAS, 1987). These standards were 
developed through state Joint Apprenticeship Committees (state JACS). State JACs 
were first established by statewide employers and labor associations in the building 
trades in the 1930s (BAS, 1987). Like the area JACs, state JACs are merely advisory 
bodies to BAS. When BAS sees a need for a state JAC, it first determines which 
organizations there are that represent employers and employees in the segment 
of the labor market concerned. When these are willing to sit down and work out 
statewide apprenticeship standards, they are asked to nominate representatives on 
a state JAC. BAS finally designates an equal number of employers and employee 
representatives to be appointed to the state JAC, which then is established as an 
advisory body to both BAS and the WTCS Board. The committee proceeds to draw 
up a set of standards for the trade classification within their industry, and advises 
the WTCS on the industry needs for related instruction. The committee submits the 
standards to BAS, which has to adopt them. If it does, all area standards set by 
local JACs and all indentures have to meet the minimum of these state standards. 
Most of the apprenticeship programs in the building trades operate under both state 
and area standards (BAS, 1987).
These state standards concern the general governance of apprenticeship in the 
occupation, and discuss various topics such as minimum qualifications of applicants, 
conditions of work, appeal procedure, minimum apprentice wage, and related 
school attendance. Minimum skills standards, however, have only been contained 
in a limited way. The standards documents contained so-called ‘Exhibit A’s’ for the 
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various occupations concerned. These contained a one page ‘Schedule of processes 
to be worked’. This schedule listed a limited number of on-the-job work processes, 
and for each a ‘recommended and approximate’ number of hours that must be 
dedicated to work or carrying out this task. The Wisconsin Apprenticeship Law 
states that the work assignments of the employer must allow an apprentice to 
gain a comprehensive knowledge of the trade, and that the apprentice must show 
competency in all the skills of the trade at the end of his apprenticeship (BAS, 
1992). But the minimum on-the-job work processes did not define a certain level 
of competence that is necessary for graduation. Neither was there some form of 
examination that by default would do the same. It was left to the discretion of 
the area JAC whether apprentices who had served their time had acquired the 
necessary level of competence. All in all, this left individual training firms more 
leverage in defining their training programs than is the case in either Germany or 
the Netherlands. 
This was even more true outside the construction sector. There, programs were 
generally not covered by state standards (BAS, 1987), nor were there area JACs 
whose monitoring of training quality could at least establish some informal minimum 
level. The only provision that slightly limited individual firms’ leverage in determining 
the contents of training in industry and service is that they needed formal approval 
of the standards they proposed themselves from BAS (BAS, 1987).
For related instruction, statewide standards should apply for trades in which 
apprentices are employed in more than one area of the state. They must provide 
the same basic related instruction curriculum, meaning that at least 2/3 of the 
school-based curriculum should be similar across technical colleges (BAS, 1987). 
This basic material was typically developed by a state advisory committee. 
However, spokesmen from the metalworking sector indicated that so far each 
technical college pretty much developed its own program, and that there thus 
was little standardization across the state. When apprentices in a certain trade 
were only employed in one part of the state, the technical college had to include 
the employer(s) and (if applicable) the union in the curriculum development, and 
coordinate this with BAS (BAS, 1987).
To sum up, Wisconsin apprenticeship was still primarily time-based by the mid-
nineties, as opposed to the Dutch and German apprenticeship systems. The latter 
are competency based through the combined use of national skills standards and 
final examinations. Outside construction, the firm-specific character of the programs 
causes additional differences in training content. First, there are relatively many 
separate apprenticeable occupations in an area like metalworking. Second, even 
within one apprenticeable occupation such as machinist, there are several different 
‘Exhibit A’s’ being used by different firms throughout the state.
Because the apprenticeable trades in the U.S. trained to a higher standard 
than the newly developed national skills standards, the latter did not have direct 
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consequences for the Wisconsin apprenticeship system. The federal debate on 
youth apprenticeship and skills standards did, however, inspire some reform efforts 
there.
First, BAS was in the process of creating state JACs (now called state apprenticeable 
trade committees) for all trades – where they previously only existed in the 
construction sector. These state apprenticeable trade advisory committees were 
to develop statewide standards for their apprenticeable occupations (BAS, 1993). 
Nominations for employer representatives were sought from employers’ associations 
or from employers that train apprentices, and for employee representatives from 
unions, in-plant local committees or (if these are lacking) from employers. The 
intention was to have fair representation coming from all over the state. In November 
1995, there were twenty state apprenticeable trade committees, covering all of the 
building trades and a large majority of the trades in the industry and service sector. 
Some of them covered only one apprenticeable occupation, but others covered 
more, as another goal of this policy was to stimulate coordination between related 
trades, and if possible achieve a reduction of their number. These committees have 
the following responsibilities (BAS, 1993):
• to advise BAS on policy and program changes in the trade;
• to formulate minimum state standards for the trade and review them every 
five years; these standards should include the period of training, minimum 
work process requirements, related instruction, probation, requirements 
for training companies, journey man/apprentice ratios, apprentice reviews 
and apprentice selections processes;
• to recommend related instruction and delivery service requirements;
• to prepare a policy on proficiency assessment/testing to be utilized by local 
committees in determining apprenticeship credit for previous experience/
education;
• to review and monitor local committee operations;
• to prepare an apprenticeship layoff/transfer policy and procedures and 
assist area committees in its use;
• to assist local committees;
• to assume statewide leadership for the purpose of improving conditions and 
expanding the number of employers using apprentices in the trade.
In addition, BAS policy has tried to move Wisconsin apprenticeship in a more 
competency-based direction (BAS, 1993). One part of their policy was to establish 
minimum core competencies for related instruction in the various trades. To facilitate 
this, the State of Wisconsin almost tripled its categorical aid to technical college 
districts for apprenticeship curriculum development in 1994-95 (Bukolt, 1995a: 
15). But newly developed state standards that govern the work-based component 
of training still did not specify minimum levels of competency (i.e. BAS, 1995), nor 
were they expected to do so in the near future.
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4.6.3.4 Skills standards for the WTCS
Finally, we will turn to the school-based vocational programs offered at the technical 
colleges. There were no statewide skill standards documents that govern these 
programs. But the WTCS Board had the formal task to authorize programs offered at 
individual technical colleges, which should provide some statewide standardization 
(WTCS, 1995e). The WTCS Board needed to approve all associate degree and 
one- and two-year technical diploma programs, and needed to ratify the WTCS 
State Director’s approval for less-than-one-year technical diploma programs and 
apprenticeship programs.
Individual colleges that wanted to start a new program submitted a needs 
assessment plan to the WTCS Board. This included the specific occupational area and 
the tentative program description. On this basis, the college could get permission 
to conduct a program investigation, whose purpose is establishing the need for 
the program. When the program at hand was a replication of a program already 
offered in one or more of the other districts, it had to contain information on those. 
The WTCS board subsequently based its decision on the material gathered in this 
procedure. If a program had been approved, the technical college had to submit a 
program implementation proposal that established the curriculum and verified the 
allocation of resources (WTCS, 1995e).
Throughout the process, the technical college’s advisory committee for the 
program area concerned played an important role. These committees consisted 
of employer and employee representatives from area firms to which the programs 
catered. In all they had nine to fifteen members that had been invited by the 
college. They advised on the program’s budget, curriculum and equipment.
In practice, it was difficult for the WTCS Board to reject proposals or (even more 
so) existing programs. The main reason for this is that the colleges are primarily 
supported through local funding, and that support for the proposal from local 
industry was by definition implied by the local advisory committee’s supporting role 
in the process. Furthermore, once programs had been approved, they subsequently 
would change over time. Substantial program changes were considered program 
modifications and required state board approval. But when individual colleges 
wanted to change a small part of an existing program they only needed approval 
for the new course(s) from the state board. The snowball effect of such changes 
over some years could cause substantial shifts in programs. Consequently, similar 
programs at different colleges have tended to differ in their contents.
Over the years a number of districts with similar programs have worked together 
to identify common occupational competencies. These were validated by industry, 
and were subsequently used to build core courses for the programs. Such core 
curricula were developed for areas like electronics, marketing, administrative 
assistance and mechanical design. The development of national skills standards and 
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of state skills standards for youth apprenticeship and certified cooperative education 
created additional pressure for creating such statewide, industry-validated core 
curricula. Statewide curriculum projects were under way in several program areas 
and planned for the near future for others (e.g. machining). 
As for direct consequences of national skills standards developed by the DOL and 
DOE pilot projects, the WTCS-system was at the time of the field work considering 
two policy options. The first was the development of a new external board with 
subcommittees, such as have been developed in states like Illinois (Occupational 
Skills Standards and Credentialing Council), Indiana (Workforce Proficiency Council) 
and Texas (Texas Skills Standards Board). But the most probable option was that 
the WTCS Board and the existing advisory committees within the system would 
check whether WTCS programs would rally with the national standards. Individual 
colleges were already beginning to utilize specific sets of national standards as 
these were released, to examine their programs and see how they compared to 
these standards. A number of colleges have volunteered to be pilot sites for the 
implementation of the NIMS machining standards.
4.6.4 The Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership
An important autonomous development in Wisconsin was the creation of a jointly 
managed consortium established by a number of metalworking firms and unions 
in the Milwaukee area: the Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership (WRTP). It had 
about two dozen members: firms concentrated in metalworking, electronics and 
related durable goods manufacturing (Rogers & Parker, 1995; Neuenfeldt & Parker, 
1996). They ranged in size from 100 to 3,000 employees, and together employed 
about 30,000 people. These workers were represented by the IAMAW, USWA, UAW, 
the United Paperworkers International Union, the Electrical Workers and other 
industrial unions. The WRTP was governed by an executive council that consisted of 
an equal number of representatives from labor, management and the public sector. 
The latter included Wisconsin’s Secretary of Labor, and directors of area technical 
colleges and area private industry councils.
The consortium’s goal was to support high performance workplaces and family-
supporting jobs in the area. The WRTP was formed at the end of 1992 to (Rogers 
& Parker, 1995: 2):
“effectively organize a region-wide social compact - firms support the regional 
economy by investing in worker training, paying good wages and reorganizing 
production so as to take advantage of  greater workforce capabilities; workers and 
unions develop the skills and accept the responsibility and authority which high 
performance production systems demand of  them; and public agencies support 
the shop floor bargaining by coordinating training and manufacturing extension 
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efforts and by assisting in the creation of  a regional infrastructure to broaden and 
institutionalize the effort.”
Members of the WRTP were committed to:
• jointly administering workplace education and training programs;
• increasing human resource budgets relative to employment levels;
• expanding future workforce programs for unemployed adults and youth;
• benchmarking incumbent and future workforce training to advanced 
practices;
• developing partnership approaches to supplier network assistance.
The WRTP offered its members the opportunity to learn from each other‘s 
experiences, to identify and develop model programs for shared problems, and to 
receive assistance in locating public sector resources that could address their needs. 
The WRTP activities included improving labor-management relations, workplace 
education and training, school-to-work transition, re-employment assistance for 
dislocated workers, and developing industry skills standards and manufacturing 
extension programs. As for the WRTP involvement in school-to-work, the consortium 
played a crucial role in the creation of a youth apprenticeship for manufacturing/
machining and in developing its statewide curriculum.
But long before the WRTP embarked on training for young people, its roots were 
laid by an initiative to stimulate incumbent worker training. In the eighties, the 
Wisconsin AFL-CIO began to encourage the development of workplace education 
centers in firms. These centers were to provide basic skills and literacy training for 
the firm’s incumbent workers. The Wisconsin government launched a program (with 
the help of a DOE grant) to encourage firms to adopt such centers (Rogers & Parker, 
1995; NCEE, 1995; Neuenfeldt & Parker, 1996). The program provided matching 
grants to firms that started such centers for three years. Firms received funds to 
cover a declining share of the costs over this period (75, 50 and 25%). After those 
three years it was hoped that firms would continue on their own. Many did, and 
have even expanded the centers, both as to the number of employees they serve 
and the kinds of training offered. Building on the previously acquired basic skills, 
some firms embarked on technical training. Some firms for instance purchased a 
CNC-miniature machining tool to train their workers. Over the years, more than 
100 workplace education centers were set up in Wisconsin (Neuenfeldt & Parker, 
1996).
Entrance barriers to such workplace education centers were low, which seems 
the most important reason for their success. The facility was open to all workers 
that wanted to improve their skills. Precise regulations varied per firm, but typically 
workers could spend some time there during working hours. They could use books, 
videotapes and computer programs for self-learning, or sign-up for customized 
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courses. The centers had an independent instructor, usually from a technical college. 
His or her independence meant that workers did not have to fear that revealing skills 
deficiencies would have consequences for managerial decisions concerning them. 
The centers were operated by joint labor-management steering committees, which 
provided a further reassurance to workers. These committees in turn established 
peer advisor networks to ensure that workers could gain information on the centers 
from a direct colleague, while the committee was informed on workers’ ideas about 
the center. 10% of the production workforce of seventeen WRTP member firms 
participated in such centers for over one year (Neuenfeldt & Parker, 1996).
The WRTP was certainly not the only new partnership in the State of Wisconsin 
that dealt with training issues. Section 4.6.2.3 pointed out that creating local 
partnerships is at the heart of Wisconsin’s school-to-work policy. But a crucial 
difference between these partnerships and the WRTP was that, while the former 
confined themselves to future worker training, the latter dealt with incumbent 
worker training, future worker training and other related issues in the same firms at 
the same time. It was exactly the combination of these issues that gave the WRTP 
an edge over school-to-work partnerships.
On the one hand, we saw that the functioning of internal labor markets has been 
an important cause for the cumbersome school-to-work transition for many American 
youngsters (section 4.4). School-to-work policies could only be really successful if 
they could change the operation of such markets. Firms cannot suddenly adopt high 
performance workplaces when the only skills upgrade to their workforce is a limited 
number of newly recruited well-trained school-leavers. Their incumbent workforce 
will need similar skills, since they have to operate in the same workplaces, and most 
of them will need further training to acquire these. Furthermore, if firms invested 
heavily in youth training but not in training for their incumbent workforce, the danger 
is that new recruits would occupy advanced positions in those markets at the cost of 
those incumbent workers. The equal involvement of firms and unions in the WRTP 
implies a better safeguard of those incumbent workers’ rights than school-to-work 
partnerships, where unions tend to occupy a minor position, and where incumbent 
worker training issues are not on the agenda. And when incumbent workers feel 
secure, management will face a much easier task in implementing the changes to 
the workplaces they consider necessary. Thus (Neuenfeldt & Parker, 1996):
“The WRTP is designed to provide the necessary institutional support for extending 
this new bargain between labor and management thought manufacturing.”
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4.7 Conclusion: American reform policies between a rock and a  
 hard place
Both at the federal level and in the state in Wisconsin, VET reform policies in the 
early nineteen nineties aimed to strengthen certain institutional aspects that are 
key strengths of the German apprenticeship system such as:
• work-based learning and youth apprenticeship
• skill standards systems
• career centers for vocational guidance
• partnerships.
American VET reforms at the time originated as small but focused programs 
to experiment with specific institutional models such as youth apprenticeship 
and national occupational skills standards. Later, they evolved into much more 
comprehensive but less focused programs. This particularly applied to federal 
school-to-work policies. These eventually did not aim for a specific national school-
to-work transition model, but were designed to enable states to develop their own 
systems, within very broad limits. They permitted a wide variation in interpretation 
and adaptation to local needs and circumstances (NCEE, 1995). In addition, the 
federal school-to-work legislation was written to provide great flexibility not only 
to state governments, but also to people at the local level of governance. While 
this aspect has significantly contributed to getting the legislation passed, it may 
undermine the policy goals when it comes to implementation (Tucker, 1994a: 7). 
The state and federal funds available for school-to-work policies were just seed 
money to trigger fundamental changes in the standard operating procedures of 
schools and companies. The danger was that (Tucker, 1994a: 15):
“School-to-work transition easily could become another marginal program added to 
all the others, a vaguely defined collection of  activities, each of  which serves only a 
handful of  students, mostly perceived as alternative programs for youngsters who do 
not fit in elsewhere.”
As for the national skills standards policies, these became not so much less focused, 
but rather their focus seemed to shift. The goal of developing national skills standards 
as a specific mechanism to improve transparency and accountability of VET programs 
gradually took a back seat to the goal of stimulating the development of high-
performance workplaces. These two goals are connected. Only if firms abandon 
low-skills strategies and adopt high-skills ones will their qualification requirements 
for new recruits rise. Only then will they be inclined to actually use national skills 
standards in their recruitment procedures. And only then will individual schools be 
forced to use those standards as benchmarks for their own vocational programs. 
As long as the demand side of the (youth) labor market fails to sufficiently demand 
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and use high skills of young workers, improvements on the institutionalization of 
the supply of VET will be in vain (cf. NCEE, 1995, and section 4.4). But at the same 
time, we have learned from our analysis from the German high-skill equilibrium that 
the availability of well-trained young generation of  VET graduates with reliable and 
comparable VET credentials makes it easier for firms to opt for high-skills strategies. 
The experiences of the DOE and DOL pilot projects showed that it is difficult enough 
to develop national skills standards and promote them with government support in 
a country that essentially lacks such a tradition. With limited funds, the NSSB could 
in effect only finance a limited set of additional pilot projects. Its careful policy may 
have been very prudent in the American context of an educational system that 
has always been very decentralized. But it could not fill the skills standards gap in 
American VET systems for the foreseeable future.
American VET reform thus never came close developing a comprehensive 
German-style VET system that some (e.g. Hamilton, 1990) called for. This gives 
these American VET reform efforts a somewhat paradoxical character. One the 
hand, reforms tried to strengthen German-style institutions to help improve the 
operation of their market for intermediate skills. On the other, the reform ambitions 
stopped well short of building a comprehensive system of regulated work-based 
learning. Our previous analysis of German apprenticeship has shown  that the fact 
that German apprenticeship system has a near monopoly on VET in the German 
youth labor market is an important factor in its success. The fact that most firms 
train their apprentices creates a potential ‘lemon’ problem for those who would try 
to opt out of their own training efforts; and the fact that future skilled workers to 
an important extent enter German firms as  an apprentice continues to make it 
attractive for German youth to opt for such an apprenticeship.  In order to generate 
the necessary support and commitment, American reform efforts understandably 
focused on ‘room to maneuver’ for local actors in choosing their own strategies. The 
floundering existence of adult apprenticeship in the State of Wisconsin for almost a 
century, that despite similar legal roots as German apprenticeship does not generate 
much work-based training, serves as an important warning that just copying such 
institutions by itself is not enough to achieve similar results (cf. section 4.4.2). 
Firms’ strategies are vital to the outcome in markets for intermediate skills. And to 
the extent that American school-to-work policies (with some exception of some of 
the skills standards efforts) did not explicitly target firms’ labor market strategies 
themselves, major changes in the type of skill equilibrium seem unlikely.  In this 
sense, the example of the WRTP offered an interesting additional policy avenue as 
it started from the firms’ needs and strategies, and linked to school-to-work policies 
from there (section 4.6.4). 
The development of industry-wide coordinated VET systems in the U.S. is severely 
hampered by a number of characteristics of the American industrial relations system 
(section cf. 4.3):
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• First and foremost, the prevalence of non-union firms that (by definition) 
are not covered by collective bargaining agreements severely complicates 
the coordination of worker and employer interests in sectors;
• Second, the decentralized character of collective bargaining, which occurs 
predominantly at firm level, makes it difficult to achieve such coordination 
even among unionized firms within a certain sector. It is no coincidence that 
the highest level of sectoral coordination has been achieved in unionized 
construction where there is some tradition of multi-employer collective 
bargaining agreements;
• Third, the relative underdevelopment of employers’ associations in the U.S. 
also makes them, due to their lack of tasks in collective bargaining, less 
capable of acting as accepted representatives of an entire sector to validate 
skills standards or assessment tests30. And it makes them less of a factor to 
discourage poaching strategies by individual firms.
• Fourth, for unionized manufacturing, the basis for an industry-wide 
coordinated training strategy is further eroded by the fact that unions 
are not organized along clear sectoral or craft lines. Workers in similar 
firms and similar occupations are organized by several unions (cf. section 
4.3.3). The decentralized organization of American manufacturing labor has 
undoubtedly contributed to the flourishing of American-style internal labor 
markets in the U.S. It also provides for a clear contrast with the building 
trades in the U.S., where unions are distinguished along craft lines. There, 
one union represents all unionized workers in the same craft, and provides 
the basis for a truly occupational labor market;
• Fifth, the traditional strategy of American industrial unions to stay clear 
of production control at firm level (Rogers, 1995) has long implied their 
neglect of firms’ training policies as an important area for a strategic union 
policy;
• Sixth, the craft nature of American construction unions has made unionized 
construction firms very vulnerable to low-wage competition from non-union 
competitors. The unintended consequence of this has been an erosion of 
the union share in sectoral production and, consequently, of the union-
dominated apprenticeship systems.
In addition, the decentralized nature of American education provides another 
formidable obstacle. The federal government can only indirectly influence VET 
by funding specific policy programs and pilot projects. State governments have 
more direct regulatory powers. But the example of Wisconsin shows that even 
within one state, the various publicly funded educational institutions (not to 
mention the private ones) have tended to operate with considerable autonomy 
and at considerable distance from one another. There has been no comprehensive 
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Department of Education to coordinate their development as in the Netherlands or 
in German states. In addition, individual schools and colleges within the various 
public systems have considerable autonomy. While such autonomy may be quite 
welcome in many areas, in the U.S. it extends to areas where some constraints on 
that autonomy seem welcome. National or statewide academic and skills standards 
and assessment procedures are prime examples.
Rather than look  to Germany as inspiration for American VET reform, others 
have thus pointed at the Japanese example. Just as in the U.S., vocational training 
in Japan is largely something for individual firms to embark on, but  (contrary to 
the U.S.) Japanese firms have been delivering rather broadly based training for 
their workforce (Sako, 1991). However, as Marsden & Ryan (1991a; 1991b) point 
out, the American labor market has historically also lacked the culture of lifetime 
employment that ensures that the profits of training investments will be reaped by 
the current Japanese employer. To envision American firms fundamentally altering 
their inclination to numerical flexibility and ‘hire and fire’ seems at least as bold an 
expectation as to picture more coordination through collective action.
What Germany and the Japan have in common is that their major firms share an 
action orientation, a conception of a control, in which their own training investments 
in their workers are key to these firms’ strategies And this creates a feedback effect 
that stimulates other firms as well as youth to also invest in training. Any state will 
have a hard time trying to move its own business community in a similar direction, 
particularly as it is not as if firms training strategies were an intended consequence 
of state intervention there. And the American government faces an even steeper 
challenge than most other states because of the aforementioned barriers.
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Notes chapter 4
1 Credits are the units used to measure the size of a course in American education. 
However, since there are different credit systems in use, one credit does not always denote 
the same workload. In the Wisconsin K-12 system, one credit typically corresponds to a 
course that meets each day for one period of 45 to 55 minutes, for up to 180 school days 
(DPI, 1995b: 28). In Wiscon sin’s technical college system, a two-year associate degree 
program consists of 64 to 72 credits.
2 The name ‘less-than-four-year colleges’ would actually be more precise, since some 
of them are three-year colleges (NCES, 1994: 66). Since the latter are the exception 
throughout the U.S., and completely lacking in Wisconsin, we will stick to the conventional 
and shorter-term ‘two-year colleges’.
3 Wisconsin is one of sixteen American states that has a chief state school offi cer that is 
elected by the population (Chubb & Moe, 1990: 279). It is the only state that does not 
have an elected or appointed state board of education next to that chief state school 
officer.
4 Thus, the only choice students and their parents have is between one public school 
and (much more expensive) private schools. The exception where choice among public 
schools was possible has been the Milwaukee school district. To avoid racial segregation, 
the district created so-called spe cialty schools. Such schools have a designated number 
of seats in one or more specialty areas, for which parents from other neighborhoods can 
apply. These specialty areas can be vocational as well as academic. In the mid nineties, 
all Milwaukee public high schools were so-called city-wide high schools, which means that 
students from throughout the city can apply for admittance. Since 1989, Milwaukee has 
been experimenting with public subsidization of private school attendance by Milwaukee 
children from poor families through the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (Toulmin, 
1995).
5 In addition, there are two separate state schools, one for the deaf and one for the 
visually handicapped (DPI, 1995b).
6 Wiscon sin has one very large school district (Milwaukee) that accounts for 11.4% of all 
public school enrollments in 1992-93, and thus significantly raises the statewide average 
(Snyder & Hoffman, 1995: 75).
7 In addition, there are three smaller types of general state aid (Toulmin & Bukolt, 1995: 
14).
8 Cf. Bukolt & Toulmin (1995) for an overview.
9 Prior to 1994, the system was called Vocational, Technical and Adult Educa tion (VTAE) 
System. Besides the 16 technical colleges in this system, Wis consin currently has two 
community colleges of a new type (WLRB, 1995: 641). These are supported exclusively 
by local public funding. Together, they enrolled 676 students in fall 1994. Because of 
their very small size, they are not further discussed in this report.
10 Cf. Bauer (1991: 4-6) for an overview of the division of various responsibil ities between 
the individual district boards and the state board. In section 4.6, we will address the 
responsibilities for the development and modification of WTCS.
11 In addition, districts can issue a debt levy, for instance to finance building projects 
(Bukolt, 1995a: 9).
12 Students from other states pay considerably higher tuition fees, unless there is a 
specific arrangement between the two states concerned. At that time, Minnesota 
residents could attend any Wisconsin technical college and pay the same tuition as 
Wisconsin residents (and vice versa). Similar arrangements existed between the three 
northern WTCS districts and two community colleges in bordering Michigan’s Upper 
Peninsula; and between three Wisconsin technical college districts and some community 
colleges in Illinois (Bukolt, 1995a: 28-29).
13 Cf. Van Lieshout (1996b: 23-36) for a more detailed analysis of Wisconsin apprenticeship 
and its governance.
14 Technical colleges also offer some pre-apprenticeship programs that can serve as 
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a gateway into apprenticeship. Students can transfer credits from the former to the 
latter’s related instruction component.
15 Cf. BAS (1987) and Van Lieshout (1996b: 27) for an extensive overview of the particular 
task area JACs may fulfill.
16 The other four are barbering, cosmetology, sprinkler fitting and funeral direct ing.
17 Sometimes workers of a plant or firm are represented by more than one union.
18 Some unions (for instance the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace 
Workers) also organize workers in Canada.
19 No labor market can function adequately if each and every entry-level position 
could exclusively be offered as an apprenticeship position. This is even more true in 
a sector where production fluctuates as heavily as it does in construction. Thus, it has 
been possible (in times when the supply of journeymen fell short of demand) to buy a 
journeyman card from a union upon demonstration of expe rience in the trade. If the 
applicant’s skills are found to be deficient, he can be trained as a so-called apprentice-
improver. He then receives a wage higher than a starting apprentice does, but lower 
than a journey man does.
20 ABC does not have a monopoly on organizing non-union construction firms. Associated 
General Contractors (AGC), the employers’ association with which construc tion unions 
do most of their business, organizes besides unionized contractors also non-union 
contractors. The latter appear to be the occasional non-union contractors that participate 
in JAC apprenticeships. On the other hand, ABC itself is not exclusively non-union. 
Approximately 5% of ABC members in Wisconsin are unionized.
21 For instance, an NTMA chapter in Wisconsin has a training committee where employers 
discuss training issues; it provides access to materials such as training videos and 
apprentice logbooks that are developed by its national organization; and it has itself 
produced a promotion video for the industry.
22 Keltner (1995) observes on the basis of a German-American comparison of the banking 
sector that the extensive vertical differentiation of their work organi zation and their 
focus on specialized training stimulate American banks to stick to competitive strategies 
that focus on price and consumer comfort. German banks, on the other hand, try to 
capture new markets through the excellent advisory capabilities of their employ ees, and 
thus employ a broad human resources development strategy. Keltner argues that the 
latter seems a more promising strategy for banks in both coun tries.
23 But they have typically done well in reading and literature (Stedman, 1994: 24).
24 Cf. Van Lieshout (1996b) for an extensive comparison of the German and Wisconsin 
apprenticeship regimes.
25 Wisconsin was one of six states that would have cooperated with the federal government 
to establish a statewide youth apprenticeship system if the Youth Apprenticeship Act had 
been passed by Congress and signed by the President. We will discuss the subsequent 
development of an independent state youth apprenticeship system in Wisconsin in 
section 4.6.2.
26 In addition, the importance of class rank in college admission procedures (cf. section 
4.2.6) has had a similar effect.
27 The National Skill Standards Board (NSSB) did subsequently sponsor a number of 
projects to try to build linkages between academic and skills standards at the state level 
(NSSB website).
28 Of the 168 identified programs, 56 concern executive, administrative and management 
personnel, and another 31 concern professional specialties. 16 programs concern 
technicians, 24 concern precision production, and only 6 concern operators (Wills, 
1994a: 16).
29 In 1994, an estimated 17,000 students were enrolled in some form of work-based 
learning (DILHR et al., 1994). About 7,000 of these were (traditional) cooperative 
education students. This number has been over 11,000 in the past. The other 10,000 
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were students enrolled in work-study programs, job shadowing, internships, on-the-job 
training and some youth apprentices.
30 In addition, legal issues necessitate validation procedures even if employers as -
sociations develop standards and assessment procedures (cf. Wills, 1994a, p. 5-6).
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5   The Dutch market for intermediate skills
5.1   Introduction
Given the substantial differences between the German and American market for 
intermediate skills and their institutionalization, it will hardly come as a surprise 
that the Dutch version, in many respects, occupies some sort of middle ground 
between those two. One of those respects is the stability of the institutionalization 
of the Dutch market, and the scope of its reform over the past decades. On the 
surface, it would appear that the Dutch governance regime and the underlying 
market have substantially changed over the past decade due to a series of reform 
efforts and policy processes culminating in a new VET Act in 1996. At the same 
time, dominant governing principles as well as the underlying choices of individuals 
and firms show more continuity than those vast policy efforts would suggest.
 This chapter will analyze the governance regime that governs the Dutch market 
for intermediate skills, and the way in which various actors respond to the incentive 
structure it poses. Like in Germany, this regime has supported a seemingly stable 
high-skills equilibrium; but there are interesting differences in the exact constitution 
and operation of this equilibrium between both countries. The extensive field work 
done for the study ‘Beroepswijs onderwijs’ for the ‘Wetenschappelijke Raad voor 
het Regeringsbeleid’ (WRR; Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policies), 
August-December 1992, served as the backbone and starting point for the analysis 
(and, as has been discussed in chapter 1, for this entire comparative project). This 
included 45 interviews with representatives of the national government (i.e. various 
government departments), of national peak employers’ associations and union 
federations, of employers’ associations and unions in construction, metalworking, 
business services and retail, of small and large firms in those four sectors, and also 
with upper secondary and tertiary VET schools and schools for related instruction 
(Dercksen & Van Lieshout, 1993: 18-19). From 1992-1997, 17 subsequent 
face to face interviews were conducted with representatives from the same and 
additional organizations, such as the association of the sector-specific national 
bodies that set skills standards in Dutch VET (Colo, ‘vereniging van kenniscentra 
beroepsonderwijs en bedrijfsleven’), and the association of Dutch VET colleges 
(Bve raad, ‘Beroepsonderwijs en Volwasseneneducatie raad’). From 1997-2003, 
(interviews in the process of) research projects for the Hugo Sinzheimer Instituut 
(HSI), as well as various seminars I attended and (co-)hosted, and additional phone 
interviews, have benefited me in further shaping this chapter.
Section 5.2 will discuss the Dutch socio-economic order, industrial relations 
and some key aspects of labor market governance and operation. Section 5.3 
will portray the Dutch education system and its various components. Section 5.4 
will analyze Dutch school-to-work transition patterns. Section 5.5 will portray the 
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aforementioned process of gradual but continuous Dutch VET reform over the 
past decades. Finally, section 5.6 will conclude with an analysis of the Dutch skill 
equilibrium, and the incentives it provides for firms and individuals to invest in 
training, comparative to its German counterpart.
5.2   Socio-economic order, industrial relations and labor market  
   governance in the Netherlands
5.2.1  The Dutch state and socio-economic governance
Unlike the federal states of Germany and the United States, the Netherlands is 
a nation-state. The Netherlands does have an intermediate regional level of 
government between local municipalities and national state, as it consists of twelve 
provinces. These provinces enjoy substantially less power and authority, and fulfill 
less prominent governing roles than either German or American states. As they fulfill 
no prominent governing roles in the Dutch labor and VET markets, we will abstain 
from further discussing them. The local level is generally more important than the 
provincial level from a governance perspective, as municipalities (496 in 2002) fulfill 
various roles prescribed by national legislation, mostly in implementing national 
programs/systems. But while municipalities do fulfill legally institutionalized roles 
for adult education, they currently do not have such roles for VET, which is why we 
will also abstain from further discussing them. Dutch labor market, education and 
VET governance regimes are thus distinctly national, with (traditionally, and from an 
international comparative perspective) relatively minor regional or local differences. 
The focus in this chapter will thus be on national legislation and policies, as well as 
on the sector level, where collective bargaining and skills standard setting bodies 
are important components of labor market and VET governance regimes.
 Just like in Germany (and in contrast to the U.S.), the Dutch state is actively 
involved in economic adjustment, in cooperation and negotiation with private agents 
within an elaborate institutional environment, and collective adaptability plays a 
distinct role (cf. CPB, 1997: 139-140). Katzenstein’s characterization of democratic 
or social corporatism applies very well to the Dutch case (Visser & Hemerijck, 1997: 
91-92):
“…an ideology of  partnership, expressed at the national level; a relatively 
centralized and concentrated system of  interest groups: and voluntary 
and informal coordination of  conflicting objectives through continuing 
bargaining between interest groups, state bureaucracy, and political parties” 
(Katzenstein, 1985: 32).
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In the Netherlands, this general characterization has historically taken a very 
unique shape known as pillarization (‘verzuiling’). With the northern majority 
of the country historically Protestant, but a significant Roman Catholic minority 
dominating the south, Dutch society has had a historical need for pacification of 
religious tensions and, building on a tradition of guild-like political organization, 
pillarization emerged as the Dutch solution to this problem (cf. Daalder, 1971). 
The term reflects the segmented organization of Dutch social life in the broadest 
sense in separate, functionally equivalent but ideologically distinct, organizations 
over most of the 20th century. Each pillar was based on one separate ideology 
and consisted of all social organizations identified by and adhering to this ideology 
- from schools to unions to political parties to sports clubs to radio and television 
networks and a great many more. Four pillars can be distinguished. Two of these 
have a religious basis, and result from the historical fact that the northern part 
of the country has been predominantly Protestant, while the southern part has 
been predominantly Catholic. The other two have a political basis, and represent 
the liberal spirit1 of the 19th century, versus the social-democratic/socialist critique 
of (pre-modern) capitalism. Until late in the 20th century, all the organizations 
a typical Dutch citizen would join over the course of his/her life would belong to 
one of these pillars. As a result, social contacts between these pillars would be 
minimized; cross-pillar marriages, for instance, were usually actively discouraged 
by parents and other meddling adults (i.e. ministers and priests), and were 
controversial at the very least. And for most of the century, each pillar was strictly 
controlled by a small elite. These elites cooperated with each other and negotiated 
compromises to achieve a remarkably stable national order (cf. Lijphart, 1968). 
Since the 1960s, however, the pillars have started to disintegrate, as a result of 
(among other factors) secularization, mass individualization and minority and 
gender emancipation. Protestant and Catholic organizations, for instance, have 
often merged; the (historical) ideological background of a particular organization 
has become a less dominant factor in shaping its views; and cross-organization 
interest and position coordination within each pillar (e.g. between a Roman Catholic 
union, Catholic political party and Catholic employers’ organization) has loosened.
Politics offers a good and relevant example of this pillarization phenomenon and 
its weakening grip on Dutch society. The Netherlands, like Germany, has a multi-
party political system. Various Christian parties have for a long time dominated 
Dutch politics, forming subsequent center-right or center–left coalition governments 
with either the right-wing VVD (‘Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie’) party or 
the social democrat Labor party PvdA (‘Partij van de Arbeid’), occasionally joined by 
additional smaller parties. For most of the 20th century, the Christian parties CHU 
and ARP reflected different religious/ideological streams within the Protestant pillar, 
while KVP represented the substantial Roman Catholic minority. What would have 
been inconceivable before that period happened by 1980: these three Christian 
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parties merged into one Christian democratic party: CDA (‘Christen Democratisch 
Appèl’). CDA continued to dominate Dutch politics through alternating coalitions 
until another political landslide occurred in 1994. A large CDA loss in the 1994 
elections led to a historical novelty in Dutch politics: a so-called ‘purple’ coalition 
of VVD, PvdA and D’66, (a smaller, relatively young left of center democratic party 
that had always promoted such a coalition). It marked the first government since 
1918 that did not include CDA or one of its three ancestors. After two purple 
coalitions, however, CDA regained its central position as the largest party in the 
2002 elections.
Coalition governments and pillarization have reinforced consensus building, 
centrist political solutions, and incremental change as dominant Dutch political 
strategies. The Netherlands has inherited a distinctive legacy of a state dependent 
on private groups for the management of public affairs (Hemerijck, 1993). Dutch 
Christian democrat political doctrine has provided the ideological basis for this 
tradition, both through the Protestant principle of ‘sovereignty in one’s own circle’ 
and through the Catholic subsidiarity principle2. In a nutshell, both principles imply 
that responsibilities should reside at the lowest possible level where they can be 
exercised effectively. These principles have enabled the aforementioned pillarization 
pattern of Dutch social organization to develop as it did: it calls for the state to 
remain reluctant in seizing (full) governance control, leaving room for the myriad 
of Christian, social or other organizations to fulfill their important governing roles. 
The principles simultaneously allowed for decentralized governance patterns within 
each pillar - particularly relevant for the Protestant-Christian community whose 
religion has a decisively local organizational pattern, contrary to the pope-centered 
governance regime of the Roman Catholic Church. These roots have helped to 
shape a Dutch tradition in which state governance, in most fields, relies heavily 
on various intermediate social organizations that fulfill prominent governing roles. 
Industrial relations (section 5.2.2) and labor market policy and social security have 
been cases in point (section 5.2.3).
5.2.2  Dutch industrial relations
Both Germany and the Netherlands are characterized as corporatist industrial 
relations systems: there is active state interference with industrial relations, but 
usually in consultation with the social partners, which implies active state support 
for employer’s associations and unions and their mutual relations (Van Waarden, 
1995). As in Germany (and contrary to the firm-level focus in American industrial 
relations), important responsibilities reside with unions and employers’ associations 
at the sector level. Dutch industrial relations show, however, more strongly evolved 
roles for national peak associations than in Germany, and more instances of tripartite 
governance (with the state and the social partners sharing responsibilities).
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5.2.2.1 Unions
Like German unions, Dutch unions are examples of the industrial-political 
union model (Visser, 1995). And both countries’ labor movements stand out in 
international comparative perspective with high official-to-member ratios, with 
substantial staff available to them, and a high status (Visser, 1995). But, contrary 
to Germany, their development in the Netherlands has also been shaped through 
the pillarization pattern, with traditionally separate social-democratic, Catholic and 
Protestant-Christian peak associations with their own sector affiliates. Today, there 
are three important union peak associations. The social-democrat and Catholic peak 
associations merged in the seventies into the Confederation of Dutch Trade Unions 
(‘Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging’ or FNV), with some catholic affiliates instead 
opting for a merger with the Protestant-Christian peak association in the Christian-
National Union Confederation (‘Christelijk-Nationaal Vakverbond’ or CNV). In 1999, 
FNV represented 64% of Dutch union members, CNV 19% (calculations based on 
CBS figures cited in Nagelkerke & de Nijs, 2001: 27), and a third peak association 
11%. This third peak association is organized more on a sector- and occupational 
specific basis: the Union of White Collar and Senior Staff Associations (‘Vereniging 
van Hoger Personeel’ or VHP). These unions enjoy no exclusive jurisdictions and 
must therefore cooperate in collective bargaining, where single table bargaining 
with employers is the rule (Visser & Hemerijck, 1997). Union membership has 
declined substantially: from 40% in 1979 to 27% in 1999 (CBS figures, cited in 
Nagelkerke & de Nijs, 2001: 27). The strongly institutionalized roles of Dutch unions 
at the various levels (to be elaborated upon below) have, however, so far prevented 
this membership decline from translating into a substantial deterioration of their 
influence. Union membership is substantially higher among 24-64 year old workers 
(28%) than among youths and young adults under 25 (13%; CBS figures for 1997, 
cited in Nagelkerke & de Nijs, 2001: 28). The Dutch labor movement is considered 
to be somewhat more intensely integrated in a vertical direction (particularly as 
their peak associations have bargaining mandates from their members, which their 
German counterparts lack). The German labor movement, on the other hand, is 
considered to be somewhat more intensely integrated in a horizontal direction – 
meaning they unite a relatively broad range of people with different backgrounds 
and interests (Visser, 1995).
The dominant level of union organization is the sector: FNV and CNV consist 
of separate unions organizing workers across broad economic sectors. The recent 
merger (1998) of four large FNV affiliates (the industrial union, the transport 
union, the food sector union and the service sector union) into ‘FNV Bondgenoten’ 
constitutes the prime example of a further enlargement of union scope. This is 
now the largest FNV affiliate (2000: 490,300 members), with the civil servant 
union second (360,000 members), the construction and wood union third (159,600 
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members), and the other FNV affiliates around 50,000 members or below (CBS 
figures, cited in Nagelkerke & de Nijs, 2001: 30). Overall union membership is below 
average in financial services (including banking), and above average in construction 
(Nagelkerke & de Nijs, 2001: 29); metalworking occupies an intermediate position. 
Unions organizing particular occupations (e.g. Association of Dutch Commercial 
Pilots, an MHP member), function levels (e.g. the Brotherhood of Fire Fighters) or 
firms (e.g. the Association of Higher Personnel Philips) do exist, but they are the 
exception.
5.2.2.2 Employers’ associations
Dutch employers are well organized: nearly all firms with 30 or more workers are 
members of an association, and membership levels are in the 80%-90% range (Van 
de Wijngaert, 1994, cited in CPB, 1997; Van Ruysseveldt & Visser, 1996: 221). In 
1981, there were no less than 1,254 employers’ associations in the Netherlands – 
one association for every 173 firms (Van Waarden, 1995: 71).  The Dutch system of 
employers’ organizations is characterized by a reasonably high level of cohesion (Van 
Ruysseveldt & Visser, 1996: 221). VNO-NCW (‘Vereniging Verbond van Nederlandse 
Ondernemingen - Nederlands Christelijk Werkgeversverbond’) and MKB (‘Midden- 
en Kleinbedrijf)’ Nederland are the peak employers’ associations. VNO-NCW is the 
product of a 1996 merger of two former pillarized peak associations, a general one 
(VNO) and a Christian one (NCW), that had previously institutionalized their mutual 
cooperation in a Council of Dutch Employers’ Associations (‘Raad van Nederlandse 
Werkgeversverbonden’ ). VNO-NCW, (as were its immediate ancestors) is a mixed 
general association that combines social and economic interest organization (Van 
Waarden, 1995). VNO-NCW members are roughly 150 sector level employers’ 
associations and 250 individual, mostly large, firms (Nagelkerke & de Nijs, 
2001: 38). In all, roughly 80,000 firms are covered this way. Almost all Dutch 
firms with more than 500 workers are a VNO-NCW member. Some VNO-NCW 
members are large federations of employers’ associations themselves, such as FME 
(‘Vereniging voor de Metaal- en Elektrotechnische Industrie’, the Federation for 
the Metalworking and Electrotechnical Industry) and AVBB (‘Algemeen Verbond 
Bouwbedrijf’, General Association of Construction Firms). MKB Nederland is the 
central employers’ peak association for small and medium-sized firms. It consists of 
approximately 125 sector level associations and 400 regional and local associations, 
thus covering approximately 125,000 firms. All peak associations (including those 
from the agricultural sector not discussed here) cooperate and coordinate their 
affairs in the Council of Central Employers’ Associations RCO (‘Raad van Centrale 
Ondernemingsorganisaties’)3.
 At the sector level, Dutch employer’s associations are relatively differentiated, 
which allows for inter-association competition between different associations (Van 
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Waarden, 1995). The membership density of the dominant sector employers’ 
associations in construction and metalworking (93% and 87%) are, however, even 
higher than in Germany (69% and 73%; Van Waarden: 90). So while the associational 
system in general is highly differentiated (and thus low in cohesion), important 
individual associations are among the most highly developed and representative 
associations in the world (Van Waarden, 1990).
Collective bargaining
Collective bargaining has been institutionalized by the 1927 Collective Bargaining 
Agreements Act (‘Wet op de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst’ or CAO Act). Initially, 
this Act merely covered employers who participated in bargaining themselves, 
and thus implied firm-level regulation. It required employers to apply collective 
bargaining agreements to all their personnel, not just to union members (Albeda 
& Dercksen, 1994: 62). The 1937 Collective Bargaining Agreement Extension Act 
(‘Wet op het algemeen verbindend en onverbindend verklaren van bepalingen van 
collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten’ or AVV Act) enabled the extension (or abolition) 
of stipulations of collective bargaining agreements by the Minister of Social Affairs 
to cover all (not merely organized) employers and workers in a sector. Extension 
is conditional upon a majority requirement: a collective bargaining agreement’s 
conditions should already apply to a substantial majority of the employed in the 
sector (Albeda & Dercksen, 1994: 106). Stipulations can be abolished on the 
grounds of conflicting with general interest and/or a too substantial disadvantage 
to legitimate interests of third parties (Albeda & Dercksen, 1994: 106).
As in Germany, and contrary to the US, the large majority of Dutch collective 
bargaining agreements is concluded at the sector level, between sector level unions 
and employers’ associations. In 2000, there were 185 sector collective bargaining 
agreements covering 4,360,000 workers directly (4,910,500 if we include workers 
covered through extension) and 767 firm level collective bargaining agreements 
covering 785,000 workers (Arbeidsinspectie, 2000). The duration of agreements 
is mostly one year or sometimes two years. The number of firm level agreements 
has doubled since the seventies. Most firm level agreements are concluded by large 
firms: they tend to cover 700-800 workers on average (Albeda & Dercksen, 1994: 
111). Firm level agreements are exempted from the extension of a relevant sector 
agreement only if at least one of the unions signing the firm level agreement has 
either also signed the sector agreement, or is organized at the sector level; or is a 
member of one of the aforementioned peak associations (Albeda & Dercksen, 1994: 
110). This principle intends to limit the risk of firm level agreements undercutting 
sector agreements.
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5.2.2.3 Works councils
Different from Germany, co-determination at the enterprise level is virtually 
absent in the Netherlands (CPB, 1997: 334). As in Germany, works councils are 
institutionalized at the firm level through a national Act: the 1950 Works Councils 
Act (‘Wet op de Ondernemingsraden’). Works councils are compulsory for firms 
with over 100 employees or at least 35 employees for more than one third of 
normal working hours. In firms that do not meet these requirements, employers 
are required to consult their workforce at least twice a year. Works councils have 
mandatory advisory rights towards management in some areas (e.g. important 
changes in work organization, group-wise recruitment or hiring of labor) and right 
of consent in others (e.g. pay system, recruitment/lay-off/promotion policies, 
training and assessment). These rights have been gradually expanded with various 
amendments to the original Act. With its 1998 amendments, works councils have 
gained the opportunity to conclude a works council agreement with the firm. This 
may include stipulations regarding labor conditions as long as these conform to 
legal and collective bargaining standards. This change accommodates the practice 
that had already emerged where works councils concluded side agreements outside 
their legal jurisdiction with employers, to accommodate firm specific solutions to 
situations not taken care of by law or collective bargaining agreement (Nagelkerke 
& de Nijs, 2001: 187-189). Members are elected on a personal basis, but union 
lists of candidates dominate the vote (by 69% in 1993 (Van Ruysseveldt & Visser, 
1996: 231)). Unions have also provided training for many works council members, 
and union shop stewards have generally had good contacts with (or have been a 
member of) works councils. Dutch unions are, however, not strongly represented on 
the shop floor and exercise only a marginal influence within firms, except indirectly 
through the aforementioned works councils (Van Ruysseveldt & Visser, 1996: 232). 
But Dutch unions have not been able to capture works councils to the extent of their 
German counterparts (Visser, 1995), and German worker/union influence at the 
firm level in general and through works councils in particular is considered stronger 
(CPB, 1997: 337/338).
5.2.2.4 National level consultations
Besides the sector and firm level, Dutch industrial relations have always been 
strongly evolved and institutionalized at the national level. Two important institutions 
emerged in the wake of World War II: the Labor Foundation and the Socio-Economic 
Council.
Peak associations of employers and unions created the Labor Foundation (‘Stichting 
van de arbeid’ or STAR) in 1944 (Albeda & Dercksen, 1994). This foundation is a 
forum for their joint negotiations that may result in central agreements covering 
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their members. Intention agreements rather than binding central agreements are, 
however, the rule (Nagelkerke & de Nijs, 2001). But these will still have an informal 
effect on members, and the repeated consultations in this body (as well as the SER, 
discussed below) contribute towards generally good relationships between both 
parties - certainly as compared to the generally conflict-ridden American industrial 
relations.  Whenever a central accord has been concluded in this Labor Foundation, 
it tends to have a marked influence on Dutch socio-economic development in 
general and collective bargaining in particular. The prime example is the famous 
1982 ‘Accord of Wassenaar’, which is discussed below.
The Socio-Economic Council (‘Sociaal-Economische Raad’ or SER) was created in 
1950. Originally primarily intended as the top level of the typically Dutch structure 
of Public law organization of firms (‘Publiekrechtelijke Bedrijfsorganisatie’), its most 
important function has become to advise the government regarding socio-economic 
policy (Albeda & Dercksen, 1994: 65). Socio-economic state regulation is typically 
passed through the SER for advice, and these recommendations have often had 
a marked influence. Contrary to the bipartite Labor Foundation, this is a tripartite 
organization consisting of equal numbers (11) of representatives of employers, 
unions and the ‘crown’. The latter are external, independent members appointed by 
the state to represent public interest.
5.2.2.5 The role of the state in industrial relations and wage setting (1)
The institutionalization of central level negotiations between peak associations is 
already a marked difference from German industrial relations, where there is not a 
formal system of joint discussion between peak associations at the national level4. 
But an even more pronounced difference is the strong influence of the Dutch state 
on industrial relations in general and wage bargaining in particular. The German 
state leaves more regulation issues to the social partners, and the most prominent 
example is German ‘Tarifautonomie’ versus the continuing direct and indirect role 
of the Dutch state in wage setting. In the face of the formidable task of rebuilding 
the country after World War II, a Dutch political consensus emerged on achieving 
a wage level below that of surrounding countries. This result was to be achieved 
by a state-guided wage policy consisting of yearly state-mandated wage rises, 
which left collective bargaining irrelevant for wage levels from 1945-1964 (Albeda 
& Dercksen, 1994: 64). A government agency (Board of Government Mediators 
‘College van Rijksbemiddelaars’) formally issued annual wage guidelines that 
were in reality agreed upon by STAR (and soon, SER) and government (Visser & 
Hemerijck, 1997: 92). In the sixties, economic forces (labor shortages that caused 
additional, ‘black’ pay on top of the formal wage to become a growing practice), 
growing political unrest in general, and growing opposition of union members to 
the state-led restricted wage policy in particular caused wage explosions within this 
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system. These resulted in wages being up to par with neighbor states by the late 
sixties, and ruined the policy (Albeda & Dercksen, 1994; Visser & Hemerijck, 1997: 
93). 
The 1970 Wage Law legalized free collective bargaining, but simultaneously still 
offered the government the opportunity to call for a wage freeze if the national 
economy should require so (Albeda & Dercksen, 1994: 69). Then the first Oil 
Crisis struck in 1973, and a left/center government created another law giving 
the Minister of Social Affairs unprecedented jurisdiction in income policy for both 
workers and others (Albeda & Dercksen, 1994: 70), which was immediately used in 
1974. Subsequent years again left scope for collective bargaining. But the 1970s are 
characterised as ‘the troubled management of a high wage economy’ and a ‘noisy 
lack of consensus’, and the period 1976-1982 in particular as a policy stalemate and 
‘corporatism without consensus’ (Visser & Hemerijck, 1997: 93; 94; 96-98). The oil 
crisis of 1979 hit even harder than the first one, and the subsequent recession and 
rising unemployment in combination with the inability of social partners to come to 
an agreement in the Labor Foundation again caused state wage measures in 1980-
82 (Albeda & Dercksen, 1994: 71-72).
5.2.2.6 ‘Wassenaar’ and beyond
By 1980, radical socio-economic reform was needed, and would soon emerge. 
An alarming report by the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR, 1980) 
criticized the ‘waiting for corporatism’ attitude, and the state installed an ad hoc 
committee (named the Wagner Committee, after its chair, a captain of industry) 
including indirect representation of employers and labor (Visser & Hemerijck, 1997: 
99). It argued that the country was in trouble and private firms needed help. The 
committee recommended (amongst other things) that firms’ profitability should 
be boosted through lower wage and energy costs; that the operation of the labor 
market should be improved through decentralized wage bargaining allowing for 
larger wage differentials; moreover, that public expenditure had to be reduced; 
and that social security should be revised to include more work incentives (Van 
Dellen, 1984). This committee also marks the start of a process of VET reform 
over the next decades, to be discussed in the next section. The 1982 elections left 
the social-democrats in the opposition, and a no-nonsense right-center coalition in 
power. It presented its plans in November 1982. They included the suspension of 
price compensation, and the freezing of civil servants’ wages, minimum wages, and 
social benefits (Visser & Hemerijck, 1997: 100). 
Two days later, peak associations of employers and unions concluded the famous 
‘Wassenaar’ central agreement. It was named after Wassenaar where and when 
these peak associations began a reorientation towards a coordinated and bipartite 
model of negotiated guidelines for responsible wage bargaining (Visser & Hemerijck, 
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1997: 81).  Formally the ‘Wassenaar’ agreement was only a recommendation, not 
a formal agreement with legally binding implications; but it proved as at least as 
influential as any formal agreement might have been (Visser & Hemerijck, 1997: 
82). Having convinced themselves that improving firms’ profitability was the sine 
qua non for economic recovery and job growth, wage moderation became the 
dominant strategy for Dutch unions. In exchange for moderated wage demands 
by these unions, employers were willing to bargain over shorter working hours. 
Parliament responded with a swift special Act allowing the opening of existing 
bargaining agreements to facilitate negotiations over job redistribution and shorter 
working hours, which occurred for two-thirds of all agreements within two years 
(Visser & Hemerijck, 1997: 101). Over the years, the Wassenaar agreement was 
followed by various guidelines, joint opinions, reports of advice, recommendations 
and agreements by the Labor Foundation, and influenced thousands of bargaining 
outcomes (Van der Toren, 1996).
A decade later, a similar change of events occurred in the wake of an emerging 
recession in 1992 (Visser & Hemerijck, 1997: 106-109). The Minister of Social 
Affairs and Employment threatened to impose wage freezes (still a possibility under 
the 1988 amendments to the Wage Act) in 1992 and 1993, and in 1993, even 
withdrawing the 1937 Collective Bargaining Agreement Extension Act became a 
topic of discussion. In December 1993 the peak associations of employers and 
unions produced a new accord, called ‘A New Course’. Unions promised to continue 
wage restraint and to allow further decentralization and flexibility, while employers 
promised to give up resistance to further working hours reductions and agreed to 
involve works councils and local unions in negotiations on local solutions. Again the 
agreement had consequences in subsequent sector and firm level bargaining.
Visser & Hemerijck (1997) have interpreted ‘Wassenaar’ as the start of a phase 
they label ‘corporatism regained’. In combination with later changes in (active) 
labor market and social security policy, it provided the basis for the remarkable 
economic recovery and job growth in the Netherlands since then. Wage moderation 
caused the change in labor costs per hour worked in manufacturing to remain at 
57.5% over the period 1980-1994, as compared to 102.4% in Germany and 68.4% 
in the U.S. (SZW, 1996). Between 1982 and 1996 the Dutch average rate of job 
growth was on par with the American job machine, and four times as high as the 
E.U. average (Visser & Hemerijck, 1997: 23), and it continued until the recession 
hit around 2002.
 There has been some discussion as to whether Dutch industrial relations have 
actually been decentralizing since 1982. Tros (2000) has extensively researched this 
hypothesis, and concludes that the assumption reflects common belief and ideology 
rather than facts. He identifies both centralizing and decentralizing tendencies, 
and proposes the label of deconcentration to analyze changes in Dutch industrial 
relations: the increased use of local level consultation and regulation without the 
(formal) delegation of such competencies from higher levels.
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5.2.2.7 The role of the state in industrial relations and wage setting (2)
Besides highlighting an important phase in Dutch industrial relations, the point of 
the preceding description was to further underline the much more prominent and 
involved role of the Dutch state in industrial relations, as compared to its German 
counterpart. Visser & Hemerijck (1997) keenly stress the important role of pressure 
and threats by the Dutch state in getting the social partners to bridge their substantial 
differences and find a mutually agreeable way out in central accords. They capture 
this aspect with the phrase ‘the shadow of hierarchy’ (of the Dutch state) across 
Dutch industrial relations. This influence was quite visible in the conception of both 
central accords discussed above. And it remained prominent in the aftermath of 
the second accord, when the state made application of the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement Extension Act conditional upon the inclusion of measures considered 
beneficial for the employment prospects of unskilled workers. As one particular and 
intended consequence of this state policy, employer’ associations and unions have 
expanded the use of entry wage scales at or near the minimum wage in collective 
bargaining agreements from 6% in 1993 to 68% in 1995 (Venema et al, 1996; Visser 
& Hemerijck, 1997: 108). This shadow of hierarchy in Dutch industrial relations 
bears a strong resemblance to the shadow of hierarchy employed by the German 
state on, in particular, employers (through threats of government intervention and 
a training tax) in the face of shortages of apprenticeship positions there (cf. section 
3.7.1).
5.2.2.8 Chambers of Commerce
Another marked difference with Germany is the absence of a separate, legally 
institutionalized artisan sector in the Dutch economy. There may be legal 
requirements for gainful employment and/or entrepreneurship in a particular 
occupation or sector, but these primarily concern professions that require tertiary 
education, and the general trend has been to gradually limit their number5. Despite 
having similar medieval guild roots as Germany, Dutch local handicraft organizations 
are not independent associations (Van Waarden, 1995). 
As in Germany, the Netherlands has Chambers of Commerce that form a separate 
column of business representation from business associations and employers’ 
associations. And, as in Germany, they are a public-private mix of governance 
mechanisms in that they simultaneously are regional business associations with 
public authorities. Instead of separate Chamber networks for different economic 
segments, the Netherlands has just one national network of currently 21 regional, 
autonomous chambers. These are controlled by a general board, consisting of an 
equal number of representatives of three segments: small and medium-sized firms, 
other firms, and unions. These board members are appointed by the respective 
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types of business and/or employers’ associations and unions. The SER decides 
which associations may appoint general board members for the various regions 
(Staatsblad, 1997). The Department of Economic Affairs (EZ) oversees the operation 
of the Chambers. The goal of these chambers is to stimulate economic interests 
of trade, industry, artisan production and services in their region. They have three 
main tasks: to promote regional economic activity by advising government and 
stimulating local economic development; to support regional businesses through 
individual and collective information and advice; and to implement particular laws 
(most prominently, they operate the public business register). In 1963, the word 
‘economic’ was specifically included in the law to limit the kind of ‘interests’ the 
Chambers were to represent, and to specifically exclude them from the area of social 
interest representation (Tweede Kamer, 1996-1997). Therefore, the Chambers do 
not fulfill governing roles in the field of VET, unlike their German counterparts.
5.2.3  Dutch labor market governance
In chapters 2 through 4, we have abundantly illustrated the sharp differences 
between the American labor market and its institutionalization on the one hand, 
and the German and Dutch ones on the other (cf. in particular section 3.3.3 and 
CPB, 1997). In the competitive model, for which the U.S. is a key example, (labor) 
market failure is reduced by supporting competition through the reduction of 
entry and exit barriers. The model relies on external labor market flexibility, tailor-
made solutions at a decentralized level, diversity of labor conditions, and financial 
incentives to promote the allocative efficiency of the labor market. The specific 
institutional model into which this notion of labor market policy translates, consists 
of easy hiring and firing of workers, school-based education, modest levels of job 
and income security, firm-level wage formation, and ample room for managerial 
autonomy. Germany and the Netherlands are, in contrast, key examples of the 
cooperative model. This model relies on commitment of employers and workers to 
keep implicit agreements in labor relationships; internalization of external effects 
into the bargaining objectives of interest groups; the creation of economies of scale 
through centralized agreements between relatively homogenous interest groups 
of labor and capital; and solidarity between workers as wells as between insiders 
and outsiders. This translates into an institutionalization of the labor market 
distinguished by a high level of employment protection, dual education, income 
protection through more than modest social security benefits, centralized collective 
bargaining, and institutionalization of worker representation at the firm level as a 
constraint to managerial prerogative. Following up on the American-German (and 
Dutch) contrast discussed in earlier chapters, we will focus on illustrating German-
Dutch differences in operation and performance of labor markets, as well as in the 
institutionalization of the latter.
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5.2.3.1 Economic and labor market performance
The Dutch economy has outperformed the German one over the nineties. Until 
1988, the Dutch relative position in per capita GDP declined, before beginning 
a remarkable recovery. Germany’s position has remained stable as compared to 
European averages. The GDP volume growth rate from 1990-1996 was 2.2 for the 
Netherlands and 1.4 for Germany (CPB, 1997: 83). Dutch per capita GDP, however, 
still lags that in West-Germany (CPB, 1997: 81). Labor productivity per hour work 
has improved in the Netherlands since the sixties relative to both Germany and, 
even more so, the U.S.: for, manufacturing, American productivity was twice as high 
as that in the Netherlands by 1960, but only slightly higher by 1995. In GPD per 
hour worked across the economy, Dutch productivity per hour worked (100) was 
higher than in both the U.S. (92) and Germany (82; CPB, 1997: 89). Standardized 
unemployment has been a more pronounced problem for Germany in recent years 
than for the Netherlands (9.0% in 1996 versus 6.3%; CPB, 1997: 90). As we have 
seen, Germany does perform better in terms of youth unemployment. The ratio 
of unskilled to skilled unemployment is most favorable for the Netherlands at 1.9; 
both German and even more so American unskilled workers have a relatively worse 
position relative to skilled ones, with ratios of 2.8 and 4.3 in 1994. Both European 
countries, however, share the problem of the persistence of unemployment for those 
who suffer from it, with 74% of Dutch and 65% of German unemployment being 
long–term as compared to just 17.1% in the U.S. (CPB, 1997: 90). Employment 
growth was highest in the U.S. over the eighties and lowest in Germany, with the 
Netherlands overtaking the U.S. in the early nineties, when German employment 
actually shrunk (CPB, 1997: 91). Average working hours are lower in Germany and 
even more so in the Netherlands than in the U.S. (CPB, 1997: 92).
5.2.3.2 German-Dutch similarities and differences in labor market   
   institutionalization
In institutional terms, CPB (1997: 284) contrasts the German ‘internal labor market’ 
and focus on commitment between employers and workers within long-term labor 
relationships with the Dutch system of ‘flexicurity’, with labor market regulations 
offering a mix between labor market flexibility and employment security. We have 
already emphasized the importance of the overlapping of occupational and internal 
labor markets (rather than just occupational or internal labor markets) in section 
3.8.3. We now emphasize that the previous Dutch characterization has only (and 
increasingly) been valid since the nineties; in the stagflation times of the seventies 
and eighties, the Netherlands much more closely resembled the German situation. 
Employment protection in both countries is relatively strict as compared to the 
U.S., but lies at an intermediate European level (CPB, 1997: 285). Procedures 
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involving dismissals feature many similarities (CPB, 1997: 286-288).  Differences 
are that German procedures for individual dismissals involve the works council but 
not employment offices, while Dutch procedures involve the employment offices 
or (alternatively and increasingly) the labor courts. And German employment 
protection is limited for small firms, as works councils are often lacking, and court 
appeal possibilities are small. Both countries have increased the room for flexibility 
in working hours, regulations concerning variable working hours being slightly more 
flexible in Germany (CPB, 1997: 288-291). Dutch regulations for short-time work 
are relatively stricter (CPB, 1997: 291-294).
5.2.3.3 Flexible employment
But the primary difference is that part-time and flexible contracts have become 
more common in the Netherlands, which makes the Dutch labor market flexible 
relative to its German counterpart (CPB, 1997: 294-303). Part-time employment in 
the Netherlands is very high with 34% as compared to 19% in the U.S. and 16% in 
reunified Germany (CPB, 1997: 296). The difference cannot be adequately explained 
by different worker preferences, sector distribution of employment or differences 
in regulations. Flexible employment is also higher in the Netherlands, but does not 
stand out as much from overall statistics due to different measures and institutional 
differences. In 1995 10% of 1995 German contracts is for limited duration, while 
in the Netherlands 12% of contracts are either concluded for less than one year or 
have variable working hours (CPB, 1997: 296). Realizing that about half of those 
German contracts for limited duration are the (multi-year) apprenticeship contracts 
(as compared to about 20% in the Netherlands), we gain a better appreciation of 
the difference. In 1991, 24% of all Dutch jobs had a tenure of less than one year, 
as compared to 13% in Germany (and 29% in the U.S.; CPB, 1997: 300).
Another marked difference shows when we focus on employment through 
temporary employment agencies, which has grown tremendously in the Netherlands. 
The share of such employment fluctuated between 0.5% and 1% in the first half of 
the eighties, has been around 2% since then, and has increased towards 3% over 
the 1990s (CPB, 1997: 299). In Germany, it continued to hover around 0.3% of 
total employment (CPB, 1997) Dutch temp agency work is increasingly relevant for 
the transition between unemployment and employment, and the transition between 
education or training and employment. In 1997, half of Dutch temp workers were 
younger than 25; and 29% had been unemployed previously to their current temp 
job. 34% of all temp workers had found a permanent job within a year; and 41% 
of this group (14% of all temp workers) had found one with the firm they had been 
working for through the temporary employment agency (Van der Ende et al., 1999). 
In all, in 1997 an estimated 100,000 temp workers found a permanent job with 
the client firm they had been temporarily employed by (Arents et al, 1998). This 
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corresponds to almost 20% of all persons that found a permanent job that year. 
Interestingly, temp workers that were older, previously long-term unemployed, or 
physically challenged, had the same chances of finding a permanent job as other 
groups (Van der Ende et al, 1999). Dutch temp work growth preceded and enabled 
a remarkable revision of the institutionalization of employment through temporary 
employment agencies in the mid-nineties, intended to allow further growth. 
5.2.3.4 Flexicurity
We cannot discuss this remarkable process in detail here (cf. Wilthagen, 1998; 
for a specific application to VET markets, Van Lieshout & Van Liempt, 2001) but it 
is worthwhile to briefly illustrate both the flexicurity concept that emerged in the 
process, and the process itself. Dutch temp agency work has been re-institutionalized 
through a widely acclaimed national act that has explicitly adopted the flexicurity 
perspective: the ‘Flexibility and Security’ Act that came into force in 1999. This 
Act tries to preserve the core ingredient of short-term flexibility in temp work for 
client firms, while simultaneously offering more security for those workers who are 
somehow locked into this type of relatively unprotected employment for more than 
six months. In 1996 it was preceded and inspired by another influential central 
agreement between the peak associations of Dutch employers and unions in the 
Labor Foundation. Agreement and Act distinguished four6 phases related to job 
tenure as a temp worker (cf. Verhulp, 1998; Grapperhaus & Jansen, 1999). Phase 
4 implied that temp workers were awarded a permanent employment contract with 
the temporary employment agency, once they had worked for 18 months (including 
time spent in prior phases) for the same client firm, or for 36 months (including 
time spent in prior phases) for various client firms. Phase 3 already entitled them 
to fixed-term employment contracts for one or more three-month periods, and 
these contracts could not be terminated in case there was temporarily no work 
at a client firm. In addition, article 34 of the agreement concerned training rights 
for temp workers: as soon as a temp worker has been working for one temporary 
employment agency for 26 weeks, the agency must discuss the worker’s training 
needs with him/her (phase 2). It also required temporary employment agencies 
to spend a gradually rising percentage (0.92% in 2002) of the total (gross) wage 
sum they pay their temp workers in a particular year on their training. And it 
created a training foundation for the sector, which has to monitor compliance with 
the training rules stipulated in the collective labor agreement and the Training 
Regulations7. In a nutshell, this re-regulation of temp work could be characterized 
as the institutionalization of tenure bonuses (improved employment security, 
pension rights, and training opportunities) for temp workers. It seeks to stimulate 
the creation of an occupational labor market for temp workers. 
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5.2.3.5 The role of the state in industrial relations and wage setting (3)
Another German-Dutch difference is in the existence of state minimum wages in 
the Netherlands and their absence in Germany. The Dutch minimum wage law (‘Wet 
minimumloon en minimumvakantiebijslag’ or WMM) entitles workers from age 23 to 
65 to a legal minimum wage. Collective bargaining agreements, however, typically 
have their lowest wage scales above this minimum. Article 14 of the WMM calls for 
a regular adjustment of the minimum wage rate according to certain procedures. 
Departing from this stipulation, the minimum wage was frozen from 1984 to 1990. 
In 1991, the article was changed through another Act. The main rule now is that 
the minimum wage rate is regularly adjusted to the weighted average of contract 
wages in the private and public sector. If, however, these wages or social security 
volumes grow so substantially that they may damage the employment level, the 
state may still depart from this main rule. In general, this institutional difference 
has not translated into substantial differences in actual lower wages. The lowest 
level of gross wages appears to be a bit higher in Germany for blue collar workers 
as compared with the Dutch minimum wage, while those for white collar workers 
appear to be a bit lower (Vogels, 1994, cited in CPB, 1997: 310).
Youth wage governance shows a more interesting difference between both 
countries. Ryan & Büchtemann (1996: 331) assert that low wage-for-age scales 
must be legitimated by guaranteed training quality. For Germany, the near monopoly 
of the apprenticeship system achieves such a situation, and upon graduation the 
newly acquired credentials guarantee a significant pay rise. The latter also applies 
to Dutch apprenticeship itself (to be discussed in the next section), but the general 
Dutch youth wage picture is different, as Dutch apprenticeship only accounts for a 
(albeit, significant) minority of Dutch youth labor. The majority of the Dutch youth 
labor market consists of regular jobs (a significant share of which are either part-
time and/or temp jobs, many of them   occupied by full-time students). Here, wages 
are influenced by an age related minimum wage system which only calls for adult 
minimum wages at age 23, which is mirrored in separate (somewhat higher) youth 
wage scales in Dutch collective bargaining agreements (cf. Doup & Asscher-Vonk, 
1991: 7-8; Quispel, 2000: 64). Article 7.3 of the WMM creates the possibility to set 
minimum wages for younger age groups. Article 8.3 stipulates that the minimum 
wage for this younger group, should only be a certain percentage of the adult 
minimum wage. This percentage can be different for workers of a different age and 
in different occupations or economic sectors. Such regulations became effective of 
January 1st, 1974. It entitled 158-22 year old workers to a youth minimum wage 
that was established as an age-dependent percentage of the adult minimum wage 
rate. For each year that a young person was younger than 23, the relevant youth 
minimum wage rate would be 7.5% lower than the adult minimum wage. Hence, it 
ranged from 40% for 15 year olds to 92.5% for 22 year olds. The chosen mechanism 
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of an age-dependent sliding scale was based on the prevalent youth wage situation 
in those days. The idea was to extend minimum wage protection to extend to 
youths and young adults, particularly those not covered by collective bargaining 
agreements. Of course, the Act simultaneously and until today institutionalizes 
and legitimizes age discrimination. Arguments were and are that youths are not 
considered to deliver a full work performance and therefore should not receive 
a full wage; that they are typically not bread winners and therefore can afford 
lower wages; and that low youth wages help remedy youth unemployment (Doup 
& Asscher-Vonk; 1991: 8). In 1980, the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment 
asked the SER for advice on decreasing youth minimum wages. He argued that this 
group typically excluded breadwinners with dependent children; that high youth 
wages do not stimulate youth employment; and that it would help economize on 
public expenditure. In those days, in particular the second reason was compelling 
as youth unemployment had started to rise quickly in the wake of the second oil 
crisis. The SER advice on the matter was divided, but the proposal got implemented 
anyway, albeit in somewhat moderated form. Starting in 1981, the percentages for 
15 and 22 year olds were set at 35% and 90%, respectively. Starting July 1st 1983, 
the percentages were again decreased. The smallest decrease was for the 15- and 
22-year olds, by each 5%, to 30% and 85%, respectively. But for all other age 
groups, the decreases were higher, with 20-year olds receiving the highest decrease 
by 8.5%. As all these percentage cuts came on top of a general freeze of the base 
rate (the adult minimum wage), youth minimum wages plummeted substantially 
over the eighties. In 1988, the state even proposed to expand coverage of the 
specific youth regime to include 23-26 year olds, again to combat unemployment 
for that group; the proposal was heavily criticized and defeated by a parliamentary 
motion (Doup & Asscher-Vonk, 1991: 57).
Despite these institutional measures, the overall adult/young wage differential 
is somewhat larger in Germany than in the Netherlands (-0.38 versus -0.21, 
respectively; 1993 data, OECD 1996b: 139). But it is by far the highest in the U.S. 
(-1.71). Relative to older workers, at least, Dutch youths thus appear to be relatively 
better paid than their German and particularly their American counterparts. But Ryan 
& Büchtemann’s point was not to argue against low (youth) wages as such, but that 
they should be legitimized by guaranteed training quality - which is not the case 
for this Dutch youth labor market segment. In a 1996 overview of age boundaries 
in legislation (discussed in parliament in 1998), the government noted that the 
argument of youths not being fully productive should only apply to apprenticeship 
and work experience positions. It proposed to analyze possibilities for replacing the 
age criterion by an experience criterion (Quispel, 2000: 64). A new bill for an Act 
Equal Treatment on Age Regarding Work, however, continues to legitimate youth 
minimum wages (Tweede Kamer, 2001-2002).
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5.3   The Dutch education system
5.3.1  Main characteristics
Bakker (2001: 37-38) lists four important characteristics of the Dutch education 
system. First, it is historically characterized by a strong role for the state in 
combination with an important role for private initiative (cf. van Kemenade, 1981). 
Since 1814, education has been identified as an object of government concern by 
the Dutch constitution. The Dutch department of Education, Culture and Science 
(conditional, obviously, on parliamentary consent) plays a dominant role in the 
governance of Dutch education, both through legislation and the sponsoring of 
schools and colleges (cf. Knippenberg & van der Ham, 1994).  Amongst other 
things, it decides (EURYDICE, 2001):
• the types of schools that may exist;
• length of courses in each type of school;
• for some, particularly, primary and secondary, types of schools:
o subjects that must or may be taught;
o minimum and maximum number of teaching periods to be devoted 
to each subject;
o minimum and maximum number of teaching periods per year;
o length of teaching periods;
• number of students in a class;
• standards of competence for teachers;
• salaries and other labor conditions for teaching staff (based upon collective 
bargaining with teacher unions);
• entry requirements and arrangements to school types;
• examination arrangements;
• school democracy and influence for staff, pupils/students and parents;
• norms for founding and closure of schools.
Second, the typically Dutch process of pillarization (cf. section 5.2.1) has resulted 
in an organization of education along the lines of these religious/political pillars 
(cf. Dronkers, 1992). The Netherlands are unique in the way that the state has 
safeguarded freedom of (state-sponsored) education by different societal religious/
political groups both formally and materially (Knippenberg & van der Ham, 1994: 
11). As a result of a 'schools dispute' over the late 19th and early 20th century to 
achieve complete equality under the law for private and public schools, the matter 
became 'pacified' in 1917. Since then, Article 23 of the Constitution guarantees 
freedom of education, which includes the freedom to found schools (freedom of 
establishment), to organize the teaching in schools (freedom of organization of 
teaching), and to determine the principles on which teaching is based (freedom of 
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conviction) (EURYDICE, 2001). As a result there are both publicly run and privately 
run (not-for-profit) schools in the Dutch education system9, both sponsored equally 
by the Dutch state. Most private schools have been established and are governed by 
religious/ideological associations/foundations. The majority of these is Protestant 
or Catholic, but there are also Jewish, Muslim, Hindustani and anthroposophist 
schools. In addition, some private schools base their teaching on specific educational 
ideas, or are otherwise non-denominational.  Privately run schools have the option 
to refuse to admit pupils whose parents do not subscribe to their belief or ideology. 
Some 70% of pupils attend privately run schools (EURYDICE, 2001). Public schools 
are run by the municipal executive or (since 1997) by another body governed by 
public law to which this authority has been delegated. Schools’ freedom of teaching 
is limited by qualitative standards set by the Department of Education, Science and 
Culture. These prescribe the subjects to be studied, attainment targets, syllabuses 
and the content of national examinations, required teacher qualifications, and 
regulate a number of other matters as well. School choice for pupils/parents is free, 
provided pupils meet general admission requirements for their school type, and 
their (parents’) views do not conflict with the denomination of a chosen privately 
run school.
Third, education is strongly institutionalized as a separate and relatively 
autonomous societal sector, with strongly professionalized occupations and a broad 
array of sector-specific organizations and interest groups, which has been described 
with the phrase ‘the pedagogical province’. For each sector within the education 
system, there are consultative bodies in which the Department consults with 
representatives of relevant parties. For example, representatives of (associations 
of) school boards, teaching staff, head teachers, parents and pupils for primary and 
(junior/general) secondary education are included in the Consultative Committee 
for Primary and Secondary Education. The Education Council (‘Onderwijsraad’) is a 
general education advisory committee advising government and parliament (both 
pro-actively and reactively) on educational matters. And there is a separate Science 
and Technology Advisory Council as well10.
Fourth, the system is meritocratic. It fulfills three functions: to prepare students 
for different social roles; to provide equal educational chances; and to allow full 
development of the individual. But progress through the educational system 
simultaneously entails an almost continuous selection process. As in Germany, after 
primary education, lower secondary education is differentiated, and disperses 12-
year-olds across different types of school distinguished by their level of intellectual 
complexity and the subsequent further education types they give access to. In 
particular the 1968 Secondary Education Act (the so-called ‘Mammoth Act’) aimed 
to prevent early differentiation from resulting in dead ends and eased mobility 
between separate school types: after completing lower types, young persons can 
enroll in higher types (cf. section 5.3.2). Adults who have failed to acquire a general 
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secondary diploma during their youth can get a second chance in adult education 
(cf. section 5.3.3).
 Figure 5.1 presents the Dutch educational system in 2001 (EURYDICE, 1991). 
While some subsystems have changed or been integrated, the main characteristics 
have remained the same over the last few decades. Primary education is 
unsegmented until age 12. However, lower secondary education is differentiated. 
The most challenging types (‘Voorbereidend Wetenschappelijk Onderwijs’ or 
VWO and ‘Hoger Algemeen Voortgezet Onderwijs’ or HAVO) prepare for tertiary 
education (university and higher vocational education or HBO, respectively). The 
other type (‘Voorbereidend Middelbaar Beroepsonderwijs’ or VMBO) prepares for 
upper secondary vocational education or apprenticeship11.
Figure 5.1: The Dutch Education System 
Source: EURYDICE (1990)
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Education is compulsory full-time from age 512 to 1613. Since 1971, there has been 
an additional part-time requirement for two days per week for 16-year olds who no 
longer attend school full-time, until the end of the school year in which they turn 
17 (Visser & Römkens, 1994: 20; 36; www.minocw.nl/leerplicht/leerplicht.html; 
EURYDICE, 2001). This two day requirement for school attendance is lowered to 
one day if this part-time attendance concerns (related) instruction in apprenticeship 
(www.minocw.nl/leerplicht/leerplicht.html; EURYDICE, 2001).
Compulsory education is free of charge, although schools tend to request voluntary 
parent contributions which parents tend to pay. Parents of children under 18 
receive child benefit, and can apply for additional financial help in sending their 
minors to schools. Pupils aged 18 or over qualify for a basic allowance for living 
costs, and can qualify for additional allowances for fees and other costs of studying 
dependent upon their parents’ income. And full-time upper secondary VET and 
tertiary education students aged 18-3414 are entitled to a non-means tested basic 
grant, and may claim a supplementary grant depending upon their parents’ income, 
for the normative duration (usually, four years) of their studies15. Grants may vary 
dependent on the type of education and whether the student lives with his/her 
parents or on his/her own. These are performance-related grants, which start out 
as a loan, but are turned into a grant provided students achieve a minimum number 
of credits in the first year and obtain their final degree within ten years. Students 
may take out an interest-bearing loan for an additional three years, should they 
need one (EURYDICE, 2001).
5.3.2  General secondary education
The 1968 Secondary Education Act (popularly known as the ‘Mammoth Act’) 
integrated an array of previously existing separate acts for various types of school 
into a single piece of legislation, apprenticeship training remaining outside its scope. 
It introduced one new type of secondary education (HAVO, to be discussed below). 
Higher professional education (HBO) was originally included, but was removed from 
it in 1986 to become an integral part of tertiary education (section 5.3.4). Senior 
secondary (school-based) vocational education was also originally included in the 
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act and has since then become a separate system (together with apprenticeship) 
under a new 1996 Act (section 5.3.4).
A major aim of the 1968 Secondary Education Act was to increase mobility 
between the various parts of the system. One could and can proceed from junior 
secondary education (‘Lager Beroepsonderwijs’ or LBO, since 1992 VBO, since 
1999 integrated in VMBO, see below) through upper secondary VET (‘Middelbaar 
Beroepsonderwijs’ or MBO) to tertiary education (‘Higher Professional Education’ 
or HBO) and, subsequently and ultimately, to university). The route from VMBO 
to MBO and HBO is known as the ‘vocational column’ in Dutch education. It offers 
the possibility for upward mobility for those who ended up in the less demanding 
types of lower secondary education, and ensures that the majority of students 
leave the education system with not just general, but also specific vocational skills. 
Increasing the internal efficiency of this vocational column, among other things 
by increasing cooperation and linkages between the various school types, is a 
prominent current policy theme, in part to remedy current and expected skilled 
labor market shortages at the intermediate and higher levels (cf. www.minocw.
nl/beroepskolom/index.html; EURYDICE, 2001).
There are currently three types of secondary education, from which pupils 
choose upon leaving primary education (presumably at age 12): pre-vocational 
secondary education (VMBO), senior general secondary education (HAVO) and pre-
university education (VWO).  Most secondary schools offer two or all of these types. 
Since 1993, all the types of (junior) secondary education start with a two to three 
year period of basic secondary education during which all pupils study the same 
broad range of subjects, regardless of the school type in which they are enrolled. 
Completion of basic secondary education is certified. Year-to-year progression is 
conditional upon performance, and students may have to repeat a year, or may be 
promoted on a conditional basis.
VWO lasts six years (typical age group: 12-18 year olds) and aims to prepare its 
graduates for university education; in practice, however, many students opt for HBO 
instead. HAVO lasts five years (typical age group: 12-17 year olds) and prepares its 
students for higher professional education in HBO; but many of its graduates opt to 
pursue a university education instead. This road is open through either additional 
VWO graduation or through the first year of HBO, which also grants university 
access. A further group of HAVO graduates opts for upper secondary VET. VWO 
and HAVO both consist of a three year first stage and a second stage. There are no 
examinations or other boundaries between the stages, but the transition entails a 
choice for one or four subject combinations for the second stage. Each combination 
includes a common component across all combinations (almost one half of the 
curriculum), a specialized component (a third of the curriculum) and an optional 
component16. VWO schools come in three specific types: grammar schools, the 
‘gymnasium’ where (classic) Greek and Latin are required, ‘atheneum’ where they 
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are not, and the ‘lyceum’ which combines both types. Graduation examinations 
consist of a national examination held in the final year and a school component.
VMBO has only existed since 1999. It replaces two previous, separate types 
of lower secondary education: junior general secondary education (‘Middelbaar 
Algemeen Vormend Onderwijs’ or MAVO) and pre-vocational education 
(‘Voorbereidend Beroepsonderwijs’ or VBO). Pre-vocational education itself was 
the heir to junior secondary vocational education (‘Lager Beroepsonderwijs’ or 
LBO). Historically, LBO/VBO offered technical and other vocational education to the 
least talented primary school graduates, preparing them for direct labor market 
entrance (as an apprentice or a regular worker) at age 16. It has suffered from 
its perception as the lowest type of junior secondary education which made it 
unpopular with pupils and parents, and labor market prospects of its graduates 
waned as entry-level skills requirements gradually rose to demand (some) senior 
secondary VET (apprenticeship or MBO). MAVO was a less demanding form of 
HAVO, whose graduates could continue in a school-based senior secondary VET 
system (MBO). In the wake of the 1996 integration of MBO and apprenticeship 
into one coherent upper secondary vocational education system (section 3.3.4 and 
3.6), and to improve the number of students continuing from junior secondary 
education to senior secondary VET, it became logical to integrate LBO/VBO and 
MAVO into a specific preparatory system. The 1999 result was VMBO, which, like 
its ancestors, takes four years to complete. VMBO is specifically intended as a 
basis for further vocational training in senior secondary vocational education or, 
for those opting for the theoretical pathway, for further general education in HAVO. 
Pupils choose one of four different sectors (engineering and technology; care and 
welfare; business; agriculture) and a particular pathway (theoretical, combined, 
middle management or basic vocational) for their final two years. In addition, they 
can choose for a vocationally-oriented program within their pathway (except those 
in the theoretical pathway who study general subjects). Pupils can either specialize 
within one particular pathway, or delay such specialization by opting for an inter-
sector program providing training across a broader range. The theoretical pathway 
gives access to levels 3 and 4 of senior secondary VET (cf. section 3.3.4 and 3.6) and 
HAVO (if it includes mathematics and German or French; there may be additional 
requirements). The combined as well as the middle management pathways give 
access to levels 3 and 4 of senior secondary VET. The basic vocational pathway 
gives access to level 2 of senior secondary VET. If pupils include mathematics, they 
can opt for subsequent upper secondary VET regardless of their specialization in a 
particular vocational area. Graduation examination consists of a school examination 
and a national examination. The latter includes a written component for everybody, 
and a practical component for those enrolled in the basic vocational or middle-
management pathway.
In 2000-2001 there were 834 general secondary schools. 28% of them were 
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public, 22% Protestant, 29% Catholic, 11% private non-denominational, and 10% 
interdenominational (EURYDICE, 2001). Most secondary teaching takes place in 
schools combining these different types of schools. And such combined schools 
often put their pupils in combined classes of two school types for the first year or 
so, which in practice postpones the process of school type choice over a year.
Decisions concerning admission to secondary schools are made by the school 
board or a specific admissions board. Prospective primary school graduates are 
assessed to establish their suitability for the different school types, 86% of primary 
schools using the test of a nationally acclaimed institute. Primary schools then advise 
parents on the type of secondary school for which their child appears best suited, 
based upon the attainment test results as well as general educational performance, 
interests and motivation. Assessment results and primary school advice provide the 
basis for secondary school boards to make their decisions.
A Basic Secondary Education (Attainment Targets and Recommended Number 
of Periods per Subject) Decree sets attainment targets for these school types 
and the recommended number of periods per subject. The Secondary Education 
(Organization of Teaching) Decree regulates teaching in the different school types, 
including admission requirements. The VWO-HAVO-MAVO-VBO School-leaving 
Examinations Decree regulates the choice of examination subjects, and stipulates 
how examination results are to be determined (EURYDICE, 2001).
5.3.3  Senior secondary VET
Initial VET in the Netherlands used to consist of two separate subsystems: 
‘middelbaar beroepsonderwijs’ (MBO) and apprenticeship. About two-thirds of 
vocational training students participate in school-based VET (MBO), while one-third 
takes part in apprenticeship training. In addition, there were a variety of schools 
for adult education. There were different laws applying to each of these types of 
education and training, and separate schools that delivered it (i.e. its school-based 
component). MBO had been governed by the Secondary Education Act since 1968, 
while apprenticeship was governed by the Apprenticeship Act from 1966 to 1993, and 
(jointly with part-time MBO) under a Part-time Vocational Education Act from 1993 
to 1996. MBO offered 2-4 years’ education, primarily school-based tracks, many 
of which came to include an internship component over time. The apprenticeship 
system offered primarily work-based training, accompanied by related instruction 
for 1-2 days at a publicly funded school. Employers’ associations and unions have 
always been heavily involved in the regulation of apprenticeship within their sector. 
They operated so-called national bodies for apprenticeship (‘landelijke organen voor 
het leerlingwezen’) that set skills standards for apprenticeship training occupations, 
counseled training firms and apprentices, developed examinations and awarded 
diplomas. We will elaborate on the old situation in section 5.5.
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Since the eighties, a continuous reform process has evolved to improve and 
integrate the various vocational (and adult) education systems. It culminated in 
the new Vocational and Adult Education Act (‘Wet Educatie en Beroepsonderwijs’ or 
WEB) that came into force on January 1st, 1996 (cf. Ministry of Education, Culture 
and Science, 1996; Van Hoof, 1998). The Act seeks to improve the operation of 
the VET market through decentralization and deregulation. It decentralized various 
responsibilities from the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science to the new 
regional education centers (‘regionale opleidingencentra’ or ROCs)17. These were 
formed through mergers between different vocational and adult education schools 
in each region. There are two types of ROCs: those in which the previous schools 
have completely merged, or those in which only the management has merged. 
They offer related instruction for apprentices, (primarily) school-based vocational 
education, and adult education for all economic sectors. These publicly funded ROCs 
do not have a monopoly on providing VET; provided they meet certain requirements, 
private training institutes can also train for the same diplomas – without the public 
funding, however. The goal of the WEB is to achieve “a self-regulating system in 
which the various actors in the field of education are in balance with one another” 
(Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, 1996: 5).
VET provided by ROCs is sponsored by the state based upon a 2000 funding model. 
This is based upon the following parameters: student numbers, graduate numbers, 
as well as the volume of educational preparation and support. Work-based training 
is sponsored by firms, which do qualify for substantial state subsidies/tax cuts and 
(often) subsidies from sector training funds (cf. section 5.5.2). Adult education is 
also sponsored by a state budget, but this is divided among municipalities who buy 
adult education packages from ROCs. In addition, ROCs provide contract training 
for firms and unemployed18.
For vocational education, the WEB distinguishes five types of programs at four 
different qualification levels: assistant (level 1; 6 to 12 months), basic skilled 
worker (level 2; 2 to 3 years), skilled worker (level 3; 2 to 4 years), and middle 
management (level 4; 3 to 4 years) or specialist (level 4; 1 to 2 years). These are 
in line with the first four levels of the European SEDOC qualification classification 
system:
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Figure 5.2: Qualification levels and types of pathways in Dutch senior secondary VET 
level  qualification type  training goal
level 1  assistant  competence in simple operational work
level 2  basic   competence in operational work
level 3  skilled worker  can work competently and independently
level 4  middle management can work competently and independently  
    in a broad area
level 4  specialist  can work competently and independently,  
      and is specialized in a particular field 
Admission to level 3 tracks and level 4 middle management tracks required a 
LBO/MAVO diploma, VMBO diploma (except basic vocational pathway) or proof of 
completion of the first three years of HAVO or VWO. Admission to level 4 specialist 
tracks requires a corresponding level 3 qualification. Level 1 and 2 tracks have no 
admission requirements in terms of previous education19. 
1920 sector-specific knowledge centers of vocational education for trade and 
industry (‘landelijke organen voor het beroepsonderwijs’ or LOBs, later renamed 
‘kenniscentra beroepsonderwijs bedrijfsleven’ or KBBs), in which employers’ 
associations, unions and education representatives cooperate, develop national 
skills standards for all the programs in their sector21. These LOBs/KBBs are also 
sponsored by the state. Each program is governed by one set of skills standards, 
which is referred to as an ‘exit qualification’. Jointly, these 600 (http://www.colo.
nl) to 700 (EURYDICE, 2001) exit qualifications and 140,000 (http://www.colo.nl) 
related skills standards are referred to as the ‘national qualification structure’22, 
and entered into the Central Register of Vocational Courses (‘Centraal register 
beroepsopleidingen’ or CREBO). They indicate in general terms what is expected 
of students. Each exit qualification has to take into account three elements:  a 
vocational element (the ability to do the job), a general/socio-cultural element 
(ability to function as a citizen in society), and a transfer element (the ability to 
continue one’s education on the next qualification level). Each exit qualification is 
broken down in a number of partial qualifications (‘deelkwalificaties’); and each 
partial qualification is defined in terms of a set of educational goals (‘eindtermen’). 
There is a certificate for each partial qualification, which students get if they pass 
a test. All certificates together lead to the diploma for the exit qualification. In 
addition to this central task of skills standard development, KBBs have to guarantee 
the quality and availability of work-based training positions. Training firms must 
meet criteria set by the KBB, and are then entered into their register of recognized 
training firms. 170,000 firms gave been entered as such (http://www.colo.nl).
These qualifications, and the partial qualifications and sets of skills standards they 
contain, are developed through the following process. First, employers’ associations 
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and unions design occupational profiles for their sector. For each occupation they list 
the key tasks and the skills required to perform them. As much as possible, they will 
incorporate future developments in this process. Second, the relevant LOB develops 
the skills standards for these profiles. It also proposes whether the exit qualification 
can be acquired through a vocational training and/or apprenticeship pathway (see 
below); for which of the partial qualifications tests have to be externally verified; 
and for which of the exit qualifications training programs should be eligible for 
public funding. This entire proposal first goes to a newly created national advisory 
committee: the Advisory Committee Education-Labor (‘Adviescommissie Onderwijs-
Arbeidsmarkt’ or ACOA). The ACOA examines all proposed exit qualifications and 
the related skills standards in the light of equal requirements. Subsequently, the 
(possibly somewhat revised) skills standards document is submitted to the Minister 
of Education, Culture and Science, with an extensive explanation of the LOB, and 
the advice from ACOA. The Minister has the final say, and will authorize the skills 
standards and decide on related matters (pathways; external verification; public 
funding). All exit qualifications and the related skills standards are then incorporated 
into the CREBO.
ROCs are free to organize their own training programs in order to train people 
to acquire a particular diploma. For instance, they can spread out the program 
(that has a given study load within particular, legally prescribed boundaries) over 
more or fewer years. Testing and examination of students is the responsibility of 
the schools. But for the smallest possible majority of all certificates, the tests have 
to be ‘externally verified’ by an independent examination organization (which can 
be the KBB, or another organization). The latter has to ensure that contents and 
level of the tests are in line with the education goals formulated for the partial 
qualifications at hand.
Each exit qualification can in principle be achieved through one of two 
pathways: a vocational training pathway (‘beroepsopleidende leerweg’ or BOL; 
primarily school-based, but including an internship component of at least 20%) 
and an apprenticeship-training pathway (‘beroepsbegeleidende leerweg’ or BBL; 
which includes a work-based component of 60% or more)23. It is up to the LOB 
to decide whether a particular exit qualification is offered in just one, or both, 
pathways. Almost half of all exit qualifications can be achieved through both a 
vocational training and an apprenticeship pathway (SER, 1999; EURYDICE, 2001); 
these are then governed by exactly the same set of skills standards. The work-
based component for both pathways requires a contract between ROC, student, and 
training firm. For BBL, the LOB also has to sign, its signature implying that the firm 
has been evaluated by the LOB as able to provide work-based training of sufficient 
quality for the particular qualification.
Students pay course fees but are eligible for a larger state grant when participating 
in BOL (cf. section 5.3.1) or receive an apprenticeship wage from their training firm, 
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which is typically regulated in a collective bargaining agreement. Firms are often 
partially or completely reimbursed for their training costs through a combination of 
an allowance from a sector training fund, and a tax cut. Interns (school-based MBO 
students during their work-based component) may or may not receive a financial 
allowance from their internship firm - which implies that the cost of apprentices is 
higher for training firms than that of interns.
Adult education consists of three segments. General adult secondary education 
(‘Voortgezet Algemeen Volwassenenonderwijs’ or VAVO) offers a second chance to 
acquire a regular general secondary education diploma for those adults who haven’t 
one. Adult basic education offers a basic first step towards further education and 
training. And Dutch as a second language is the third component. VAVO and adult 
basic education are governed by a separate adult education qualification structure, 
the details of which we will not go into.
The entire vocational and adult education sector (‘beroepsonderwijs en 
volwasseneneducatie’ or BVE) consisted of 61 separate schools in 2002. Besides 
43 ROCs offering a full range of vocational and adult education, these include 13 
specialist schools targeted to specific branches of industry, two schools exempted 
from the ROC requirement because of a specific denominational basis, one attached 
to an HBO college, and two schools attached to institutes for the deaf (http://www.
minocw.nl/english/figures2003/060.html). The number of ROC students averages 
around 10,000, varying from 2,000 to 24,000. Data on VET and corresponding labor 
market participation will follow in section 5.4, and we will analyze the evolution of 
the Dutch VET governance regime over time in more detail in section 5.5.
5.3.4   Tertiary education
The second half of the twentieth century has seen a massive growth in higher 
education participation in the Netherlands. University participation particularly 
exploded between 1960 and 1975, while higher professional education participation 
expanded particularly rapidly in the seventies, after it had been brought under 
the Secondary Education Act. Currently, universities and HBO are regulated by 
the 1993 Higher Education and Research Act, amended by the 1996 Quality and 
Practicability Act. It regulates the structure of courses and institutions, examination 
regulations, staff, planning, funding, and internal college democracy; and it sets 
parameters for the organization of teaching, entry requirements, and study loads. 
A Higher Research and Education Plan sets out the government agenda for higher 
education policy for a four year period. In 2000, there were 13 universities and 56 
colleges for higher professional education, enrolling 161,000 and 298,700 students 
respectively (EURYDICE, 2001).
HBO offers higher professional education in seven areas: education, economics, 
social studies, language and culture, engineering and technology, agriculture and 
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the natural environment, and health care. Admission to HBO requires a HAVO or 
VWO diploma, or a level 4 upper secondary VET diploma24. For those aged 21 or over, 
admittance is possible after passing an entrance examination. HBO colleges can set 
their own additional entry requirements in terms of specific subject combinations 
required for particular courses. There are full-time, part-time and (a small but 
increasing number of) dual pathways25. Full- and part-time courses generally include 
a work-based (internship) component. Teaching is loosely guided by a framework 
set by the government, upon which individual colleges have to elaborate in teaching 
and examinations regulations. Examinations are organized by the colleges.
Universities offer academic tracks in seven sectors: economics, health, social 
sciences, science, law, engineering and technology, and language and culture. 
University admission requires a VWO diploma or an HBO propaedeutic certificate26, 
while universities are able to set additional entry requirements in terms of specific 
subject combinations required for particular courses, and the possibility of passing 
an entrance examination for (over) 21 year olds lacking a required diploma. There 
are both full-time and part-time tracks, some of them with a work-based (internship) 
component. Dual pathways have been introduced on an experimental basis since 
1998. Teaching and examinations are organized by the universities.
Recently, Dutch higher education has switched to a bachelor-master structure 
in the wake of an E.U. agreement. University bachelor’s courses are generally 3 
years, master courses 1 (together, equivalent to the previous four year courses). 
HBO courses have become four year bachelor’s courses. HBO colleges can also 
offer master courses, but these are not publicly funded contrary to the university 
masters. Each university and HBO college needs to have its courses accredited by 
a National Accreditation Institute, which will review them on a six year basis based 
on assessments by visiting committees.
5.3.5  Further training in the Netherlands: private initiative and   
   social partners
Further training is largely a matter of private initiative. It may be supplied by firms 
themselves, by publicly funded schools/colleges, and by various private training 
institutions. In this sense, one can analyze this market for incumbent worker 
training as non-regulated, and a lack of transparency has been quoted as one of its 
weaknesses (cf. Dercksen & Van Lieshout, 1993).
It must be recognized, however, that in many sectors the involvement of the 
social partners with training issues has done much to combat both the transparency 
issue, and the threat of underinvestment in broader training. Many sectors have 
their own training institutes that offer further training credentials (and offer training 
to prepare for them) that are widely recognized within that sector. Sometimes this 
task was/is performed by the same national body that regulated the apprenticeship 
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system and currently acts as KBB for senior secondary VET; sometimes it is a 
separate institute (for instance, NIBE in banking).
In addition, collective bargaining agreements tend to contain stipulations on 
training. Since the mid-eighties, both the number and nature of such training 
regulations in collective labor agreements have grown substantially. A study has 
explored 130 sector collective labor agreements with 5,000 or more workers, and 
company-level collective labor agreements with more than 2,000 workers; jointly, 
these agreements cover over 4.2 million workers (Arbeidsinspectie, 2000). This 
study has found the following stipulations in those agreements:
Table 5.1: training stipulations in Dutch collective bargaining agreement
Source: Arbeidsinspectie (1990)
Stipulations regarding training and training leave can be seen as more traditional 
types of stipulations, while those concerning development plans are relatively 
new. Other examples of more recent types of stipulation are labor market related 
(e.g. the creation of a vacancy database), are diagnostic (e.g. establish systems 
to recognize previously acquired qualifications), are financial (e.g. personal 
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development budgets) or are career/mobility related (e.g. creation of  a mobility 
center). These new types of stipulations indicate two trends (STAR, 2001b: 12). 
One is a trend towards the broadening of training policy from job- and firm-specific 
to a more general employability policy that transcends the individual firm. The other 
is a trend towards enabling tailor-made individual provisions, in line with a more 
general development towards framework-type of arrangements in collective labor 
agreements (cf. Tros, 2000). Accordingly, Dutch social partners are more strongly 
involved in further training issues than their German counterparts. The role of 
German social partners is strongly focused on apprenticeship, with less regulation 
or stimulation of further training.
5.4   The school-to-work transition in the Netherlands
Table 5.2 lists the number of graduates of various types of education. One important 
caveat is that the vocational training number is only the number of graduates from 
school-based MBO (BOL); numbers including BBL are presented below.
Table 5.2 Number of graduates from different types of school-based education, 
1996-2001
Source: http://www.minocw.nl/english/figures2003/060.html)
Since the Rauwenhoff Committee (Tijdelijke adviescommissie Onderwijs 
Arbeidsmarkt, 1990: cf. chapter 1 and section 5.5), the concept of a starting 
qualification (defined as an HAVO, VWO, MBO level 2 or higher diploma) figures as a 
prominent benchmark in Dutch education. The most obvious reason underlying this 
concept is that unemployment is concentrated among those who lack a diploma or 
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have one below that level (figure 5.3). We may observe, however, that unemployment 
among HAVO and VWO graduates is even higher than that among MAVO and VBO 
graduates, suggesting HAVO and VWO graduates had better continue in HBO, WO, 
or upper secondary VET, and underlining the importance of the last three types of 
education in easing the school-to-work transition.
Figure 5.3 Level of education and unemployment, 1991-2001
    
Source: http://www.minocw.nl/english/figures2003/060.html)
In the period of 1996-2001, the percentage of 18-24 year olds that lack a starting 
qualification fell from 17.6 to 15.3 (http://www.minocw.nl/english/figures2003/060.
html), indicating a gradual progress in this respect (also cf. Geerligs et al, 2002). 
School drop-out rates (students leaving one type of education without a diploma 
and without transferring to another type of education) are higher. If we include 
the VMBO and MBO-level 1 graduates that do not continue in education, the drop-
out rate would be approximately 30% of the total number of school-leavers. An 
important caveat, however, is that we don’t know how many of these drop-outs re-
enter education at a later stage and subsequently acquire a starting qualification.
VET participation has grown in the Netherlands. Expressed as a percentage of 
the 15-24 year old population, MBO/BOL participation grew from 14.4% to 15.8% 
and apprenticeship/BBL participation grew from 5.9% to 6.9% between 1992/1993 
and 1998/1999 (Geerligs et al, 2002). In 2001-02, there were 441,000 participants 
in (senior secondary) VET. 58% were enrolled in BOL full-time, a further 7% in BOL 
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part-time, and the remaining 35% were enrolled in BBL (http://www.minocw.nl/
english/figures2003/060.html). From 1997-1998 to 2001-2002, BBL participation 
rose from 119,700 to 153,400, while participation in full-time BOL declined slightly 
(from 267,400 to 255,600), as part-time BOL participation grew (from 23,100 to 
31,600).
There has been an interesting difference in the development of participation at 
levels 1 and 2 versus levels 3 and 4. Compared with 1998/1999, the number of 
participants at levels 1 and 2 increased by 30% until 2001/2002, while the number 
of participants at levels 3 and 4 remained virtually the same. The same picture 
emerges when we confine ourselves to the intake of new students: the number of 
level 1-2 entrants rose with 17,000 (7,500 of which were accounted for by BOL-
pt), whereas the number of level 3-4 entrants rose with only 6,500 (http://www.
minocw.nl/english/figures2003/060.html).
Of all participants in vocational education, 38% was enrolled in the sector of 
economics, 34% in the sector of technology and 28% in the sector of personal and 
social services/health care. In BBL, technology is the largest sector (49% of all BBL 
participants). The economics sector has the largest number of BOL participants 
(43% of all BOL-ft participants in BOL-ft, 63% of all BOL-pt participants).
In 2000, 187,000 students left vocational education. 60% of them had obtained 
a certificate (from the course last attended), 40% had not. Some of the latter may 
have already obtained a certificate at a lower level in vocational education. The 
number of registered27 early school-leavers in adult and vocational education in the 
2000/2001 school year amounted to 19,000, which is 5% of the total number of 
participants registered; eventually, 48% of these were reinstated. Of the participants 
obtaining a certificate in BOL-ft, almost 30% moved on to HBO in 2000 (down from 
32% in 1999). Across the board, almost three out of every four VET-leavers (with or 
without a certificate) left the education system altogether. 26% transferred within 
the education system: they transferred to another MBO course (14%), moved on 
to HBO (8%) or moved on to other types of education (4%) (http://www.minocw.
nl/english/figures2003/060.html). 
Table 5.2 lists the number of acquired VET qualifications by pathway from 1997-
2001. Again, we see a more rapid rise for BBL than for BOL. The most remarkable 
characteristic, however, is that graduation numbers from BBL at levels 3 and 4 
doubled over this period. The favorable Dutch economic and labor market conditions 
of the late nineties were presumably part of the explanation. With 13,000 early 
school-leavers from BBL as compared to 18,000 from BOL in 2000, the relative 
performance of BOL seems better in this respect, given the relatively larger number 
of BOL participants.
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Table 5.3: Number of senior secondary VET qualifications acquired by pathway, 
1997-2001
Source: http://www.minocw.nl/english/figures2003/060.html).
From 1997 to 2001, favorable economic development has led to a large shortage 
in staff. There has also been a severe shortage of upper secondary education 
graduates. This shortage is reflected in the low unemployment figures. Less than 
2% of upper secondary VET graduates are unemployed one and a half years after 
graduating (table 5.4). 
Table 5.4: Social position of senior secondary VET graduates, 1997-2001
Source http://www.minocw.nl/english/figures2003/060.html).
Salaries have risen sharply as a result of this (table 5.5). In 2001, school-leavers 
earned some 30% more than school-leavers did in 1997. In 2001 this increase was 
the largest: approximately 10%. This sharper increase in salaries in 2001 is linked 
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to both the shortage on the labor market and to increasing inflation. This may partly 
explain the drop from more than 30% of VET graduates continuing their education 
in 1997 to less than 25% by 2001 (table 5.4).
Table 5.5: Labor market position of employed senior secondary VET graduates, 
1997-2001
Source http://www.minocw.nl/english/figures2003/060.html).
Apprenticeship/BBL graduates have generally faced an easy apprenticeship-to-work 
transition, even when compared with MBO/BOL graduates, who show more mobility 
(including some periods of unemployment) in their early careers (figure 5.4). BBL 
graduates tend to find work more quickly, are given a permanent position sooner, 
and earn more than those with a BOL certificate. The other side of the coin is that 
BBL graduates tend to be more dissatisfied with the level of their first job. Of all 
the BBL certificate holders surveyed, only 38% think that the level of the training 
program fits in well with the job. Among BOL participants, this is 66% (http://www.
minocw.nl/english/figures2003/060.html). Moreover, earlier research has found 
that (school-based) MBO graduates have had better long-term career prospects in 
terms of upward mobility (cf. Van der Velden & Lodder, 1993).
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Figure 5.4: Unemployment among BOL and BBL graduates, 2001
Source http://www.minocw.nl/english/figures2003/060.html).
Similar results were reported by De Vries & Wolbers (2002) for an earlier generation 
of (1997-1998)28 VET graduates. More importantly, multivariate analysis allows 
them to establish the extent to which such differences are indeed partially explained 
by the participation in different pathways, rather than by other factors. They find no 
significant differences between graduates from both types of pathways in terms of 
employment chances, possibly due to the very tight labor market situation at that 
time. While apprenticeship graduates more often have permanent contracts than 
MBO graduates, the difference vanishes in a multivariate analysis. However, one of 
the variables that account for this fact is whether graduates have combined paid 
employment with their training (either a dual track, or an internship in a school-
based track). If they have, they stand a higher chance of acquiring a permanent 
contract. Graduates from apprenticeship tracks do have higher gross wages a year 
and a half after graduation than graduates from school-based tracks, even if one 
takes into account their advantage in work experience (in other words, the fact 
that they have made a head-start in terms of wages through their employment 
during training). The school-based pathway graduates, on the other hand, are 
more often employed in a job matching their qualification level and occupation than 
apprenticeship graduates. De Vries & Wolbers (2002) conclude that, contrary to 
the policy goal of equivalent pathways, significant differences do exist in terms of 
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subsequent employment quality (i.e. wages and quality of the job-training match). 
BOL and BBL are equivalent only in terms of chances of employment chances and 
the chances of a permanent rather than temporary contract, a fact which may have 
more to do with the extremely tight labor market and low unemployment figures for 
the entire group at the time. It remains to be seen if differences in these respects 
between the pathways emerge in a less tight labor market. 
The labor market for graduates of programs at levels 3 and 4 is generally good, 
as unemployment is very low (table 5.6). The sectors of technology and health care 
are particularly promising, with relatively high salaries, low numbers of flexible 
contracts, and a high percentage of jobs corresponding to the VET specialization. 
The economics sector is relatively lagging behind, with BBL levels 3-4 graduates 
earning € 3 per hour less than their contemporaries with health care training. The 
labor market position of level 1 and 2 graduates is weaker, although (in these 
economically more favorable years) it does not show very much in unemployment 
figures.
Table 5.6: Labor market position of senior secondary VET graduates by sector and 
by level, 2001
Source http://www.minocw.nl/english/figures2003/060.html).
Comparing OECD figures on apprenticeship participation for 18 and 22 year olds 
in 1994, we may observe an interesting difference between the Netherlands and 
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Germany (OECD, 1996b: 118-119). Apprenticeship participation in Germany is, as 
we have seen in chapter 3, concentrated among youths in their late teens: 39.1% 
of 18 year old men and 29.6% of 18 year old women participated in some form 
of apprenticeship in 1994, as compared to 7.5% and 7.6% of their 22 year old 
counterparts. Dutch apprenticeship participation is less concentrated among youths 
in their late teens, and more evenly spread over youths and young adults: 9.4% 
of 18 year old men and 9.1% of 22 year old women participated in some form of 
apprenticeship in 1994. 22 year old Dutch women even participate substantially 
more in apprenticeship than their 18 year old counterparts: 8.2% versus 4.0%. The 
average age of the participants in BOL-ft was 18; in BBL it was 24 and in BOL-pt it 
was 29. This indicates that Dutch apprenticeship is less exclusively a direct school-
to-work transition market than its German counterpart. Further evidence is the fact 
that 57% of BBL participants do not come directly from any other type of education 
(http://www.minocw.nl/english/figures2003/060.html). Dutch apprenticeship/
BBL thus seems to mix a distinct role in initial VET and the direct school-to-work 
transition, which is similar to the German apprenticeship system, with a second role 
in further training for workers similar to the Wisconsin apprenticeship system.
5.5    Dutch VET governance: the gradual evolution of a WEB of  
 apprenticeship and school-based tracks 
5.5.1  The original VET systems
5.5.1.1 Apprenticeship
Like German apprenticeship, Dutch apprenticeship has its roots in the medieval guild 
system. The Dutch guilds, however, were abolished under the French occupation, 
during Napoleon. Around 1875, local employers’ associations started to reconsider 
work-based training alongside the gradually developing school-based VET system, 
resulting in the foundation of (large) firm-based apprenticeship systems from the 
1880s on; the first trade apprenticeship systems originated in 1884 and 1907 
(Bakker, 2001: 55-57). But numbers were low: a mere 132 apprentices by 1915. 
Apprenticeship was regulated by law in 1919. The law saw apprenticeship as 
additional to the contemporary ancestor of LBO (‘ambachtschool’), for those areas 
with insufficient numbers of LBO schools, and the relative status of apprenticeship 
was that of an inferior alternative to those schools. Apprenticeship numbers 
grew to 3000 by 1930 (many of them in the printing industry), and its status 
gradually improved, as full-time schools were unable to keep up with VET demand. 
Apprenticeship training was organized by associations, either regional associations 
organizing more sectors, or sector associations (Bakker, 1995: 55-57).
After World War II, apprenticeship became an ingredient towards the 
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reconstruction of country and economy (Bakker, 2001: 78-83). Several advisory 
committees consisting of educational and pedagogical scientists and especially 
employers’ associations and unions advised on the matter. A 1947 vocational 
education committee of the Labor Foundation proposed a sector level organization of 
apprenticeship, and the inclusion of a requirement to conclude training contracts in 
collective bargaining. It resulted in the formation of national bodies for apprenticeship 
per sector, which produced work-based training programs and exams (‘landelijke 
organen voor het leerlingwezen’ or LOLs). Regional bodies were to organize 
apprenticeship placement, related instruction,  and social-pedagogical counseling of 
apprentices and their firm trainer (Bakker, 2001: 78-83). Apprenticeship gradually 
changed from an alternative for school-based VET towards the final qualification for 
skilled workers. Numbers rose to 19,000 apprentices by 1950, to 34,000 by 1955 
(which corresponded to 10% of employed 14-20 year old young people) and 72,000 
by 1965 (Bakker, 2001: 78-83; 93). Related instruction came to be recognized as a 
separate type of education. It became increasingly organized during the day rather 
than for evening classes, and specific schools for related instruction were developed 
on an experimental basis (Bakker, 2001: 93-96).
These developments resulted in a new 1966 Apprenticeship Law. It consolidated 
the previously developed structure of national and regional bodies. It thus saw 
to contents and examinations, rights and duties of apprentice (articles 13) and 
firm trainer (articles 8 and 12), and required apprentices to participate in related 
instruction (article 14) that itself became regulated in the 1968 Mammoth Act29 
(Van Lieshout & Van Liempt, 1999: 124-125; Bakker, 2001: 93-96). While the 1969 
German BBiG constitutes apprenticeship contracts as a separate type of contract, 
concluded for the duration of the training period (cf. section 3.3), the Dutch 
situation implied that apprentices typically had a so-called training-labor agreement 
(‘leerarbeidsovereenkomst’). This was not (nor is) one separately institutionalized 
type of contract but is a combination of a separate labor contract and a separate 
training contract. The training contract and its main conditions (but not the labor 
contract) were defined through the Apprenticeship Law (and, currently, through the 
WEB). It had to be signed not just by apprentice (or parent) and firm, but also by 
the relevant national and regional body. Labor contract terms were (and are) defined 
through collective bargaining. In the late sixties and seventies, training contracts for 
Dutch apprentices (for the duration of the training period) were routinely combined 
with labor contracts for an unlimited period. So at that time, Dutch apprentices 
tended to enjoy more formal30 job and employment security than their German 
counterparts, whose employment with their training firm was and is only secured 
for the length of their training. There were some other interesting differences with 
the German apprenticeship law that implied less protection for Dutch apprentices. 
The Dutch law did not include a ban on apprentices performing unsuitable tasks; 
apprentices did not have a right to a continuation of their contract when failing 
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to pass their (first) final examination31; and the contract is terminated when the 
apprentice reaches the age of 2732 (Van Lieshout & Van Liempt, 1999: 125).
Related instruction for apprenticeship was increasingly delivered by specific trade 
schools (‘streekscholen’): their number grew from 11 in 1970 to 25 in 1978 (Bakker, 
2001: 117). The work-based component was typically delivered by an individual 
firm, some of the larger ones having their own apprenticeship schools to organize 
their apprenticeship training, as is still the case with many larger German firms. The 
LOLs set skills standards, developed and organized national examinations (which 
included a practical as well as a theoretical component, which both have to be 
passed in order to graduate) and provided diplomas for the (work-based component 
of) apprenticeship programs. These LOLs were joint organizations of sector unions 
and employers’ associations, now legally required to also include representatives of 
a related instruction school association and parents, and subsidized by the state for 
their public tasks in the regulation of apprenticeship. The Act intended a monopoly 
of one LOL per economic sector, but as several contemporary observers noted, the 
range of LOLs operating in subsequent years has shown examples of several operating 
in closely related fields (cf. Laman Trip, 1976: 23). The LOLs also employed trade 
consultants, who counseled both apprentices and their firm-appointed trainer. The 
latter was the primary task for the regional bodies. They counseled (prospective) 
apprentices, (training) firms and intermediary organizations. By 1967, there were 
34 LOLs33, 14 regional bodies, and 33,000 firms training apprentices (Geurts & 
Tesser, 1976: 42).
Contrary to German apprenticeship, the Dutch Act distinguished two different 
qualification levels within the apprenticeship system: primary apprenticeship and 
continued apprenticeship. Primary apprenticeship, intended for secondary school-
leavers of whom an LBO or equivalent diploma could be demanded34, took two or 
three years. Primary apprenticeship gave access to secondary apprenticeship, which 
in later years in turn might give access to tertiary apprenticeship, each of those 
offering one or two year tracks. Both often also allowed direct access from HAVO 
and VWO (and, for secondary apprenticeship, MAVO) graduates. Apprenticeship 
graduation, however, did not result in entry rights to school-based education such 
as MBO, HBO or university.
Apprenticeship numbers hovered around 70,000 between 1966 and 1972 
(Ganga, 1992), 80% or more of them in primary apprenticeship. Over the years, the 
relative share of primary apprenticeship in total apprenticeship numbers declined 
from 86% in 1966 to 79% by 1980 and 65% by 1990 (Ganga, 1992). Returning to 
the seventies, apprenticeship numbers showed their dependence upon economic 
conditions by declining sharply in the wake of both oil crises: from 70,588 in 1973 
to 54,642 in 1976 (Ganga, 1992). Then they rose to the old level and peaked at 
74,341 in 1980, before beginning another sharp drop to 59,161 in 1983 (Ganga, 
1992).
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5.5.1.2  MBO
MBO prepared its students for intermediate level employment in various occupations 
and sectors. Pathways were primarily targeted to the occupation, but also included 
general subjects such as languages. The 1968 ‘Mammoth’ Act anchored and 
strengthened the position of MBO in the Dutch educational system. In its wake the 
number of MBO schools expanded rapidly and pathways were developed for new 
sectors such as the hotel and catering industry, tourism, nursing and civil services 
(BVE procescoördinatie, 1997). By the eighties, MBO consisted of a broad range 
of separate schools for various occupations and branches offering 3- and 4-year 
school-based pathways: economic and administrative occupations, shopkeeping, 
hotels and catering, technical occupations, services and health care, butchery, 
commerce, housekeeping and technical education, laboratory schools, nautical 
schools, and agricultural schools.
Until the early nineties MBO was governed by class schedules set by the education 
sector itself rather than skills standards set by social partners. For some tracks the 
Minister of Education set a required class schedule, for others schools could propose 
their own alternative schedule – but few did, as implementing the proposed table 
of the Department of Education and Science implied automatic approval. Some 
sectors also had national examinations, set by the same Department.
MBO often included a work-based component (internships or ‘stages’). Size and 
organization of these internships varied by sector and branch: there could be one 
or more internship periods, and they could vary from a couple of weeks to several 
months. Within the framework of the class schedules, schools themselves were 
responsible for their organization. State regulation did require a written internship 
contract to be concluded between school, student and training firms, including the 
learning activities to be undertaken at the workplace, working hours, counseling 
by school and firm, and insurance. It prescribed themes to be regulated in such 
contracts, but lacked the link to a basic definition of rights and duties of the parties 
involved as the Apprenticeship Act included. Interns could receive some financial 
compensation from the internship firm, but many didn’t (and today, still don’t), 
making interns cheaper than apprentices.
Rising youth unemployment in the late seventies brought the government to 
address the so-called ‘gap in the Mammoth Law’: a growing number of youths left 
(lower) general secondary education without a sufficient qualification to find direct 
employment, and failed to secure an apprenticeship position as supply started 
to decline. The ‘gap’ meant that there was no suitable school-based alternative 
available to apprenticeship for this group. The answer were 21 experiments with 
full-time school-based short MBO courses (‘Kort Middelbaar Beroepsonderwijs’ or 
KMBO) in 1979, followed by a four year provisional legal arrangement, extended 
for a subsequent four year period (De Bruijn, 1997; Bakker, 2001: 133-148). 
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Surprisingly, LBO, apprenticeship and socio-cultural organizations and educational 
institutions were more prominently involved than MBO schools. Participation in 
short-MBO grew to 12,000 in 1983 and over 25,000 in the late eighties. Employers, 
however, considered short MBO a significantly less than equivalent alternative to 
apprenticeship training (VNO & NCW, 1980: 24-25).
5.5.2   A history of incremental policy reform
5.5.2.1  The Wagner Committee and the Open Summit
We discussed the importance of the so-called Wagner Committee for Dutch economic 
and labor market reform in section 3.2.2. In its first report, the committee signaled 
increasing discrepancies between labor market supply and demand in terms of 
education, occupation and age. One of its recommendations is therefore to improve 
the linkages between education and labor market (Van Dellen, 1994: 18). It advises 
to improve the status of technical education; to give trade and industry more voice 
in the programming of in particular technical education (whereby the importance 
of apprenticeship and internship is stressed);  to prepare workers for the need for 
further training during their career; and to expand opportunities for work-based 
learning in firms in the face of the exploding youth unemployment at the time.
Government decided to continue the committee, and its second and third reports 
elaborate upon the previous notions, resulting in more specific recommendations 
for VET reform. The second report discusses two important characteristics of Dutch 
VET: its sequential rather than dual institutionalization and the focus on school-
based VET relative to Germany (cf. section 2.3.6.3) and the lack of involvement 
of social partners in defining the contents of school-based VET. It pleads for an 
increased involvement of social partners in VET, and for an increased role for a 
work-based component in it. Young people who do not enroll in university should 
finish their career in vocational (or professional) education. And, in accordance with 
the German example, apprenticeship should be the main school-to-work route.
The report observes the sharp decrease in apprenticeship positions in the 
economic recession of that time (the number of apprentices dropped from 74,341 
in 1980 to 59,161 by 1983; Ganga, 1992), and calls for efforts to increase the 
number of positions over the next few years. It summons social partners to reach 
agreements to lessen the dependence of apprenticeship on the economic tide, 
as well as trying to ensure (together with the state) to increase the supply of 
apprenticeship in order to absorb all young school-leavers. It also pleads for a 
more flexible approach to the combination of labor and training contracts, and 
to related wages. The committee fears that the fact that training contracts are 
combined with permanent labor contracts, and the fact that apprenticeship wages 
lie more above state minimum wages than warranted by apprentices’ productivity 
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in a number of sectors, are factors in the decrease of apprenticeship numbers. 
Finally, the committee recommends linking the development of apprenticeship to 
further training of older workers and unemployed, as well as the integration of 
short MBO and apprenticeship, in order to prevent the former from luring potential 
apprentices.
For MBO and HBO, the committee proposed the introduction of two stages: a 
first phase consisting of full-time school-based education and training, and a second 
phase under the primary responsibility of trade and industry which combines work-
based VET with school-based related instruction. As in the apprenticeship system, 
combined employment/training contracts should be concluded to govern the former. 
In sum, the report proposes dualization of (the second phase of) MBO and HBO.
To increase the involvement of the social partners, the report recommends the 
creation of national bodies at the sector level for MBO and HBO, resembling those 
already in existence for apprenticeship. Their guidelines would have to include 
requirements for the inclusion of a work-based component in MBO and HBO. The 
new roles for social partners and firms in (work-based) VET should be regulated 
in a Vocational Education Act, as well as the joint responsibility of government, 
social partners and national bodies for the structure and contents of VET, work-
based training sponsoring and the regulation of employment/training contracts. In 
addition, trade and industry should be involved in local and regional consultation 
committees, school boards, in technical teacher training, and by making employees 
available to counsel students in the work-based training component.
In the wake of these recommendations in the second Wagner report, an open 
summit was organized in the spring of 1983 to discuss them: the ‘Open Wagner 
Consultations’ (Open Overleg Wagner, 1984). Peak associations of employers and 
unions, educational peak associations, and (the most relevant Departments of) 
national government participated. The Open Summit shared the view of the Wagner 
Committee that social partners had become too detached from VET governance, and 
shaped its recommendations on the principle of a shared responsibility of education, 
government and social partners to improve the linkages between education and 
labor market. In general, the Wagner recommendations have been adopted for MBO, 
but not for HBO. The Open Summit recommended the creation of national bodies 
for MBO. The Open Summit also adopted the recommendation for a loosening of the 
tie between apprenticeship training contracts and permanent labor contracts, albeit 
with the implication that the combination of training contracts with permanent labor 
contracts was preferable. But combining training contracts with fixed-term labor 
contracts, or even fixed-term training contracts without labor contracts was deemed 
acceptable in order to achieve the desired increase in apprenticeship numbers. Which 
brings us to the most remarkable single recommendation of the Open Summit: it 
translated the proposed increase in apprenticeship positions into the formidable 
ambition to double the influx of new apprentices in primary-level apprenticeship 
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- at a time of severe economic crisis and high youth unemployment.
The Wagner dualization proposals were not confirmed by the Open Summit. 
It argues that both apprenticeship and school-based MBO with internships have 
their own merits and their own functions in the VET system, as some young people 
prefer more school-based VET, while others prefer more work-based learning. It 
instead recommended the continued co-existence of school-based tracks including 
internships and dual, apprenticeship-type tracks, albeit with improvements to 
the organization of the work-based component in both types of track. The Open 
Summit argues that school-based VET should include a practical component 
(internships, observations, excursions), and that internships in particular are a 
necessary ingredient to acquire a vocational qualification. It subsequently qualifies 
this position by noting that internships should be a responsible learning instrument 
in the wake of the education targets, and should only be implemented if other 
learning instruments are insufficient to attain these goals. Internship components 
should be emphatically considered in the process of skills standards development, 
and they should be governed by regulation including quality standards. Guarantees 
should be created to ensure that internship supply can meet demand. It stops short 
of calling for legal regulation in this respect, as relevant partners were willing to 
develop an adequate and effective internship policy.
5.5.2.2  Changes over the eighties: apprenticeship
Various institutional changes occurred in Dutch VET governance in the wake of 
the Wagner Committee and the Open Summit. To pursue the goal of doubling the 
number of new apprentices stated by the Open Summit, social partners in many 
Dutch sectors agreed upon a deterioration of labor conditions for apprentices in 
the early eighties (Frietman, 1990). Employers had previously lamented the steep 
rise in apprenticeship wages over the seventies (in the wake of the introduction 
of youth minimum wages in 1974). Gross wages for 17-year old metalworking 
apprentices rose from Dfl 303 in 1972 to Dfl 1,004 by 1980; for adult apprentices, 
they rose from Dfl 723 to Dfl 1,827 over the same period (VNO & NCW, 1980: 
45)35. The subsequent deterioration over the eighties had various shapes. To begin 
with, some sectors confined the duration of labor contracts they gave apprentices 
to the training period; others (such as metalworking) went one step further and no 
longer coupled the training contract to any labor contract at all. In addition, wages 
were limited36. In some sectors, wages were no longer paid for the time spent 
in related instruction (Overdiep, 1991). In metalworking, the abolition of related 
labor contracts for apprentices resulted in lower trainee allowances replacing the 
previous apprenticeship wages. In construction, where the combination of training 
and labor contract continued, apprentices were paid for only 20 hours during the 
first six months (Hövels et al., 1989; Frietman, 1990). Hence, in this respect an 
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increase in flexibility occurred in the Dutch apprenticeship regime.
But as with Dutch labor market reform in later days, the other side to this increased 
flexibility was intended to be enhanced security, particularly for unemployed young 
people, as the aforementioned measures were intended to make apprenticeship 
positions available to more youths. The state and the social partners undertook 
additional initiatives to achieve this goal. Social partners in many sectors have 
created extensive training funds through collective bargaining from the eighties 
onwards, many of which sponsor apprenticeship training. Sector training funds are 
financed through a levy on firms’ wage bills, and redistribute the money to training 
firms to (partially) compensate them for the costs of apprenticeship training and/or 
further training (Waterreus, 1997; 2002). Waterreus (1997) identified 66 training 
funds (funds created by a levy system which subsidize training) in the Dutch market 
sector. 30 (out of 48) sponsored apprenticeship training, 41 sponsored further 
training, and 37 funded other activities. Almost half of these funds entitled workers 
to a specific number of days’ of training. Usually, this is a collective entitlement at 
the firm level, and the employer decides which workers actually receive training. 
Waterreus (2002) identified 99 training funds. These now include the public 
sector; some additional funds were discovered; some had merged; but the growth 
also indicates the creation of new funds since 1995 (e.g. in the information and 
communication technology sector, for temporary employment agencies and the 
travel industry). Some sectors have separate funds to sponsor apprenticeship and 
further training; others have umbrella social funds that sponsor an even wider 
range of activities, including apprenticeship and/or further training. Most funds of 
the latter type are not created through a levy system, but through public and E.U. 
subsidies. 80% of the funds was created over the eighties and nineties. In all, 38% 
of firms covering 2.5 of 6.6 million workers were covered by a training fund in 
1999, two-thirds of them being subsidized that year. Firm coverage varies by sector. 
Energy and water, as well as hotel and catering are sectors with 100% coverage; 
construction has 52% and industry 71%: financial services have no training funds 
at all. As of 1999, firm levies to such funds are eligible for an extra tax deduction as 
far as they concern course costs (not: wage subvention for time spent in training). 
Besides these 99 training funds, the later study identified 11 cross-sector and public 
funds that stimulate training more indirectly, for instance through co-funding of 
training projects. Waterreus (2002) observes a substantial growth of both worker 
training (in particular in small firms, though training investments there still lag 
behind those in larger firms) as well as activities of training funds and other training 
stimulation arrangements in collective bargaining agreements (cf. section 5.3.5). By 
1999, further training was by far the largest expense category of the funds. There 
is a significant decrease of the share of apprenticeship expenses from 30% to 13%, 
but this is probably explained by an institutional change in government financial 
support for apprenticeship training. The state already subsidized the work-based 
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apprenticeship training component on a small scale in the seventies. In the wake 
of the Open Summit target to double primary apprenticeship intake a structural 
and substantial state subsidy called BVL (‘Bijdrage Vakopleiding Leerlingwezen’) 
was created. The subsidy was allocated to the sector training fund, and consisted 
of three components: a basic component, an additional component for GOAs (to be 
discussed below), and an additional component for specific target groups. In 1994, 
this subsidy was replaced by the aforementioned fiscal facility to training firms 
themselves.
In addition to the creation of training funds, many sectors (such as metalworking37 
and construction) organized local training partnerships (‘gemeenschappelijke 
opleidingsactiviteiten’ or GOAs) that formally employ the apprentice and place 
them with one (or more) member firms that perform (parts of) the actual work-
based training component (Frietman, 1990).  Most metalworking GOAs were 
generally a pool of apprenticeship positions supplied by individual firms (Hövels et 
al., 1989). Others had a more ‘school’-based character implying off-the job training 
in a GOA facility combined with work-based placements with firms. Only through 
the 1988-1989 collective bargaining agreement did individual firms regain the 
option to train apprentices themselves. In the early nineties, 90% of metalworking 
apprentices were trained in GOAs (Aalders, 1994). In construction, a GOA rotated 
apprentices in different training firms due to the specialized nature of many (small) 
contractors who cannot deliver full training for all relevant skills - resembling the 
ÜBS in German construction apprenticeship (cf. section 3.5.3). Hövels & Verijdt 
(1987) list three ways in which GOAs can alleviate apprenticeship shortages. First, 
independent associations with a primary goal of training may find it easier to supply 
extra training positions than private-for-profit firms. Second, GOAs can combine 
partial training positions with firms that in themselves are insufficient to deliver full 
training and/or to commit to the full duration of apprenticeship training. Third, they 
can alleviate shortages by combining apprenticeship training with part-time jobs, 
as was done in installation technology, where two apprentices shared one job. Their 
most important concern is that rotating apprentices across more firms may weaken 
the bond between an apprentice and an individual firm, and makes it more doubtful 
for an individual firm whether the passing apprentice will end up with it rather 
than with one of the other training firms. As firms primarily train to have qualified 
workers in their future, this might gradually undercut their inclination to train. 
This flexibilization of apprenticeship training governance thus also caused more 
differentiation, both between sectors (such as metalworking and construction) as 
well as within them. In metalworking, for instance, three separate apprenticeship 
training situations arose for apprentices employed by these GOAs: training in a 
(former) firm school, in-company training corner, and, on the job training. Each of 
them paid different trainee wages, and qualified different state and training fund 
subsidies to the GOA (Hövels et al, 1990).
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The result of all these policies and institutional changes was indeed that the 
ambitious goal of doubling the number of new apprentices in primary apprenticeship 
was met over the second half of the eighties. The number of new primary apprentices 
rose from 26,670 in 1983 to 52,494 by 1988 (and 53,158 by 1990; Arbeidsvoorziening, 
1992: 31). Total apprenticeship numbers rose from 73,394 in 1983 to 127,388 by 
1990 (Ganga, 1992). Obviously, the improving economy and employment situation 
also allowed for this success. But the success also occurred against the background 
of a declining size of relevant youth generations, and a declining outflow of secondary 
education. Growing numbers of apprentices from general secondary education 
and short MBO, and a rising percentage of LBO graduates becoming apprentices 
to counteract the overall decline in LBO participation, were responsible for this. 
Ganga (1992) concludes that apprenticeship apparently became more attractive 
to both young people and firms over this period. Not all apprentices, however, 
completed their training: 37% of new 1987 primary apprentices abandoned their 
training prematurely (Arbeidsvoorziening, 1991); by 1990, 23% had graduated, 
and another 38% had at least completed the final training year. This implies that 
Dutch graduation rates lie significantly below those in German apprenticeship.
5.5.2.3  Changes over the eighties: school-based VET
Turning our attention from apprenticeship to school-based VET, the sector did suffer 
(together with the other educational sectors) from the financial problems of the 
Dutch state over the eighties. Each education sector faced budget cuts, which were 
to an important extent achieved through sector-specific reform efforts focusing on 
efficiency gains through concentration and mergers of schools and colleges. The 
three-letter acronym for this reform for the VET sector was SVM (‘Sectorvorming 
and Vernieuwing MBO’; cf. OW, 1988; SVM procescoördinatie, 1990). To be precise, 
budget cuts did not result in an overall decrease of available means, but in a 
significant decrease in their previous growth pace. And, the operation strengthened 
policy lines developed in the wake of the Wagner Committee, and followed through 
in the 1996 WEB. SVM applied to MBO and full-time short MBO, and consisted of two 
phases: a first phase of sector formation and school mergers, and a second phase 
of skills standard development in cooperation with the social partners. The first 
phase entailed school mergers to form broad schools offering both MBO and full-
time short MBO in four economic sectors: agriculture, the technical sector, economy 
and service, and health care. It integrated between 300 and 400 separate schools 
in 141 MBO schools by 1991, each of them offering VET for at least one of the four 
sectors. The second phase started with the formation of national bodies for MBO 
in 1989: sector partnerships (‘Bedrijfstaksgewijs Overleg Onderwijs Bedrijfsleven’ 
or BOOBs, and ‘Bedrijfstaksgewijs Overleg Technisch Onderwijs’ or BOTOs) were 
created to develop skills standards for the MBO programs. These were organized 
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per sector, and consisted of an equal number of representatives from education and 
the sector. The final approval of the standards remained the sole competence of the 
Minister of Education. These partnerships completed their first sets of standards in 
1993, only to be merged with the aforementioned LOLs into 22 new sector standard-
setting partnerships: the LOBs (now KBBs) discussed in section 5.3.3. This phase 
also entailed (peak) employers’ associations and unions becoming involved in MBO 
policy consultations between the state and the schools.
Besides SVM, two separate but largely similar integration processes occurred (cf. 
Bakker, 2001: 140-141). One concerned apprenticeship, part-time short MBO and 
various training arrangement under the jurisdiction of the Department of Social Affairs 
and Employment. These were lumped together as ‘cursorisch beroepsonderwijs’ and 
regulated by a separate Act from 1992 until the 1996 WEB. Another one concerned 
the adult education sector, which was regulated by a separate Act from 1991 until 
the 1996 WEB. As to the former, the schools for related instruction were broadened 
to include the other types of training, but apprenticeship governance itself did not 
change significantly, as this process was rather one of ordering a differentiated 
supply than of integrating the arrangements themselves (Bakker, 2001: 140-41).
Nevertheless, some have complained that the budget cuts, reorganizations and 
lay-offs over this period were achieved at the expense of attention for innovation 
in contents and in contacts with social partners and trade and industry (cf. NCW, 
1992). In the meantime, MBO participation increased sharply and undisturbed from 
168,000 in 1980 to 288,000 by 1990 (SCP, 1992).
5.5.2.4  The Rauwenhoff Committee
By the end of 1989, the Dutch government installed a new advisory committee 
chaired by an ex-CEO: the ‘Tijdelijke Adviescommissie Onderwijs Arbeidsmarkt’, also 
known (after its chair) as the Rauwenhoff Committee (Tijdelijke Adviescommissie 
Onderwijs Arbeidsmarkt, 1990).  The committee proceeded along the lines 
drawn by the Wagner Committee38, as well as those observed in the SVM and 
other contemporary policy processes. It shared the view that government, social 
partners, trade and industry, education and individuals are jointly responsible for 
initial VET and further training. Its analysis centers on the conviction that that joint 
responsibility can not yet fully blossom because the various actors are hampered 
in their room for maneuvering, and its recommendations are intended to improve 
linkages between education and labor by increasing actors’ maneuvering scope.
This general undercurrent is reflected best in the first central theme of its 
recommendations: the concept of the autonomous school. Schools and colleges 
should receive more freedom and autonomy from the Department of Education, 
which includes the freedom to look for alternative funding sources (e.g. in training 
unemployed or incumbent workers).
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The second central recommendation was to expand co-makership in VET between 
business and education. Contrary to the Wagner Committee, which had proposed 
a sector level intermediate level consultation structure (which was subsequently 
created for MBO), as far as the Rauwenhoff Committee was concerned, this structure 
could be abolished in favor of direct contacts between individual schools and firms. 
Such micro-level contacts were thought to improve linkages between education and 
labor by allowing more flexibility. 
One obvious example was to stimulate work-based forms of VET, such as 
apprenticeship. Like the Wagner Committee, the Rauwenhoff Committee proposed 
that each type of vocational education (MBO, HBO and now also university 
education) should include a compulsory, fluent school-to-work transition based 
upon an employment/training contract between school, firm and individual. Under 
the slogan dualization (‘dualisering’), this goal was listed as a separate goal next 
to co-makership. The combination of school-and work-based component could be 
shaped according to different models (e.g. the standard apprenticeship model, 
or alternating periods of more work-based and more school-based VET). School 
and individual should be responsible for the entire pathway, while firms should be 
responsible for the possible combination of training contracts with labor contracts. 
Social partners in sectors should stimulate the latter, but should no longer be directly 
involved with  the concluding of an individual contract. Work-based students should 
be rewarded according to the legal youth-minimum wage for the number of hours 
spent in work-based training. Social partners and state should arrive at a covenant 
to shape this dualization.
The fourth and final proposed central theme was that of a starting qualification: 
each Dutch citizen should receive a lifelong right on publicly sponsored education 
to achieve a diploma at or beyond the level of primary apprenticeship (cf. section 
5.4).
The government generally responded favorably to the report, but simultaneously 
allowed itself important deviations on both the central concept as well as on specific 
recommendations (OW, 1990). To begin with the former: the government proposed 
the concept of a shared responsibility of all partners for VET and further training, 
rather than a joint responsibility. It does take issue with the classic division of 
responsibility, where government is responsible for an adequate supply of initial VET 
up to labor market entry, and for second chance adult education; trade and industry 
and individuals for further training; and labor market authorities for retraining of 
the unemployed39.
As to the specific recommendations, the government agreed with the ambition 
to arrive at a fluent, dual school-to-work transition in each pathway, but declined to 
act as a central director for dualization of school-based VET. The initiative should lie 
with individual schools and firms; the idea is one of a bottom-up process with the 
government monitoring decentralized efforts through quality norms. Work-based 
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VET should not necessarily always be paid, unless it includes productive labor. The 
government also assumed a general correlation between qualification level and 
extent of the school-based component to exist - which means that dualization options 
are considered most valid for MBO, less for HBO, and sparingly for universities. It 
proposes a swift start of dualization in short MBO. MBO should start with ‘free-
haven’ projects where possibly inhibiting central regulations are lifted to allow 
initiatives from sectors to prove themselves; but full-time MBO pathways should 
continue as they were, at least for the time being. HBO colleges were allowed to 
offer cooperative education pathways, where study and work periods alternate. 
Universities are just invited to develop dual experiments.
Co-makership between individual schools and firms is considered worthwhile, 
but not at the expense of the intermediate skills standard setting bodies. The 
government expands the definition of co-makership from the one-on-one relations 
between schools and firms in the Rauwenhoff interpretation to an interpretation 
which includes relations among schools, among firms, between schools and 
private-for-profit institutes, and between schools and sector training institutes. The 
government also subscribes to the goals of autonomous schools and a starting 
qualification, but (as with co-makership) is less ambitious in its specific elaboration 
of these goals than the Rauwenhoff Committee. The government proposes a lower 
target than the Rauwenhoff starting qualification: a transitory qualification at LBO/
MAVO level. And the idea of a lifelong right to state sponsored education to acquire 
a starting qualification is reduced to a right up to age 27.
5.5.2.5  Two covenants
In the wake of the Rauwenhoff report and the government response to it, two 
covenants were agreed upon: one between the state and social partners (OW, 1991a) 
and another one between the state and the VET schools (OW, 1991b)40. Covenants 
were along the general lines of the government reaction to the Rauwenhoff report, 
albeit with some differences.
The covenant between state and social partners agreed to keep apprenticeship 
numbers constant, and to try to support its growth trend. The covenant acknowledged 
that dualization may have its advantages, but simultaneously points out that it 
cannot solve all problems between education and labor market (OW, 1991a). It 
also argues that the scope for dualization for specific education and economic 
sectors cannot be established at a central level, in advance, and calls for research41 
to establish discrepancies between education and labor and the attraction of and 
possibilities for dualization. Social partners in economic sectors should decide on 
that matter. And it admonishes sector employers’ associations and unions to reach 
agreements on number and quality of work-based training places in collective 
bargaining agreements. The covenant stimulates co-makership, a theme that is 
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now again focussed on relations between schools and firms, but expanded to include 
relations between groups of schools and an economic sector. The covenant opts for 
a starting qualification policy as the Rauwenhoff Committee did (and unlike the 
government which opted for a lower target of a transitory qualification). But unlike 
that committee, it formulates a policy intention (to try to stimulate as many youths 
and workers as possible to achieve a starting qualification) rather than a right.
Both covenants do not completely overlap: there are differences between them. 
An interesting one is that the entire covenant between state and VET schools does 
not contain the word dualization. Instead, the chosen phrase is ‘strengthening the 
work-based component’, which of course can also be accomplished by improving/
expanding internships. The covenant lists the following principles (OW, 1991b) for 
a strengthening of the work-based VET component:
• all upper secondary VET tracks are governed by skills standards set by the 
Minister of Education;
• ‘long’ MBO remains governed by skills standards linked to vocational 
qualification, general qualification, and a transitory qualification to gain 
access to HBO;
• strengthening the work-based component of short MBO must not alter its 
threshold-free access;
• if strengthening the work-based component results in financial gains the 
fruits will fall to schools and LOBs.
The latter point is noteworthy as it is indicative of a fear present at that time among 
VET schools and social partners: that the state in general, and the then Minister of 
Education in particular, was considering dualization in part as a means to cut back 
state investments in (upper secondary) VET. The traumatic efficiency operations 
of the eighties help explain this fear, though both state and Minister have always 
denied its validity. This fear does help explain the reluctance among these actors in 
fully embracing the dualization theme in those days (Van Lieshout, 1992; Dercksen 
& Van Lieshout, 1993). Presumably in order to reduce this fear, the government 
included a budget guarantee for VET in both covenants, trying to guarantee peace 
in the sector and allowing it to focus on innovation in contents.
In the state-school covenant, schools further acknowledge that apprenticeship 
is a good alternative to full time short MBO, and promise to cooperate in limiting 
the intake of students in the latter. At the very least, apprenticeship influx should 
remain constant. The covenant also specifies the increased autonomy of schools, 
which will be funded on a lump sum basis, and can make their own strategic choices 
regarding personnel, buildings, inventory and innovation.
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5.5.2.6  The preparation of the WEB
In the wake of SVM, the related institutional changes and developments in VET 
over the eighties, and the Rauwenhoff policy trajectory, the main characteristics 
for the new integrated vocational and adult education system, subsequently to be 
institutionalized by the WEB, emerged.
The process of ROC formation actually started in 1991 with a government policy 
document (OW, 1991c). It entailed a next (enforced) step in mergers as it formulated 
the target of one ROC in each labor market region, including all (schools for) related 
instruction, short MBO, MBO and adult education. Arguments for ROC formation 
were to increase the scope for tailor-made solutions for individual students, and 
to ease transition between various tracks and pathways, both to reduce drop-out 
and to facilitate lifelong learning/recurrent education. Paradoxically, the merger 
process was to be one of voluntary mergers between the schools, stimulated by 
financial incentives in state funding. A specific requirement was to arrive at schools 
covering three of the recently formed SVM sectors42. Of all main components of 
institutional innovation resulting in the WEB, ROC formation was the most heavily 
contested. Another increase in the scale and scope of VET schools might have more 
disadvantages than advantages, and the sector might be better served by peace 
on this front to allow it to focus on innovation in VET contents (cf. NCW, 1992). The 
schools in the sector accepted the ROC perspective, but criticized the involuntary 
and institutional character of the related policy (Veld, 1994: 147).
The integration of the skills standards systems for MBO and apprenticeship into 
one encompassing national qualification structure was spearheaded by another 
government policy document (OW, 1992a) and a resulting covenant between the 
state and LOLs (OW, 1992b). LOLs and BOOBs/BOTOs were merged into LOBs (now 
KBBs) to develop an integrated national qualification structure up to and including 
the upper secondary level. For each sector, all relevant vocational qualifications 
were to be defined in terms of certificates (themselves consisting of various partial 
certificates) and skills standards. Schools would have a large amount of autonomy 
as to how to achieve these qualifications for their students. The LOBS were to be 
tripartite bodies with representatives of firms, unions and schools. Besides the 
development and innovation of sector qualification structures, LOBs would have 
responsibilities in concluding training contracts, training firm accreditation, counseling 
work-based students/apprentices, and the development and implementation of an 
examination and graduation system.
In this period, the dualization theme was addressed by another government 
advisory committee, the dualization committee or (again after its former-CEO 
chairman) the Van Veen Committee (Commissie dualisering, 1993). The committee 
basically follows up on both the government response to Rauwenhoff and the 
covenants by watering down the Rauwenhoff (and, prior, Wagner) proposal on this 
300
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
theme, by stating that there is not one general discrepancy between education 
and labor, so there could be no universal solution – including dualization. It 
proposes to replace the concept of dualization by that of vocational socialization 
(‘beroepsvorming’) which can be shaped in different ways (as implied by the 
report’s title, which translates as ‘vocational socialization in many ways’), including 
(improved) internships. It thus cemented the tiles on the already emerging 
foundation for the continued coexistence of primarily work-based and primarily 
school-based pathways under the WEB43.
As of 1994, the BVL state subsidy for apprenticeship training was replaced by a 
tax cut on training firms’ wage bill taxes and associated social insurance premiums, 
of about € 2,000 per year per apprentice for training firms. As the tax cut benefits 
individual firms and there was no longer a specific subsidy for GOAs, their financing 
had to be reconstructed. In sectors with an evolved training infrastructure such 
as construction and metalworking, the typical solution was that GOAs themselves 
were accredited as recognized training firms, and as such became the beneficiaries 
of the tax cut themselves (typically on top of subsidies from the sector O&O fund). 
But in a newly emerging sector like information and communication technology, 
lacking an evolved associational and VET infrastructure, where GOAs had been just 
proved vital to the development of such an infrastructure in the first place, some 
GOAs completely vanished, were taken over by ROCs, or redirected their activities 
towards a different (further) training market (cf. Van Lieshout & Van Liempt, 2001: 
94).
In 1993, an umbrella government policy document described the main 
characteristics of the WEB (OW, 1993a), while a related policy document elaborated 
on the topic of adult education in general, and the starting qualification theme in 
particular (OW, 1993b). In the latter, the government admonished relevant actors 
to agree on obligations to stimulate the acquisition of starting qualifications. The 
former formulated goals and policy processes to arrive at a WEB active as of January 
1st, 1996 (which was the date of expiry consciously set for separate temporary Acts 
governing the separate subsystems at the time). Goals were (OW, 1993a):
• one coherent system of flexible, effective and efficient pathways;
• each student gets offered a pathway that leads as fast as possible to the 
aspired goal;
• drop-out will be prevented as much as possible;
• employers' associations and unions have influence on the type and level of 
vocational qualifications;
• qualifications should be broad and oriented towards society.
The WEB is explicitly shaped as a developmental Act, combining current policy 
processes and new policy developments. This developmental nature continued in its 
final shape and implementation: some specific policies or parts of the institutional 
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context it created were only finalized after its introduction. An example is the 
process of ROC formation, which resulted in 46 ROCs by January 1st, 1997 (BVE 
procescoördinatie, 1997). By then, over a decade of mergers had reduced the 
number of schools in the sector from roughly 1,000 to 6544.
Although the remaining policies, advisory reports and other policy events 
accompanying the creation of the WEB and continuing after its arrival hosted 
various interesting discussions, we will not further detail them here. The main 
characteristics of the contemporary Dutch VET regime from our international 
comparative perspective in this book has been defined by the policy process 
over the decade discussed above, and the main characteristics of the WEB have 
been outlined in section 5.3.3. We will skip to the first evaluation of the WEB, 
before drawing conclusions on trends, continuity, and change, and noteworthy 
characteristics of Dutch VET and its governance over the last two decades from an 
international comparative perspective.
5.5.3   The evaluation of the WEB
5.5.3.1  The steering committee report
The WEB was evaluated in 2001 by a relatively autonomous steering committee. Its 
chair and members were appointed on a personal basis, therefore not representing 
organized interests. A policy memorandum from the Department of Education, 
Science and Culture to Parliament, however, explicitly interprets the evaluation 
assignment to be a report on the factual situation in the VET system, not an 
assignment to reconsider it (Polder, 2002). But the committee subsequently did get 
room to do suggestions concerning the WEB.
The committee distinguished seven thematic complexes based on the goals 
the WEB was meant to achieve. It organized a hearing with relevant interest 
associations to establish a central evaluation question as well as other questions for 
each theme, and subsequently commissioned a separate research project for each 
of them - except for the first theme that was explored by two separate projects 
(Polder, 2002). Themes and main findings for VET (we will continue to neglect adult 
education here) are listed below.
Meeting societal demand, the linkage between education and labor
The central question here is whether the WEB steers actors to allow the system to 
function adequately, geared to meeting social and labor market demand. Brandsma 
(2001) signals important friction areas regarding the qualification structures, and 
observes that particularly in this area, the results from negotiation and consultation 
processes do not yet result in an adequate meeting of social and labor market 
302
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
demand. Heijke (2001) specifically targets the fact that current steering mechanisms 
insufficiently steer ROC tracks that deliver broad and sustainable qualifications 
for the labor market and offer optimum development opportunities for students. 
VET supply is too easily differentiated in separate tracks with insufficient attention 
to what should be included in initial VET on the one hand, and what should be 
included in further training on the other. Moreover, the macro level monitoring of 
effectiveness and efficiency is unilaterally geared to labor market demand, but it is 
not focused on students’ interests and capacities.
Meeting individual demand, accessibility, and the position of the student
The central question here is whether the WEB steers actors to allow the system to 
function adequately, aimed at meeting individual demand, VET accessibility, and 
strengthening the position of the participant. Doets & Westerhuis (2001) observe 
improvements in these areas, but simultaneously observe a gap between possibilities 
offered by the WEB and the extent to which this room for maneuvering is used. 
They consider improvement of the selfsteering capacity of actors more important 
than legal changes to address this gap.
Quality of the VET and adult education supply and examinations
The central question here is whether the WEB steers ROCs and examination 
institutions to offer a supply of VET and exams of sufficient quality, targeted to 
external needs. The answer is positive, but has its caveats (Nieuwenhuis, 2001). It 
is positive because quality awareness has increased, and is beginning to translate 
into operational quality policies. One caveat is that quality policies have not yet 
been implemented integrally or from a shared educational vision. Another is that 
the system of regulation and responsibilities has not yet been elaborated in a 
transparent fashion. In general, the WEB functions adequately, but in some aspects 
(the regulation of examinations in particular) it can still be optimized.
Efficiency of pathways: internal and external returns
The central question here is whether the WEB offers sufficient conditions to realize 
optimum accessibility, graduation rates, and outflow to HBO or labor market (Van 
der Velden, 2001). Various reasons have prevented a full quantitative evaluation. 
One was the simple fact that for many sectors the first exit of a generation of 
graduates had yet to occur, preventing an assessment of external returns to the 
new VET tracks. In addition, reliable national and local figures on graduation and 
drop-out rates are also lacking. With these important caveats in mind, the following 
findings are reported (Van der Velden, 2001; Geerligs et al., 2002). VET accessibility 
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has increased between 1992/1993 and 1998/1999. VET participation has grown as 
a share of the relevant age group; accessibility for target groups has increased; 
there is a slight decrease45 in the number of youths leaving education without a 
starting qualification; and improvements in the linkages between MAVO/VBO and 
VET have not resulted in higher drop out rates in the first year of VET46. Preliminary 
developments in post-WEB graduation rates indicate either a slight improvement 
or at the least no deterioration - which also means they are still quite low. The 
number of VET graduates continuing in HBO has increased from 25% in 1991 to 
39% by 1998. First post-WEB labor market results have generally been good, but 
the booming Dutch labor market situation at that time is the most important cause 
for that (cf. section 5.4).
Linkages with other education subsystems (De Bruijn, 2001)
The central question here is whether the WEB offers sufficient conditions to allow an 
optimal gearing of VMBO to VET, and VET with HBO, respectively. De Bruijn (2001) 
observes that the WEB only sets a general framework for these linkages. Curriculum 
linking must occur in regions, between or within individual schools/colleges. In 
general, respondents do not consider WEB changes in this area necessary, although 
some specific suggestions for additional regulation are given.
Self-steering system, autonomy of schools, quality assurance 
The central question here is whether the WEB offers sufficient conditions for self-
steering by ROCs, policy capacity and quality assurance, geared to external needs 
(Karstanje, 2001). The conclusion is that the WEB does offer such conditions, but 
that they are not sufficient. The report notes that improvement processes in some 
areas have already started (e.g. a process by Colo (the association of LOBs) to 
strengthen the qualification structure, a joint process of the Colo and ‘Bve raad’ 
(the association of ROCs) to improve examination procedures, and improvement in 
the supervision of organizations). 
Different governance relations, decreasing governance workload
The central question here is whether the WEB offers sufficient conditions for 
optimal governance relations within the VET system and a decreased governmental 
workload. The answer is yes and no, respectively (Leenknegt, 2001). Yes, because 
the WEB in principle offers enough room for a task division between relevant actors, 
allowing each to carry its relevant responsibility for the field. But the current division 
of tasks does seem insufficiently transparent in some areas, resulting in tensions 
among actors. And no, because the decentralized governance regime puts much 
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responsibility with in particular the ROCs, which leads to an increased governmental 
workload rather than a decreased one. 
These reports and another hearing with relevant interest organizations on the 
research results were the basis for the evaluation report of the steering committee 
(Stuurgroep Evaluatie WEB, 2001; Polder, 2002).  The steering committee 
concluded that actors were happy with the increased freedom the WEB offers them. 
It simultaneously concludes that the scope offered is not (yet) always used in an 
optimum fashion; that tasks and responsibilities are not always clear; and that 
various actors have swiftly taken up roles that effectively limit the scope for ROCs 
by additional regulation. Checks are unilaterally concentrated on ROCs, but few 
exist for other actors. ROCs are thus accountable for their performances, but are 
codependent for those performances on the performance of other actors. In sum, 
an imbalance has emerged in the division of responsibilities between various actors, 
and will have to be addressed. The report also observes a tension between the 
three goals of the WEB: to qualify for vocational employment, for HBO entry, and 
for social citizenship. In particular the committee finds that VET is targeted too 
strongly on labor market demands.
 The steering committee identifies eight core problem areas:
1. the national qualification structure for VET;
2. the governance of the work-based component;
3. external accountability of examinations and examination quality;
4. accessibility and tailor-made solutions;
5. the position of participants;
6. internal and external supervision;
7. governance of adult education;
8. implementation of temporary regulation.
I will limit my discussion here to those of the aforementioned themes most relevant 
for the themes central to the international comparison in this book: the national 
qualification structure for VET and the governance of the work-based component.
Regarding the qualification structure for VET, the main problem is that the 
current governance regime results in a larger internal differentiation of that 
structure (in separate tracks) than is warranted. This results in tracks that do 
not qualify as broadly and as sustainably as is considered desirable from a macro 
level efficiency perspective. In the WEB, macro-level efficiency is supposed to be 
guaranteed through the work of an independent committee (ACOA) that advises on 
proposed qualifications from that particular point of view. Criteria to be considered 
were the supply of work-based training positions and labor market perspectives 
for graduates. As the (requests for) supply of qualifications, and the right to offer 
the corresponding tracks by individual schools exploded in the wake of the WEB, 
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the Department of Education has issued further guidelines to make this macro-
level efficiency test more rigorous, specifying the sources schools should use 
to support their request. But ACOA found that these sources do not allow solid 
conclusions on labor market perspectives: they are often not comparable, and may 
even contradict each other. ACOA recommendations have therefore grown to test 
the quality of the argumentation of the request more than actual labor market 
perspectives themselves, and the Department of Education has formalized this 
practice in a new regulation requiring schools ‘just’ to show that they have analyzed 
the labor market situation. This in effect abolished the macro efficiency test, and 
the ACOA has not been asked for advice since 2000 (cf. SER, 2002: 16)47. The 
steering committee reports additional shortcomings to the qualification structure 
regarding internationalization, responsiveness, transparency, level 1 qualifications, 
qualifications for HBO entry and cross-sector qualifications. The proposed solution 
is to achieve the necessary cohesion of the qualification structure by limiting the 
number of (at the time) 21 LOBs to 4: one for each broad economic sector. Each of 
them should have a tripartite board. Underneath the umbrella of each of these 4 
remaining LOBs, more branch-specific consultations could continue.
Regarding the work-based component, the three-party configuration between 
LOBs, ROCs and training firms is not without its problems, and the quality of the 
component is not always sufficiently guaranteed. Here, it is important to note that 
the WEB entailed a change in that division of responsibilities regarding student 
counseling during work-based learning. Previously, LOBs counseled apprentices, 
while MBO schools themselves counseled interns. One particularly debated theme 
during the development of the WEB was who would counsel students during work-
based learning, since LOBs and schools both wanted this task. In the end, the WEB 
made schools responsible for the counseling of students during the work-based 
component. While they had already done so for their previous interns, this task was 
new for dual tracks, the number of which was increasing; and they were supposed 
to perform this task from their regular funds. Soon after the WEB, ROCs found this 
task to be more complex and time-consuming than they had foreseen; and their 
personnel was not always as specifically equipped for this particular task (dealing 
with firms) as the apprenticeship counselors of the LOBs had been. Interestingly 
enough, a significant number of ROCs found themselves signing contracts with a 
particular commercial initiative of a number of cooperating temporary employment 
agencies: ‘PasKlaar’. ‘PasKlaar’ at least brokered between BOL and/or BBL students 
looking for work-based placements and firms. It sometimes acted as their formal 
employer and training firm while subsequently placing them with one or subsequent 
customer firms (making them a functional equivalent for GOAs for sectors that 
didn’t have these, or across sectors)48. Either way, through this initiative or on 
their own, ROCs have improved their organization and counseling for the work-
based component, although quality issues do remain. The steering group advises 
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ROCs to develop a powerful strategic policy to address that quality, for instance by 
exempting specialized personnel for this task. It also advises requiring firm trainers 
to be certified - albeit with the possibility of an exception for small and medium-
sized firms, who this might pose too heavy a burden for.
5.5.3.2  The Education Council report
The government (in particular the Education Minister) responded with a 
memorandum outlining some main lines to solicit another round of responses from 
relevant associations of VET actors, and simultaneously solicited advice from the 
Education Council. In general, the latter agrees with the steering committee that 
the WEB generally functions adequately (Onderwijsraad, 2001b). It also agrees 
with the committee that the coordination of the VET system should be improved, 
but whereas the committee has sought such improvements more in structural 
interventions, the Council opts for curriculum improvements within the current 
legal governance regime. It also emphasizes that the new legal governance regime 
should be given time to develop, and that in particular individual actors should 
be given time to increase their policy capacity. The Council judges it too early for 
revision/remodeling of the WEB. It does identify a number of themes that require 
further study:
• the development of a new-style, competency-based qualification 
structure;
• examination (a theme which is the subject of a separate report covering all 
segments of the education system);
• governance of adult education;
• legal changes that may become necessary further down the road.
But again, the Council emphasizes that the WEB itself is not the cause of most 
problems concerning the aforementioned themes; instead, more state governance 
in some areas (while preserving ROC autonomy) may be required.
5.5.3.3  The Education Inspection report
Meanwhile, Education Inspection has published its own evaluation of the WEB 
(Inspectie van het Onderwijs, 2001). This report also emphasizes that WEB evaluation 
at this point in time can just offer a preliminary balance, as some policy threads 
were only implemented years after 1996, and some of those implementations 
would only be rounded off in future years. It also agrees with the other reports that 
in areas where the WEB does not yet function according to the original intentions 
of legislature, the cause is usually a not yet adequate implementation rather than 
inhibiting legal stipulations. Delegated tasks are not always adequately exercised 
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by actors yet, and occasionally they are even neglected. And, finally, it also concurs 
with (in particular) the Education Council that the further implementation of the 
WEB should use structural legal changes as sparingly as possible, as they distract 
from implementation itself. This report is organized around the themes: increasing 
scale, qualification structure, examination, work-based components, accessibility/
flexibility/tailor-made solutions, the position of participants, and self-steering 
capacity. Again, I will limit myself to the findings regarding the qualification structure 
and the work-based component.
With respect to the qualification structure, the report observes that the WEB has 
resulted in a more transparent structure of qualifications and tracks, and as such 
results in better linkages between the education and labor market. However, the 
number of tracks and qualifications is too high, resulting in a dispersed qualification 
structure. Replacing occupational profiles by occupational competency profiles, a 
better coordination among LOBs regarding VET supply, a better gearing of that supply 
to regional demand, and a simplification of the qualification structure by reducing 
the number of qualifications and tracks, are required. The WEB offers room for such 
developments, and relevant actors have already put forward initiatives along these 
lines. Regarding the work-based component, again the WEB is considered to allow 
sufficient opportunities. Although this component is often organized effectively, 
improvements are necessary regarding the evaluation of learning results in this 
component, linkages between theory and practice, counseling of apprentices/interns 
by ROCs and complying with legal stipulations regarding the training contract. And 
the division of responsibilities between training firms, LOBs and ROCs is evaluated 
as non-transparent. However, the WEB is again judged to offer sufficient scope to 
make it transparent. The only area where the WEB lacks stipulations is in terms of 
the accreditation of training firms (and the accountability of this process).
5.5.3.4  The government response
In the light of all these extensive reports and comments, the final government 
response (and the preceding memorandum discussed with relevant organizations) 
to the report of the steering committee was succinct. Its main tune is that in some 
respects the time proved too early for a thorough evaluation of the effects of the 
WEB, while in other respects it proved to be too late because some areas (e.g. 
examinations) required urgent accompanying policies to address specific issues. 
The general conclusions are:
• the WEB allows sufficient scope to realize its underlying intentions;
• not all room to maneuver is used by relevant actors;
• there are no grounds for fundamental, structural changes;
• efforts are required to achieve quality and efficiency improvements within 
the current legal governance regime;
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• future legal changes are relegated to a future mid-term orientation on VET 
policy and the future implementation of a recent long term orientation on 
'Learning without limits'.
As to recommendations regarding the various specific themes, we will again limit 
ourselves to the qualification structure and the work-based component.
The government response agrees with the steering committee that the coherence 
of the qualification structure should be improved through a joint format filled 
with sustainable competencies, and subsequently relegates improvements of the 
qualification structure to policy efforts with the aim that had already been initiated 
in the field. ACOA had already advised a greater focus on core competencies in skills 
standards in 1999 (ACOA, 1999). This recommendation distinguished itself from 
the concept of key qualifications (cf. section 3.5.2.1). Core competencies are those 
capabilities of an individual that are used to tackle the core tasks of an occupation 
in adequate, process- and product-oriented fashion. The suggestion was adopted 
by the Department of Education and served as a basis for a Qualification Structure 
Development Plan developed by the association of Dutch KBBs, COLO (COLO, 
1999). This then hosted a policy development trajectory resulting in a proposal 
for frameworks and formats for the desired qualification structure shortly after the 
WEB evaluation (COLO, 2002). One important relating new concept underlying the 
vision of a future improved qualification structure is a 'chain' approach: making 
the qualification structure competency-based requires a simultaneous shift to a 
competency-based approach in the tracks, in the work-based components and in 
examinations. Other relevant points made by the government in its response to 
the steering committee report are that the new qualifications should be broad and 
sustainable, and that the sponsoring formula for LOBs should no longer contain 
an element based upon the number of qualifications developed. As to the number 
of LOBs: the government sticks with a bottom-up approach, taking into account 
ongoing processes to stimulate mutual cooperation. Further ways to improve 
this cooperation will be discussed with the field. A separate point relating to the 
qualification structure in the government response is how to achieve a VET supply 
which is both effective and efficient. The theme has been relegated to the SER for 
advice.
Regarding the governance of the work-based component, the government sees 
the various specific problems observed by the reports as implementation problems, 
and does not propose any legal changes as to the division of responsibilities. 
However, should the associations of LOBs and ROCs agree upon necessary changes 
in the future, the subject would be open to revision. The government also declines 
to formalize certification of firms' trainers, primarily for fear that the resulting costs 
might deter some small and medium-sized firms from training. It does propose 
a study to identify ways for LOBs to increase transparency of how they deal with 
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evaluating the quality of the work-based component in general and that of firm 
trainers in particular.
5.5.3.5  SER recommendations
In the wake of this response, the SER was asked for advice on three themes: 
(the governance of) macro-efficiency of VET supply, the work-based component 
and the occupational column (improving linkages between VMBO, VET, and HBO). 
Regarding the former, the SER (2002) subsequently advised the Minister to again 
abide by his own law and re-establish the macro-level efficiency test, albeit shaped 
following a somewhat different procedure than is currently included in the law. 
Further improvements are sought in implementing conditions for micro-level 
decision-making at the regional level. Schools should be required to consult with 
other schools, economic sectors, firms and KBBs on their supply and its change over 
time. And state sponsoring should be conditional for six years, and achieve ‘regular’ 
status only when the underlying business targets have been sufficiently met after six 
years. Regarding the work-based component, recommendations have little specific 
substance. Advice is phrased in general terms: to shape future work-based learning 
policies in a way that accommodates other relevant and/or desirable trends (e.g. 
lifelong learning, competency-based learning, changes in work organization), and 
to address current problem areas rapidly.
5.5.4   Conclusions: continuity and change in the Dutch VET   
    governance regime
5.5.4.1  Dutch continuity and change relative to Germany
This section has portrayed the evolution of Dutch VET governance over the past two 
decades. While it has been both the subject and product of a continuous reform 
process, from our international comparison with Germany and the U.S. its continuity 
in many respects is the first thing to be emphasized. The Dutch governance regime 
has always been much closer to the German VET regime than to its American 
counterpart. The typical route from education to intermediate level employment 
leads through multi-year vocational education and training pathways, whereas 
such long, structured and specialized pathways are the exception in the U.S.. As 
in Germany, VET is supplied by both schools and firms. As in Germany, national 
standards (albeit in different forms) have always governed the main components 
of such tracks, and there have been national examinations or (currently) indirect 
institutionalized checks to guarantee their quality, and ensure congruence with the 
national standards.
Change over those two decades has made the Dutch governance regime even more 
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comparable to its German counterpart: the emphasis on the work-based component 
has increased, and it is now a legally required part of each upper-secondary VET 
pathway. And, while traditionally occupational profiles and skills standards for the 
apprenticeship system were developed by employers associations and unions, but 
not for MBO, these associations (together with school representatives) now do so 
for all upper-secondary VET.
Having established these broad and increased similarities between the Dutch and 
the German VET governance regime, however, we must stress some crucial differences 
between the two. The most obvious one is that in Germany, apprenticeship routes, 
whose major component is work-based, dominate the school-to-work transition, 
whereas in the Netherlands, two types of pathway have co-existed: those with 
a major work-based component (previously apprenticeship, now BBL), and those 
with a minor work-based component (previously MBO, now BOL). In this German-
Dutch comparison, the Dutch glass is both half full and half empty. One can just as 
easily argue that the challenging proposals of various advice committees to dualize 
(at least upper-secondary) vocational education have been fully implemented (with 
each track now having a work-based component) as that they have been futile 
(with primarily school-based tracks still dominant). Arguing either case is, however, 
irrelevant as compared with the more obvious observation that precisely these 
predominantly school-based pathways and their success in the Netherlands provide 
a third alternative to institutionalized German-style apprenticeship and American-
style low VET institutionalization: substantial, state-funded, school-based tracks. 
For countries currently lacking the institutional prerequisites for a successful 
apprenticeship system (such as the U.S.), this Dutch example might prove a more 
viable example to learn from than the German apprenticeship example that has 
dominated international literature up till now. And, as the evolution of the Dutch 
VET governance regime over time shows, one can still have social partners set skills 
standards for (primarily) school-based tracks, and gradually expand and improve 
their work-based component as time goes by.
In earlier publications (cf. van Lieshout, 1997d), we have emphasized 
another German-Dutch difference in the institutionalization of work- and school-
based components: in the German governance regime, school-based VET tracks 
explicitly function to ease the transition between general secondary education and 
apprenticeship, implying a sequential institutionalization of both types of pathways. 
The Dutch WEB provides the basis for a parallel institutionalization of both types of 
pathway, each by themselves facilitating the general secondary education to work 
transition. For roughly half of the qualifications, both options are currently open 
to young people and firms. It is noteworthy that the equivalency in terms of skills 
standards does not translate into a full equivalency in terms of graduates’ early labor 
market careers. Both the history of the creation of short MBO since 1979 and the 
experience under the new WEB regime show a different appreciation by employers of 
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both pathways (with usually a preference for the more work-experienced graduates 
if available). And they show distinctions in labor market results of the graduates 
from both pathways (with more work-based tracks showing an easier school-to-
work transition, but more school-based tracks apparently easing the chances of 
subsequent upward mobility). From a scientific point of view, it would be very 
interesting to make targeted comparisons of employer preferences for and early 
labor market careers of graduates from both pathways for specific labor market 
segments, and we hope the next WEB evaluation will seize this opportunity.
Parallel institutionalization of pathways might offer the advantage that, when 
apprenticeship supply declines in a declining economy, the more school-based 
pathways can absorb those youths unable to find an apprenticeship position. 
However, the German full-time vocational schools in fact do the same, to the extent 
that BFS experience delivers full credit towards subsequent apprenticeship training; 
indeed to the extent that it does not offer full credit, it in fact causes some delay in 
the individual school-to-work transition there. However: a declining economy will 
also cause a decline in internship provision in the Netherlands, a problem that will 
have to be solved by either relaxing quality standards for training firms49 or offering 
school-based practical training alternatives.
 Another consequence of the parallel institutionalization is that more school-
based and more work-based tracks will compete for students and training firms. 
As the same schools provide both tracks, this competition should be fair enough, 
allowing both types of actors to follow their own preferences. In contrast to 
Germany, this does give Dutch firms the alternative of scaling back their training 
expenses by switching to hiring interns rather than apprentices - an option that 
could theoretically undermine apprenticeship supply over time. Recent enrollment 
numbers do not show such an effect as BBL participation has increased more 
rapidly than BOL participation (section 5.4), but, since this occurred in a booming 
labor market context, it will be interesting to watch enrollment developments in a 
floundering Dutch economy.
5.5.4.2  Neglected questions
The new Dutch WEB governance regime is a remarkably coherent and modern 
legal regime, reflecting and improving upon the strengths of its ancestors, and 
integrating apprenticeship into the regular education system, which might help to 
improve its status. The WEB evaluation generally leads to a positive conclusion on 
the new governance regime: actors in the field, researchers and committees are 
generally happy with its basics, and criticism focuses on either particular legislative 
details or even more so, on implementation issues. Given the extensive nature of 
the evaluation, however, it is worth noting that it is limited in focus: it is focusing 
on this new Dutch regime, and its underlying philosophy, and whether the original 
312
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
intentions have materialized. From our comparative perspective, there are some 
issues that have received surprisingly little attention. We have already mentioned 
one above: a more detailed look at micro-level decision processes (by firms, youths 
and schools) regarding the pathway choice within a particular labor market segment 
would be very interesting.
Another thing that is highly remarkable is the fact that, when attention in Dutch 
policy in general and this evaluation in particular focuses on the micro-level, it nearly 
always exclusively focuses on schools (and then mostly ROCs) and their autonomy. 
While the emancipation of work-based learning in the Netherlands has proceeded 
well in terms of a respectable position for dual tracks in legislation, qualification 
structure, and participation, this has by no means led to an emancipation of the 
training firm as an equally relevant micro-level actor as ROCs. The latter continue to 
figure much more prominently in the attention of Dutch policymakers than training 
firms. The German-Dutch contrast in this respect could not be sharper: in Germany 
the majority of policies and research is focused on the firm as the central training 
organization (‘Ausbildungsträger’), while in the Netherlands it is the ROC which 
find itself in that spotlight. This in itself shows how strongly historically embedded 
cultural perceptions of VET continue even in and after legislative changes, which 
clearly aimed to enhance the role of the traditional minority partner. One would 
hope that a future evaluation of the WEB will focus more on the role of training 
firms and their perceptions and problems; failing to give them the attention they 
deserve runs the risk that particular problems (or perceptions thereof) may not 
appear on the policy agenda.
The same holds true for the lack of a volume focusing on differences between 
economic sectors in VET organization, school-to-work transition, and labor market 
discrepancies. It fails to uncover interesting similarities and differences on how 
a comprehensive legal regime can function differently depending upon additional 
governance mechanisms at the sector level (e.g. in terms of qualification structure, 
types of pathway, training funds), while such information could easily provide 
valuable policy lessons.
Another blind spot concerns the recurrent complaint about a too fragmented 
qualification structure in Dutch VET policy over the past decade. As 700 separate 
qualifications at the upper secondary level is indeed a remarkably high number 
in an international comparative respect, and there are indications of significant 
overlap between various of them, the goal of a little less fragmentation in the 
Dutch qualification structure is understandable. However, what is incomprehensible 
is that LOBs (and, indirectly, the social partners) should routinely serve as the 
scapegoat for this fragmentation. A perceived need for reducing the number of 
LOBs to combat this problem has been argued both in policy discussions preceding 
the WEB, and in those surrounding its recent evaluation. There would be some 
grounds for this if the cause for the high differentiation of the Dutch qualification 
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structure would lie in an extraordinary amount of horizontal differentiation in 
occupations. However: if one compares the total of approximately 300 German 
apprenticeship qualifications with the total of over 600 Dutch qualifications, it is 
obvious that the higher Dutch number is caused by a more vertical differentiation 
of the qualification structure, rather than an exaggerated horizontal differentiation. 
The German apprenticeship qualification structure has mostly just one qualification 
level (and a maximum of two in some sectors), implying that most of those 300 
qualifications are distinguished horizontally. The Dutch WEB distinguishes four 
qualification levels, its intention being that each branch/occupational group has a 
pathway at each level. In practice, this is not always the case, as some areas lack 
level 1 pathways, while others lack level 4 pathways50. However, it is safe to say 
that there will be, on average, pathways at at least 3 qualification levels for each 
occupational group. If we correct for vertical differentiation, this leaves us with 
a horizontal differentiation of roughly 200 occupational groups – so less than in 
Germany. In other words: the most important cause for the high differentiation 
of the Dutch qualification structure simply lies in the vertical differentiation into 
four different qualification levels. It is therefore incomprehensible that, in Dutch 
policy documents, the high differentiation of the qualification structure is routinely 
attributed to LOBs failing to achieve enough (cross)-sector coordination, without 
any reference to the number of qualification levels as at least another, and probably 
a more important, cause of the (perceived) problem. 
But that is not all. The extent of vertical differentiation in Dutch VET has gradually 
increased over the last few decades, and the most important actor responsible for 
this is the state - not LOBs or social partners. Over the years, a policy spiral has 
occurred to address the ‘gap in the Mammoth Act’, which has resulted in newly 
created lower qualification levels. By 1979, the analysis that there was no school-
based alternative available for those youths who did not qualify for MBO, and could 
not find an apprenticeship position or regular job, resulted in the creation of short 
MBO (now level 2 BOL). By 1990, primary apprenticeship - short MBO was broadly 
judged as the minimum qualification level of what was necessary to start a not-too-
cumbersome labor market career. Paradoxically, the introduction of this starting 
qualification concept primarily triggered a policy debate on the group that would 
never be able to reach this level. And actual policy formation promptly translated 
the original goal into a distinctly different one: the ‘need’ to create an additional 
lower qualification level to allow them to graduate with a VET certificate - which has 
now become qualification level 1. This process was accelerated by a simultaneous 
policy attempt by the Dutch state (in particular by the Department of Social Affairs 
and Employment) to stimulate social partners to include lower wage scales into 
their collective bargaining agreements. Social partners in many sectors initially 
responded with a ‘thanks but no, thanks: we have no need for employment at such 
levels’. However, the Dutch state used its ‘shadow of hierarchy’ to get most of them 
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on board. To summarize: not only is vertical rather than horizontal differentiation 
the primary cause of the large number of Dutch qualifications, the Dutch state rather 
than LOBs or social partners has been the active proponent behind the addition of 
new qualifications by expanding the number of qualification levels.
And third: to the extent that the Dutch state seeks to reduce the number 
of qualifications, and for a moment assuming that the high extent of vertical 
differentiation is untouchable, would a reduction of horizontal differentiation be 
best achieved through a reduction of the number of LOBs? We sincerely doubt it. 
The German counterpart of the LOBs is one (1) BIBB, under whose umbrella many 
sector-specific discussions about training occupations occur. The idea to arrive at 
4 Dutch LOBs is linked to a similar structure, with more sector-specific discussions 
about qualifications taking place under their umbrellas. But so far, the umbrella 
of the BIBB hosts more horizontal differentiation than occurs under the separate 
umbrellas of the 22 Dutch LOBs. And those 22 LOBs (given the expansion of the 
number of qualification levels) now host more qualifications than the 32 previous 
LOLs. Moreover, the recent merger of three LOBs in line with blurring boundaries 
between their economic sectors (which also hosted mergers (or merger discussions) 
between training funds and employers’ associations) shows that LOBs will indeed 
merge if labor market changes clearly indicate the need for this. It is naïve to think 
that the number of separate organizations is either the cause of or the solution to 
the high extent of differentiation, and it is naïve to think that making LOBs tripartite 
(including school representatives in each LOB board) would solve the problem.
5.6   Analyzing the Dutch skills equilibrium
Like its German counterpart, the Dutch skills equilibrium is a high-skills equilibrium. 
Both individuals and firms routinely invest in substantial, multi-year, initial, 
senior secondary VET tracks. There are important similarities in the institutional 
configuration supporting both high-skills equilibriums. But there are also some 
intriguing differences.
To start with the similarities: the most important one may be the organization 
of labor market demand. Both German and Dutch firms (expect to) fill a large 
share of their demand for new recruits with young graduates from multi-year, 
occupation-specific upper-secondary VET tracks. For firms, this suggests that work 
organization in (larger) Dutch firms will more closely resemble that in German firms 
than in American firms. Although our methodology for this study has not allowed 
us to settle this matter empirically, the evidence from the (few) available matched 
plant comparisons including the Netherlands corroborate this picture for at least 
metalworking and food-processing (cf. section 2.3.8). When controlled for product 
quality, labor productivity estimates for Dutch food-processing workers are second 
only to German workers among four European countries (Mason et al., 1993). And 
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while labor productivity among American pump manufacturing workers is higher 
than that for their Dutch counterparts, the difference is caused by economies of 
scale (larger production batches) and higher automation levels. Dutch frontline 
workers are both more qualified (70% lacking formal qualification in the U.S., vs. 
only 22% in the Netherlands) and more productive when performing particular 
key tasks (e.g. American workers taking 50% more time than Dutch ones to set 
up their machines; Mason & Finegold, 1995). It would be very worthwhile to have 
more of such matched plant comparisons in the near future, to establish whether 
similar differences do indeed apply to other sectors, and to more closely settle some 
specific issues51. For our purposes here, the point is that work organization in Dutch 
firms generally requires substantial intermediate skills just like in Germany. And, 
likewise, recruitment practices of Dutch firms for such jobs at least entail screening 
candidates for relevant (senior secondary) vocational credentials. And more 
often than not, they also include delivering the (work-based) part of that training 
themselves, either by hiring interns or by offering apprenticeship positions.
 One obvious difference in the precise operation of the German and Dutch skills 
equilibriums is that work-based training is the primary pillar of the former, while 
a school-based component is the major component underlying the latter (albeit, 
with work-based training as a very relevant second pillar). In particular, while 
apprenticeship comprises an almost perfect monopoly on the German VET market, 
in the Netherlands primarily school-based pathways comprise the majority of that 
market.
5.6.1	 	 	 Why	do	Dutch	firms	train	fewer	apprentices	than	German		
	 	 	 	 firms?
Von Henninges (1994) estimates that 24.2% of German firms employed apprentices 
in 1992. Moerkamp (1993) estimates the number of Dutch training firms at 9%. 
Our own calculations of the number of apprentices in comparison to the number of 
workers in each country for that period result in a similar difference (Van Lieshout, 
1996a: 132).
 One obvious factor to be considered when attempting to explain the smaller 
volume of the Dutch apprenticeship system are apprenticeship costs and benefits. 
To begin with, we have to consider relative price differences in the cost of 
apprentices for training firms. Information on costs and benefits of apprenticeship 
training which is as representative and specific as Von Bardeleben et al (1994a; 
1994b; 1995) for Germany is not available for the Netherlands. The closest is a 
pilot study by De Vries and Heere (1993). They collected data on the costs and 
benefits of apprenticeship training for 31 Dutch training firms. This sample cannot 
be considered representative, not just because of its small size, but also because it 
mostly contains firms with a relatively strong training tradition and highly evolved 
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training infrastructure. With that caveat, De Vries and Heere (1993) have found 
substantial differences in costs and benefits between economic sectors. The most 
important cause of those differences are substantial differences in the costs of 
apprenticeship wages. While comparing the Dutch and German figures from the 
aforementioned reports has its limits due to methodological issues and differences, 
they do suggest that the net52 apprenticeship training costs for both countries were 
roughly comparable, possibly even somewhat lower in the Netherlands, in the early 
nineties (Van Lieshout, 1996a: 116-117).  Anyway, the (limited) evidence available 
does not point towards higher costs for Dutch apprenticeship training as a factor 
that could explain the smaller Dutch apprenticeship training volume.
 That brings us to international differences in the indirect benefits from 
apprenticeship training for training firms as a possible explanatory factor. Von 
Bardeleben et al. (1994a; 1994b; 1995) and De Vries and Heere (1995) do 
not present quantitative estimates of these benefits, but limit themselves to a 
qualitative overview of indirect benefits as mentioned by their respondents. Both 
lists are roughly comparable as well. Dutch training firms list the following training 
motives:
• Apprenticeship graduates who have been trained within the same firm need a 
relatively short introduction phase on their subsequent job;
• One's own graduated apprentices are broadly employable throughout the 
firm;
• Quality and employability of own graduated apprentices is judged to be typically 
better than that of external recruits
• Own graduated apprentices are more involved with the firm;
• Some firms can't find suitable external labor in the external labor market and 
therefore have to train their own future workforce;
• Some firms train to upgrade their personnel;
• Firms guarantee continuity by taking on the training themselves;
• Firms are confronted with new developments and techniques by providing 
training themselves;
• Training fulfills an important public relations function for firms.
One other important similarity between these studies for both countries is that 
many firms in both countries are not very aware of the costs, and even less 
of the benefits, of apprenticeship training. Attempts to analyze such costs and 
benefits may therefore be theoretically interesting to establish the viability of a 
particular institutional incentive structure to stimulate training; but they should 
not be misinterpreted as an adequate model of how firms actually make training 
decisions. Firms’ training decisions are qualitative policy decisions by one or a few 
key managers and/or a works council, not the outcome of a quantitative analysis of 
various policy options. I will return to this issue below.
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 Since evidence of significant Dutch-German differences in apprenticeship 
costs, direct benefits of apprenticeship training (labor productivity) or indirect 
benefits (other real or perceived benefits from training future skilled workers) is 
lacking, differences in the institutional environment emerge as the most relevant 
explanation for the difference in apprenticeship training volumes. While there are 
various differences in the exact regulation of apprenticeship, the main characteristics 
of both governance regimes are similar enough to fail to explain the significant 
difference in training volume. The most adequate explanation for that difference 
seems to be the existence of two important alternatives to apprenticeship training 
in the Netherlands: equivalent full-time initial VET pathways, and regular (low 
wage) youth employment.
The existence of fully qualifying school-based VET in the Netherlands goes 
a long way towards explaining its smaller apprenticeship system. VET for some 
sectors (in particular the economic-administrative sector) has historically become 
institutionalized in state-sponsored school-based VET rather than through 
apprenticeship training. And even in some sectors with a strong apprenticeship 
tradition, VET for middle management and some technician level occupations 
became institutionalized through four-year MBO tracks rather than apprenticeship 
training. In Germany, the FS provide the equivalent for VET for such positions; 
but access to FS presupposes prior apprenticeship training due to the sequential 
organization of apprenticeship and (subsequent) technician/middle management 
training in FS. In the Netherlands, both became institutionalized in parallel tracks 
and education systems: youths could either opt for front-line worker training 
in (primary) apprenticeship, or for (primarily) school-based tracks for middle 
management and technician positions, at age 16.
The consistent influx of new generations of graduates from (primarily) school-
based tracks ensures that the external supply of skilled labor is larger than in 
Germany for firms that opt not to train themselves. This makes that market much 
less of a lemon market than its German counterpart, thereby reducing an important 
push factor for German firms to hire their own apprentices (cf. section 3.7.2). If 
Dutch school-based tracks would indeed be completely school-based, an additional 
factor reducing the lemon effect would be that a generation of graduates would 
enter the external labor market in full (including the best among them). In Germany 
the most talented apprentices will never see the external market, as they will be 
retained by their training firms, which significantly enhances the 'lemon' nature of 
that external market. The inclusion of a significant internship component in Dutch 
school-based tracks should intervene here, however. It is likely that internship firms 
will rapidly offer good interns a labor contract, which may imply that the graduates 
entering the external labor market may still be of (on average) lower quality.
Of course, that internship component should serve as a more general and 
important caveat for misinterpreting the large German-Dutch apprenticeship volume 
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difference as a similarly large difference in work-based training investments by 
firms in both countries. The required internship component makes the difference in 
work-based training overall significantly smaller. Moerkamp (1993) estimates that 
30% of apprenticeship training firms and 20% of the other firms offer internships53. 
Obviously, again there are important differences between sectors. Heijke (2001) lists 
more recent percentages of firms training BBL and BOL students in four economic 
branches in five regions:
Table 5.7 Percentage of firms with BBL and BOL students
Source: Heijke (2001): p. 82.
As the work-based component of Dutch BOL tracks remains smaller than that of 
apprenticeship tracks in both countries, the overall work-based training volume in 
the Netherlands might still be smaller than that in Germany. But it would require a 
separate study to decide the matter empirically in a satisfactory way.
The more important point of table 5.7 is to illustrate that (initial) training activity 
in general and the balance between BOL and BBL in particular is quite different in 
different Dutch economic sectors. This way, the Dutch case underlines that skills 
equilibriums can therefore be quite sector specific within the same national and 
legal context. Specifically, in some sectors more Dutch firms prefer the BBL, while 
in others, more prefer BOL. The Dutch case provides a rich sector variation for a 
study in the specific institutional elements at the sector level that explain such 
differences. One important factor that would have to be included is the existence of 
an apprenticeship training infrastructure, such as an apprenticeship training fund and 
specific provisions in collective bargaining agreements. Another one is the average 
firm size: typically, larger firms tend to train more than smaller firms (albeit with 
exceptions such as the high training activity of many relatively small construction 
firms). Aalders (1994) attempted to explain Dutch sector differences in (overall) 
worker training activity and found it difficult or even impossible to construe adequate 
indicators for important explanatory variables such as technology, product market 
and government policy to allow for a quantitative explanation. His qualitative study 
explores various relevant variables. His general conclusion is that sector differences 
in the average training intensity are to an important extent explained by differences 
in the structure of the sector (firm size and homogeneity) and differences in the 
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context of the sector (pace of technological change). Industrial relations figure in 
the equation, too. Union strength is a factor, though not the most important one. 
According to Aalders (1994), markets with a low threshold for firm entry, and the 
position of large firms and/or key persons in the sector are more important factors 
contributing to training in general and training fund creation in particular. A direct 
consequence of the sector differences in the Netherlands is that it prevents us 
from developing a general hypothesis on the preference for either apprenticeship 
or (more) school-based pathways. The matter simply requires more and different 
research than was possible in the context of this project.
(Primarily) School-based VET is not the only alternative available to Dutch youths 
(and firms) for apprenticeship. While regular employment for German youths is 
a rare exception, regular youth employment is considerable in the Netherlands. 
A large share of that consists of side jobs of students enrolled in BOL or higher 
education tracks. Dutch student sponsoring legislation offers substantial possibilities 
for additional income acquisition above state-sponsored scholarships and loans 
through such jobs. Student income acquisition though such side jobs has risen 
sharply over the nineties (Bureau Interview-NSS, 1999), and there are estimates 
of 55,000 higher education students occupying the equivalent of 30,000 full time 
jobs requiring no more than VBO or MAVO credentials (Nrc, 1999). OECD figures 
indicate a concentration of Dutch (and American) youth employment in some 
below-average skills sectors such as hotels and restaurants, personal services, and 
wholesale and retail trade and repair (OECD, 1996b; cf. section 3.4.4). In the 
Netherlands, the system of youth minimum wages makes regular employment of 
young workers a cost-attractive option for wage-competitive firms, which then do 
not have to compensate for such low wages by offering (regulated apprenticeship) 
training.  Regular youth wages (while somewhat higher than the legal minimum 
youth wages) are hardly higher than apprenticeship wages. And with regular youth 
employment there are no limits on the productive deployment of regular young 
workers, or requirements to provide training in general, let alone for skills which 
this individual firm has no direct need for from this worker. In Germany, low youth 
wages are always apprenticeship wages that compensate young people for low 
wages with institutionalized training rights (as is the case in Dutch apprenticeship). 
The German Apprenticeship Act in fact forbids training (and thus, hiring) youths of 
up to age 18 outside of the apprenticeship governance regime in formal training 
occupations. To be fair: the existence of sector training funds and financial 
incentives provided by the government (first a subsidy, then a fiscal facility) do 
compensate Dutch training firms for part of their related apprenticeship training 
costs, while such incentives are generally lacking for German training firms. The 
point is, that while many (smaller) German firms hire apprentices for (in part) 
their direct (and cheap) productive contribution, similar Dutch firms will often opt 
to hire such labor through formal regular youth employment. Both practices have 
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their advantages: while the aforementioned German apprenticeship positions are 
certainly not the most attractive ones, at least these young cheap workers have 
some established training rights that regular young Dutch workers lack. To the 
extent that the latter are simultaneously enrolled in a school-based VET program 
(as many, though not all, are), the latter then does not necessarily mean that they 
lack training altogether. But, in retrospect, it is surprising that all the attempts to 
further stimulate work-based training in the Netherlands have focussed on replacing 
school-based components by work-based components. The more promising avenue 
of trying to substitute low-wage regular youth employment without institutionalized 
training rights by work-based training linking low youth wages to such rights has 
hardly received any attention.
Once again: firms’ training decisions in practice are not the outcome of a 
quantitative assessment of various human resource policy options. While such 
assessments are helpful in attempting to formulate hypotheses to explain differences 
in training intensity, they do not model the actual decision-making process. This 
brings us to another level of explanation for such differences: differences in the 
conceptions of control of key actors (firms, employers’ associations). Chapter 3 
emphasized that German firms have historically wanted to keep the government 
from seizing control over training issues, in part because they fear that school-
based training would fail to achieve the same standard of craftsmanship. As there 
generally have not been any full-fledged school-based VET tracks, their skepticism 
in this respect is understandable. The chapter also showed how, as a result, the 
government has leverage to ‘blackmail’ firms and their associations into more 
training in bad economic times by threatening to impose a firm levy. This dynamic 
is quite different in the Netherlands. While there are sectors (like construction and 
metalworking) with a strong history of and belief in apprenticeship training, many 
other sectors and their firms lack such traditions. Instead, these latter sectors 
will primarily or exclusively have (good) experiences with MBO/BOL tracks. And 
even sectors with a strong history of apprenticeship training like metalworking and 
construction also have good experiences with MBO/BOL tracks - in particular for 
supervisor or technical specialist types of level 4 qualifications.  In sum: the more 
obvious but far from negligible explanation for differences in apprenticeship volumes 
between both countries lies in firms’ conceptions of control vis-à-vis skills policies. 
In those of German firms, apprenticeship tends to be the primary option considered, 
while for many Dutch firms, it may not even figure into their consideration at all.
Such differences in conceptions of control translate themselves into different 
strategies of associations. While German employers’ associations have tended 
to want to restrict government intervention, their Dutch counterparts mostly 
represent firms that either rely in the first place on (primarily) school-based tracks 
for skilled graduates, or at least do so to some extent. Moreover, even Dutch 
firms that exclusively train apprentices have appreciated the financial incentives 
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the Dutch government has provided. This helps explain the fact that Dutch 
employers’ associations have tended to take a different position from their German 
counterparts, where it comes to government intervention. They stress the fact that 
initial VET is first and foremost a government responsibility. The government in 
turn also has a different conception of control than its German counterpart. Faced 
with employers calling for a prime role for government in initial VET provision, as 
well as with schools, their interest organizations, and teachers unions, it is quite 
understandable why the few more or less radical calls for a dualization of school-
based VET by advisory committees have never been met. Add to this the fact that 
MBO and now BOL have always functioned relatively adequately. As a consequence, 
even if Dutch government would have wanted to achieve such dualization, it could 
obviously not deploy similar ‘blackmail’ (‘shadow of hierarchy’) techniques, as the 
German government has been able to fall back upon.
More difficult to explain are differences in the conception of control of the labor 
movement in both countries. While the German labor movement has seen an 
apprenticeship system with a limited extent of vertical differentiation in qualifications 
as an important tool to ensure interest congruence among their membership, the 
Dutch labor movement either has not, or has failed to reach that goal. The matter 
is interesting enough to warrant a historical comparison of the evolution of union 
stances in this matter.
5.6.2   Why do Dutch youths opt for school-based VET?
Section 3.6.1 explored the reasons why large numbers of German youths opt for 
apprenticeship training (cf. Van Lieshout, 1996a: 59-73). While apprenticeship 
numbers are considerable in the Netherlands, (primarily) school-based tracks 
remain the main VET route.  How can this difference be explained, in particular 
given the basic similarities in the institutionalization of apprenticeship in both 
countries? We will revisit the reasons explaining German apprenticeship popularity 
for possible answers.
 An important part of the international difference can be explained by the 
availability of (primarily) school-based VET tracks in the Netherlands, which have 
supplied training more or less equivalent to apprenticeship training in pre-WEB 
days, and formally equivalent  (awarding the same diplomas) under the WEB. This 
explanation may sound obvious, but it is also obviously relevant: if there is only 
one route, participation in that route will be higher than in a country that also 
provides an alternative route. Of course, this begs another, historical question: how 
did school-based VET become the dominant VET route in the Netherlands over the 
past century, while apprenticeship became the dominant VET route in Germany? 
Empirical research for this project was not targeted to answer this historical question, 
and therefore cannot hope to answer it satisfactorily. But some clues are available. 
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In chapter 3, we saw that employer (and their associations’) preferences are an 
important part of the answer to this historical question for Germany: employers 
preferred to keep the state out of VET affairs. For the Netherlands, the ‘schools battle’ 
at the start of the twentieth century presents itself as a relevant factor. It ensured 
that the elites in the various social pillars were keenly aware of the relevancy of 
(their own) schools to socialize their own groups. As Dutch schools thus (amongst 
many other things) became a part of the strategy of various social groups, this 
may help explain the prominence and high status of education and schools in the 
Netherlands. Subsequently, in the second part of that century, education became a 
prominent part of the socio-democratic political strategy to promote the chances of 
upward social mobility for workers’ children. The architecture of the 1968 Mammoth 
Act reflected this goal, particularly with the inclusion of a VET-based progression 
route through the education system (up to university) as an alternative to the 
purely general and academic route. Formally, apprenticeship has always remained a 
separate system outside this articulated education system. As education has, to an 
important extent, helped to substantially increase the chances of upward mobility 
for workers’ children, parents have come to value (school-based) education as 
very important for the future chances of their children. Over the past decade, one 
consistent theme that crops up in interviews with professionals employed in (the 
governance of) Dutch VET in general and apprenticeship in particular are complaints 
about the less favorable status of apprenticeship (relative to full-time school-based 
tracks) among students and (as importantly) their parents. While we offer the former 
historical hypothesis as no more than that, these contemporary effects of different 
experiences of past generations with school-based and dual tracks in Germany and 
the Netherlands are having lasting effects on the choices of present and future 
young generations. While Dutch apprenticeship has long been a substantial and 
good source for new craftsmen, it has always been more of a hidden gem than its 
German counterpart - somewhat in the shadow of a larger school-based VET system. 
This results in substantially fewer parents having direct or indirect experience with 
dual tracks, while all have experience with school-based tracks. In contrast to this, 
most German parents have experienced an apprenticeship themselves and are 
therefore familiar with the form. And the standard expectancy for most German 
youths was and is to enter the labor market through apprenticeship sooner or later. 
Apprenticeship being the largest form of education and training for late teens in 
Germany, the German media have also tended to give it the attention it deserves. 
Dutch apprenticeship has never had this size, or this cultural status, or the public 
attention.
There is a link here with a separate reason listed to explain the attraction of 
apprenticeship for German youths: the availability of interesting further training 
opportunities upon apprenticeship graduation. In general, Dutch pre-WEB 
apprenticeship allowed continuation from one apprenticeship level to another, but 
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did not result in more attractive return opportunities back into the school-based 
education system. In particular, the difference lies in the parallel institutionalization 
(next to apprenticeship) of middle management and technician training in Dutch 
MBO and its ancestors, as opposed to their sequential institutionalization (after 
apprenticeship) in Germany. The historical fact that technician and middle 
management VET became institutionalized in German ‘Fachschulen’ (FS) that 
presupposed prior apprenticeship training helps to explain the larger German 
apprenticeship training volume in two ways. First, it offers a simple and direct 
explanation in that those who later participate in FS will have had to participate in 
apprenticeship before that, while the comparable Dutch group entered MBO (and 
its ancestors) directly and without prior apprenticeship training. Second, it offers an 
additional element to explaining the status differences in the perception of students 
and parents of the appeal of apprenticeship. It matters whether an apprenticeship 
contains just future (frontline) craftsmen, or also includes future craft specialists 
and their immediate managers. And it matters, whether an apprenticeship system 
is considered the straight course for (and a necessary prerequisite for entry into) 
specialist and middle management occupations. While in the Netherlands schools 
training for such positions directly competed with apprenticeship in attracting 
students, in Germany apprenticeship was not only saved this competition - the 
prospect of possible later entry into these FS actually even strengthened the appeal 
of the apprenticeship system.
Apprenticeship takes two to tango, so another part of the explanation will have 
to involve the strategic choices of employers rather than apprentices. Historical 
hypotheses that warrant further research here are, first, that the gradual 
development of developed full-time VET schools has led many branches to organize 
their training within that context. Or perhaps schools themselves (or the state) may 
have simply beaten the employers to organizing it first. Either way, while Dutch 
apprenticeship is spread across a larger part of the economy than its American 
counterpart, much of it is indeed concentrated in industry and craft sectors with 
a longer history, originating at a time when there were no developed VET schools 
around. Much less apprenticeship (and if so, in smaller apprenticeship numbers) 
is found in service sector occupations that evolved in a later period - certainly 
in comparison with Germany. If VET schools come to offer training for new and 
growing occupations while apprenticeship doesn’t, the former will gradually expand 
their scope and numbers more than the latter.
In addition to a school-based VET alternative, the Netherlands offer a third route 
to its young people: regular youth employment. While German employers have 
generally offered youth jobs in the form of apprenticeship positions, Dutch employers 
in various sectors hire a significant number of youths in regular jobs at (or, more 
often, slightly above) the regular youth minimum wage. To be sure: a significant 
share of these jobs are actually part-time jobs filled by (VET or higher education) 
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students, in which case the route is not an alternative to (school-based) VET. But 
the fact remains that regular employment for youths is more readily available as 
an alternative to continued VET than it is in Germany. This will also explain part 
of the lower Dutch apprenticeship numbers - in particular when we realize that 
some German apprenticeship positions are offered primarily because of the positive 
balance between apprenticeship costs and apprentice productivity over the training 
period (or after a short period of continued employment upon graduation).
 We consider these two more readily available alternatives to apprenticeship 
(school-based VET and regular employment) for Dutch youths the most important 
explanations for the German-Dutch difference in apprenticeship volumes. To 
complete the comparison with Germany, we will briefly discuss the remaining 
elements used to explain the appeal of German apprenticeship for young people.
One element explaining the appeal of German apprenticeship was the lack of 
formal entry requirements, which makes it an option for everyone who manages to 
find a firm willing to train him/her. Dutch pre-WEB apprenticeship did have formal 
entry requirements, which may have prevented some apprentice-wannabes from 
participating. But this translates only into a smaller apprenticeship volume to the 
extent that the apprenticeship positions they could have hypothetically filled will 
either never have materialized, or have remained vacant. As in most cases a firm 
looking for an apprentice will have been able to find one who met the admission 
requirements, the extent to which the German-Dutch participation differences 
can be explained by this institutional difference is limited. In addition, subsequent 
apprenticeship tracks at WEB levels 1 and 2 do not have formal admission 
requirements.
 Another factor was that apprenticeship wages (while relatively low) still were 
more attractive financially in Germany than scholarships for school-based students. 
It is notable that Dutch state-provided scholarships for full-time school students 
have allowed for relatively ample opportunities to gain additional income through 
side jobs over the last two decades. But, as I mentioned in section 3.6.1, one 
should not overestimate the importance of short term financial consequences as a 
factor in the decision making process of young people.
 As in Germany, Dutch apprenticeship has generally provided good labor market 
prospects. While the Dutch culture of certified craftsmanship is not as pervasive 
and elaborate as in Germany, certified apprenticeship does indeed hold value in 
the relevant labor market segments. There are some institutional differences, such 
as the fact that Dutch social security has not distinguished occupational unfitness 
from labor unfitness. But again, one should not overestimate the relevancy of such 
reasoning in the actual training decision making process. More important is the 
difference in (sector) scope of apprenticeship. In Germany, banking apprenticeship 
has long served as a prime example of how apprenticeship could pave the way to 
careers in a promising, secure (and white collar) employment sector. As a simple 
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result of the relatively smaller scope of Dutch apprenticeship, the argument of 
subsequent good labor market prospects and (more importantly) entry lanes into 
many internal labor markets will presumably have applied to a lesser extent to 
the Dutch situation - objectively, as well as in the perception of youths and their 
parents. And, perhaps most importantly, we have already discussed the parallel 
institutionalization of technician and middle management training in Dutch MBO 
and its ancestors, as well as its consequences.
 Finally, in section 3.6.1 we have applauded the strong and steady 
institutionalization of the German career information centers - themselves role 
models for the later development of such centers in Wisconsin and other American 
states. The responsibility for career information has not been institutionalized as 
straightforwardly, and has certainly not been stable. While the Dutch PES of course 
has had to include an apprenticeship as a possible employment opportunity for 
the unemployed, it has lacked such separate specialized and proliferated centers 
for this task. There have been and are career information centers, separate from 
the PES, but these have changed and switched names repeatedly, and their status 
and market share has not come close to that of their German counterparts. Both 
these things may partially be accounted for by the fact that apprenticeship was 
strongly coordinated at the sector level, nationally through the LOLs, and regionally 
through the regional apprenticeship bodies and other sector-specific types of 
regional training organizations and partnerships. But the advantage of regional, 
economy-wide career information centers with a large market share in terms of 
reported apprenticeship vacancies and, as a result, many visitors, should not be 
underestimated. It simply increases the chances of clearing the market by matching 
supply and demand, and helps stimulate both supply and demand.
5.6.3  Summary and conclusion
In sum: Dutch work organization and firms’ recruitment practices have put a 
premium on substantial initial VET for youths much like in Germany. But while 
in Germany all those incentives channel young persons into apprenticeship (or 
higher education), the Dutch governance regime offers more ways, both to firms 
and youths. For one, both firms and youths can opt for work-based and (primarily) 
school-based tracks offering a full vocational credential. Second, firms and young 
people both have the alternative of regular low (youth) wage employment much 
more readily available to them than their German counterparts. While German 
youth employment is predominantly institutionalized in apprenticeship training 
(and thus includes training rights), there are some Dutch sectors that employ a 
large share of young people in regular employment not linked to formal training 
provision. This segment of the youth labor market seems to bear more resemblance 
to the American example of (non-college) youth jobs that offer relatively unstable 
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temporary employment spells, rather than giving access to corresponding labor 
market careers in such segments. Both the important role of school-based VET and 
the more prominent role for regular youth employment without training in some 
sectors help explain the smaller supply of apprenticeship training in the Netherlands 
as compared to Germany. In addition, the relative importance of dual, more 
school-based initial tracks and regular youth employment differs significantly in 
the context of similar national legislation. This underlines the importance of sector 
level variables, and warrants more analysis. One important explanatory variable to 
be considered is differences in conceptions of control of firms and other relevant 
actors: previous experience with particular strategic skills policy options tends to 
shape such conceptions of control in ways that tend to reinforce the continuance of 
past practices.
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Notes chapter 5
1 In conjunction with its particular ideology, the liberal pillar was the least ‘pillarized’ 
of the four pillars. In many social sectors, for instance, one would only have separate 
Protestant, Catholic and social-democrat organizations; and hierarchical (and cross-
organizational) interest coordination seems to have been weakest within this liberal 
pillar.
2 A similar subsidiarity principle has since been adopted at E.U. level, in respect to the 
division of responsibilities between the E.U. member states, as well as regions within 
those states.
3  VNO-NCW and MKB Nederland are currently discussing an integration of their business 
processes while presevering their separate identities
4 The German state has institutionalized a forum (Bündnis für Arbeit) for joint negotiations 
between the federal government and peak associations of unions and employers in the 
second half of the nineties, to try to alleviate unemployment and strengthen German 
economy’s competitiveness. The Dutch example of the ‘Wassenaar’ Accord and later 
Accords has inspired the German state to pursue this road, but progress has, so far, 
been modest. Cf. Bundesregierung (1999) for negotiations on the specific topic of VET.
5 One notable example is an act that regulates health care occupations that entail 
individual patient care, which also regulates senior secondary level occupations besides 
tertiary ones. But it is a good example of the trend towards less (strict) regulation of this 
kind, as it replaces previous legal stipulations that were based on the shared principle 
of limited access to such occupations. The new act is based on the principle of free 
access to these occupations. Only specific health care actions are to be undertaken by 
specifically qualified personnel. In addition, some occupational titles are protected and 
reserved for specially qualified personnel (http://www.bigregister.nl).
6 A new collective bargaining agreement has changed the four phase systems into a 
three phase system, which preserves the key changes discussed here.
7 Van Velzen (2005) compares temp worker training and its institutionalization in the 
Netherlands and the U.S. in the process of a broader comparison of flexible worker training 
in construction and information and communication technology in both countries.
8 The court has summoned the Dutch government to expand minimum wage protection 
to 13- and 14-year olds (who have been allowed light work for limited hours since 1996) 
by the summer of 2004, ruling in favor of the unions FNV-CNV. Compare Rechtbank ‘s-
Gravenhage, 11 december 2002.
9 In addition, there are mixed, merged schools which combine schools of various 
denominations, or public and privately run schools.
10 SER and WRR are prominent general governmental advisory bodies that also may 
address educational issues.
11 There is a separate stream of special schools in primary and secondary education 
for children with learning and behavioral difficulties, and there are separate schools for 
children with disabilities preventing them from adequate counseling at regular schools.
12 The age was lowered from 6 to 5 in 1985. Today, approximately 99% of 4-year olds 
already attend primary schools.
13 One is obliged to finish the school year when one reaches the age of 16.
14 Provided they started their current studies before the age of 30.
15 Higher education student funding has changed repeatedly over the last decades. We 
will] abstain from a detailed overview of all those changes.
16 Complaints of curriculum overload and fragmentation have recently resulted in 
changes.
17 Agricultural VET falls under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture, not the 
Department of Education. Agricultural VET is provided by separate AOCs rather than 
ROCs. We will exclude the agricultural sector from our subsequent analysis.
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18 Labor market governance and policy for reintegrating and training the unemployed 
has hosted several policy shifts over the years. We will not discuss these here. Cf. Sol 
(2000) for an overview and analysis.
19 As of 2003, admission requirements (a diploma from VMBO or one of its ancestors) 
are introduced for level 2 tracks, provided there is a corresponding level 1 track for the 
same occupational group. In addition, admission requirements for senior secondary VET 
will become sector-specific.
20 In 1993, 22 LOBs were created through mergers of similar but separate bodies for 
apprenticeship and MBO. 3 (electro, metalworking and installation technology) of them 
have merged in February 2003 into one KBB for technical craftsmanship (including the 
information and technology sector).
21 LOBs either have a bipartite board consisting of an equal share of union and employer 
representatives, or a tripartite board which also includes an equal share of school 
representatives (WEB article 9.2.1). LOBs with bipartite boards are required to have a 
tripartite education-business committee where school representatives occupy half of the 
seats. For such LOBs, it is this committee that actually submits the qualifications and 
skill standards proposal for the economic sector to the Minister of Education.
22 There is a separate qualification structure for adult education.
23 The draft for the WEB actually proposed something different. There would be one 
pathway at each qualification level, with a predetermined size for its work-based 
component. Objections from business and schools resulted in the Department adopting 
this two-pathway approach (cf.]. Van Lieshout, 1997d).
24 Exemptions of half a year or more are possible for students graduating from a related 
upper secondary VET course.
25 Since 1998, HBO colleges can offer a dual variant of each full-time track.
26 HBO graduates may be exempted from parts of the course.
27 All schools must report each education participant up to 23 years of age, who has 
not yet earned a starting qualification and who has been absent from his or her study 
program for one month, to the local authorities in his or her city of residence.
28 Note that many of these graduates will in fact have followed pre-WEB pathways, 
particularly at higher qualification levels.
29 This implied that the state appointed a lesson table for related instruction, with the 
LOLs responsible for the programs for the work-based component.
30 Informally, of course, apprenticeship is a quite secure bet for German youngsters, 
since a very high percentage of apprenticeship graduates are offered a regular labor 
contract by their training firm upon graduation.
31  But the act does create the opportunity to prolong the training contract to allow an 
apprentice to take the next exam. The act also explicitly creates the opportunity to 
conclude a training contract for a shorter period than training duration, conditional upon 
approval of the LOL.
32 LOLs may waive this legal stipulation to allow an apprentice to graduate (Laman Trip, 
1976: 45).
33 One of them (Philips Education Association) was actually not a sector body, but an 
organized apprenticeship for a large Dutch multinational.
34 Over the years, orientation and linkage courses were developed for those lacking such 
qualifications to gain access to primary apprenticeship.
35 Employers specifically put forward the coupling of training contracts to labor contracts 
as an important source of drop-out, a point also noted by other observers (Laman 
Trip, 1976: 46). Peak employers associations emphasized that 13.7% of 1978 (primary) 
apprentices had to abort apprenticeship training because of the legal dissolution of their 
labor contract, and emphasized the detrimental nature of the ‘last in, first out’ principle 
in this respect (VNO & NCW, 1980: 43). Closer scrutiny of the relevant annex reveals 
that this was actually the third most important reason for contract ending, after failure 
to attend compulsory related instruction, and change of occupation.
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36 General wage freezes and wage moderation and the specific lowering of youth minimum 
wages at the time already by themselves provided a basis for such deterioration (cf. 
sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3).
37 Many of the regional partnerships in metalworking were former firm apprenticeship 
schools (Hövels et al., 1989).
38 An interesting difference between both committees is that the Rauwenhoff committee 
included university education (with HBO, MBO and apprenticeship) in its definition of 
vocational education.
39 At the time, labor market governance had just become an explicitly shared responsibility 
of the state and social partners, with tripartite regional labor market boards. Since then, 
the role of social partners in labor market governance has been strongly reduced, the 
system again overhauled, and the current system combines public governance with 
private-for profit labor market intermediaries and reintegration firms.  Cf. Sol (2000) for 
an extensive analysis.
40 Covenants with the HBO and university sector were not concluded; implications were 
discussed in regular negotiations between government and these sectors.
41 This research subsequently reported that dualization was a topic of discussion in 
sectors, and found a generally positive attitude towards it (Hövels, 1992). But opinions on 
the topic were quite balanced, and the positive attitude was not expected to immediately 
host (nor did it later translate into) a flurry of sweeping initiatives.
42 Agricultural schools, under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture, remained 
separate from ROCs offering VET and adult education for the other three sectors.
43 An internal memorandum of the Dutch Department of Education on the report reflects 
the disappointment at that time by at least the author. The memorandum speaks of 
a “committee which wants to re-establish the hegemony of school-based VET in the 
Netherlands and to close the discussion over the relation between labor market and 
education”. I personally think that by that time a difference of emphasis had emerged 
between the government and the (VET directorate) of the Department of Education at 
that time. With the latter group still attracted (not without reason) by the thought of a 
very strong work-based component, the former group probably declined (not without 
reason) to face what would have been extremely fierce opposition from the MBO sector 
and employers, if it had adopted a policy resembling the Rauwenhoff proposal on this 
theme. The Minister of Education of those days was stuck somewhere in the middle.
44 At that time: 46 ROCs, 13 sector schools, 2 denominational schools, 2 schools for the 
deaf and 2 MBO schools integrated with HBO colleges.
45 Van der Velden (2001) reported no decrease, Geerligs et al. (2002) a slight 
decrease.
46 Although students of these first post-WEB generations were themselves less satisfied 
about the linkages than the last pre-WEB generations.
47 Which means that the Dutch state itself, in this respect, violates its own law, which still 
requires the same procedure.
48 Compare Van Lieshout  & Van Liempt (2001: 31-35; 37) for a more extensive analysis 
of this interesting initiative.
49 From our pre-WEB research for the WRR (Dercksen & Van Lieshout, 1993), we came 
across the following example. A retail MBO school lowered its internships standards to 
allow students to complete an internship at a simple gas station when facing a (recession 
induced) lack of better internship opportunities - just because the students otherwise 
would not be able to complete their education.
50 The latter poses a problem, as only level 4 qualifications give access to HBO, so 
graduates of level 3 tracks where there is no corresponding level 4 track find themselves 
at a dead end should they prefer to continue their career in the education system. Policy 
responses to address this issue are in progress.
51 One of them would be the relation between wage levels, firms’ competitive strategies, 
and the resulting work organization in both Germany and the Netherlands. The Dutch 
wage moderation policy has sometimes been (dis)qualified as a ‘begging thy neighbor’ 
policy, offering quality products and services at (slightly) lower wage costs than 
German firms. Does this policy in fact translate into slightly lower wages in comparable 
Dutch firms? And, do these lower wages then translate in a slightly smaller focus on 
product quality in firms’ strategies, and in a high-but-not-as-high-as-in Germany skills 
equilibrium?
52 Apprenticeship costs minus the labor productivity of apprentices (which is the direct 
benefit of employing apprentices).
53 Combined with the 9% offering apprenticeship training, this would imply that 27% 
of Dutch firms offered some form of work-based training in the context of initial VET - 
which would be even higher than the 24% listed for Germany for 1992 by Von Henninges 
(1994). But as Moerkamp’s study is based on empirical research in just 11 economic 
branches, all of which have a regulated apprenticeship system, its basis is not suited to 
actually consider it representative for the entire economy in this respect.
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6 Analyzing markets for intermediate skills: different hands
6.1 Introduction
Our ambition was to analyze and compare how empirical markets for intermediate 
skills operate under different governance regimes. We expected such governance 
regimes to consist of a combination of different governance mechanisms that 
influence each other and the choices actors make. The question underlying the 
national case studies and their comparison in chapters three through five was:
How do markets for intermediate skills operate in each of these three countries?
 Each chapter addressed the following questions for each of the three cases:
• What options for vocational education and training exist?
• Which rules and actors govern them?
• How does the interaction of these rules and actors help to explain the actual 
choices of young people and employers regarding VET?
The institutional order, actors’ strategies, and their interaction, were analyzed for 
markets for intermediate skills in (West-) Germany (chapter 3), the American state 
of Wisconsin (chapter 4), and the Netherlands (chapter 5) as they operated in the 
early and mid nineteen nineties. The existing VET options and the rules and actors 
governing them were described and analyzed, culminating in an analysis of how the 
interaction between those rules and actors helps explain the empirically observed 
choices of young people and firms in those countries. As each country chapter 
described and analyzed its national case by already contrasting it with the previous 
one(s), the three markets were simultaneously compared along the way.
The central argument of this book is that empirical markets for intermediate 
skills are indeed (as chapter 2 argued theoretically) governed by multiple, 
interacting governance mechanisms, which constitute a particular governance 
regime. Different governance regimes result in different strategies available to 
actors and/or in different expected benefits to similar strategies. In this sense, 
institutions can help explain different behavior by similar actors in different markets. 
Simultaneously, actors in training markets are not just passive respondents to 
incentives posed by certain external rules. Actors have their own action orientation, 
their own conception of control on how to operate effectively in their environment 
to acquire the skilled workforce they need. A conception of control is simultaneously 
a worldview that allows actors to interpret the actions of others and a reflection of 
how the market is structured (cf. section 2.3.6.3). Such conceptions of control are 
influenced by past and present institutional aspects of the actor’s environment (e.g. 
the industrial relations system in which they operate) and the incentives it implies 
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in terms of the expected benefits of certain strategies. But conceptions of control 
are also interdependent: action orientations of some actors will in turn help shape 
those of others. For instance, firms’ typical skill strategies in a certain sector in a 
certain region will result in particular types of job openings and training options 
being available. The historic availability of such options will in turn shape the action 
orientation of (future) workers concerning their own strategic choices. Different 
action orientations of similar actors will result in different reactions to certain rules 
or reforms, and therefore help explain the relative stability of major differences 
between different markets. Governance regimes should thus not be interpreted 
exclusively as if pure and perfect stimulus-response relations would exist between 
external rules (institutions), the incentives they entail, and the resulting actors’ 
strategies. Comparing markets for intermediate skills shows the delicate balancing 
of the quasi-objective incentives posed by the institutional environment and 
actors’ own strategies in markets for intermediate skills. Crouch et al. (1999) have 
used a similar approach in their book on the skill creation in advanced industrial 
countries.
This final chapter will first answer the central question in section 6.2 by 
summarizing some main characteristics of the operation of markets for intermediate 
skills in different countries,  the regimes that govern them, and the skills equilibriums 
they support. Next the chapter will reflect on the theoretical perspective that we 
used to analyze our three cases. In particular, it addresses the question if and how 
it was worthwhile to use a governance approach that explicitly targets multiple 
alternative coordination mechanisms (markets, firms, state, and associations) and 
their interaction. Couldn’t we achieve similar results with a less extensive typology 
of governance mechanisms? Sections 6.3 through 6.6 will reflect on the role of the 
specific governance mechanisms (firms, state, markets and associations) in our 
analysis of the cases: if and how is each of these specific governance mechanism 
relevant for our analysis of the cases? 
6.2 Three different markets for intermediate skills
German, American and Dutch markets for intermediate skills show substantial 
differences in their operation, despite some similarities such as the existence of 
apprenticeship legislation.
6.2.1 Germany
Chapter three analyzed the high-skills equilibrium supported by German 
apprenticeship and other institutions. The German market for intermediate skills 
has continued to attract much international attention because it is one of a very 
few where individual firms’ investments in formal VET account for the majority of 
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VET investments. In section 3.7.2 we followed the rest of the literature (e.g. Casey, 
1986; 1992; Steedman; 1993; Soskice, 1994) in distinguishing between larger 
and smaller firms when explaining why so many German firms choose to train 
apprentices. For smaller firms, apprenticeship costs are so low as compared to (in)
direct benefits, that it is plausible that firms will already recoup their costs during 
the training period, or if only a small number of apprentices stay on for a short while 
upon graduation. Larger firms on average incur significant costs during the training 
period, which is why additional reasons beyond short-term cost-effectiveness are 
needed to explain their persistent training efforts.
Soskice (1994) distinguished two conditions which help to explain these larger 
firms’ training investments. First, if firms do not recoup the full costs of training 
over the training period itself, the retention rate of apprentices becomes important. 
The more apprentices stay on for a longer period, the more additional (in)direct 
benefits of training will be recouped. The other crucial factor is the relative price 
of training as compared to the price of alternatives. Firms will train as long as the 
costs of apprenticeship training are less than the costs of firm-specific training for 
external recruits plus the costs of risking recruitment of a ‘lemon’ (a person hired in 
the external labor market that turns out to be less than adequate). With this second 
factor, the choice of other actors become a core ingredient into the decision making 
process: as long as most firms choose to train, it is not only feasible but smart to 
train yourself (because of the substantial ‘lemon’ risk of not training yourself).
Within the German institutional (education and labor market) environment, it does 
not only make sense for the large majority of German firms to invest in apprenticeship 
training (section 3.7.2), but for the large majority of German youngsters (section 
3.6.1) as well. The key reason is, that German firms predominantly recruit their 
future skilled workers as apprentices they train themselves. Soskice (1994: 33) 
has pointed out that German apprenticeship is a rank-order tournament. Not each 
apprenticeship position is equally attractive, and school-leavers rank apprenticeship 
across sectors, firms, and even within an individual firm. German youngsters actively 
compete for the best apprenticeship positions, as career prospects differ with the 
occupation and firm in which one is trained. (The more attractive) Firms carefully 
screen school performances of applicants, and often administer their own tests as 
well. This creates an important feedback effect: German children are stimulated to 
work hard in school in their early teens, as they will be rewarded for their efforts by 
a more attractive apprenticeship position in their late teens.
And this feedback effect causes another feedback effect: because young people 
tend to work hard in school in the years before apprenticeship, German firms get 
apprentices with a relatively decent (general) skills basis. This helps them to keep 
training costs low, as compared to firms in countries where 16-years-olds are not as 
qualified.
The German case shows that as long as children already start working hard in 
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school, and firms reward their efforts with the more attractive entry jobs with related 
career prospects, a stable high-skills equilibrium in the market for intermediate 
skills is possible. We noted that this high-skills equilibrium is achieved through a 
market that is free (in the sense that firms as well as apprentices are free to enter 
the market) but regulated (though apprenticeship legislation and related regulation 
such as skills standards for training occupations). And we noted that it achieves 
overlapping occupational and internal markets that tend to combine advantages of 
both.
6.2.2 The American state of Wisconsin
Our next case, the U.S. (chapter four) showed us why such a high-skills equilibrium 
is harder to achieve than the German example might seem to indicate. The U.S. 
suffers from what has been labeled a ‘missing middle’ on its labor market (Berryman 
et al.; 1992: 1).
An important cause for the difficulty that American young people experience 
in finding career jobs lies in the functioning of American labor markets. On the 
one hand, occupational labor markets are underdeveloped. On the other, American 
internal labor markets have typically not demanded high skills from new recruits, 
but have relied on gradual informal on-the-job learning for incumbent frontline 
workers.
The small size of apprenticeship is a case in point for the underdevelopment 
of occupational labor markets. Only in unionized construction has apprenticeship 
traditionally provided a basis for occupational labor markets (sections 4.2.5 
& 4.3.2). Outside unionized construction, apprenticeship positions are either 
completely lacking (as in the banking sector, cf. section 4.3.4) or reserved for 
the training of a small incumbent worker elite (as in the metalworking sector, cf. 
section 4.3.3). This German-Wisconsin difference is all the more intriguing as the 
Wisconsin (adult) apprenticeship regime was explicitly inspired by the example of 
German apprenticeship legislation from the early 20th century (cf. Van Lieshout, 
1996b)1. Apparently, mimicking (apprenticeship) legislation will not necessarily 
lead to similar results. While there were differences in apprenticeship legislation 
between both countries in the mid-nineties, other factors seem more important to 
explain the diverging paths both apprenticeship systems took.
For one, the lack of multi-firm collective bargaining agreements that set relatively 
high minimum wage rates across sectors and regions in Wisconsin implies that 
Wisconsin firms can more readily train regular workers informally at lower wage 
levels than their German counterparts. Because starting wages for regular workers 
can be lower in Wisconsin than in Germany, and because apprentice wages are 
relatively higher, there is a substantially slighter (if any) benefit (in terms of lower 
training costs) in apprenticing somebody over hiring him/her as a regular worker to 
train informally on-the-job.
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A second important factor is the fact that American firms face few constraints 
on lay-offs as compared to their German counterparts. The combination of both 
enables American firms to more readily pursue business strategies focusing on low 
wages and numerical flexibility. Tayloristic work organization and Fordist production 
methods originated in the U.S. and shaped work organization in American firms. 
Important evidence for its effect on training policies and apprenticeship in particular 
comes from Parker’s historical research on the attempt to create a German-style 
apprenticeship system in Wisconsin metalworking in the Milwaukee district in the 
first decades of the 20th century (Parker, 1994; 1996). Parker discovered that while 
these metalworking employers had been active in organizing apprenticeship in the 
nineteen twenties, they were at the same time eroding the basis for it by gradually 
adopting Tayloristic and Fordist production methods that would leave the majority 
of their workforce in semi-skilled jobs. Thus, they subsequently had less need for 
intensive apprenticeship training to the journeyman level. In the nineteen nineties, 
the lower levels in the work hierarchy in many metalworking and other industrial 
firms were still relatively low-skilled. 
Third, higher wage differentials make it easier to poach trained workers than in 
Germany. ‘Poaching’, is not necessarily a pirating action by another firm, but may 
very well be a consequence of a worker’s own choice to leave, as some historical 
explanations for the decline of American apprenticeship in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century have argued (cf. Elbaum, 1989; Jacoby, 1991; Elbaum & Singh, 
1995).
Furthermore, Wisconsin’s technical colleges provide a quality school-based 
alternative to apprenticeship training, whereby the cost of training is shared by the 
student and the state.
Finally, one cannot neglect the fact that the image of apprenticeship as an 
institution in the U.S. has always been strongly connected to union involvement 
(more so than in Europe) with the prestige of American unions being much lower 
than their German and Dutch counterparts (cf. Jacoby, 1991).
Internal labor markets can be seen as a mechanism to prevent poaching, since 
these limit access to the most attractive jobs to those who stay with their firm 
(Sako, 1991). American internal labor markets have been characterized by the 
aforementioned Tayloristic and Fordist tradition of work organization in American 
industry. First, jobs on the lower rungs of the internal career ladder are relatively 
low-skilled. Second, promotion is often granted according to formalized job ladders 
and seniority rules. Outsiders are typically hired predominantly on the bottom 
rung(s) of these job ladders. Since these entry-level jobs are not apprenticeships, 
young people are as expensive to hire for those jobs as adult workers. This is why 
American employers have generally preferred to hire adults with some relevant 
work experience for such posi tions (Osterman, 1980).
Theoretically, an ample supply of quality school-based training and a massive 
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participation in it could compensate for a lack of work based training for young 
people. But American internal labor markets have given young people little reason 
to enroll in demanding school-based VET courses:
• First, opportunities for entering other firms on higher job rungs are scarce, 
so VET certificates do not directly qualify for more attractive occupational 
labor markets; of all workers, a staggering 94.2% of German workers 
indicated they had needed qualifications to obtain their current job, as 
compared to only 55.8% of their American counterparts (OECD, 1994b: 
144);
• Second, entry-level positions in American internal labor markets typically 
don’t require many skills;
• Third, formal general or vocational credentials have typically counted less 
than seniority for promotion to higher rungs on internal career ladders;
• Fourth, pay-rates are based solely on the characteristics of the job, not 
on that of the worker – or his/her credentials. As an indicator, the relative 
importance of human capital variables to industry variables in explaining 
inter-industry wage differentials is substantially lower in the U.S. than in 
Germany (Bellmann & Möller, 1995: 153).
Most non-college bound youngsters have therefore historically opted to directly 
enter the labor market, accept an un- or semi-skilled job as attractive as can be 
found, and slowly work their way up from there. 
While American labor markets on average do reward high school gradua tion 
somewhat in terms of a wage premium, American firms do not put much trust 
in a high school diploma per se. Apparently, the lack of competency standards 
lets schools for younger age groups simply pass their failures and problems up 
to the top of the system (Tucker, 1994b: 3). And this lack is not compensated by 
rigorous screening of high school records by employers when they hire youngsters 
and young adults. For first employ ers, a certificate in itself tends to be enough. 
There was no relation between school performance and the attractiveness of first 
jobs in the U.S. (Rosenbaum & Kariya, 1991). And by the time that the young adult 
finds an employer that offers him a more (career) promising entry-level position on 
an internal labor market, this employer will find an applicant’s last job(s) and any 
(technical) college courses taken since high school graduation more informative 
than the students’ high school transcript of a few years ago.
While American labor markets thus do not exactly encourage young people to 
work hard in secondary school, four-year colleges do. The number of high school 
graduates that transfers to a (prestigious) four-year college has traditionally been 
the most distinct benchmark to measure the performance of American high schools. 
This has made college prep the dominant track in American high schools, and has 
allowed an underdevelopment of VET programs – particularly, as they are relatively 
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expensive for the (on average) small school districts. The general American dislike 
for tracking young people in separate tracks has kept the parents of this ‘forgotten 
half’ from demanding such VET programs. And to complete this vicious circle: with 
few high school students graduating from quality vocational programs, American 
firms have had little reason to aim their recruiting efforts for their more demanding 
entry-level positions at high school graduates.
It is, in this context, easy to understand why America’s two-year colleges, 
such as Wisconsin’s technical colleges, have been a relative success story (Brint 
& Karabel, 1991): they offer quality training in a low-skills environment. They do, 
however, (so far) not supply the large majority of non-college bound youngsters 
with a smooth school-to-work transition the way the German apprenticeship system 
does. In Wisconsin, relatively few people enroll in WTCS programs immediately 
after high school. Only about a third of WTCS FTE enrollments were in vocational 
programs that train frontline workers (Rogers et al., 1991). Furthermore, the lack 
of binding national or statewide (skills) standards and assessment procedures does 
not guarantee a certain minimum quality of VET. And, the dispersion of VET across 
various independent and decentralized systems that are only weakly linked does 
not make the available options very transparent for young persons, parents or adult 
workers. In short, there are problems of too little coordination and cooperation in 
these areas (Rogers & Streeck, 1991: 11).
It is in this context that American and Wisconsin policy-makers have embarked 
on ambitious attempts to ‘build the middle’ (Berryman et al, 1992) in the nineties. 
They developed reform efforts that generally tried to improve the school-to-work 
transition for American youngsters through the development of coordinated industry-
wide VET systems. Specifically, these efforts have included some polices inspired by 
Germany. But rather than to strive for a copying of the German market (as some had 
put forward) the ambition eventually amounted to trying to build partial German-
style institutional arrangements - be it national sector skills standards partnerships, 
local school-to-work partnerships or specific youth apprenticeship programs.
6.2.3 The Netherlands
Chapter five analyzed the Dutch case. The Dutch case resembles the German one 
in that it, too, constitutes a high-skills equilibrium with most youth enrolling in (and 
many but not all graduating from) multi-year VET tracks. Dutch work organization 
and firms’ recruitment practices have put a premium on substantial initial VET 
for youth much like in Germany. But while in Germany incentives channel young 
persons into apprenticeship, the Dutch governance regime offers more ways, both 
to firms and youth. For one, both firms and young people can opt for work-based 
and (primarily) school-based tracks offering a full vocational credential. Second, 
firms and young people both have the alternative of regular low (youth) wage 
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employment much more readily available to them than their German counterparts 
– more like is the case in the U.S.. While German low-wage youth employment 
is predominantly institutionalized as apprenticeship training (and thus includes 
training rights), there are some Dutch sectors that employ a large share of young 
people at low wage levels below the adult minimum wage in regular jobs not linked 
to formal training provision. Both the prominent role of fully qualifying school-based 
VET and the more prominent role for regular youth employment without training 
in some sectors help explain the smaller supply of apprenticeship training in the 
Netherlands as compared to Germany.
When compared to the U.S., of course, Dutch firms still do invest substantially in 
formal work-based VET themselves: through the supply of apprenticeship positions 
and through the supply of internship position for those enrolled in (predominantly) 
school-based VET tracks. Within the Netherlands, the relative importance of dual, 
more school-based initial tracks and regular youth employment differs significantly 
between different sectors in the context of similar national legislation. This underlines 
the importance of sector level variables, including differences in conceptions of 
control of firms and other relevant actors. 
6.3 Firms as a coordination mechanism
6.3.1 Explaining training investments
Firms’ training investments (or lack thereof) themselves were central to the analysis 
throughout this book. We want to understand if, how and why firms will invest in 
training. We have analyzed if, how and why firms choose to train youth (or not) 
within the institutional context of Germany, the American state of Wisconsin, and 
the Netherlands (cf. sections 3.7.2, 4.4.2 and 5.6.1).
Differences in external incentives certainly go a long way in explaining differences in 
firm’s training investments as rational responses to different external environments. 
In section 3.7.2, we followed the rest of the literature (e.g. Casey, 1986; 1992; 
Steedman, 1993; Soskice, 1994) in distinguishing between larger and small firms 
when explaining why so many German firms choose to train apprentices (also cf. 
section 6.2.1). For smaller firms, apprenticeship costs are so low as compared to 
(in)direct benefits, that it is plausible that these firms will already recoup their 
training costs during the training period, or if only a small number of apprentices 
stay on for a short while upon graduation. Larger firms can afford to incur significant 
costs during the training period, because most apprentices will stay on with these 
larger training firms beyond their graduation (which generates additional benefits) 
and because not recruiting apprentices means risking a substantial recruitment 
problem down the road. The lack of equivalent school-based VET tracks next to 
apprenticeship in Germany helps explain the fact that the (work-based) training 
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investments of firms for initial VET are relatively higher in Germany as compared 
to the Netherlands.
If, to an important extent, we can already understand national differences in firms’ 
strategies as logical responses of firms to a different external institutional environment, 
why not just ‘model’ the firms as an owner-manager that rationally responds to external 
incentives, instead of going the more complex route of including the firm not just as an 
actor, but as a governance mechanism? Why not just leave the rest of what goes on at 
the firm level a proverbial black box?
A closer look at Soskice’s explanatory model already begins to answer that question. 
Soskice (1994) distinguishes the retention rate of apprentices and the price of training 
relative to alternatives as two important factors explaining firms’ training investments 
(or lack thereof). Firms will train as long as the costs of apprenticeship training are 
less than the costs of firm-specific training for external recruits plus the costs of risking 
recruitment of a ‘lemon’ (a person hired in the external labor market that turns out to be 
less than adequate).  Through both factors, firms’ choices already move beyond a pure 
response to an external incentive. The retention rate of apprentices is not a completely 
exogenous factor: while it is dependent upon the choices of the apprentices themselves, 
the high retention rate of German apprentices is also a consequence of conscious firm 
strategies. German firms (in particular the larger ones) plan to retain a large share of 
their apprentices, and this intention is a prominent part of their reason to hire these 
apprentices.
In addition, an anticipation (based upon past experience) of choices by other actors is 
an important factor entering into training decisions. Two instances of such anticipations 
are important in the explanation of the substantial training investments by German firms. 
The first is the anticipation that most apprentices will continue to stay with the training 
firm when given the opportunity, as they have in the past. Second, the anticipation 
that the very large majority of (larger) firms will again hire a subststantial number of 
apprentices this year to satisfy their own future skilled worker demand - and be able to 
retain them upon graduation. This enters the training decision equation as a push factor 
towards training investments: if we do not hire apprentices today, the cream of the crop 
of this generation will continue to work for our local competitors.
This way, a closer look at the explanatory model for German firms’ apprenticeship 
investments already shows that a somewhat more comprehensive analysis of firms is 
required to adequately understand their training investments. When one would focus 
the analysis on understanding the reasons why firms do (or do not) opt to invest in 
initial work-based VET within one single country, at the very least we have to incorporate 
the anticipation (based on past experiences) of the behavior of other actors into the 
analysis.
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6.3.2 Work organization
When we focus on differences in training investments between firms in different 
countries, it becomes even more important to include other factors into the 
explanation. A prime case in point is the case of (adult) apprenticeship in Wisconsin. 
The institutional regime for that apprenticeship system was explicitly modelled on 
the German example of the early twentieth century from which, obviously, also 
the modern German apprenticeship system emerged. But we have seen that 
both regimes have resulted in very different market outcomes. While modern 
German apprenticeship constitues an almost perfect monopoly on the school-to-
work transition for German youth, its Wisconsin sibling (with the exception of the 
construction sector) evolved into an elite incumbent worker training system in a 
minority of sectors.
Even if differences in modern apprenticeship legislation had emerged between 
the German and Wisconsin apprenticeship governance regimes by the nineteen 
nineties (cf. Van Lieshout, 1996b), these differences themselves do not appear to 
be most important factor in explaining the German-Wisconsin differences in training 
behavior by firms and young people. These legislative differences may very well be 
the result of a difference in scale: since Wisconsin (adult) apprenticeship failed to 
achieve a significant market share throughout the economy, it is understandable 
that its regulations have not been the subject of serious public scrutiny (from the 
general population, social partners and political parties) and reforms as in Germany, 
where the law came to govern the large majority of skills training in the large 
majority.
There are other external institutional differences between Germany and the U.S./
Wisconsin governance regimes to be considered, such as the lack of sector-level 
collective bargaining in the U.S. outside of unionized construction, and lack of strict 
constraints on dismissals in the U.S. (cf. sections 4.4.2 & 6.2.2). But these factors are 
best analyzed as possible remote causes of the resulting international differences. 
The proverbial elephant in the room, and the readily available proximate cause of 
international differences in training behavior between German and Wisconsin firms 
are differences in the organization of work.
The demand for labor and, thus, for particular sets of qualifications, is shaped 
first and foremost by the organization of work. And with most employment taking 
place in firms, the firm is the most important single actor shaping this organization. 
Matched establishment comparisons in various economic sectors show relevant 
international differences in work organization as well as workforce qualifications 
and labor productivity, and the links between them (cf. section 2.3.7). Firms shape 
their training policies on the basis of their work organization - a work organization 
they have developed within their particular institutional context. And it is this causal 
chain with which adequate explanations of national differences in firms’ training 
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investments start (cf. sections 3.7, 4.4.2 and 5.6.1).
Parker’s historical research on the attempt to create a German-style apprenticeship 
system in the metalworking sector in the Milwaukee district in the first decades of 
the 19th century provides us with an exellent example (Parker, 1994; 1996). Parker 
observed that while these employers were active in organizing apprenticeship over 
the nineteen twenties, they were at the same time eroding the basis for it by 
gradually adopting Tayloristic and Fordist production methods that would leave the 
majority of their workforce in semi-skilled jobs (cf. sections 4.4.2 & 6.2.2). His 
analysis points us to the credible hypothesis that the core of an explanation for the 
very different paths of Wisconsin (adult) apprenticeship and German apprenticeship 
with their similar legislative roots may very well be changing firm strategies towards 
work organization rather than external institutional differences.
Of course, firms do not develop their work organization in a splendid isolation, 
and exploring the causes of national differences in work organization will in turn 
lead us to (possibly institutional) remote causes. If, for instance, firms happen to 
find themselves in a country where the education system in general (and possibly an 
apprenticeship system in particular) provides an ample supply of skilled workers, a 
high-skill strategy is a much more viable option. Firms shape their training policies 
(and their human resources policies in general) in a particular institutional context 
in a particular region at a particular point in time. Many of the rules that influence 
their choices are to an important extent set at a relatively high (national) level. The 
prominent role of work organization therefore does not diminish the importance 
of external institutions; in fact, it requires us to consider a broader range of 
institutions, rather than overstate the importance of individual institutions within 
the training markets themselves. Given the fact that firms in different countries 
have different action orientations, they can respond differently to similar institutions 
in the training market itself. As work organization is an important proximate cause 
that helps us to understand and explain such differences, it becomes interesting to 
consider the remote (and possibly institutional) causes of how such differences in 
work organization have emerged. 
From a theoretical standpoint, the important role of work organization as a 
proximate cause for differences in training policies is one important reason why 
international comparative research on different skill equilibria and school-to-work 
transition patterns is well-served by a multilevel approach that includes the firm 
level as a separate topic for analysis. Firms’ work organization is the result of 
previous choices that will shape their subsequent training choices as a proximate 
cause. External institutional factors at the sector and national level will previously 
have influenced their choices in work organization, and will currently interact with 
the demands and consequences of that work organization to shape current training 
choices. 
With the multilevel nature of this research, firm-level empirical research 
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was limited next to the analysis of the national and sectors levels. And firm-
level research was not devised as to analyze work organization in any detail, let 
alone the productivity it results in. Indications gathered from our own firm visits 
in the metalworking sector were pretty much in line with those from matched 
establishment comparisons in this sector (Mason et al., 1992; Mason & Finegold, 
1995; Finegold & Wagner, 1997). We therefore can and will not explore the role 
of this particular variable in more detail here. A series of matched establishment 
comparions in a number of sectors in these countries would indeed help us to 
elaborate our understanding of the interaction between their governance regimes 
and the resulting skill equilibria.
6.3.3 Recruitment
German-Wisconsin differences in the operation of the apprenticeship market lead 
us to additional evidence for the importance of including firm-level research and 
analysis into a comparison of markets for intermediate skills. As important as work 
organization is, it is not the only aspect to consider at the firm level: recruitment 
policies and practices are another relevant variable to consider. Kerr’s concept of 
‘ports of entry’ to firms internal labor markets (cf. section 2.3.5.4) reminded us that 
not all jobs are effectively open to outsiders. Recruitment is a vital intermediating 
variable that shapes the operation of labor and training markets, and their social 
and economic effects.
Prime case-in-point is the very different effect of the (adult) apprenticeship 
governance regime in Wisconsin in general, and in the metalworking sector in 
particular, from that of its German counterpart. At first, it was kind of puzzling to 
come from Germany with an apprenticeship system governing the school-to-work 
transition to arrive in an American state that a) has an apprenticeship law that 
does not generate much training and b) was trying to improve its school-to-work 
transition by (among many other things) building a separate youth apprenticeship 
system. It was, of course, obvious from the low number of apprentices that Wisconsin 
apprenticeship only played a minor role in the school-to-work transition. During the 
field work, however, we learned that even a substantial share of apprenticeship does 
not adress the school-to-work transition! Firm visits and interviews indicated that 
Wisconsin metalworking apprentices typically had already been working for the firm 
and were promoted from an entry-level job within that firm to an apprenticeship 
position. Because the majority of (adult) apprenticeship recruits in Wisconsin 
metalworking firms are not (high) school graduates but (incumbent) workers, the 
adult apprenticeship system obviously did not even function as a (direct) school-to-
work transition mechanism there.
Theoretically (as well as for public policy purposes), this little fact teaches us 
two lessons. First, it provides an additional argument to argue our case that firms 
strategies/internal labor market aspects may significantly alter the operation of an 
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apprenticeship system and therefore the firm level has to be separateley included 
in the empirical and theoretical analysis.
Second, we learn that apprenticeship systems do not by definition govern the 
school-to-work transition. They only do so if and when firms opt to recruit school 
graduates as apprentices, instead of those who have entered the labor market. 
Realizing how metalworking apprenticeship started as a new youth training system 
almost a century ago, and evolved into an elite incumbent worker training system, 
it seems that school-based education systems may ‘drift’ from their original goals. 
In this sector at least, this Wisconsin adult apprenticeship system appears to 
have experienced a small but relevant ‘work experience’ or ‘age’ drift. The drift is 
understandable given Parker’s analysis of the role of changing work organization 
in those firms by the nineteen thirties. As work organizaton gradually developed 
to require many semi-skilled jobs and fewer skilled jobs requiring apprenticeship 
training, mass apprenticeship for all new recruits was no longer required. But, 
simultaneously, apprenticeship then becomes a possible route for upward mobility 
for incumbent semi-skilled workers. Both human resources management and a 
union would soon agree that apprenticeship opportunities should first and foremost 
be made avaible to incumbent workers. For management, the lack of comparable 
high school vocational credentials also makes if safer to recruit incumbent workers, 
whose talent and skills and competencies they have been able to observe themselves 
for a while, than high school graduates.
The metalworking sector was not the only one to find an indication of the 
importance of recruiting policies and practices for different training patterns.  While 
teller jobs in both Dutch and German banking were ‘career’ jobs for those lacking 
a college education, our (limited) field work on this sector in Wisconsin suggested 
that tellers there were often recruited from the college student ranks. Instead of 
a career job, teller was often a ‘side’ job to help support a college education. The 
high general education level of the students helps to limit banks’ training costs; 
the downside may have been that the shallower bank-specific skills of tellers 
may offer one explanation why American banks have not been as successful in 
capturing the rapidly developing personal financial service market, as Keltner 
(1995) argued. Keltner’s argument in fact was that American banks, because of 
their work organization and human resources policies, failed to develop the type of 
professional needed to capture the rapidly developing high-end market for financial 
advice.
6.3.4 Firms’ action orientations as a proximate cause
Firms’ policies are shaped, but not completely determined, by their current 
institutional environment. Within that context, firms (and other actors) are 
obviously free to choose their own policies, to train or not, and to hire whomever 
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for whichever job description they choose. The institutional context makes some 
options more attractive than others. Thus, instutitons and regulation matters 
because the influence costs and benefits of alternative options, and may cause 
national differences.
But institutions do not direcly determine firms’s training choices. They provide 
an environment to which firms repond - but firms may respond differently to similar 
environments. Because they do not just face an external environment: their current 
(work) organization and workforce are as important in shaping their training choices. 
National differences in firm’s internal make-up may therefore be objective causes 
for the fact that different firms respond differently to similar external incentives. 
Section 6.3.2 provided us with the example of how differences in work organization 
seem a key factor responsible for the diverging paths of similar apprenticeship 
systems in Wisconsin and Germany.
Firms do not constantly meet and weigh the impact and balance the effects of 
such internal and external incentives, and the costs and benefits they imply for their 
training strategies. Such strategies are relatively stable; and they are generally the 
result of any detailed accounting. While firms make conscious decions regarding 
training, it was instructive to note that firms in neither country tended to make 
cost-benefit calculations of training and alternative options. For Germany, this is 
what von Bardeleben et al. (1994a; 1994b; 1995) learned when they embarked 
upon empirical research to determine such costs and benefits. In addition, von 
Bardeleben et al. and others that have made such cost-benefit analyses have had 
to include an important category of so-called indirect training benefits such as 
lower recruitment and selection costs, lower risk of wrong recruitment decisions 
and a positive image for training firms (cf. section 3.7.2). These costs are needed 
to explain why it may be rational for larger firms to invest in training beyond the 
direct benefits they will receive from such investments. But even in such research, 
these indirect categories are only roughly estimated. The point is that (German) 
training firms apparently think such indirect benefits exist, and that the balance of 
their training investments is positive for their firms, without having actually made 
detailed cost-benefit analyses of their substantial training investments themselves. 
Training decisions are generally not to the outcome of a detailed and exact analysis, 
but rather reflect a more qualitative strategic decision.
Theoretically, the notion of an action orientation of firms towards training fits in 
with well with this empirical evidence. Both external and internal institutions will 
have shaped firms’ action orientations regarding training. And, rather than to make 
any detailed analysis of if how and why particular internal or external changes would 
have to lead a change in training policies, firms respond to such changes from these 
action orientations. Given the fact that such action orientations can differ substantially 
between countries (and sectors), a similar change in an external environment will 
illicit different responses from firms with different action orientations.
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The best example is offered by firms’ reactions to the possibility of more state 
intervention with VET in Germany than in the Netherlands. When, in the days of 
Dutch Secretary of Education Ritzen, firms feared that the government might use 
its dualization proposals as a pre-text to scale back public VET investments (a 
claim that, to be sure, has always been strongly claimed to be unfounded by that 
government), preventing that became an important goal of employers’ associations 
(and unions) in reform debates and covenants that were concluded. In the German 
case, firms and their associations react as strongly to a possible change in state 
intervention – but, contrary to their Dutch counterparts, they are up in arms when 
the state threatens to intervene more in funding issues (i.e. by imposing a levy 
system). German firms share an action orientation where they believe that there is 
no satisfactory functional equivalent to firm-based training under a regime governed 
(to an important extent) by their own associations. They will even counteract 
their short-term self-interest (by hiring additional apprentices they will not need 
themselves) to preserve that system.  While some Dutch and Wisconsin firms may 
feel as strongly about their own apprenticeship system, the majority of firms in 
those countries do not have that conviction. They consider school-based training a 
satisfactory functional equivalent. 
6.3.5 Conclusions
Firms are more than just actors that respond to incentives posed by external 
institutions. Apprenticeship training, by its very nature, is a conscious choice to not 
rely on recruitment in the external labor market. Apprenticeship training implies 
that the firm choses to start a long-term relation with a (future) worker who does 
not yet command all the skills needed for the job he is projected to fulfill a few 
years down the line, and to systematically train him to acquire those skills in the 
near future. Apprenticeship training, in this sense, is a perfect example of how a 
firm can act as an alternative coordination mechanism to an (external) market. The 
choice to train (and how) is influenced by external incentives (e.g. apprenticeship 
legislation), by expected behavior by other actors (e.g. other firms), and by 
internal aspects of the firm itself (e.g. work organization). We have seen that even 
apprenticeship training, based on similar legislative roots, can take quite different 
forms in different countries – and in different sectors, as we will further elaborate 
in the next section.
6.4 The role of associational governance
Besides firms, the other governance mechanism we specifially included in our 
theoretical approach was assocations. Streeck et al. (1987) had already pointed 
out the important roles German employers’ associations and unions have in 
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the governance of German apprenticeship in terms of regulation, financing, 
implementation and supervision and control. Both the German and Dutch high-
skills equilibrium come with important governing roles for these assocations. 
In Germany, the strong role of associations in apprenticeship governance was 
cemented in the 1969 Vocational Training Act. In the Netherlands, the formal role 
for Dutch employers’ associations in VET governance has been steadily enlarged 
since the nineteen eighties, both at the sector and the national level. The governing 
roles they already had with the old Dutch apprenticeship system were expanded 
to roles regarding school-based vocational training, and these new roles were 
cemented in the new 1996 Act. The American low-skills equilibrium generally lacks 
governing roles for associations. Even apprenticeship governance in Wisconsin is 
generally a case of the state monitoring individual firms, rather than an example of 
associational governance.
But the one exception we find in Wisconsin is, therefore, particularly intriguing. 
In unionized construction, apprenticeship forms a German-like monopoly on 
training for young persons. And in this sector, employers’ associations and 
unions do play important governing roles in the apprenticeship system. Joint 
apprenticeship committees are the sponsor of apprenticeship programs, and they 
place the apprentices with individual firms. The funding comes from a levy on union 
workers’ wages. This example shows that even in the U.S., it is indeed possible 
to create a flourishing apprenticeship system through sector-level and regional 
supports. In addition, we found a non-union employers’ association creating its 
own apprenticeship system for the non-union construction sector. Associational 
governance for apprenticeship does, thus, not always include union involvement.
Important as associations are for an analysis of training governance regimes, 
one should be careful not to overstate their case. Katz & Ziderman (1990), for 
instance, hypothesize that German chambers of commerce (which basically are 
employer’s associations that also perform some public tasks) strongly and effectively 
discourage competition for skilled workers among firms. While there is certainly 
some peer pressure under German employers to each train their own apprentices, 
this appears to be a vast exaggeration of the extent to which this actually happens. 
German firms train apprentices, first and foremost, because they perceive it to be in 
their individual interest. Peers may play an additional role in shaping that opinion: 
the mental barrier to stop training is certainly higher if you would be the only one in 
your regional association to not train your own apprentices. But German firms are 
not coerced into training because by their assocations. In fact, it is because German 
firms want to train themselves that they have asked their associations to govern 
and uphold the system.
Overstating the role of peer pressure through employers’ associations in 
Germany also neglects the important role that conscious union strategies have 
played in shaping a governance regime for the German market for intermediate 
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skills that supports a high-skills equilibrium. German unions have always pressed 
for an apprenticeship system that guarantees high quality training for all (future) 
workers. They try to strengthen their power by maximizing the homogeneity of 
the workforce they represent, which explains their interest in keeping the level 
of both horizontal and vertical external differentiation in apprenticeship low (cf. 
section 3.5.2.4; Streeck et al, 1987; Reuling, 1998). And they are willing to make 
apprenticeship training affordable by allowing firms to negotiate low apprenticeship 
wages with them for their (future) members. The broadness of those German 
industrial unions in combination with their conviction that a more homogenous 
workforce strengthens their bargaining power has led them to champion significant 
reorganizations of a large number of separate training occupations over time into 
lesser occupations with more overlap in their basic training content2.
American unions in fact have an additional incentive to pursue high-skill training 
policies: as their members’ firms compete with non-union firms that can charge 
lower prices to the extent that they pay lower wages, the union sector’s claim 
to offer higher quality craftsmen is vital to their local competitive position. The 
resemblance between German industrial unions and these craft unions lies in the 
vigor with which they strive to maintain apprenticeship as the general port of entry 
into their occupation – although in both instances, employers and their associations 
generally seem to agree with that goal.
Another observation is relevant here. While associations play important roles 
in the governance of German apprenticeship, there is one important role they do 
generally not fulfill. In many apprenticeship systems an important part of the training 
costs is covered through training funds that are created in sector level collective 
bargaining agreements. In our three countries in this study, such funds exist for 
apprenticeship in Wisconsin construction and in many Dutch sectors. With the 
exception of the construction sector, however, such funds are conspicuously lacking 
in Germany. While such funds are considered important institutional supports for 
apprenticeship systems, the world’s most famous apprenticeship system apparently 
can do without.
Having cautioned against overstating the importance of associations, the 
conclusion remains that associational governance plays an important role in successful 
markets for intermediate skills, particularly those where work-based learning plays 
a key role. Collective bargaining can help to keep training affordable by defining low 
training wages as compared to (semi-)skilled wages. The other side to that coin is 
to give the trainees rights, e.g. by guaranteeing training quality up front (through 
binding skill standards), and by institutionalizing entitlements to reward training 
completion (e.g. high skilled worker wages). And, thirdly, employers’ associations 
can indeed function as a stabilizing factor in maintaining the consensus in a particular 
regional and sectoral business community that it is in their members’ long-term 
interest to continue their training investments. The example of apprenticeship 
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in unionized construction in Wisconsin shows that associational governance can 
effectively support an apprenticeship system in a national environment where that 
system normally flounders. It is, therefore, understandable that countries trying 
to stimulate work-based learning have attempted to strenghten the potential for 
associational governance. Examples in our cases were the expansion of associational 
governance into Dutch school-based VET (chapter 3), American subsidies for 
national partnerships to develop skills standards (cf. section 4.5.3.3 & 4.5.3.4) and 
for local school-to-work partnerships (cf. section 4.6.2.3), as well as the emergence 
of a Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership (4.6.4).
6.5 Market mechanisms
The importance of firms and associations as alternative governance mechanisms 
does not negate the operation of market mechanisms. But the role (or lack 
thereof) of these other governance mechanisms does shape how and why market 
mechanisms operate within in particular country. And, in fact, such alternative 
governance mechanisms may help market mechanisms to function adequately.
Empirical markets for intermediate skills themselves are not adequately modeled 
as one single market with a simple, uniform product (skilled labor) supplied by one 
uniform type of producer (schools) and demanded by one uniform type of consumer 
(firms)3. Skill acquisition takes place over more years over an individual worker’s 
career. Some of it will take place in (public or private) schools; a lot of it will take 
place through formal or informal learning on various jobs (that may be closely 
related or differ distinctly in their contents); and some of it occurs in other spheres 
of life4. Because of the importance of firms as both producers and consumers of 
skilled labor, supply and demand side of markets for intermediate skills cannot be 
distinguished as neatly as in (most) commodity markets.
In fact, modeling markets for intermediate skills as one single market would 
underestimate the importance of market mechanisms: market mechanisms play 
an important role at several points in time across a school-to-work transition. We 
at least have to distinguish between a market where students (or young workers) 
choose between VET (and academic) options, and a market where VET graduates 
search for jobs they have been training for (cf. sections 2.3.6 and 6.4.1). These 
two markets are linked through the VET tracks if and when progress through tracks 
– but they nevertheless remain different markets that citizens enter at different 
points in time.
If and when the training occurs in firms, in analytical terms this is where 
they choose for ‘hierarchy’ as a coordination mechanism in house, rather than to 
purchase skilled labor on the external market. Even then, however, this does not 
mean that the external market does not play a role. Quite to the contrary: the fact 
that firms commit to apprentices for a while results in a focused matching process. 
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Take the metalworking sector in the German state of Baden-Württemberg for an 
example. The large majority of metalworking firms train their own apprentices to 
an extent that typically matches their future (skilled) labor market demand. Since 
they invest heavily in this training, they have a vested interest in recouping their 
investments by retaining most graduated apprentices as regular skilled workers 
upon their graduation (cf. section 3.7.2). Thus, they tend to be careful and thorough 
in their apprentice recruitment. For the young people, the apprenticeship monopoly 
implies that interesting career openings tend to arise as an apprenticeship. When 
successfully progressing through that apprenticeship training, chances are that a 
suitable vacancy will be available for the apprentice upon graduation – and when 
the apprentices has done well, he will get the job. But this simultaneously implies 
that that vacancy will never be open to anyone looking for employment from outside 
that firm. Thus, young people have a vested interest in acquiring an apprenticeship 
position. And, since their school record will be an important part of the evaluation 
process, in working hard at school.
The interesting thing here is that the result is what Soskice (1994) has labelled a 
rank-order tournament. Not each apprenticeship position is equally attractive, and 
school-leavers rank apprenticeship across sectors, firms, and individual firms for a 
particular training occupation. The interesting thing is that German apprenticeship 
shares this aspect with the most famous system of higher education: the American 
market for higher education. Despite the formal equality of American college 
diploma’s and German appenticeship graduation, informal differences in status of 
those colleges and training firms results in active competition between American 
youngsters for access to the best colleges, and between German youngsters for 
access to the best internal labor markets through an apprenticeship position. We 
discussed how apprenticeship regulation in fact helps to organize this market in 
section 3.8.2. When comparing the German apprenticeship market to the American 
market for intermediate skills, the difference is certainly between an organized and 
an unorganized market. And the organized market seems to bring out the best 
behavior of both firms and young people.
The German apprenticeship system is conducive to the operation of the labor 
market, too. The reliable credentials provided by apprenticeship provide a solid 
basis for external mobility for skilled workers. The fact that inter-firm mobility under 
apprenticeship graduates is not very high is not a reflection of the impossibility of 
mobility, but a reflection of the fact that most firms alreay have trained their own 
and are happy with the results. The overlapping of occupational and internal labor 
markets (cf. section 3.8.3) seems to combine the best of both worlds for young 
workers.
6.6	 States	and	their	different	playing	fields
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International differences in the role of firms and associations as governance 
mechanisms in markets for intermediate skills implies that states play different 
fields when governing VET markets. The fact that German firms continue to train 
apprentices, and will oppose attempts at increased state intervention in the training 
market, makes the governing task for the German state distinct from its Dutch 
counterpart, let alone its American one. American states faced a situation where 
young people enroll in high schools focussed on college preparation, and without an 
apprenticeship system of any quantitative significance. The German state faced a 
situation where they can effectively coerce firms to up their apprenticeship training 
efforts above their immediate individual need by threatening to take over the 
responsibility for and provision of VET from the social partners.
We saw how similar attempts at apprenticeship legislation may still lead to quite 
divergent results, due to differences in work organization. We also saw that in 
a country where the apprenticeship volume overall is almost negligible, sector-
level governance may still make it very relevant in a particular sector, as we 
saw in unionized construction in Wisconsin. For states, governing the market for 
intermediate skills is thus more complicated than ‘just’ setting the legal incentives 
right. Legal incentives may still achieve different results in different countries. And, 
vice versa, different countries may benefit from different legislation. Just as we 
cautioned against overstating the importance of associational governance, we have 
to caution against overstating the autonomous power of the state in governing 
VET.
With that caveat, there are still things states can learn from a careful analysis of 
how various markets of intermediate skills operate. For instance, there are basically 
three important aspects that help explain the Dutch and German5 school-to-work 
transitions, as well as the apparent attractiveness of organized VET to young 
people:
• firms do actively recruit young people;
• firms actively screen young people and include close scrutiny of their school 
performance as an important indicator;
• young persons are actively helped at the local level with their school-to-
work transition – although the Netherlands has been much weaker here 
than Germany (cf. section 5.6.2).
While states cannot directly influence the first two aspects, they can at least try to 
stimulate this type of behavior by firms. For instance, they can try to build a reliable 
skills standards system to make it easier to screen young people’s credentials, and 
easier screening may stimulate recruitment. They can directly try to help youth with 
their school-to-work transition at the local level.
One important consequence of the importance of other governance mechanisms 
such as the firm and associations is that labor market governance is at least as 
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important as educational/VET governance in the narrow sense markets. This is a 
lesson relevant for both academic analysts as well as policymakers. VET governance 
in general, and work-based VET governance in particular, is a way to potentially help 
shape internal labor markets into potentially occupational labor markets, and thus 
ensure that there are organized training opportunities available that can effectively 
serve as ports of entry into firm’s internal labor markets for young people. This 
insight can also help generate additional possible policy options. To give one 
example: when the Netherlands tried to stimulate work-based learning, the debate 
focused on increasing the work-based component of school-based tracks. But the 
Dutch state could have tried to stimulate apprenticeship beyond its boundaries at 
the time had it aimed by focusing not on school-based tracks, but on low-wage 
regular youth employment as a source for that growth. By allowing low-wage youth 
employment without guaranteed training rights (such as included in apprenticeship 
contracts) a considerable share of Dutch youth employment takes that form, rather 
than the form of an apprenticeship as is the case in Germany. Limiting low youth 
wages to apprenticeship could thus result in a growth of Dutch apprenticeship.
Institutionalizing (VET) schools and their operation is obviously another major part 
of the role of the state – and one that it does fulfill quite autonomously, in the 
end. We ended up discussing the role of schools less extensively than we originally 
anticipated when we started this project. School interviews were an important part 
of the research, and crucial to our understanding of the different VET systems. 
The reason why schools have been given relatively less attention is because they 
play a different role in each in of the countries that is to an important extent a 
consequence of the role of formal firm-based (apprenticeship) training.
In Germany, VET schools are distinctly a junior partner to assist the firm with 
the training of its apprentices. An important junior partner, which deserves and 
receives a lot of respect – but a junior partner nonetheless. Given the fact that 
apprenticeship is the centre around which the various types of full-time VET are 
organized, related instruction for apprenticeship is central in their policies.
The role of Wisconsin’s technical colleges is different. They are the dominant 
supplier of organized VET in their region. Only for a limited number of occupations 
and a limited number of apprentices does that supply consist of related instruction. 
School-based VET is the core business of these colleges, with many students 
employed and following specific courses next to their job, rather than multi-year 
programs. In addition, since the initiative to develop new pathways or programs 
does not reside with (employers’) associations and unions as in Germany, they have 
an entrepreneurial role in organizing the VET supply for their region.
The Dutch ROCs developed through a series of mergers between various small 
schools with sometimes quite different identities. These differences stemmed 
from the type of tracks the different establishments offered (related instruction, 
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or adult education, or MBO) and the economic sector they offered VET for. The 
resulting large ROCs more closely resemble the Wisconsin Technical Colleges, which 
should not surprise us as American two-year colleges served as the example on 
which the Dutch ROC formation was explicitly based (cf. Van Lieshout, 1996c: 5). 
As compared to the German VET schools, the primary difference is that overall, 
school-based training makes up a larger part of Dutch VET supply than work-based 
training. Dutch ROCs are better described as the senior training partner, with 
firms as junior partners providing internships – and the work-based component of 
apprenticeship. Nevertheless, there are at least two crucial differences with their 
American/Wisconsin counterparts. First, while the schools may be senior training 
partner in the Netherlands, and while state policies have intended to increase their 
autonomy – the supply of VET is consciously limited to particular tracks, for which 
binding sets of skills standards are developed by the LOBs/KBBs in which they 
have to cooperate with the social partners. This by definition limits them in their 
entrepreneurship relative to their American counterparts. In addition, the role of the 
Dutch state (i.e. the Department of Education) provides for a permanently different 
playing field from the WTCS, where under the supervision of an independent board 
the association of colleges themselves governs their sector.
The different roles of schools within the three national VET systems are an 
indication of broader differences in markets for intermediate skills. Closer scrutiny 
in an historical analysis might, however, reveal that previous choices in the 
institutionalization of schools may have helped these markets to develop in their 
distinct fashions the way they did.
6.7 Conclusion: different hands
Governance regimes for VET consist of much more than states and their VET legislation 
and related policies. At the very least, an effective analysis of VET governance 
regimes considers at least four potentially equivalent coordinating mechanisms: 
market mechanisms, hierarchies, states, and associational governance.
For states, the consequence of their lack of autonomy in unilaterally defining 
an effective governance regime translates into the notion that there is not one 
identical invisible hand that governs VET markets in a similar fashion in each and 
every region and sector.  There are ‘different hands’ that govern, as the title of this 
book suggests. The hand that governs actual markets for intermediate skills is a 
specific combination of the four aforementioned governance mechanisms. Similar 
state policies can lead to distinctly different results because of differences in the 
role of the other governance mechanisms, and vice versa.
This is one important reason why we have not used single governance mechanisms 
as labels to identify the associational governance regimes we analyzed in this book. 
Tempting as it may appear to label the German apprenticeship governance regime 
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as associational because associational governance does play a pronounced role 
in it, it runs the risk of being misinterpreted to imply that the other governance 
mechanisms are less important. But as we have analyzed, the role of firms as a 
governance mechanism is probably even more crucial to understand that German 
regime. And the distinct roles of firms and associational governance as governance 
mechanisms do not eliminate the role of market mechanisms, but may strengthen 
them, since the result is a highly competitive rank-order tournament for the best 
apprenticeship positions and the best apprentices.
Alternatively, one might be tempted to label the Dutch regime as a school-based 
regime. While the regime is certainly more school-based than its German counterpart, 
work-based learning and therefore the firm as a governance mechanism play a 
major role for a significant minority of Dutch VET tracks, and a significant minor role 
in the form of internship in the majority of tracks. Associational governance in the 
Netherlands also plays a prominent role, and the fact that the scope of associational 
skills standards systems has been expanded to cover (primarily) school-based track 
is an interesting innovation. The exact operation of the market mechanism, however, 
is somewhat less transparent than in Germany. This is a logical consequence of the 
fact that predominantly school-based tracks (which implies applying to schools) and 
work-based tracks (which means applying to a training firm) co-exist. A detailed 
analysis of how the exact matching process from students to tracks/apprenticeship 
openings proceeds, and how proactive firms are consciously opting for more school-
based over work-based tracks or vice versa, would be interesting here.
Both Germany and the Netherlands have governance regimes where the four 
coordination mechanism all play an important role; the difference is in the particular 
mix of those governance regimes, and their interaction.
With the U.S., one of the four governance mechanisms, associational governance, 
is less developed than in Germany or the Netherlands. Even adult and youth 
apprenticeship do not involve employer’s associations and unions as prominently, 
with the notable exception of the construction sector. With the underdevelopment 
of VET in high schools, the American regime is firm-based as in Germany; the 
crucial difference is that of an unorganized and an organized labor market. But, 
in effect, the key part of that difference is that German youth will enter into a 
multi-year contract with a single firm that is accompanied by a formal training 
plan. American youth that do not go to higher education will typically have had two 
or three subsequent semi-skilled jobs over a similar period, with some informal 
training, and possibly a course or two at a two-year college. Therefore, one can 
hardly label the American regime as ‘hierarchical’, since German firms typically play 
a more substantial role for a longer period in training individual young persons.
National states, then, do not have a serious other option then to go their own 
way in developing their market for intermediate skills. International comparisons 
can help to identify alternative ways on how such markets can work, and inspire 
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ideas for reform at home. The idea to straightforwardly copy one or the other 
aspect of another countries’ governance regime, however, will seldom lead to similar 
results6. Rather than straightforward copying of such institutional arrangements, 
international comparative work can result in new questions that can shed a new 
light on the strengths, weaknesses and peculiarities of one’s own market for 
intermediate skills. 
Notes chapter 6
1 Cf. Van Lieshout (1996b) for an extensive comparison of the German and Wisconsin 
apprenticeship regimes.
2 Of course, unions were certainly not the only advocates for a general change in this 
direction, as both employers’ associations themselves and independent research from 
the BIBB pointed in a similar direction. But employers’ associations in this process may 
have to deal with factions among their constituency wanting to preserve a particular 
training occupation (cf. section 3.5.2.4).
3 For an extensive argmentation: compare Van Lieshout (1999). It points out the 
shortcomings of an attempt to analyze the Dutch market for intermediate skills as 
such.
4 These days, most young persons will predominantly pick up basic computer skills while 
entertaining themselves at home.
5 And, for that matter, the Japanese. Cf. Van Lieshout, 1997a: 45.
6 The same goes for other markets and policy fields, as well.
355
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
References
Aalders, M. (1994). Bedrijfsopleidingen - organisatie en financieringsstructuur. Naar een verklaring van 
sectorale verschillen in omvang en structuur van bedrijfsopleidingen. Assen: Van Gorcum. (Ph.d Thesis 
Erasmus University)
ABC (Associated Builders & Contractors of  Wisconsin) (1995). 1995-96 ABC of  Wisconsin 
construction users’ guide. Madison, WI: Associated Builders & Contractors of  Wisconsin.
Abraham, K. & S. Houseman (1994). ‘Earnings inequality in Germany.’ In R. Freeman & L. Katz 
(Eds.) Differences and changes in wage structures. Chicago: University of  Chicago Press.
Acemoglu, D. & J. Pischke, J. (1996). Why do firms train? Theory and evidence. Cambridge, MA: 
National Bureau of  Economic Research.
ACOA (Adviescommissie Onderwijs-Arbeidsmarkt) (1996). De ontwikkeling van de 
kwalificatiestructuur voor secundair beroepsonderwijs. ’s-Hertogenbosch: ACOA.
ACOA (Adviescommissie Onderwijs-Arbeidsmarkt) (1999). Een wending naar kerncompetenties. De 
betekenis van kerncompetenties voor de versterking van de kwalificatiestructuur secundair beroepsonderwijs.  
‘s-Hertogenbosch: ACOA.
Adams, R. (1995). ‘Industrial relations in Europe and North America: some contemporary 
themes. European Journal of  Industrial Relations, 1 (1), 47-62.
Adams, R. (1996). ‘The North American model of  employee representation: “A hollow 
mockery.” Comparative labor law journal, 15 (4), 4-14.
Adler, T. (1994). ‘Funktion und Bedeutung von Ausbildungsordnungen.’ In: Cramer, Schmidt & 
Witwer (Red.). Ausbilder-Handbuch: Aufgaben, Strategien und Zuständigkeiten für Verantwortliche in 
der Aus- und Weiterbildung. Köln: Deutscher Wirtschaftsdienst.
Akerlof, G. (1984).‘Gift exchange and efficiency-wage theory: four views.’ American economic review, 
74 (2), 79-83.
Albeda, W., & W. Dercksen (1994). Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland. Alphen aan den Rijn/
Zaventem: Samsom Bedrijfsinformatie.
Althoff, H. (1994a). ‘Ursachen  des Fachkräftemangels – Tätigkeit und Zufriedenheit von 
Erwerbstätigen mit unterschiedlichem beruflichen Abschluß.’ Berufsbildung in Wissenschaft und 
Praxis, 23 (3), 17-23.
Althoff, H. (1994b).‘Warum die Berufsbildungsstatistik zu viele naue Ausbildungsverträge 
ausweist.’ Gewerkschaftliche Bildungspolitik, 1994 (2), 29-34.
Arbeidsinspectie (2000).Voorjaarsrapportage CAO-afspraken 2000. Den Haag: Arbeidsinspectie.
Arbeidsvoorziening (1992). Schoolverlatersbrief  1992. Rijswijk: Arbeidsvoorziening.
Arbeidsvoorziening (1995). Schoolverlatersbrief  1995. Rijswijk: Arbeidsvoorziening.
Arbeitsgruppe Berufliche Bildung (1994). Zur Lage der beruflichen Bildung und daraus 
abzuleitende vordringliche Maßnahmen Bonn: Bundesministerium für Bildung und 
Wissenschaft.
Archer, M. (1979). Social origins of  educational systems. London: Sage Publications.
Archer, M. (Ed.) (1982). The sociology of  educational expansion. London: Sage Publications.
Arents, M., P. Donker van Heel & V. Polanen Petel (1998). Instroom uitzendkrachten 1997. 
Rotterdam: Nederlands Economisch Instituut.
Arnold, R. & J. Münch (1994). Fragen an das duale System der deutschen Berufsausbildung. 
Kaiserslautern: Universität Kaiserslautern.
Arrow, K. (1974). The limits of  organization. New York: Norton and Company
356
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
Asselberghs, K., R. Batenburg, F. Huijgen & M. de Witte (1998). De kwalitatieve structuur van de 
werkgelegenheid in Nederland deel IV. Bevolking in loondienst naar functieniveau: ontwikkelingen in de 
periode 1985-1995. Tilburg: Organisatie voor Strategisch Arbeidsmarktonderzoek.
Atkinson, J. (1985). ‘Flexibility: Planning for an uncertain future.’ Manpower policy and practice.
Axelrod, R. (1984). The evolution of  cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
Azariadis, C. (1975). ‘Implicit Contracts and Unemployment Equilibria.’ Journal of  Political  
Economy, 83 (6), 1183-1202.
Bailey, T. (1993). ‘Can youth apprenticeship thrive in the United States?’ Educational researcher, 22 
 (3), 4-10.
Bailey, T. (Ed.) (1995). Learning to work. Employer involvement in school-to-work transition programs. 
Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
Bailey, T. & D. Merritt (1995). Making sense of  industry-based skill standards. Berkeley, CA: National 
Center for Research in Vocational Education.
Bakker, W. (2001). Sturen op de tijstroom. Onderwijs voor werkende jongeren en beleid tussen economie en 
ontplooiing 1945-1995. Utrecht: Universiteit Utrecht. (Ph.D Thesis)
Bardeleben, R. von, U. Beicht & K. Feher (1991). Kosten und Nutzen der betrieblichen Berufsausbildung. 
Forschungsstand – Konzeption - Erhebungsinstrumentarium. Berlin/Bonn: Bundesinstitut für 
Berufsbildung.
Bardeleben, R. von, U. Beicht & K. Feher (1994a). ‘Kosten und Nutzen der betrieblichen 
Berufsausbildung.’ Berufsbildung in Wissenschaft und Praxis, 23 (3), 3-11.
Bardeleben, R. von, U. Beicht & K. Feher (1994b). Bildunsökonomischen Betrachtung der 
betrieblichen Berufsausbildung. In Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung (Red.). Perspektiven der 
dualen Berufsausbildung. (pp. 43-62). Bielefeld: Bertelsmann.
Bardeleben, R. von, U. Beicht & K. Feher (1995). Betriebliche Kosten und Nutzen der Ausbildung. 
Räpräsentative Ergebnisse aus Industrie, Handel und Handwerk. Berlin/Bonn: Bundesinstitut für 
Berufsbildung.
Barr, N. (1998, first published ?) The economics of  the welfare state. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
BAS (Wisconsin Department of  Industry, Labor and Human Relations, Bureau of  
Apprenticeship Standards) (1987). Apprenticeship manual. A compilation of  the policies and 
procedures under which the Wisconsin apprenticeship program functions. Madison, WI: Wisconsin 
Department of  Industry, Labor and Human Relations.
BAS (Wisconsin Department of  Industry, Labor and Human Relations, Bureau of  
Apprenticeship Standards) (1992). A guide to apprenticeship training in Wisconsin. Madison, WI: 
Wisconsin Department of  Industry, Labor and Human Relations.
BAS (Wisconsin Department of  Industry, Labor and Human Relations, Bureau of  
Apprenticeship Standards) (1993). The apprenticeship model. Madison, WI: Wisconsin 
Department of  Industry, Labor and Human Relations.
BAS (Wisconsin Department of  Industry, Labor and Human Relations, Bureau of  
Apprenticeship Standards) (1995). State apprenticeship standards for the masonry trades. Bricklayer, 
plasterer, marble mason, tile setter, terrazzo worker and cement mason. Madison, WI: Wisconsin 
Department of  Industry, Labor and Human Relations.
BAT (US Department of  Labor, Bureau of  Apprenticeship and Training) (1992). Apprenticeship 
Washington, DC: US Department of  Labor.
Batenburg, R., K. Asselberghs, F. Huijgen & P. van der Meer (2003) De kwalitatieve structuur van de 
werkgelegenheid in Nederland, deel V. Trends in beroepsniveau en overscholing in de periode 1987-2000. 
Tilburg: Organisatie voor Strategisch Arbeidsmarktonderzoek.
357
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
Bauer, J. (1991). Vocational, Technical and Adult Education system. Madison, WI: Wisconsin 
Legislative Fiscal Bureau.
Becker, G. (1993).Human capital. A theoretical and empirical analysis with special reference to education 
(Third edition). Chicago/London: The University of  Chicago Press. 
Beicht, U. (1993). ‘Tarifliche Ausbildungsvergütungen 1992 in den alten und neuen 
Bundesländern.’ Berufsbildung in Wissenschaft und Praxis, 22 (3), 10-17.
Beicht, U. (1994). ‘Ausbildungsvergütungen 1993 – Entwicklung in West und Ost.’ Berufsbildung in 
Wissenschaft und Praxis, 23 (2), 42-43.
Bellmann, L. & J. Möller (1995).‘Institutional influences on interindustry wage differentials.‘ In: 
F. Buttler, W. Franz, R, Schetkatt & D. Soskice (1995). Institutional frameworks and labor market 
performance. (pp. 132-167). London/New York: Routledge.
Benner, H. (1992).Darstellung aus der Sicht des Bundes.’ In: H. Benner & F. Pützmann (Red.). 
20 Jahre Gemeinsames Ergebnisprotokoll. Eine kritische Darstellung des Verfahrens zur Abstimmung von 
Ausbildungsordnungen und Rahmenlehrpläne für die Berufsausbildung in anerkannten Ausbildungsberufen. 
(pp. 1-35).Bonn: BMBW/KMK.
Berger, P. & T. Luckmann (1966).The social construction of  reality. New York: Doubleday.
Berryman, S., E. Flaxman & M. Inger (1992).Building the Middle. Berkeley, CA: National Center 
for Research in Vocational Education and Training.
Bethke, E. (1990).A guide to curriculum planning. Madison, WI: Wisconsin Department of  Public 
Instruction.
BfA (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit) (1994a).Berufsberatung 1992-1993.Nürnberg: BfA.
BfA (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit) (1994b).Arbeitsstatistik 1993 – Jahreszahlen. Nürnberg: BfA.
BIBB (Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung) (1992).Ausbildungsordnungen und wie sie entstehen. Berlin/
Bonn: BIBB.
Blanchflower, D. & R. Freeman (1992). ‚Unionism in the United States and other advanced 
OECD countries.‘ Industrial relations, 31 (1), 56-77.
Blossfeld, H. (1990) ‘Changes in educational careers in the Federal Republic of  Germany.’ 
Sociology of  education, 63 (?), 165-177.
BMBW (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft) (1989).Grund- und Strukturdaten 
Ausgabe 1988-89. Bonn: BMBW.
BMBW (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft) (1993).Grund- und Strukturdaten 
Ausgabe 1993-94. Bonn: BMBW.
BMBW (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft) (1994). Berufsbildungsbericht 1994. 
Bonn: BMBW.
Boesel, D. & L. McFarland (1994). National assessment of  vocational education. Final report to Congress. 
Volume I. Summary and recommendations. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of  Education.
Bonderud, K. & M. Bukolt (1995). School-to-work programs. Madison, WI: Wisconsin Legislative 
Fiscal Bureau.
Boudon, R. (1981). De logica van het sociale. Alphen a/d Rijn: Samson. 
Brandsma, J. (red.) (2001). Leren kwalificeren. De inhoudelijke aansluiting van beroepsonderwijs en educatie 
op de maatschappelijke vraag. Zoetermeer: Stuurgroep Evaluatie WEB.
Brint, S, & J. Karabel (1991). ‘Institutional origins and transformations: the case of  American 
community colleges.’ In: W. Powell & P. DiMaggio (Eds.). The new institutionalism in 
organizational analysis. (pp. 337-360) Chicago, IL: The University of  Chicago Press.
Broeder, C. den (1995).The match between education and work: what can we learn form the German 
apprenticeship system? Den Haag: CPB.
Brötz, R. (1993).“Lean banking” – Neue Aufgaben im Dienstleistungsbetrieb Bank? In: Hans 
358
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
Böckler Stiftung (Red.). Qualifikationen für neue Formen der Arbeits- und Produktionsorganisation. 
(pp. x-y) Gelsenkirchen: Hans Böckler Stiftung.
Brown Ruzzi, B. (1997). A system of  national skill standards and qualifications for the United States: Early 
stages of  implementation. Paper presented at the international conference `Institutions, markets 
and economic performance’, organized by the Netherlands School for Social and Economic 
Policy Research, Utrecht, December 11-12 1997.
Bruijn, E. de (1997). Het experimentele en het reguliere: twintig jaar voltijds kort middelbaar beroepsonderwijs. 
Een studie naar de relatie tussen onderwijskundige vormgeving en rendement. Amsterdam: Universiteit 
van Amsterdam. (dissertation).
Bruijn, E. de (2001).Aansluiting tussen stelsels. Zoetermeer: Stuurgroep Evaluatie WEB.
Bruno, M. & J. Sachs. (1985).Economics and worldwide stagflation. Cambridge: Harvard University  
 Press.
Büchtemann, C., J. Schupp & D. Soloff  (1993).‘Roads to work: school-to-work transition 
patterns in Germany and the United States.’ Industrial relations journal, 24 (2), 97-111.
Büchtemann, C. & D. Soloff  (1994). ‘Education, training and the economy. Report on an 
international conference on „Human capital investments and economic performance“, Santa 
Barbara, California, November 1993.’ Industrial relations journal, 25 (3), 234-246.
Bukolt, M. (1995a).Wisconsin Technical College System. Madison, WI: Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal 
Bureau.
Bukolt, M. (1995b). Pupil assessment. Madison, WI: Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau.
Bukolt, M. (1995c). Charter schools. Madison, WI: Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau.
Bukolt, M. & C. Toulmin (1995). Statutory requirements for elementary and secondary (K-12) school 
districts. Madison, WI: Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau.
Bundesregierung (1999). Bündnis für Arbeit, Ausbildung und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit. Ergebnisse 
der Arbeitsgruppe “Aus- und Weiterbildung”. Berlijn: Presse- und Informationsamt der 
Bundesregierung.
Bureau Interview-NSS (1999)Jongeren ‚99. Amsterdam: Bureau Interview-NSS.
BVE procescoördinatie (1997). Sprong naar kwaliteit. Bunnik: BVE procescoördinatie.
Cairnes, J. (1874). Some leading principles of  political economy. London: MacMillan and co.
Calmfors, L. & J. Driffil. (1988). ‘Bargaining structure, corporatism and macroeconomic 
performance.’ Economic policy, 6 (April), X-Y.
Campbell, J., J. Rogers Hollingsworth & L. Lindberg (Eds.) (1991).Governance of  the American 
economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Carnevale, A. (1991). America and the new economy. Alexandria, VA: American Society for Training  
 & Development.
Casey, B. (1986). ‘The dual apprenticeship system and the recruitment and retention of  young 
persons in West-Germany.’ British journal of  industrial relations, 24 (1), 63-81.
Casey, B. (1992). ‘Apprentice training in Germany: the experiences of  the 1980s.’ in: D. Phillips 
(Ed.). Lessons of  cross-national comparison in education. (pp. 89-111).Oxford: Triangle Books.
CERI (Centre for Educational Research and Innovation). (1995). Education at a glance. OECD 
indicators. Paris: OECD.
CERI (Centre for Educational Research and Innovation). (19956. Education at a glance. OECD 
indicators. Paris: OECD.
Chubb, J. & T. Moe (1990). Politics, markets, and America’s schools. Washington, DC: The 
Brookings Institution.
Clauß, T. (1993). Ausbildung und Erwerbstätigkeit in den Bauberufen. Ergebnisse aus der BIBB-IAB-
359
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
Erhebung 1991/92. Berlin/Bonn: BIBB.
Clegg, H. (1976).Trade unionism under collective bargaining: A theory based on comparisons of  six countries. 
Oxford: Basic Blackwell.
Coase, R. (1937). ‘The Nature of  the Firm’. Econometrica, 4, 386-405.
Cohen, J. & J. Rogers (1992).‘Democratic governance and secondary associations.’ Politics & 
society, 393-472.
Coleman, J. (1964).Introductions to mathematical sociology. New York: Free Press.
Coleman, J. (1974).Power and the structure of  society. New York: W.W. Norton.
Coleman, J. (1990).Foundations of  social theory. Cambridge: Belknap Press of  Harvard University  
 Press.
Collins, R. (1979).The credential society. An historical sociology of  education and stratification.New York: 
Academic Press.
COLO (Vereniging Kenniscentra Beroepsonderwijs Bedrijfsleven) (1999)Ontwikkelingsplan 
kwalificatiestructuur. Zoetermeer: COLO.
COLO (Vereniging Kenniscentra Beroepsonderwijs Bedrijfsleven) (2002). Samen werken aan leren. 
Naar een competentiegerichte kwalificatiestructuur voor het middelbaar beroepsonderwijs. Zoetrmeer: 
COLO.
Commissie dualisering (1993). Beroepsvorming langs vele wegen. Rapport commissie dualisering. 
Zoetermeer: Ministerie van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen.
Commission on the Skills of  the American Workforce (1990). America’s choice: high skills or low 
wages. The report of  the Commission on the Skills of  the American Workforce. Washington, DC: 
National Center on Education and the Economy.
Conen, J. & F. Huijgen (1980). ‘De kwalitatieve structuur van de werkgelegenheid in 1960 en 
1971.’ Economisch statistische berichten, 65, 480-487.
Conen, J, F. Huijgen & B. van Riesewijk (1983). ‘De kwalitatieve structuur van de 
werkgelegenheid in 1960, 1971 en 1977. Deel I, II en III.’ Economisch statistische berichten, 68 
(april/mei), 361-369, 416-422, 464-469.
Corson, W. & M. Silverberg (1994).The school-to-work apprenticeship demonstration: preliminary findings. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of  Labor.
CPB (Centraal Plan Bureau) (1997)Challenging neighbours. Rethinking German and Dutch Economic 
Institutions Berlin: Springer.
Cramer, G. & K. Müller (1994).Nutzen der betrieblichen Berufsausbildung. Köln: Deutscher Instituts- 
 Verlag.
Crouch, C. (1993).Industrial relations and European state traditions. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Crouch, C., D. Finegold & M. Sako (1999). Are skills the answer? The political economy of  skill creation 
in advanced industrial countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Daalder, H. (1971). ‘On building consociational nations: the cases of  Netherlands and 
Switzerland.’ International Social Science Journal, 23 (3), 355-370.
Daly, A., D. Hitchens & K. Wagner (1985). ‘Productivity, machinery and skills in a sample 
of  British and German manufacturing plants. Results of  a pilot inquiry.’ National Institute 
Economic Review, 1985 (February), pp. 48-61.
David, P. (1985). ‘Clio and the economics of  QWERTY.’ American economic history, 75 (X), 332- 
 337.
Davids, S. (1993). ‘Junge Erwachsenen ohne anerkannte Berufsausbildung in den alten und 
neuen Bundesländern.’ Berufsbildung in Wissenschaft und Praxis, 22 (2), 11-17.
Dekker, R., A. de Grip & J. Heijke (1995).Arbeidsmarktsegmentatie en arbeidsmarktgedrag. Den Haag: 
360
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
OSA.
Dellen, H. van (red.) (1984). Een nieuwe elan:. de marktsector in de jaren tachtig. De rapporten van de 
Adviescommissie inzake het industriebeleid (juni 1981 en de Adviescommissie inzake de voortgang van het 
industrieelbeleid: januari 1982-juni 1982, juli 1982-januari 1983, februari 1983-juni 1983, juli 1983-
december 1983) Deventer: Kluwer.
Dercksen, W. & H. Kamps (1992). Linkages between education and business; to mutual responsibilities. 
Hoofddorp: Bureau voor Economische Argumentatie.
Dercksen, W. & H. van Lieshout (1993). Beroepswijs onderwijs. Ontwikkelingen en dilemma’s in de 
aansluiting van onderwijs en arbeid. Den Haag: Sdu Uitgeverij.
DILHR (Wisconsin Department of  Industry, Labor and Human Relations), Wisconsin 
Department of  Public Instruction, Wisconsin Department of  Health and Social Services, 
Wisconsin Technical College System, University of  Wisconsin System & Wisconsin 
Department of  Administration (1994).State of  Wisconsin application for federal implementation grant 
School to Work Opportunities Act of  1994. Madison, WI: Wisconsin Department of  Industry, 
Labor and Human Relations, Wisconsin Department of  Public Instruction, Wisconsin 
Department of  Health and Social Services, Wisconsin Technical College System, University 
of  Wisconsin System & Wisconsin Department of  Administration
DILHR (Wisconsin Department of  Industry, Labor and Human Relations), Wisconsin 
Department of  Public Instruction, Wisconsin Department of  Health and Social Services, 
Wisconsin Technical College System, University of  Wisconsin System & Wisconsin 
Department of  Administration (1995).State of  Wisconsin school-to-work state plan June 1995.
Madison, WI: Wisconsin Department of  Industry, Labor and Human Relations, Wisconsin 
Department of  Public Instruction, Wisconsin Department of  Health and Social Services, 
Wisconsin Technical College System, University of  Wisconsin System & Wisconsin 
Department of  Administration
DOE (U.S. Department of  Education) (1993). Vocational-technical education: major reforms and debates, 
1917-Present. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of  Education.
DOE (U.S. Department of  Education) & DOL (U.S. Department of  Labor) (1996).1996 school-
to-work report to Congress. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of  Education & U.S. Department 
of  Labor.
DOE (US Department of  Education) & OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development) (1994).Vocational education and training for youth: towards coherent policy and practice. 
Washington/Paris: US Department of  Education/OECD.
Doeringer, P. & M. Piore (1971).Internal labor markets and manpower analysis. Lexington, MA:   
 Lexington Books.
Doets, C. & A. Westerhuis (red.) (2001).Voldoen aan individuele vraag, toegankelijkheid, positie deelnemer. 
Zoetermeer: Stuurgroep Evaluatie WEB.
DOL (U.S. Department of  Labor) (1994).Training and employment report of  the Secretary of  Labor 
covering the period July 1990 - September 1991.Washington, DC: U.S. Department of  Labor.
DOL (U.S. Department of  Labor) (1995). Training and employment report of  the Secretary of  
Labor covering the period July 1991 - September 1992.Washington, DC: U.S. Department of  
Labor.
Dool, P. van den et al. (1994).Vocational training in the Netherlands: reform and innovation.Paris:   
 OECD.
DPI (Wisconsin Department of  Public Instruction) (1995a). Guidelines for implementing a School 
361
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
to Work Opportunities Act cooperative education state skill standards certificate program. Madison, WI: 
Wisconsin Department of  Public Instruction.
Doup, , A. & I. Asscher-Vonk (1991).Leeftijdscriteria in het arbeidsbestel. Den Haag: VUGA   
 Uitgeverij B.V.
DPI (Wisconsin Department of  Public Instruction) (1995b). 1993-94 school performance report. 
Madison, WI: Wisconsin Department of  Public Instruction.
DPI (Wisconsin Department of  Public Instruction) (1995c). Information series. Madison, WI: 
Wisconsin Department of  Public Instruction.
Dresser, L., J. Rogers & J. Whittaker (1996). The state of  working Wisconsin. Madison, WI: Center 
on Wisconsin Strategy.
Drexel, I. (1993).Das Ende des Facharbeitsaufstiegs? Neue mittlere Bildungs- und Karrierewege in 
Deutschland und Frankreich. Frankfürt/New York: Campus Verlag.
Drexel, I. (1994b). ‘Brückenqualifikationen zwischen Facharbeit und Ingenieur – für eine 
Revitalisierung von Facharbeiteraufstieg.’ Berufsbildung in Wissenschaft und Praxis, 23 (4), 3-8.
Dronkers, J. (1992). ‚Blijvende organisatorische onderwijsverzuiling ondanks secularisering: een 
onbedoeld effect van overheidsbeleid?‘ Beleid en maatschappij, 5, 227-237.
Dybowski, G., H. Pütz, E. Sauter & H. Schmidt (1994). Berufliche Weiterbildung und Hochschulzugang 
– Ein Vorschlag für ein eigenständiges und gleichwertiges Berufsbildungssystem. Berlin/Bonn: BIBB.
Educational Approval Board (1995).Annual report. Madison, WI: Educational Approval Board.
Elbaum, B. (1989). ‘Why apprenticeship persisted in Britain but not in the United States.’ Journal 
of  economic history, 49 (2), 337-349.
Elbaum, B. & N. Singh (1995). ‘The economic rationale of  apprenticeship training: some lessons 
from British and U.S. experience.’ Industrial relations, 34 (4), 593-622
Elster, J. (1989).The cement of  society: a study of  social order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ende, M. van der, P. Donker van Heel & M. Arents (1999). ‘Het uitzendbureau als bemiddelaar’. 
Economisch Statistische Berichten, 84 (4186), 56-58.
EURYDICE (2001).Information dossier on the Dutch education system.www.minocw.nl
Evans, P. et al. (Eds.) (1985). Bringing the state back in. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Falk, R. (1982).‘Kosten der betrieblichen Aus- und Weiterbildung. Repräsentative Erhebung für 
1980.’ In: U. Göbel & W. Schlaffke (Red.). Bericht zur Bildungspolitik 1982-1983 des Instituts der 
deutschen Wirtschaft. (pp. 63-)Köln: Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft.<
Fend, H. (1974).Gesellschaftlicher Bedingungen schulischer Sozialisation. Weinheim: Beltz.
Finegold, D. (1991).‘Education, training and economic performance in comparative perspective.’ 
In: D. Phillips (Ed.). Lessons of  cross-national comparison in education. Wallingford: Triangle Books.
Finegold, D. (1997). A cross-national perspective on skill standards systems. Paper presented at the 
international conference `Institutions, markets and economic performance’, organized by 
the Netherlands School for Social and Economic Policy Research, Utrecht, December 11-12 
1997.
Finegold, D., K. Brendley, R. Lempert, D. Henry, P. Cannon, B. Boultinghouse & M. Nelson 
(1994). The decline of  the U.S. machine-tool industry and prospects for its sustainable recovery. Volume 
1.Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
Finegold, D. & B. Keltner (1997). A cross-national perspective on skill standards systems. Paper 
presented at the international conference `Institutions, markets and economic performance’, 
organized by the Netherlands School for Social and Economic Policy Research, Utrecht, 
362
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
December 11-12 1997.
Finegold. D. & D. Soskice (1988). ‘The failure of  training in Britain: analysis and prescription.’ 
Oxford review of  economic policy, 4 (3), 21-52.
Finegold, D. & K. Wagner (1997). ‘When lean production meets the German model: innovation 
responses in the US and German pump industries.’ Industry and innovation, 4 (2), 207-232.
Fligstein, N. (1996). ‘Markets as politics. A political-cultural approach to market institutions.’ 
American sociological review, 61(8), 656-673.
Freeman, R. (1976). The over-educated American.New York/London: Academic Press.
Freeman, R. (1994a).Working under Different Rules. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Freeman, R. (1994b). ‘How labor fares in advanced economies.’ In: R. Freeman, Working under 
different rules. (pp. 1-28). New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Freeman, R. (1994c). ‘Lessons for the United States.’ In: R. Freeman, Working under different rules. 
(pp. 223-239). New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Freeman, R. & L. Katz (1994b). ‘Rising wage inequality: the United States vs. other advanced 
countries.’ In: R. Freeman, Working under different rules. (pp. 29-62). New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation.
Frietman,  J. (1990). De kwaliteit van de praktijkcomponent in het leerlingwezen. Nijmegen: ITS.
Ganga, V. (1992). Deelname, uitval en rendement van het leerlingwezen. Den Haag: Ministerie van 
Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen.
Geerligs, J., U. de Jong, R. van der Velden & M. Wolbers (2002). ‘Toegankelijkheid en 
doorstroom naar vervolgonderwijs en arbeidsmarkt.’ In: W. Houtkoop & A. van Wieringen 
(Red.). De omgeving van het beroepsonderwijs. Jaarboek 2001-2002 van het Max Goote Kenniscentrum. 
(pp. 101-115). Amsterdam: Max Goote Kenniscentrum.
Gesamtmetall (Gesamtverband der metallindustriellen Arbeitgeberverbände) (1993)Berufsbildung.  
 Köln: Gesamtmetall
Geurts, J. & P. Tesser (1976).Werkende jongeren en hun onderwijs.Nijmegen: LINK.
Giddens, A. (1984).The constitution of  society. Outline of  the theory of  structuration. Cambridge: Polity  
 Press.
Gitter, R. (1994). ‘Apprenticeship-trained workers: United States and Great Britain.’ Monthly labor 
review, 117 (4), 38-42.
Gordon, J., J. Jallade & D. Parkes (1994). Structures of  vocational education and training (VET) and 
the match between education and work: An international comparison. Synthesis report. Den Haag: 
Organisatie voor Strategisch Arbeidsmarktonderzoek.
Governor’s Commission For A Quality Workforce (1991).A world class workforce for Wisconsin. 
Recommendations. Madison, WI: Wisconsin Department of  Administration.
Governor’s Commission on Schools for the 21st Century (1991). A new design for education in 
Wisconsin: Schools capable of  continuous improvement. Madison, WI: Wisconsin Department of  
Administration.
Grand, J. Le & W. Bartlett (eds.) (1993).Quasi-markets and social policy. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Granovetter, M. (1985). ‘Economic action and social structure: the problem of  embeddedness.’ 
American journal of  sociology, 91 (3), 481-510.
Grapperhaus, F. & M. Jansen (1999). De uitzendovereenkomst. Deventer: Kluwer.
 Grip, A. de (1987). Onderwijs en arbeidsmarkt: scholingsdiscrepanties. Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij.
De Grip, A. & L. Groot. (1990). ‘Technologische ontwikkelingen en opleidingseisen in het 
bankwezen’. Tijdschrift voor Arbeidsvraagstukken, 6 (3), 67-77.
363
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
De Grip, A., L. Groot, J. Heijke & E. Willems (1990). De aansluiting tussen beroepen en functies 
en de relatie met scholings- en mobiliteitsprocessen. Den Haag: Organisatie voor Strategisch 
Arbeidsmarktonderzoek.
Groeneveld, S. & van Kooten, G. (2001). ‘Aansluiting en doorstroming: de effecten van 
onver- en onderscholing op de promotiekansen van werknemers Energie.’ Tijdschrift voor 
arbeidsmarktvraagstukken, 17 (2), 181-196.
Groot, W. (Ed.) (1998).Overscholing en verdringing op de arbeidsmarkt. Amsterdam: Welboom.
Groot, W. & H. Maassen van den Brink (1995). ‘De leerling en zijn zaak: de economische 
benadering.’ In R.M. Verwayen-Leijh & F. Sudulsky (red.), De leerling en zijn zaak. (pp. ?-?). 
Utrecht: Adviesraad voor het Onderwijs.
Groot, W. & Maassen van den Brink (1996). ‘Overscholing en verdringing op de arbeidsmarkt’ 
Economisch statistische berichten, 74-77.
Groot, W. & H. Maassen van den Brink (2000). ‘Overeducation in the labor market: a meta-
analysis.’ Economics of  education review, 19 (), 149-158.
Grünewald, U., E. Biber, F. Glowitz & D. Moraal (Red.) (1994). The structural meaning of  alterance 
in context of  the initial education and vocational training systems: an international comparison. Synthesis 
report. Berlin: BIBB (Bündesinstitut für Berufsbildung).
Hall, P. (1993). ‘Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State, the Case of  economic Policy-
making in Britain.’ Comparative Politics, 1993 (April), 275-296.
Hamilton, S. (1990). Apprenticeship for adulthood. Preparing youth for the future. New York, NY: The  
 Free Press.
Hamilton, S. (1993). ‘Prospects for an American-style youth apprenticeship system.’ Educational 
researcher, 22 (3), 11-16.
Hardin, G. (1968).‘The Tragedy of  the Commons.’ Science, 162 (?), 1243-1268.
Harhoff, D. & T. Kane (1993).Financing apprenticeship training: evidence from Germany. Washington:  
 NBER.
Hartog, J. (2000).’Over-education and earnings: where are we,  where should we go?’ Economics of  
education review, 19 (), 131-147.
Hecker, U. (1993). ‘Lehrgänge zur Vorbereitung auf  die Externenprüfung – Unterstützung beim 
nachträglichen Erwerb des Berufsabschlusses.’ Berufsbildung in Wissenschaft und Praxis, 22 (3), 
32-37
Hecker, U. (1994). ‘Externenprüfung – eine Chance zum nachträglichen Berufsabschluß.’ In: 
BIBB (Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung). Berufsausbildung nachholen. Wege zum nachträglichen 
Berufsabschluß für ungelernte (junge) Erwachsene. (pp. 49-60). Berlin/Bonn: BIBB.
Heidelberger Institut Beruf  und Arbeit (1993).Chancen ergreifen. Heidelberg: Heidelberger Institut  
 Beruf  und Arbeit.
Heijke, H. (2001).De WEB tussen vraag en aanbod. Zoetermeer: Stuurgroep Evaluatie WEB.
Hemerijck, A. (1993).The Historical Contingencies of  Dutch Corporatism.Oxford: Balliol College.   
 Dissertation.
Henninges, H. von (1994).Die berufliche, sektorale und statusmässige Umverteilung von Facharbeitern.
Nürnberg: Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung. 
Herrigel, G. (1989).‘Industrial Order and the Politics of  Industrial Change: Mechanical 
Engineering.’ In P. Katzenstein (Ed.), Industry and Politics in West Germany. Toward the Third 
Republic. (pp. 185-220). Ithaca, NY/London: Cornell University Press.
364
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
Herrigel, G. (1994). ‘Industry as a Form of  Order. A Comparison of  the Historical 
Development of  the Machine Tool Industries in the United States and Germany.’ In J. 
Rogers Hollingsworth, P.C. Schmitter & W. Streeck (Eds.), Governing Capitalist Economies. 
Performance and Control of  Economic Sectors. (pp. 97-128). New York/Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Herrigel, G. (1996). ‘Crisis in German Decentralized Production: Unexpected Rigidity and 
the Challenge of  an Alternative Form of  Flexible Organization in Baden-Württemberg.’ 
European Urban and Regional Studies, 3 (1), 33-52.
Hilbert, J., H. Südmersen & H. Weber (1990). Berufsbildungspolitik. Geschichte – Organisation – 
Neuordnung. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
Hildebrandt, S. (1993). Berufsbildung und Beschäftigung in französischen Kreditinstituten. Ein institutionelles 
Beziehungsgeflecht im Wandel. Berlin: Wissenschafszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung.
Hilton, M. (1991). ‘Shared training: learning from Germany.’ Monthly labor review, 114 (3), 33-37.
Hitchens, D., Wagner, K. & Birnie, J. (1996).‘The comparative productivity of  East and West 
German manufacturing: A matched plant comparison.’ In: K. Wagner & B. van Ark (eds.). 
International productivity differences. Measurement and explanation. (pp. 269-284). Amsterdam: 
Elsevier.
Hochstetter, H. & E. Muser (1992).Schulgesetz für Baden-Württemberg. Stuttgart/Berlin/Köln:   
 Verlag W. Kohlhammer.
Hodgson, G. (1988).Economics and institutions. Oxford: Polity Press.
Hoest, R. L’ (1997).‘Challenges for the German apprenticeship system and limits of  its 
transferability’.  In J. Wickham (Ed.), The Search for competitiveness and its implications for 
employment. (pp. 203-222). Dublin: Oak Tree Press.
Hollingsworth, J. Rogers (1991).‘Die Logik der Koordination des verarbeitendes Gewerbes in 
Amerika.’ Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 43(1), 18-43.
Hollingsworth, J. Rogers, P. Schmitter & W. Streeck (Eds.) (1994a).Governing capitalist economies. 
Performance & control of  economic sectors. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hollingsworth, J. Rogers, P. Schmitter & W. Streeck (1994b).‘Capitalism, sectors, institutions, and 
performance.’ In J. Rogers Hollingsworth, P. Schmitter & W. Streeck (Eds.), Governing capitalist 
economies. Performance and control of  economic sectors (pp. 3-16).New York/Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Hollingsworth, J. Rogers & W. Streeck (1994).‘Countries and sectors. Concluding remarks on 
performance, convergence and competitiveness.’ In J. Rogers Hollingsworth, P. Schmitter 
& W. Streeck (Eds.), Governing capitalist economies. Performance and control of  economic sectors .(pp. 
270-297).New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Holton, R.J. (1992).Economy and society. London: Routledge.
Hoof, J. van (1998).‘Nieuwe institutionele kaders en de aansluiting tussen beroepsonderwijs en 
arbeidsmarkt.’ Tijdschrift voor Arbeidsvraagstukken, 14 (1), 85-96.
Hondeghem, A. (1990).De loopbaan van een ambtenaar: tussen droom en werkelijkheid. Leuven: 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
Hoof, J. van (1987).De arbeidsmarkt als arena. Arbeidsmarktproblemen in sociologisch perspectief.   
 Amsterdam: Sua.
Hoof, J. van & J. Dronkers (1980).Onderwijs en arbeidsmarkt: een verkenning van de relaties tussen 
onderwijs, arbeidsmarkt en arbeidssysteem.Deventer: Van Loghum Straterus.
Hövels, B. (1992).Branches over dualisering. Uitkomsten van een enquête onder werkgevers- en 
365
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
werknemersorganisaties over dualisering van het beroepsonderwijs. Nijmegen: ITS.
Hövels, B. (1993).‘Terug naar de inhoud op het snijvlak tussen onderwijs en arbeid.’ In: B. 
Hövels & L. Römkens (ed.). Notities over kwalificaties. (pp. 4-67).‘s-Hertogenbosch: CIBB.
Hövels, B, J. Geurts & J. van Wel (1989).Opleidingsbeleid tussen markt en sturing. Sectoraal 
opleidingsbeleid in de metaal- en elektrotechnische industrie: ontwikkeling en structuur. Nijmegen: ITS.
Hövels, B. & H. Verijdt. (1987). Naar een versterking van het leerlingwezen. Samenvatting en conclusies van 
een onderzoek naar beleidsinstrumenten ter versterking van het leerlingwezen. Den Haag: SZW.
Huijgen, F., B. Riesewijk, B. & G. Conen. (1983).De kwalitatieve structuur van de werkgelegenheid in 
Nederland: bevolking in loondienst en functieniveaustructuur in de periode 1960-1977. ´s Gravenhage: 
Staatsuitgeverij.
Huijgen, F. (1989). De kwalitatieve structuur van de werkgelegenheid in Nederland, deel III: bevolking in 
loondienst en functieniveaustructuur in 1977 en 1985.´s Gravenhage: Organisatie voor Strategisch 
Arbeidsmarktonderzoek.
IG Metall (Industriegewerkschaft Metall) (1985).Qualifizierte Ausbildung für alle. Neuordnung der 
industriellen Metall- und Elektroberufen. Frankfurt am Main: IG Metall.
Inspectie van het Onderwijs (2001).Van WEB tot werkelijkheid. Een rapportage over de evaluatie van de 
WEB. Utrecht: Inspectie van het onderwijs.
Jacobs, A. (1993). Inleiding tot het Duitse arbeidsrecht.Arnhem: Gouda Quint B.V.
Jacoby, D. (1991). ‘The transformation of  industrial apprenticeship in the United States.’ Journal 
of  economic history, 51 (4), 887-910.
Jäkel, E. & W. Junge (1986). Die deutschen Industrie- und Handelskammern unter der Deutsche Industrie- 
und Handelstag. Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag.
Janssen, A. (1996). ‚Netherlands. Training and assessment of  adults’ skills and competences.‘ In 
OECD, Assessing and certifying occupational skills and competences in vocational education and training. 
Paris: OECD.
Johannson, K. & M. Schuler (1994). ‘The example of  the building trade.’ In: R. Koch & J. 
Reuling (Eds). Vocational training in Germany: modernization and responsiveness. (pp. 49-67). Paris: 
OECD.
Karstanje, P. (red.) (2001). Zelfsturend stelsel, autonomie instellingen, kwaliteitszorg. Zoetermeer: 
Stuurgroep Evaluatie WEB.
Katz, E. & Ziderman, A. (1990). ‘Investment in general training: the role of  information and 
labour mobility.’ Economic journal, 100 (12), 1147-1158.
Katz, H. (1993). ‘The decentralization of  collective bargaining: a literature review and 
comparative analysis.’ Industrial and labor relations review, 47 (1), 3-22.
Katzenstein, P. (Ed.) (1985). Small states in world markets. Industrial policy in Western Europe. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press.
Katzenstein, P. (1987).Policy and politics in West Germany: the Growth of  a semi-sovereign state. 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Keltner, B. (1995). ‘Relationship banking and competitive advantage: Evidence from the U.S. and 
Germany.’ California Management Review, 37 (4), 45-72.
Kemenade, J. van (Red.). (1981).Onderwijs: bestel en beleid. Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff.
Kerr, C. (1954).  ‘The balkanization of  labor markets’, in: E. Wight Bakke, P. Hauser, G. 
Palmer, C. Myers, D. Yoder & C. Kerr (ed.). Labor mobility and economic opportunity. pp. 92-110. 
Cambridge: MIT Press,
366
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
Klein, R. & M. Schlösser (1994). ‘The example of  the metalworking industry.’ In: R. Koch & J. 
Reuling (Eds). Vocational training in Germany: modernization and responsiveness. (pp. 27-48).Paris: 
OECD.
Klerman, J. & L. Karoly (1994). ‘Young men and the transition to stable employment.’ Monthly 
labor review, 117 (8), 31-48.
Klerman, J. & L. Karoly (1995).The transition to stable employment: The experience of  U.S. 
youth in their early labor market career. Berkeley, CA: National Center for Research in 
Vocational Education.
Kloas, P., & B. Selle (1994). Vom Ungelernten zur Fachkraft. Modelle zur Kombination von Arbeit und 
Berufsausbildung im Überblick. Berlin/Bonn: Bundsinstitut für Berufsbildung.
KMK (Sekretariat der Ständigen Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1994).Bericht über die Entwicklung  des Bildungswesens in 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1992-1994. Bestandaufnahme und Perspektiven internationaler 
Entwicklung. Bonn: Sekretariat der Ständigen Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
Knippenberg, H, & W, van der Ham (1994). Een bron van aanhoudende zorg. 75 jaar Ministerie van 
Onderwijs [Kunsten] en Wetenschappen. Assen: Van Gorcum.
Koch, R. & J. Reuling (1994).Vocational training in Germany: modernization and responsiveness. Paris:  
 OECD.
Kochan, Th.A., H. Katz & R. McKersie (1994). The transformation of  American industrial relations.  
 Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.
Koeslag, M. & R. van der Velden (1997). De afbakening van beroependomeinen van opleidingen in het 
middelbaar beroepsonderwijs. Paper gepresenteerd op het Congres `In banen geleid? Allocatie en 
nieuwe vormen van sturing op de arbeidsmarkt in België en Nederland’, georganiseerd door 
SISWO i.s.m. Regioplan, Rotterdam, 18 september 1997.
Kraayvanger, G. & B. van Onna (1986). Intermediaire voorzieningen – nieuwe ontwikkelingen tussen 
onderwijs en arbeid)? ’sGravenhage: Organisatie voor Strategisch Arbeidsmarktonderzoek.
Kramer, W. (1994).Alternative Ausbildungsmögelichkeiten für Hochschulzugangsberechtigte im 
Tertiären Bereich. Köln: Deutscher Instituts-Verlag
KWB (Kuratorium der deutschen Wirtschaft für Berufsbildung) (1985).Zur Finanzierung der 
Berufsausbildung. Grundposition der Wirtschaft.Bonn: KWB.
Laman Trip, W. (1976). Het leerlingwezen in Nederland. Brussell: Bureau voor officiële publicaties 
van de Europese Gemeenschappen.
Leenknegt, G. (Red.) (2001).Bestuurlijke en juridische aspecten van de WEB. Andere bestuurlijke 
verhoudingen, vermindering bestuurslast. Zoetermeer: Stuurgroep Evaluatie WEB.
Lerman, R. & J. Lane (1994). ‘Training differences and earnings inequality: a comparative study 
of  German and United States youth.’ In: R. Burkhauser & G. Wagner (Eds.) Proceedings 
of  the 1993 International Conference of  German socio-economic panel users. (pp. 19-26).Uitgever? 
Vierteljahreshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung
Lieshout, H. van (1992). Dilemma’s rond dualisering. Master’s thesis: Utrecht University.
Lieshout, H. van. (1995). ‘Controle over verschuivingen in onderwijsstelsels: beheersing of  
besturing? In: B. Boon, J. Demmers, P. van Leeuwen & B. Snels (Eds.). Alles onder controle. 
Essays van de wetenschappelijke generatie X. (pp. 143-157).Utrecht: ISOR.
Lieshout, H. van (1996a). Beroepsonderwijs in Duitsland. Een analyse van het Duits duale stelsel van 
beroepsonderwijs vanuit Nederlands perspectief. Amsterdam: Max Goote Kenniscentrum voor 
Beroepsonderwijs en Volwasseneneducatie.
367
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
Lieshout, H. van (1996b). Governance of  vocational education and training. A comparison of  apprenticeship 
systems in (West) Germany and Wisconsin (U.S.). Paper presented at the WESWA Conference, 
Utrecht, November 12-13 1996.
Lieshout, H. van (1996c) Vocational education, training and labor markets in the United States. Lessons 
for Dutch policy from a qualitative assessment their operation and current reform policies in the American 
state of  Wisconsin. Report for the Dutch Ministry of  Education, Science and Culture. Utrecht: 
AWSB
Lieshout, H. van (1997a). Een internationale vergelijking van de school-to-work transition in Nederland, 
Duitsland, de V.S. en Japan. Utrecht: AWSB.
Lieshout, H. van (1997d). ‘Strukturierung beruflicher Qualifikationen - ein niederländisch-
deutscher Vergleich.’ In: Berufs bil dung in Wis sen schaft und Praxis, 26 (3), S. 22-27.
Lieshout, H. van (1997b)
The transferability of  German apprenticeship: the case of  Wisconsin. Paper presented at the IIRA 
European Regional Congress, Dublin August 26-29, 1997.
Lieshout, H. van (1998). ‘Arbeidsverhoudingen en de produktie van middelbare kwalificaties in 
Duitsland en de Verenigde Staten’. Tijdschrift voor Arbeidsvraagstukken, 14 (3), 228-242.
Lieshout, H. van (1999) ‘Enhancing the operation of  markets for vocational education and 
training.’ In F. van Wieringen & G. Atwell (eds.). Vocational and adult education in Europe, pp. 49-
86. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Lieshout, H. van & A. van Liempt (1999). 2000 IN 1999 VERANDEREN IN TEKST 
‘Flexicurity en opleidingsmarkten.’ In R. van het Kaar, Naar een nieuwe rechtsorde van de arbeid?, 
(pp. 109-147). Den Haag: Sdu.
Lieshout, H. van (1999b).Firms, human capital and productivity: matched establishment comparisons.   
 Amsterdam: SCHOLAR.
Lieshout, H.A.M. van & A.A.G. van Liempt (2000). ‘Temporary employment agencies and 
training in the Netherlands.’ In A.M.L. van Wieringen, M. van Dyck, B.W.M. Hövels & W.J. 
Nijhof  (eds.). Nieuwe aansluitingen tussen onderwijs en arbeid, pp. 122-138.Amsterdam: Max 
Goote Kenniscentrum.
Lieshout, H. van & A. van Liempt (2001). Flexicurity: recent developments in Dutch vocational education 
and training. Amsterdam: Max Goote Kenniscentrum.
Lieshout, H, van (2001). ‘Marktwerking in het beroepsonderwijs: internationale vergelijking.’ In: 
M. van Dyck (red.), Onderwijs in de markt, pp. 167-191Den Haag: Onderwijsraad.
Lieshout, H. van & T. Wilthagen (2002). ‘Transitional labour markets in action: new 
developments in the Dutch vocational education and training market.’ In S. Roualt, H. 
Oschmiansky & I. Schömann (eds.). Reacting in time to qualification needs: Towards a cooperative 
implementation?, pp. 241-269. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung.
Lijphart, A. (1968) The politics of  accommodation: Pluralism and democracy in the Netherlands. 
Berkeley: University of  California Press
Lindbeck, A. & D. Snower (1988). The Insider Outsider Theory of  Employment and Unemployment.   
 Cambridge: MIT Press.
Lindberg, L., J. Campbell, J. & J. Rogers Hollingsworth (1991). ‘Economic governance and 
the analysis of  structural change in the American economy.’ In J. Campbell, J. Rogers 
Hollingsworth & L. Lindberg (Eds.), Governance of  the American economy (pp. 3-34).  
368
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lindenberg, S. (1991). ‘Die Methode der abnehmender Abstraktion: Theoriegesteuerte Analyse 
und empirischer Gehalt.’ In: H. Esser & K. Troitzsch (eds.). Modellierung sozialer Prozesse, pp. 
29-78. Bonn: Informationszentrum Sozialwissenschaften.
Little, D. (1991). Varieties of  social explanation: an introduction to the philosophy of  social science. Boulder:  
 Westview Press.
Luhmann, N. (1966). Recht und Automation in der öffentlichen Verwaltung: eine verwaltungswissenschaftliche 
Untersuchung. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
Lutz, B. ((1994). ‘The difficult rediscovery of  “professionalism”.’ In: OECD (Ed.). Apprenticeship: 
which way forward? (pp. 19-28). Paris: OECD.
Lynch, L. (1993). ‘The economics of  youth training in the United States.’ Economic journal, 103,  
 1292-1302.
MacDuffie, J. & T. Kochan (1995). ‘Do U.S. firms invest less in human resources? Training in the 
world auto industry.’ Industrial relations, 34 (2), 147-168.
MacDuffie, J. & F. Pil. (1996). Training in the word auto industry: New evidence from the international 
assembly plant study. Paper prepared for the ILR-Cornell Institute for Labor Market Policies 
Conference ‘New empirical research on employer training: Who pays? Who benefits?’. 
Ithaca, November 15-17, 1996.
Malkmus, S. (1994). Structures of  vocational education and training (VET) and the match between education 
and work. Germany: national report. Den Haag: OSA.
March, J. & J. Olsen (1989). Rediscovering institutions. The organizational basis of  politics. New York:  
 Free Press.
Marsden, D. & P. Ryan (1990a). ‘Institutional aspects of  youth employment and training policy in 
Britain.’ British journal of  industrial relations, 28 (3), 351-369.
Marsden, D. & Ryan, P. (1990b). ‘Institutional aspects of  youth employment and training Policy: 
reply.’ British journal of  industrial relations, 29 (3), 497-505.
Marsden, D. & P. Ryan (1995). ‘Work, labour markets and vocational preparation: Anglo-German 
comparisons of  training in intermediate skills.’ In: L. Bash & A. Green (Eds.). World yearbook 
of  education 1995: youth, education and work. (pp. 67-79). London/Philadelphia: Rogan Page.
Mason, G. & B. van Ark (1996). ‘Productivity, machinery and skills in engineering: an Anglo-
Dutch comparison.’ In: D. Mayes (ed.). Sources of  productivity growth. (pp. 97-119). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Mason, G., B. van Ark & K. Wagner (1993). Productivity, product quality and workforce skills: food 
processing in four European countries. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung.
Mason, G. &  D. Finegold (1995). Productivity, machinery and skills in the United States and Western 
Europe: Precision engineering. London: National Institute of  Economic and Social Research.
Mason, G., S. Prais & B. van Ark (1992). ‘Vocational education and productivity in the 
Netherlands and Britain.’ National Institute Economic Review, 1992 (May), pp. 45-63.
Mayntz, R. (1988). ‘Funktionelle Teilsysteme in der Theorie sozialer Differenzierung.’ In: R. 
Mayntz et al. (eds.). Differenzierung und Verselbständigung, pp. 11-44 Frankfurt: Campus
Mayntz, R. &  F.W. Scharpf  (1995). ‘Der Ansatz des akteurzentrierten Institutionalismus.’ In R. 
Mayntz & F.W. Scharpf  (eds.). Steuerung und Selbstorganisation in staatsnahen Sektoren, pp. 39-72. 
Frankfurt am Main: Campus.
Meer, P. van der & A. Glebbeek (2002). ‚The return to formal overschooling: filling a research 
gap.‘ The Netherlands’ journal of  social sciences, 37 (2), 108-131
Mertens, D. (1974)‘Schlüsselqualifikationen. Thesen zur Schulung für eine moderne 
369
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
Gesellschaft.’ Mitteilungen aus der Arbeidsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, 1974 (7), x-y.
MGK (Max Goote Kenniscentrum) & NEI (Nederlands Economisch Instituut) (1998). 
Monitoring and financing lifelong learning. Country report: The Netherlands.Amsterdam: Max 
Goote Kenniscentrum voor Beroepsonderwijs en Volwasseneneducatie.
Milwaukee Area Technical College (1995). 1996-1997 Catalog. Milwaukee, WI: Milwaukee Area  
 Technical College.
(Dutch) Ministry of  Education, Culture and Science (1996).Adult and vocational education act. 
Main outline. Zoetermeer: Ministry of  Education, Culture and Science.
MKS (Ministerium für Kultus und Sport Baden-Württemberg) (1989). Bildungsplan für die 
Berufsschule Band 1. Allgemeine Fächer (Pflicht- und Wahlpflichtfächer, Zusatzunterricht). Villingen: 
Necker-Verlag.
Moerkamp, Y. (1993). Kwaliteit en beschikbaarheid van leerarbeidsplaatsen voor MBO en leerlingwezen. 
Bunnik/Den Haag: Adviescentrum Opleidingsvraagstukken/VUGA.
Moorhouse, M., E. Rice, S. Smith, S. & M. Shaw (1995). The Department of  Labor skill standards 
projects: an analysis and lessons learned. Washington, DC: CAL, Inc./Aguirre International.
Münch, J. (1989). Berufsbildung und Bildung in den USA: Bedingungen, Strukturen, Entwicklungen und 
Probleme. Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag.
Münch, J. (1994). Das Berufsbildungssystem in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Luxemburg. Bureau 
voor officiële publicaties der Europese Gemeenschappen.
Nagelkerke, A. & W. de Nijs (2001). Regels rond arbeid. Groningen: Martinus Nijhof.
National Commission on Excellence in Education (1983). A nation at risk: the imperative for 
educational reform. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of  Education.
NCES (National Center for Education Statistics) (1994). Vocational education in G-7 Countries: 
profiles and data. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of  Education.
NCEE (National Center on Education and the Economy) (1995). Building a system to invest 
in people: states on the cutting edge. Washington, DC: National Center on Education and the 
Economy.
NCW (Nederlands Christelijk Werkgeversverbond) (1992). Naar een zelfstandige, ondernemende school. 
Een nieuwe verhouding tussen overheid en beroepsonderwijs. ‘s-Gravenhage: NCW.
NSSB (National Skill Standards Board) (1995). National voluntary skill standards. An orientation guide 
for members of  the National Skill Standards Board. Washington, DC: National Skill Standards 
Board.
Neuenfeldt, P. & E. Parker (1996). Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership: building the infrastructure 
for workplace change and skill development. Washington, DC: AFL-CIO Human Resources 
Development Institute.
Nieuwenhuis, L. (red.) (2001). Kwaliteit getoetst in de BVE. Kwaliteit en niveau van aanbod en examens in 
het beroepsonderwijs en de volwasseneneducatie. Zoetermeer: Stuurgroep Evaluatie WEB.
Noll, I., U. Beicht, G. Böll, W. Walcher & S. Wiederhold-Fritz (1983). Nettokosten der betrieblichen 
Berufsausbildung. Berlin/Bonn: Beuth Verlag.
North, D. (1981). Structure and change in economic history. New York: Norton.
North, D. &  R. Thomas (1973).The rise of  the western world. Cambridge: Cambridge University  
 Press.
Oakes, J., M. Selvin, L. Karoly, L. & G. Guiton (1992). Educational matchmaking: academic and 
vocational tracking in comprehensive high schools. Berkeley, CA: National Center for Research in 
Vocational Education.
370
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) (1985). Education and   
 training after basic schooling.
Paris: OECD.
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) (1994a).Apprenticeship: which 
way forward? Paris: OECD.
OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) (1994b). The OECD jobs 
study. Evidence and explanations. Part II - the adjustment potential of  the labour market. Paris: OECD.
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) (1996a).Assessing and 
certifying occupational skills and competences in Vocational Education and Training. Paris: OECD.
OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) (1996b). Employment   
 outlook. Paris: OECD.
OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) (1997). Employment outlook.
Paris: OECD.
Oi, W. (1962). ‘Labor as quasi-fixed factor’. Journal of  Political Economy, 70, pp. 538-555.
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of  collective action: public goods and the theory of  groups. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
Onderwijsraad (2001a).De markt meester? Verkenning. Den Haag: Onderwijsraad.
Onderwijsraad (2001b). WEB: werk in uitvoering. Een voorlopige evaluatie van de Wet Educatie en 
Beroepsonderwijs. Den Haag: Onderwijsraad.
Onstenk. J. & B. Hövels (1995). Het rendement van het leerlingwezen in Duitsland vergeleken met 
Nederland. Amsterdam: SCO-Kohnstamm Instituut
Oosterbeek, H. (1998). ‘Innovative ways to finance education and their relation to lifelong 
learning.’ Education economics, 6 (3), pp. 219/251.
Open Overleg Wagner (1984). Op weg naar een gezamenlijke verantwoordelijkheid. Eindrapport van het 
Open Overleg inzake de voorstellen van de commissie Wagner inzake het beroepsonderwijs. ‘s-Gravenhage: 
Open Overleg Wagner.
Osterman, P. (1980). Getting Started. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Osterman, P. (ed.) (1984). Internal Labor Markets. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Osterman, P. (1994). ‘Internal labor markets: theory and change’. In: C. Kerr & P. Staudohar 
(eds.). Labor economics and industrial relations. Markets and institutions. (pp. 303-339). Cambridge/
London: Harvard University Press.
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: the evolution of  institutions for collective action. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, E., R. Gardner & J. Walker (1994). Rules, games, and common pool resources. Ann Arbor: 
University of  Michigan Press.
Overdiep, I. (1991).Positieverbetering van leerling-werknemers in vakopleidingen en stagiair(e)s in het voltijds 
beroepsonderwijs. Amsterdam: FNV.
OW (Ministerie van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen) (1988). Sectorvorming en vernieuwing in het 
middelbaar beroepsonderwijs. Den Haag: Sdu.
OW (Ministerie van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen) (1990).Kabinetsreactie rapport Tijdelijke 
adviescommissie Onderwijs Arbeidsmarkt. Zoetermeer: OW.
OW (Ministerie van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen) (1991a). Samen werken aan beroepsonderwijs. 
Convenant tussen overheid en centrale organisaties van werkgevers en werknemers inzake Rauwenhoff. 
Zoetermeer: OW.
371
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
OW (Ministerie van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen) (1991a).Samen werken aan beroepsonderwijs. 
Convenant secundair beroepsonderwijs. Zoetermeer: OW.
OW (Ministerie van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen) (1991c). Hoofdlijnennotitie roc’s. Een notitie over de 
vorming van regionale opleidingencentra. Zoetermeer: OW.
OW (Ministerie van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen) (1992a). Naar landelijke organen voor het 
beroepsonderwijs. Zoetermeer: OW.
OW (Ministerie van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen) (1992b). Convenant tussen de Minister van 
Onderwijs en Wetenschappen en de landelijke organen van het leerlingwezen en de toekomstige rol van de 
landelijke organen van het (secundair) beroepsonderwijs. Zoetermeer: OW.
OW (Ministerie van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen) (1993a). Kernpuntennotitie voer de Wet Educatie en 
Beroepsonderwijs. Zoetermeer: OW.
OW (Ministerie van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen) (1993b). Blijven leren. Ontwikkelingsperspectief  
voor de volwasseneneducatie in brede zin. Een discussienota. Zoetermeer: OW.
Paauwe, J. & R. Williams. (1998). ‘De strategische positionering van de personele functie onder 
uiteenlopende marktomstandigheden’. Management en Organisatie, 1998 (1), 63-79.
Pais, J. (1996). ‘Erwachsenwerden mit Rückfahrkarte? Übergänge, biographische Scheidewege 
und sozialer Wanderl in Portugal.’ In: A. Walther (Ed.). Junge Erwachsene in Europa. (pp. 75-93). 
Opladen: Leshke+Budrich.
Paris, K. (1985). A political history of  vocational, technical and adult education in Wisconsin. Madison, WI: 
Wisconsin Board of  Vocational, Technical and Adult Education.
Parmentier, K., K. Schober & M. Tessaring (1994). ‘Zur Lage der dualen Berufsausbildung in 
Deutschland. Neue empirische Ergebnisse aus dem IAB.’ In: S. Liesering, K. Schober & 
M. Tessaring (Eds.). Die Zukunft der dualen Berufsausbildung. Eine Fachtagung der Bundsanstalt für 
Arbeit 21.-22. April 1994 in Nürnberg. (pp. 7-47). Nürnberg: Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und 
Berufsforschung.
Parker, E. (1994).Room to manoeuvre: The institutional conditions of  regional industrial restructuring. 
Madison, WI: University of  Wisconsin-Madison. Dissertation
Parker, E. (1996). The district apprenticeship system of  the Milwaukee metalworking sector, 1900-1930. 
New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University.
Parsons, T. (19xx) H2 zoeken in Scharpf  of  inleidingsboeken sociologie
Peters, E. & M. du Bois-Reymond (1996). ‘Zwischen Anpassung und Widerstand: Junge Frauen 
im Modernisierungsprozess.’ In: A. Walther (Ed.). Junge Erwachsene in Europa. (pp. 93-123). 
Opladen: Leshke+Budrich.
Phillippe, K. (1995). National profile of  community colleges: Trends & statistics 1995-1996. Washington, 
DC: American Association of  Community Colleges.
Polder, K. (2002). ‘Evaluatie van de WEB: van onderzoek naar beleid?.’ In: W. Houtkoop & A. 
van Wieringen (Red.). De omgeving van het beroepsonderwijs. Jaarboek 2001-2002 van het Max Goote 
Kenniscentrum. (pp. 188-206). Amsterdam: Max Goote Kenniscentrum.
Powell, W. & P. DiMaggio (1991). The new institutionalism in organizational analysis. Chicago: Chicago 
University Press.
Prais, S. (1981). ‘Qualifications of  the labour force as a whole.’ National Institute Economic Review, 
1981 (November), 47-59.
Prais, S. (Ed.) (1995a). Productivity, education and training: Britain and other countries compared. Reprints 
of  studies published in the National Institute Economic Review. London: National Institute for Social 
and Economic Research.
372
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
Prais, S. (Ed.) (1995b). Productivity, education and training: An international perspective. 
London: National Institute of  Economic and Social Research.
Prais, S., V. Jarvis & K. Wagner. (1989). ‘Productivity and vocational skills in services in Britain 
and Germany: Hotels.’ National Institute Economic Review, 1989 (November), pp. 52-74.
Prais, S. & K. Wagner. (1983). ‘Some practical aspects of  human capital investment: training 
standards in five occupations in Britain and Germany.’ National Institute Economic Review, 1983 
(August), 46-65.
Przeworski, A. & H. Teune (1970). The logic of  comparative social inquiry. New York: John Wiley.
Quack, S., J. O’Reilly &  S. Hildebrandt (1994). New patterns of  recruitment and training in German, 
UK and French banks. An attempt to analyze sectoral regulatory systems from a dynamic perspective. 
Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin.
Quack, S., J. O’Reilly &  S. Hildebrandt (1995). ‘Structuring change: recruitment and training 
in retail banking in Germany, Britain and France’. International Journal of  Human Resource 
Management, 6 (4), 759-794.Berlin Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin.
Quispel, Y. (2000). Leeftijdsgrenzen op de arbeidsmarkt. Utrecht: Landelijk Bureau    
 Leeftijdsdiscriminatie.
Rahn, M. (1994). Profiles of  the national industry skills standards projects. Berkeley, CA: National 
Center for Research in Vocational Education.
Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage (2002). ‘Minimumloon 13- en 14-jarigen.’ JAR 2003 (1), 10-11.
Reich, M., D. Gordon, D. & R. Edwards. (1973) ‘A Theory of  Labor Market Segmentation.’ 
American Economic Review, 63 (2), 359-365.
Reisse, W. (1996). ‘Germany. The institutional framework and certification in the dual system.’ 
In: OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). Assessing and 
certifying occupational skills and competences in vocational education and training. (pp. 157-171).Paris: 
OECD.
Reuling, J. (1991). Berufsausbildung in den Niederlanden. Strukturprobleme, Reformdiskussion und 
Entwicklungslinien. Berlin/’s-Hertogenbosch: BIBB/CIBB
Reuling, J. (1998). ‘The German “Berufsprinzip” as a model for regulating training content and 
qualification standards.’ In: W. Nijhoff  & J. Streumer, Key qualifications in work and education. 
(pp. 63-76). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Rhodes, M. (1995). WTCS transfer enrollment to the University of  Wisconsin System, 1994-1995. 
Madison, WI: Joint Administrative Committee on Academic Programs.
Rogers, J. (1995). ‘A Strategy for Labor.’ Industrial relations, 34 (3), 367-381.
Rogers, J. & E. Parker (1995). The Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership: lessons for national policy. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of  Labor.
Rogers, J. & W. Streeck (1991). Skill needs and training strategies in the Wisconsin metalworking Industry. 
Executive summary. Madison, WI: Robert M. LaFollette Institute of  Public Affairs.
Rogers, J. & W. Streeck (1994). ‘Workplace representation overseas: the works council’s story.’ In: 
R.Freeman, Working under different rules. (pp. 97-156). New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Rogers, J., W. Streeck & E. Parker (1991). ‘The Wisconsin training effort.’ In: J. Conant, R. 
Haveman & J. Huddleston (Eds.). Dollars and sense: policy choices and the Wisconsin budget, volume 
2. (pp. 119-153). Madison, WI: Robert M. LaFollette Institute of  Public Affairs.
Römkens, L. & K. Visser (1994). Beroepsonderwijs en scholing in Nederland. Berin: CEDEFOP.
Rosenbaum, J. (1996). ‘Policy uses of  research on the high-school-to-work transition.’ Sociology of  
education, 69 (extra), 102-122.
Rosenbaum, J. & T. Kariya (1991). Do high school achievements affect the early jobs of  high 
373
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
school graduates in the United States and Japan?’ Sociology of  education, 64 (1), 78-95
Rosenbaum, J.E., D. Stern, M. Hamilton, S. Hamilton, S. Berryman & R. Kazis (1992). Youth 
apprenticeship in America: guidelines for building an effective system. Washington, DC: William T. 
Grant Foundation Commission on Youth and America’s Future.
Van Ruysseveldt, J. & J. Visser (1996). ‘Weak corporatism going different ways? Industrial 
relations in the Netherlands and Belgium.’ In: J. van Ruysseveldt & J. Visser (eds.) Industrial 
relations in Europe. Traditions and transitions. (pp. 205-264). London/Thousand Oaks/New 
Delhi: SAGE.
Ryan, P. (1991). ‘Introduction: comparative research on vocational education and training.’ In: 
P. Ryan (ed.). International comparisons of  vocational education and training for intermediate skills. (pp. 
1-20). London: The Falmer Press
Ryan, P. & C. Büchtemann (1996). ‘The school-to-work transition.’ In: G. Schmid, J. O’Reilly & 
K. Scgómann (Eds.) International handbook of  labour market policy and Evaluation. (pp. 308-347). 
Cheltenham/Brookfield: Edward Elgar.
Sako, M. (1991). ‘Institutional aspects of  youth employment and training policy: a comment on 
Marsden and Ryan.’ British journal of  industrial relations, 29 (3), 485-490.
SCANS (Secretary’s Commission on Achieving Necessary Skills) (1991). What work requires of  
schools: A SCANS report for America 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of  Labor.
SCANS (Secretary’s Commission on Achieving Necessary Skills) (1992). Learning a living: 
a blueprint for high performance. A SCANS report for America 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of  Labor.
Scharpf, F. (1987).‘A game-theoretical interpretation of  inflation and unemployment in Western 
Europe.’ Journal of  Public Policy, 7 (pp. 227-257).
Scharpf, F. (1997).Games real actors play. Actor-centered institutionalism in policy research. Boulder/
Cumnor Hill: Westview Press.
Schmid, G. (1992).‘Flexibele coördinatie: de toekomst van het duale systeem uit oogpunt van 
arbeidsmarktbeleid.’ Cedefop beroepsopleiding, 1992 (1), 53-58.
Schmid, G. (1996). Beschäftigungswunder Niederlande? Ein Vergleich der Beschäftigungssysteme in den 
Niederlanden und in Deutschland. Berlin: Wissenschafszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung.
Schmid, G. (1998). Transitional labour markets: a new European employment strategy. Berlin:   
 Wissenschafszentrum Berlin.
Schmid, G. (2000). ‘Transitional labour markets. A New European Employment Strategy.’ In: 
B.Marin, D. Meulders, & D. Snower (Eds.). Innovative Employment Initiatives. (pp. 223-254). 
Aldershot/Brokfield/Singapore/Sydney: Ashgate.
Schmitter, P. & W. Streeck (1981). The organization of  business interests: a research design to study the 
associative action of  business in the advanced industrial societies of  Western Europe.. Discussion paper 
IIM/LMP 81-13. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin.
Schnabel, C. (1995). ‘Collective bargaining in Germany: Recent trends, problems and proposals 
for reform.’ In: R. Hoffmann, O. Jacobi, B. Keller & M. Weiss (Eds.). German industrial 
relations and the impact of  structural change, unification and European integration. (pp. 30-37). 
Düsseldorf: Hans Böckler Stiftung.
Schömann, I. (2002). ‘A right to vocational training: The anticipative action of  workers’ 
representatives in selected European countries.’ In: S. Rouault, H. Oschmiansky & I. 
Schömann (Eds.). Reacting in time to qualification needs: towards a cooperative implementation? (pp. 
374
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
186-195). Berlin: Wissenschafszentrum Berlin.
Schömann, K. & P.J. O’Connell (2002). Education, training and employment dynamics. Transitional 
labour markets in the European Union. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Schöngen, K. (1993). ‘Abwanderung von Absolventen industrieller Metall- und Elektroberufe 
aus ihrem Beruf  – Strukturen und Gründe.’ Berufsbildung in Wissenschaft und Praxis, 22 (4), 
14-17.
Schöngen, K., J. Ulrich & G. Westhoff  (1994) ‘Von der Ausbildung zur Beschäftigung – 
Ergebnisse einer Befragung westdeutscher Fachkräfte.’ Berufsbildung in Wissenschaft und Praxis, 
23 (4), 22-27.
SCP (Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau) (1992). Sociaal en cultureel rapport 1992. Rijswijk/Den Haag:  
 SCP.
Sengenberger, W. (1987). Struktur und Funktionsweise von Arbeitsmarkten. Die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland im internationalen Vergleich. Frankfurt am Main/New York: Campus Verlag. 
Sengenberger, W. (1992). ‘Vocational training, job structures and the labour market.’ In: N. 
Altmann, C. Koehler & P. Meil (Red.). Technology and work in German industry. (pp. 246-256). 
München: Institute for Social Science Research.
SER (Sociaal-Economische Raad) (1999) Flexibiliteit in leerwegen. Den Haag: Sociaal-Economische  
 Raad.
SER (Sociaal-Economische Raad) (2002) Koersen op vernieuwing. Advies over macro-doelmatigheid, 
innovatiebeleid en beroepspraktijkvorming in het ( middelbaar) beroepsonderwijs. Den Haag: Sociaal-
Economische Raad.
Shenon, C. (1992). Union perspectives on new work-based youth apprenticeship initiatives. Cambridge, MA: 
Jobs for the Future.
Simitis, S. (1994). ‘The rediscovery of  the individual in labour law’. In: R. Rogowski & T. 
Wilthagen (Eds.). Reflexive labour law. Studies in industrial relations and employment regulation (pp. 
183-205). Deventer: Kluwer Law and Taxation.
SKF (Sachverständigenkommission Kosten und Finanzierung der beruflichen Bildung) (1974). 
Kosten und Finanzierung der außerschulischen Berufsbildung (Abschlußbericht).BT-Druck-Sache 7-1811, 
14.3.1974. Bonn: SKF.
Smith, A. (1975; first published 1776). An inquiry into the nature and the causes of  the wealth of  nations. 
London: Dent & Sons Ltd.
Smits, W. (2005). The quality of  apprenticeship training. Conflicting interests of  firms and apprentices. 
Maastricht: Researchcentrum voor Onderwijs en Arbeidsmarkt.
Snyder, T. & C. Hoffman (1995). State comparisons of  education statistics: 1969-70 to 1993-94. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of  Education.
Sol, E. (2000). Arbeidsvoorzieningsbeleid in Nederland. De rol van de overheid en de sociale partners. 
Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam. (Ph. D Thesis)
Solow, R. (1980). ‘On theories of  unemployment.’ American economic review, 7 (1), 1-11.
Soskice, D. (1990). ‘Wage determination: the changing role of  institutions in advanced 
industrialized countries.’ Oxford Review of  Economic Policy, 6 (4), 36-61.
Soskice, D. (1993).‘Social skills from mass higher education: rethinking the company-based initial 
training paradigm.’ Oxford review of  economic policy, 9 (3), 101-113.
Soskice, D. (1994). ‘Reconciling markets and institutions: The German apprenticeship system’. 
In: L. Lynch (ed.). Training and the private sector. International comparisons (pp. 25-60). Chicago/
London: The University of  Chicago Press.
375
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
Spence, O. (1973). ‘Job market signaling.’ Quarterly journal of  economics, x (y), 355-374.
Staatsblad (1997). Wet van 24 december 1997, houdende regels omtrent de kamers van koophandel en   
 fabrieken. No. 783.
STAR (Stichting van de Arbeid) (2000). Meer prioriteit voor het beroepsonderwijs. Den Haag: 
STAR.
STAR (Stichting van de Arbeid) (2001a). ‘Er is meer nodig’. Aanbevelingen voor het 
arbeidsvoorwaardenoverleg 2001. Den Haag: STAR.
STAR (Stichting van de Arbeid) (2001b). Werk maken van employability beleid! Den Haag: STAR.
StBa (Statistisches Bundesamt) (1993b). Bildung im Zahlenspeigel 1993. Wiesbaden: Statistisches  
 Bundesamt.
StBa (Statistisches Bundesamt) (1994). Fachserie 11: Bildung und Kultur; Reihe 2: Berufliche Schulen; 
1992. Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt.
Stedman, L. (1994). ‘Incomplete explanations: the Case of  U.S. performance in the international 
assessments of  education.’ Educational researcher, 23 (7), 24-32.
Steedman, H. (1993).‘The economics of  youth training in Germany.’ Economic journal, 103, 1279- 
 1291.
Steedman, H. & K. Wagner. (1987). ‘A second look at productivity, machinery and skills Britain 
and Germany.’ National Institute Economic Review, 1987 (November), pp. 84-95.
Steedman, H. & K. Wagner. (1989). ‘Productivity, machinery and skills: clothing manufacture in 
Britain and Germany.’ National Institute Economic Review, 1989 (May), pp. 40-57.
Steinmo, S., K. Thelen & F. Longstreth (eds.) (1992). Structuring politics. Historical institutionalism in 
comparative analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stern, D., N. Finkelstein, J. Stone III, J. Latting & C. Dornsife (1995). School to work. Research on 
programs in the United States. Washington, DC/London: The Falmer Press.
Stevens, M. (1994a). ‘Labour contracts and efficiency in on-the-job training.’ Economic journal, 104  
 (March), 408-419.
Stevens, M. (1994b). ‘A theoretical model of  on-the-job training with imperfect competition.’ 
Oxford Economic Papers. 46 (4), pp. 537-562.
Stooß, F. (1990) ‘Zum Beruf  als Grundlage des Berufsbildungsgesetzes.’ Recht der Jugend und des 
Bildungswesens, 38 (4), 351-360.
Stooß, F. (1994) Wie eine Berufsklassifikation entsteht: Grundlagen, Vorgehen und Details, dargestellt and 
der ‘spanenden Metallverformung’ und am Beispiel der deutschen Klassifizierung der Berufe – Ausgabe 
1988. Unpublished manuscript (Nürnberg: Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung).
Streeck, W. (1992). Social institution and economic performance. London: Sage.
Streeck, W., J. Hilbert, K. van Kevelaer, F. Maier & H. Weber (1987). The role of  the social partners in 
vocational training and further training in the Federal Republic Of  Germany. Berlin: CEDEFOP.
Streeck, W. &  P. Schmitter (1985). Private interest government: beyond market and state. London/  
 Beverly Hills: SAGE.
Stuurgroep Evalutie WEB (2001). De WEB: naar eenvoud en evenwicht. Eindrapport van de Stuurgroep 
Evalutie WEB Zoetermeer: Stuurgroep Evaluatie WEB.
Suchman, D. (1995). University of  Wisconsin enrollment and admissions policies. Madison, WI: 
Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau.
SVM procescoördinatie (1990). Startprogramma vernieuwing middelbaar beroepsonderwijs. Bunnik: SVM.
 Swaan, A. de (1988). Zorg en de staat. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Bert Bakker.
SZW (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid) (1996). De Nederlandse verzorgingsstaat in 
376
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
internationaal en economisch perspectief. Den Haag: Sdu.
Tessaring, M. (1993).‘Das duale System der Berufsausbildung in Deutschland: Attraktivität und 
Beschäftigungsperspektiven. Ein Beitrag zur gegenwartigen Diskussion.’ Mitteilungen aus der 
Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, 1993 (2), 131-161.
Thelen, K. & S. Steinmo (1992). ‘Historical institutionalism in comparative politics’. In: S. 
Steinmo, K. Thelen & F. Longstreth (eds.). Structuring politics. Historical institutionalism in 
comparative analysis. (pp. 1-32). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Thurow, L. (1975). Generating inequality. Mechanisms of  Distribution in the U.S. Economy. New York:  
 Basic Books.
Tijdelijke adviescommissie Onderwijs-Arbeidsmarkt (1990). Onderwijs-arbeidsmarkt: naar een 
werkzaam traject. Advies van de tijdelijke adviescommissie Onderwijs-Arbeidsmarkt. Alphen aan den 
Rijn: Samson H.D. Tjeenk Willink.
Tijdens, K, (1992). 25 jaar produkt- en proces innovaties in het girale betalingsverkeer. Amsterdam: 
Universiteit van Amsterdam.
Toren,  J. van der (1996). Achter gesloten deuren? Cao-overleg in de jaren negentig. Amsterdam:   
 Welboom.
Toulmin, C. (1995). Milwaukee Parental Choice Program. Madison, WI: Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal  
 Bureau.
Toulmin, C. & M. Bukolt (1995). Elementary and secondary school aids. Madison, WI: Wisconsin 
Legislative Fiscal Bureau.
Tros, F. (2000). Decentralisering van arbeidsverhoudingen. Een onderzoek naar de arbeidsvoorwaardenvorming 
in de Nederlandse private sector in de periode 1982-2000. Utrecht: Utrecht University (Ph.D. thesis).
Tucker, M. (1994a). A school-to-work transition system for the United States. Rochester, NY: National 
Center on Education and the Economy.
Tucker, M. (1994b). Designing performance-driven schools. Rochester, NY: National Center on 
Education and the Economy.
Tweede Kamer (1996-1997)Memorie van Toelichting bij de Regels omtrent de Kamers van Koophandel en  
 Fabrieken, 25029 no. 3.
Tweede Kamer (2001-2002) Gelijke behandeling op grond van leeftijd bij arbeid, beroep en beroepsonderwijs 
(Wet gelijke behandeling op grond van leeftijd bij de arbeid); Voorstel van wet, 28 170 no. 1-2.
UW (University of  Wisconsin System) (1995a). Introduction to the University of  Wisconsin 
System 1995-1996. Madison, WI: University of  Wisconsin System.
UW (University of  Wisconsin System) (1995b). CBA communiqué volume 2. Madison, WI: 
University of  Wisconsin System.
Vaughan, R. (1994). State apprenticeship directors’ statistical data report. San Francisco, CA: National 
Association of  State and Territorial Apprenticeship Directors.
Veen, K. van (1997). Inside an Internal Labor Market. Formal Rules, Flexibility and Career Lines in a 
Dutch Manufacturing Company. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
Veld, T. (1994). ROC-vorming: beleid voor een nieuw bestel. Rotterdam : RISBO.
Velden, R. van der (red.) (2001). Toegankelijkheid, intern rendement en doorstroom. Zoetermeer: 
Stuurgroep Evaluatie WEB.
Velden, R. van der & B. Lodder (1993). Alternative routes from vocational education to the labour market. 
Labour market effects of  fulltime vs. dualized vocational education. Maastricht: ROA.
Velzen, M. van (2004) Titel. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University (Ph. D thesis).
Venema, P., A. Faas & J. Samadhan (1996) Arbeidsvoorwaardenontwikkeling in 1995. Den Haag:   
 Arbeidsinspectie.
377
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
Vereniging BVE, LDC & AOC-Raad (1992). Studiegids MBO en leerlingwezen 1993; alle opleidingen in 
het MBO en leerlingwezen. Meppel: 1992.
Verhulp, E. (1998). ‘De uitzendkracht in het Flex(s)t(r)ijdperk’. Sociaal Recht. 1998 (11), 322-334.
Veum, J. (1993). ‘Training among young adults: who, what Kind, and for how long?’ Montly labor 
review, 116 (8), 27-32.
Veum, J. & A. Weiss (1993). ‘Education and the work histories of  young adults.’ Montly labor   
 review, 116 (4), 11-20.
Visser, J. (1995). ‘Trade unions from a comparative perspective.’ In J. van Ruysseveldt, R. 
Huiskamp & J. van Hoof  (Eds.), Comparative industrial & employment relations (pp. 37-67). 
Heerlen/London: Open University/SAGE Publications.
Visser, J & A. Hemerijck (1997). ‘A Dutch miracle’. Job growth, welfare reform and corporatism in the 
Netherlands. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Visser, J. & J. van Ruysseveldt (1996). ‘Robust corporatism, still? Industrial relations in Germany.’ 
In J. Van Ruysseveldt & J. Visser (Eds.), Industrial relations in Europe. Traditions and transitions. 
(pp. 124-174) London/ Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: SAGE Publications.
VNO (Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen) & NCW (Nederlands Christelijk 
Werkgeversverbond) (1980). Naar een vernieuwd leerlingwezen. Den Haag: VNO & NCW.
Vogels, E. (1994). De onderkant van de arbeidsmarkt, een overzicht van de wettelijke minimum(jeugd)lonen, 
laagste cao-lonen en loon en arbeidsvoorwaardenstelsels in Europees perspectief. Den Haag: Ministerie van 
Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid.
Vries, G. de (1993). Het pedagogisch regiem. Groei en grenzen van de geschoolde samenleving. Amsterdam: 
Meulenhoff.
Vries, I. de & F. Heere (1993). Kosten en baten van het leerlingwezen bij bedrijven. Den Haag: OSA.
Vries, M. de & M. Wolbers (2002). ‘Leerweg en arbeidsmarktintrede.’ In: W. Houtkoop & A. 
van Wieringen (Red.). De omgeving van het beroepsonderwijs. Jaarboek 2001-2002 van het Max Goote 
Kenniscentrum. (pp. 101-115). Amsterdam: Max Goote Kenniscentrum.
Waarden, F. van (1995a).‘Employers and employers’ associations.’  In J. van Ruysseveldt, R. 
Huiskamp & J. van Hoof  (Eds.), Comparative industrial & employment relations. (pp. 68-108). 
Heerlen/London: Open University/SAGE Publications.
Waarden, F. van (1995b). ‘Government intervention in industrial relations.’  In J. van Ruysseveldt, 
R. Huiskamp & J. van Hoof  (Eds.), Comparative industrial & employment relations. (pp. 109-133). 
Heerlen/London: Open University/SAGE Publications.
Waarden, F. van (1997). ‘Vakopleiding in de procesindustrie een collectief  goed?.’ In 
Opleidingsfonds Procesindustrie (Ed.), Een reisje langs de Rijn. Visies op organisatie en financiering 
van opleiden in de procesindustrie. (pp. 73-91). Haarlem: Opleidingsfonds Procesindustrie.
Wagner, K. (1993). The Institutional Embeddedness of  the German Vocational Training System - How 
much is Transferable to Britain? Paper prepared for the international Conference on ‘Production 
regimes in an integrating Europe, Berlin, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin.
Wagner, K. (1995). ‘Why does the German training system work: the incentives that drive the 
German apprenticeship system.’ Australian Bulletin of  Labor, 21 (3), 236-255.
Wagner, K. (1997). Costs and other challenges for the German apprenticeship system after unification. 
Paper presented at the EU seminar ‘Knowledge and work’, organized by the Max Goote 
Kenniscentrum voor Beroepsonderwijs en Volwasseneneducatie, Amsterdam.
Waterreus, J. (1997). O&O-fondsen onderzocht. Opleidings- en Ontwikkelingsfondsen en de scholing van 
werknemers. Amsterdam: Max Goote Kenniscentrum.
Waterreus, J. (2002).O&O-fondsen op herhaling. Amsterdam: MGK.
378
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
Wielers, R. & A. Glebbeek (1990). ‘Worden we écht te slim voor ons werk? Drie interpretaties 
van de onderzoeksresultaten van Huijgen.’ Mens en Maatschappij, 65 (3), 271-288.
Wielers, R. & A. Glebbeek (1995). ‘Graduates and the labour market in the Netherlands: three 
hypotheses and some data.’ European Journal of  Education, 30 (1), 11-30.
Wieringen, F. van (1984).
Wijngaert, R. van de (1994). Trade unions and collective bargaining in the Netherlands. Amsterdam: 
Tinbergen Institute. (Ph.D. Thesis).
William T. Grant Foundation Commission on Work, Family and Citizenship (1988). The forgotten 
half: pathways to success for America’s youth and young families. Washington, DC: William T. Grant 
Foundation.
Williamson, O. (1975). Markets and hierarchies: analysis and anti-trust implications. New York: Free  
 Press.
Williamson, O. (1985). The economic institutions of  capitalism. Firms, markets, relational contracting. New  
 York: Free Press.
Willis, P. (1977). Learning to Labour. Farnborough: Saxon House.
Wills, J. (1994a). An overview of  skill standards systems in education and industry. Systems in the U.S. and 
abroad. Volume I. Washington, DC: Institute of  Educational Leadership.
Wills, J. (1994b). Education driven skill standards systems in the United States. Volume II. Washington, 
DC: Institute of  Educational Leadership.
Wills, J. (1994c). Industry driven skill standards systems in the United States. Volume III. Washington, 
DC: Institute of  Educational Leadership.
Wills, J. (1994d). Skill standards systems in selected countries. Volume IV. Washington, DC: Institute of  
Educational Leadership.
Wills, J. (1995). Voluntary skill standards and certification. Skill standards: a primer. Washington, DC: 
U.S. Department of  Labor.
Wilthagen, T. (1998). Flexicurity: A new paradigm for labor market policy reform? Berlin: 
Wissenschafszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung.
Winkelmann, R. (1997). ‘How young workers get their training: A survey of  Germany versus the 
United States.’ Journal of  Population Economics, 10, 159-170.
Wisconsin Board of  Vocational, Technical and Adult Education (1992). Five year longitudinal 
follow-up 1985-86 graduates. Madison, WI: Wisconsin Board of  Vocational, Technical and 
Adult Education.
Wittebrood, K. & S. Keuzenkamp (red.) (2000). Rapportage Jeugd 2000. Trajecten van jongeren naar 
zelfstandigheid.
Den Haag: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau.
WLRB (Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau) (1995). State of  Wisconsin blue book 1995-96.
Madison, WI: Wisconsin Department of  Administration.
Wolfs, G. (1992). Firm internal labour markets in the Netherlands. A contract-theoretical approach. 
Dissertation Maastricht: Faculty of  Economics and Business Administration.
Womack, J., D. Jones. & D. Roos. (1990). The machine that changed the world. New York, NY:   
 Rawson-MacMillan.
Woods, P., C. Bagley & R. Glatter (1998). School choice and competition: markets in the public interest?  
 London: Routledge.
WRR (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid) (1980). Plaats en toekomst van de industrie.  
 Den Haag: Sdu.
WRR (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid) (1987). Activerend arbeidsmarktbeleid. 
379
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
Den Haag: Sdu Uitgeverij.
WRR (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid) (1990). Een werkend perspectief; 
Arbeidsparticipatie in de jaren ‘90. Den Haag: Sdu Uitgeverij.
WTCS (Wisconsin Technical College System) (1994). Education issues #2. Madison, WI: 
Wisconsin Technical College System.
WTCS (Wisconsin Technical College System) (1995a). Go here. Get there. 1996-1997 guide. 
Madison, WI: Wisconsin Technical College System.
WTCS (Wisconsin Technical College System) (1995b). WCTS facts. Madison, WI: Wisconsin 
Technical College System.
WTCS (Wisconsin Technical College System) (1995c). Selected student statistics. January 1995. 
Madison, WI: Wisconsin Technical College System.
WTCS (Wisconsin Technical College System) (1995d). 1993-94 graduate follow-up report. Madison, 
WI: Wisconsin Technical College System.
WTCS (Wisconsin Technical College System) (1995e). Educational services manual. Madison, WI: 
Wisconsin Technical College System.
WTCS (Wisconsin Technical College System) Board (1996). Five year longitudinal follow-up of  
1989-90 graduates. Madison, WI: Wisconsin Technical College System Board.
Zemsky, R. (1994). What employers want: employer perspectives on youth, the youth labor market, and 
prospects for a national system of  youth apprenticeships. Philadelphia, PA: National Center on the 
Educational Quality of  the Workforce.
Websites
http://www.colo.nl/Beroepsonderwijs/gegevens.htm
http://www.minocw.nl/beroepskolom/index.html
http://www.minocw.nl/english/figures2003/060.html
http://www.minocw.nl/leerplicht/leerplicht.html
380
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
381
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
382
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
383
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
  Nederlandse samenvatting
1  Introductie: onderzoeksvragen en opzet
Onze ambitie was te analyseren en vergelijken hoe empirische markten voor 
middelbare kwalificaties opereren onder verschillende reguleringsregimes. We 
verwachtten dat zulke reguleringsregimes zouden bestaan uit een combinatie van 
verschillende reguleringsmechanismen die elkaar, en de keuzes die actoren maken, 
beïnvloeden. De vraag voor de nationale casus studies en hun vergelijking in de 
hoofdstukken drie tot en met vijf was: hoe opereren markten voor middelbare 
kwalificaties in elk van deze drie landen? Elk hoofdstuk adresseerde voor een land 
de volgende vragen :
• Welke opties zijn er voor beroepsonderwijs en scholing?
• Welke regels en actoren reguleren deze opties?
• Hoe helpt de interactie van deze regels en actoren de feitelijke keuzes van 
jonge mensen en werkgevers in relatie tot beroepsonderwijs en scholing te 
verklaren?
De institutionele orde, strategieën van actoren, en hun interactie werden geanalyseerd 
in markten voor middelbare kwalificaties in (West-)Duitsland (hoofdstuk 3), 
de Amerikaanse staat Wisconsin (hoofdstuk 4) en Nederland (hoofdstuk 5). De 
bestaande opties voor beroepsonderwijs en scholing en de regels en actoren die hen 
reguleerden werden beschreven en geanalyseerd, resulterend in een analyse van hoe 
de interactie tussen die regels en actoren de empirisch geobserveerde keuzes van 
jonge mensen en bedrijven in die landen helpt te verklaren. Elke landenhoofdstuk 
beschreef en analyseerde de nationale casus tegen de achtergrond van de casussen 
uit eerdere hoofdstukken, zodat de drie markten gaandeweg werden vergeleken.
2   Een actor-gecentreerde institutionalistische benadering van  
	 markten	voor	middelbare	kwalificaties
Het kernargument in dit boek luidt dat empirische markten voor middelbare 
kwalificaties inderdaad worden gereguleerd door meerdere, interacterende 
reguleringsmechanismen, die gezamenlijk een bepaald reguleringsregime 
constitueren. Verschillende reguleringsregimes resulteren in verschillende 
strategieën die beschikbaar zijn voor actoren, en/of in verschillende te verwachten 
opbrengsten voor vergelijkbare strategieën. In dit opzicht kunnen instituties 
verschillend gedrag van vergelijkbare actoren in verschillende markten helpen 
te verklaren. Tegelijkertijd zijn actoren in scholingsmarkten niet slechts passieve 
respondenten die reageren op prikkels, zoals die worden gesteld door externe 
regels. Actoren hebben hun eigen actie oriëntatie, hun eigen conceptie van controle, 
384
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
op hoe ze effectief kunnen opereren in hun omgeving om de gekwalificeerde 
beroepsbevolking te verwerven die ze nodig hebben. Zo’n conceptie van controle is 
tegelijkertijd een visie op de wereld die actoren in staat stelt de acties van anderen 
te interpreteren, en een reflectie van hoe de markt is gestructureerd (paragraaf 
2.3.6.3). Dergelijke concepties van controle worden beïnvloed door vroegere en 
actuele institutionele aspecten van de omgeving van de actoren (bijvoorbeeld het 
arbeidsverhoudingenstelsel waarin ze opereren) en de prikkels die die omgeving 
impliceert in termen van de verwachte opbrengsten van bepaalde strategieën. 
Maar concepties van controle zijn ook afhankelijk: actie oriëntaties van sommige 
actoren zullen op hun beurt die van anderen helpen beïnvloeden. De typische 
kwalificatiestrategieën van bedrijven in een bepaalde bedrijfstak in een bepaalde 
regio zullen bijvoorbeeld resulteren in bepaalde typen vacatures en scholingsopties 
die beschikbaar zijn. De historische beschikbaarheid van dergelijke opties zal op 
zijn beurt de actie oriëntatie van (toekomstige) werknemers beïnvloeden voor 
wat betreft hun eigen strategische keuzes. Verschillende actie oriëntaties van 
vergelijkbare actoren zullen resulteren in verschillende reacties op bepaalde regels 
of hervormingen, en daarom helpen ze de relatieve stabiliteit van belangrijke 
verschillen tussen verschillende markten te verklaren. Reguleringsregimes moeten 
daarom niet exclusief worden geïnterpreteerd alsof er pure en perfecte stimulus-
respons relaties zouden bestaan tussen externe regels (instituties), de prikkels 
die ze impliceren, en de resulterende strategieën van actoren. Het vergelijken 
van markten voor middelbare kwalificaties in onze drie landen vereist het delicate 
balanceren van de quasi-objectieve prikkels die de institutionele omgeving stelt, 
met de eigen strategieën van actoren in markten voor middelbare kwalificaties.
3	 	 De	Duitse	markt	voor	middelbare	kwalificaties
Hoofdstuk 3 analyseerde het hoge kwalificatie-evenwicht dat wordt geschraagd door 
het Duitse leerlingstelsel en andere instituties. De Duitse markt voor middelbare 
kwalificaties heeft voortdurend internationale aandacht gegenereerd omdat het 
een van de weinige is waar bedrijfsinvesteringen in formeel beroepsonderwijs en 
scholing verantwoordelijkheid zijn voor de meerderheid van de investeringen in 
beroepsonderwijs en scholing. In paragraaf 3.7.2 volgen we de rest van de literatuur 
(o.a. Casey, 1986; 1992; Steedman; 1993; Soskice, 1994) in het onderscheiden 
van grotere en kleinere bedrijven bij het verklaren waarom zo veel Duitse bedrijven 
kiezen voor het zelf opleiden van leerlingen. Voor kleinere bedrijven geldt dat de 
kosten van de leerlingen zo laag zijn in vergelijking tot de (in)directe opbrengsten, dat 
het plausibel is dat deze bedrijven hun opleidingskosten reeds zullen terugverdienen 
gedurende de opleidingsperiode, dan wel wanneer slechts een klein aantal leerlingen 
aanblijft voor een korte periode na afronding van de opleiding. Grotere bedrijven 
maken gemiddeld significante kosten gedurende de opleidingsperiode, zodat er 
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aanvullende redenen nodig zijn (boven de kosteneffectiviteit op de korte termijn) 
om hun voortdurende opleidingsinspanningen te verklaren.
Soskice (1994) onderscheidde twee condities die de opleidingsinvesteringen 
van grotere bedrijven helpen te verklaren. Ten eerste, als bedrijven de volledige 
opleidingskosten niet kunnen terugverdienen binnen de opleidingsperiode zelf, dan 
wordt het aanblijfpercentage van leerlingen belangrijk. Hoe meer leerlingen voor 
een langere periode aanblijven, des te hoger de additionele (in)directe opbrengsten 
van de opleiding die zullen worden terugverdiend. De andere cruciale factor is de 
relatieve prijs van de opleiding ten opzichte van de prijs van alternatieven. Bedrijven 
zullen opleiden zolang als de kosten van een leerlingwezenopleiding lager zijn dan 
de kosten van het bedrijfsspecifiek scholen van externe rekruten, plus de kosten 
van het risico dat men een ‘citroen’ huurt (een externe rekruut, die niet blijkt te 
voldoen). Met deze tweede factor wordt de keuze van andere actoren een belangrijk 
ingrediënt in het keuzeproces: zolang als de meeste bedrijven zelf opleiden, is niet 
alleen mogelijk maar zelfs slim om dat zelf ook te doen (vanwege het substantiële 
‘citroen’ risico als men niet zelf opleidt in zo’n omgeving).
Binnen de Duitse institutionele omgeving (van onderwijs en arbeidsmarkt) is 
het niet alleen verstandig voor de grote meerderheid van Duitse bedrijven om 
te investeren in leerlingwezenopleidingen (paragraaf 3.7.2), maar ook voor de 
grote meerderheid van Duitse jongeren (paragraaf 3.6.1). De belangrijkste reden 
is dat Duitse bedrijven hun toekomstige vakkrachten overwegend rekruteren als 
leerlingen die ze zelf opleiden. Soskice (1994: 33) heeft er op gewezen dat het 
Duitse leerlingstelsel een ‘rank-order’ toernooi is: niet elke opleidingsplaats is even 
aantrekkelijk, en schoolverlaters ordenen leerlingwezenplaatsen op attractiviteit per 
bedrijfstak, opleidingsbedrijf, en zelfs binnen een individueel bedrijf. Duitse jongeren 
concurreren actief om de beste opleidingsplaatsen, omdat loopbaanperspectieven 
verschillen naar het beroep en het bedrijf waarin men wordt opgeleid. De (meer 
attractieve) bedrijven screenen zorgvuldig de schoolprestaties van sollicitanten, 
en nemen hen vaak ook nog zelf testen af. Dit creëert een belangrijk feedback 
effect: Duitse kinderen worden gestimuleerd om in hun vroege tienerjaren hard te 
werken op school, omdat ze voor hun inspanningen beloond zullen worden via een 
attractievere opleidingsplek aan het eind van hun tienerjaren.
 En dit feedback effect veroorzaakt een ander feedback effect: omdat jonge 
mensen de neiging hebben hard te werken in de schooljaren voorafgaand aan 
een leerlingwezenopleiding, krijgen Duitse bedrijven leerlingen met een relatief 
fatsoenlijk (algemeen) kwalificatieniveau. Dit helpt hen om opleidingskosten 
laag te houden, in vergelijking met bedrijven in landen waar 16-jarigen minder 
gekwalificeerd zijn.
 De Duitse casus laat zien dat zo lang als kinderen reeds hard werken op school, 
en bedrijven hun inspanningen daarna belonen met attractievere startbanen met 
bijbehorende loopbaanmogelijkheden, een stabiel hoog kwalificatie-evenwicht 
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mogelijk is in markten voor middelbare kwalificaties. We observeerden dat dat 
hoge kwalificatie-evenwicht wordt bereikt op een markt die vrij is (in de zin dat 
zowel bedrijven als leerlingen vrij zijn om de markt te betreden) maar gereguleerd 
(door leerlingwezenwetgeving en gerelateerde regulering zoals eindtermen voor 
opleidingsberoepen). En we observeerden dat het leidt tot overlappende beroeps- 
en interne arbeidsmarkten, die de voordelen van beide neigen te combineren.
4	 	 De	Amerikaanse	markt	voor	middelbare	kwalificaties:	
  de casus Wisconsin
Onze volgende casus, de V.S. (hoofdstuk vier) toonde ons waarom zo’n hoog 
kwalificatie-evenwicht moeilijker te realiseren is dan het Duitse voorbeeld zou 
kunnen doen vermoeden. De V.S. lijdt aan wat wel gelabeld is als een ‘missend 
midden’ op haar arbeidsmarkt (Berryman et al.; 1992: 1).
 Een belangrijke oorzaak voor de moeite die Amerikaanse jongeren hebben om 
banen met loopbaankansen te vinden ligt in het functioneren van Amerikaanse 
arbeidsmarkten. Aan de ene kant zijn beroepsarbeidsmarkten onderontwikkeld. 
Aan de andere kant vereisten Amerikaanse interne arbeidsmarkten doorgaans geen 
hoge kwalificaties van nieuwe rekruten, maar vertrouwden op geleidelijk informeel 
leren op de werkplek voor werknemers op de werkvloer.
 De kleine omvang van het leerlingwezen is een voorbeeld van de onderontwikkeling 
van beroepsarbeidsmarkten. Enkel in de vakbondssector in de bouw heeft 
het leerlingwezen traditioneel een basis gelegd voor beroepsarbeidsmarkten 
(paragrafen 4.2.5 & 4.3.2). Daarbuiten ontbreken leerlingplaatsen geheel (zoals 
in het bankwezen, zie paragraaf 4.3.4) of zijn ze voorbehouden voor de opleiding 
van een kleine elite van zittende werknemers (zoals in de metaal, zie paragraaf 
4.3.3). Dit verschil tussen Duitsland en Wisconsin is des te intrigerender omdat 
het regime voor het (volwassen) leerlingwezen in Wisconsin expliciet was 
geïnspireerd door het voorbeeld van het Duitse leerlingstelsel aan het begin van 
de twintigste eeuw (van Lieshout, 1996b). Klaarblijkelijk leidt het imiteren van 
leerlingwezenwetgeving niet noodzakelijk tot vergelijkbare resultaten. Hoewel er 
verschillen in leerlingwezenwetgeving bestonden tussen beide landen in het midden 
van de jaren negentig, lijken andere factoren belangrijker om de divergerende 
paden te verklaren die beide leerlingstelsels namen.
 Ten eerste, het overwegend ontbreken van (regionale) collectieve 
arbeidsovereenkomsten die relatief hoge minimumlonen zetten per bedrijfstak 
en regio in Wisconsin impliceert dat bedrijven daar hun werknemers eenvoudiger 
informeel kunnen scholen op lagere loonniveaus dan hun tegenhangers in Duitsland. 
Omdat beginlonen voor reguliere werknemers in Wisconsin lager kunnen zijn dan in 
Duitsland, en omdat leerlinglonen relatief hoger zijn, is er een substantieel kleiner 
verschil (in termen van lagere opleidingskosten) ten gunste van het in dienst nemen 
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van leerlingen in vergelijking met het inhuren van dezelfde persoon als regulier 
werknemer die informeel op de werkplek wordt geschoold.
 Een tweede belangrijke factor is dat Amerikaanse bedrijven relatief weinig 
ontslagbescherming bieden in vergelijking tot Duitse bedrijven. De combinatie 
van beide maakt dat Amerikaanse bedrijven eenvoudiger bedrijfsstrategieën 
kunnen kiezen die focussen op lage lonen en numerieke flexibiliteit. Tayloristische 
arbeidsorganisatie en Fordistische productiemethoden ontstonden in de V.S. en 
vormden de arbeidsorganisatie in Amerikaanse bedrijven. Belangrijk bewijs voor 
het effect daarvan op opleidingsbeleid en het leerlingwezen in het bijzonder komt 
van Parker’s historisch onderzoek op de poging om een Duits-getint leerlingstelsel 
te creëren in de metaal in Wisconsin, in het district van Milwaukee in de eerste 
decades van de twintigste eeuw (Parker, 1994; 1996). Parker ontdekte dat 
terwijl deze metaalwerkgevers actief waren geweest in het organiseren van 
leerlingwezenopleidingen in de jaren twintig van de vorige eeuw, ze tegelijkertijd 
de basis daarvoor uitholden door geleidelijk Tayloristische en Fordistische 
productiemethoden te adopteren die de meerderheid van hun personeel in semi-
gekwalificeerde banen deed belanden. Op die manier hadden ze vervolgens minder 
behoefte aan intensieve leerlingwezenopleidingen tot het niveau van geschoold 
vakman. In de jaren negentig van de vorige eeuw waren banen in de lagere regionen 
van menig metaal- en ander productiebedrijf in Wisconsin nog steeds relatief laag 
geschoold.
Ten derde, grotere loonverschillen maken het gemakkelijker om geschoolde 
werknemers weg te kopen dan in Duitsland. ‘Wegkopen’ is niet noodzakelijkerwijs 
een actieve daad van ‘piraterij’ door een ander bedrijf, maar kan zeer goed het 
gevolg zijn van een werknemer zijn eigen keuze om te vertrekken, zoals sommige 
historische verklaringen voor de teloorgang van het Amerikaanse leerlingwezen in 
de negentiende en twintigste eeuw hebben beargumenteerd (zie Elbaum, 1989; 
Jacoby, 1991; Elbaum & Singh, 1995).
Verder bieden technical colleges in Wisconsin een kwalitatief, schools alternatief 
voor een leerlingwezenopleiding, waarbij de opleidingskosten worden gedeeld door 
de student en de staat.
Tenslotte is het imago van het leerlingstelsel als een institutie in de V.S. altijd 
sterk (meer dan in Europa) verbonden met vakbondsinvloed, waarbij Amerikaanse 
vakbonden een lagere status hebben dan hun Duitse en Nederlandse tegenhangers 
(zie Jacoby, 1991).
 Interne arbeidsmarkten kunnen worden beschouwd als een mechanisme om het 
wegkopen van geschoolde werknemers te voorkomen, omdat ze toegang tot de 
meest attractieve banen voorbehouden aan degenen die bij hun werkgever blijven 
(Sako, 1991). Amerikaanse interne arbeidsmarkten zijn gekarakteriseerd door de 
eerder genoemde Tayloristische en Fordistische traditie van arbeidsorganisatie in 
de Amerikaanse industrie. Ten eerste zijn banen in de lagere regionen van interne 
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loopbaanladders relatief laaggeschoold. Ten tweede wordt promotie vaak toegekend 
volgens geformaliseerde baanladders en regels van senioriteit. Buitenstaanders 
worden vaak overwegend op de lagere niveaus van deze loopbaanladders 
aangenomen. Omdat dergelijk entree banen geen leerlingplaatsen zijn, zijn jongeren 
net zo duur als volwassenen in zo’n baan. Dit is waarom Amerikaanse werkgevers 
in het algemeen de voorkeur hebben gegeven aan het inhuren van volwassenen 
met enige relevante werkervaring voor dergelijke banen (Osterman, 1980).
 In theorie kan een ruim aanbod van kwalitatief schools beroepsonderwijs en een 
grote participatie daarin compenseren voor een gebrek aan scholing in bedrijven 
voor jonge mensen. Maar Amerikaanse interne arbeidsmarkten hebben jonge 
mensen over het algemeen weinig reden gegeven om te participeren in uitdagende 
schoolse beroepsonderwijscursussen:
• Ten eerste, kansen om bedrijven op een hoger baanniveau binnen te komen 
zijn relatief schaars, zodat certificaten van beroepsonderwijs niet direct 
toegang geven tot aantrekkelijker beroepsarbeidsmarkten; terwijl een 
verbazingwekkend aantal van 94,2% van Duitse werknemers aangaven 
dat ze officiële kwalificaties nodig hadden gehad om hun huidige baan te 
krijgen, gold dat voor slechts 55,8% van hun Amerikaanse tegenhangers 
(OECD, 1994b: 144);
• Ten tweede, entreeposities op Amerikaanse interne arbeidsmarkten vereisen 
typisch niet al te veel competenties;
• Ten derde, formele algemene of beroepskwalificaties hebben typisch 
minder geteld dan senioriteit voor promotie naar hogere rangen op interne 
loopbaanladders;
• Ten vierde, beloning is uitsluitend op baankenmerken gebaseerd, niet op 
eigenschappen van de werknemer – of zijn diploma’s. Indicatief is dat het 
relatieve belang van variabelen, die samenhangen met menselijk kapitaal, 
in het verklaren van beloningsverschillen tussen bedrijfstakken substantieel 
lager is in de V.S. dan in Duitsland (Bellmann & Möller, 1995: 153).
De meeste jongeren die niet naar een vierjarig college gaan hebben daarom 
historisch gezien ervoor gekozen om direct de arbeidsmarkt te betreden, een zo 
attractief mogelijk on- of laaggeschoolde baan te aanvaarden als ze kunnen vinden, 
om van daaruit langzaam hun weg naar boven te werken. Hoewel Amerikaanse 
arbeidsmarkten gemiddeld een high school diploma iets belonen in termen van een 
loonpremie, vertrouwen Amerikaanse bedrijven niet erg op een high school diploma 
op zich. Klaarblijkelijk laat een gebrek aan algemene competentiestandaarden toe 
dat scholen voor jongere leeftijdsgroepen hun feilen en problemen doorgeven naar 
de top van het systeem (Tucker, 1994b: 3). Dit gebrek wordt niet gecompenseerd 
door een rigoureuze screening van high school prestaties door werkgevers wanneer 
ze jongeren en jongvolwassenen in dienst nemen. Voor eerste werkgevers is een 
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diploma op zich vaak voldoende. Er was geen relatie tussen schoolprestaties en de 
attractiviteit van eerste banen in de V.S. (Rosenbaum & Kariya, 1991). Tegen de 
tijd dat jongvolwassenen een werkgever vinden dien hen een aantrekkelijker entree 
positie op een interne arbeidsmarkt aanbieden, zal die werkgever de laatste baan 
van de sollicitant en eventuele (technische) college cursussen, die de betrokkene 
eventueel na zijn high school gevolgd heeft, interessanter vinden dan de high school 
resultaten van een paar jaar terug.
 Hoewel Amerikaanse arbeidsmarkten dus jongeren niet echt stimuleren om hard 
te werken in het secundair onderwijs, doen (vierjarige) colleges dat wel. Het aantal 
afgestudeerden van een high school dat doorstroomt naar een (prestigieus) vierjarig 
college is traditioneel de meeste onderscheidende benchmark om de prestaties 
van Amerikaanse high schools te meten. Dit heeft studieroutes die voorbereiden 
op zo’n college tot de dominante route in Amerikaanse high schools gemaakt, en 
tegelijkertijd een onderontwikkeling van beroepsonderwijsprogramma’s mogelijk 
gemaakt – in het bijzonder, omdat dergelijke programma’s relatief duur zijn voor 
de gemiddeld kleine school districten in de V.S.. De algemene Amerikaanse afkeur 
voor het sorteren van jongeren in aparte paden heeft verhindert dat de ouders 
van deze ‘vergeten helft’ dergelijke aparte programma’s hebben geëist. En om de 
vicieuze cirkel te voltooien: waar slechts weinig high school studenten afstuderen 
via goede beroepsonderwijsprogramma’s, hebben Amerikaanse bedrijven weinig 
reden gehad om hun rekruteringspogingen voor hun meer uitdagende entreebanen 
op die high school afgestudeerden te richten.
 Het is, in deze context, gemakkelijk te begrijpen waarom Amerikaanse two-year 
colleges, zoals de technical colleges in Wisconsin, een relatief succesverhaal zijn 
(Brint & Karabel, 1991): ze bieden kwaliteitsscholing in een laaggekwalificeerde 
context. Ze bieden, echter, tot dusverre geen soepele transitie van school naar werk 
voor de meerderheid van de jongeren die niet naar een vierjarig college gaat, zoals 
het Duitse leerlingwezen dat wel doet. In Wisconsin stromen relatief weinig jongeren 
direct na high school door naar een opleiding in het Wisconsin Technical College 
systeem. En slechts ongeveer een derde van de instroom daarin betrof werknemers 
op de werkvloer (Rogers et al., 1991). Het ontbreken van bindende eindtermen en 
assessmentprocedures op nationaal of staatniveau leidt niet tot een gegarandeerde 
minimum kwaliteit van beroepsonderwijs en scholing. En de versplintering van het 
beroepsonderwijs over verschillende onafhankelijke en gedecentraliseerde systemen 
die slechts zwak verbonden zijn, maakt de beschikbare opties niet erg transparant 
voor jongeren, hun ouders, of volwassen werknemers. Om kort te gaan, er zijn 
problemen van te weinig coördinatie en samenwerking op deze terreinen (Rogers & 
Streeck, 1991: 11).
 In deze context hebben Amerikaanse beleidsmakers – zowel op nationaal 
niveau als in de staat Wisconsin – zich gestort op ambitieuze pogingen om het 
‘midden te bouwen’  in de jaren negentig (Berryman et al, 1992). Ze ontwikkelden 
390
H.A.M. van Lieshout    Different Hands. Markets for intermediate skills Germany, the U.S. and the Netherlands
hervormingspogingen die in zijn algemeenheid probeerden de transitie van school 
naar werk voor Amerikaanse jongeren te verbeteren door de ontwikkeling van 
gecoördineerde bedrijfstaksbrede beroepsonderwijsstelsels. Specifiek bevatten 
deze pogingen sommige beleidsopties die direct door het Duitse voorbeeld werden 
geïnspireerd. Maar in plaats van te opteren voor het kopiëren van de Duitse markt 
(zoals sommigen hadden bepleit) resulteerde deze ambitie uiteindelijk in een poging 
om gedeeltelijk ‘Duitse’ institutionele arrangementen te creëren – bijvoorbeeld 
nationale samenwerkingsverbanden om eindtermen te ontwikkelen, plaatselijke 
school-naar-werk partnerships, of specifieke jeugd-leerlingwezen programma’s.
5	 	 De	Nederlandse	markt	voor	middelbare	kwalificaties
Hoofdstuk vijf analyseerde de Nederlandse casus. De Nederlandse casus lijkt op de 
Duitse in de zin dat hier ook sprake is van een hoog kwalificatie-evenwicht waarbij 
de meeste jongeren instromen in meerjarige beroepsonderwijsprogramma’s (en 
veel daarvan, maar niet allemaal, daar ook weer met een diploma uitstromen). 
Arbeidsorganisatie en de rekruteringspraktijken van bedrijven hebben een 
premie gezet op substantieel initieel beroepsonderwijs voor jongeren op een 
vergelijkbare wijze als in Duitsland. Maar terwijl in Duitsland prikkels jongeren in 
een leerlingwezenopleiding leiden, biedt het Nederlandse stelsel meerdere opties, 
zowel voor bedrijven als jongeren. Ten eerste, zowel bedrijven als jongeren kunnen 
kiezen tussen zowel duale als (overwegend) schoolse paden die leiden naar een 
volledige beroepskwalificatie. Ten tweede, zowel bedrijven als jongeren hebben het 
alternatief van reguliere laag betaalde (jeugd)werkgelegenheid veel makkelijker 
beschikbaar dan hun Duitse tegenhangers – en meer vergelijkbaar met de V.S.. Terwijl 
Duitse laagbetaalde jeugdwerkgelegenheid overwegend is geïnstitutionaliseerd als 
leerlingwezenopleidingen (en als zodanig, scholingsrechten inhoudt), zijn er een 
aantal Nederlandse bedrijfstakken die een groot aandeel van jongeren op lage 
loonniveaus beneden het volwassen minimumloon in dienst nemen, in reguliere 
banen die geen formele scholing met zich meebrengen. Zowel de prominente rol 
van volledig kwalificerend schools beroepsonderwijs als de meer prominent rol voor 
reguliere jeugdwerkgelegenheid zonder scholing in sommige bedrijfstakken helpt 
het kleinere volume aan leerlingwezen opleidingen in Nederland ten opzichte van 
Duitsland te verklaren.
 In vergelijking met de V.S. investeren Nederlandse bedrijven natuurlijk zelf 
ook substantieel in formele opleidingen op de werkplek: door het aanbieden 
van leerlingplaatsen, en door het aanbieden van stages voor studenten in 
(overwegend) schoolse beroepsopleidingen. In Nederland verschilt het relatieve 
belang van duale opleidingen, overwegend schools initiële opleidingen en reguliere 
jeugdwerkgelegenheid aanzienlijk tussen verschillende bedrijfstakken in de context 
van vergelijkbare nationale wetgeving. Dit onderstreept het belang van variabelen 
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op bedrijfstakniveau, inclusief verschillen in concepties van controle van bedrijven 
en andere belangrijke actoren.
6	 	 	 Analyses	van	markten	voor	middelbare	kwalificaties:		 	
 verschillende handen
Het slothoofdstuk reflecteert op het theoretische kader dat we gebruikt hebben om 
onze drie casussen te analyseren. In het bijzonder adresseert het de vraag of en 
hoe het de moeite waard was om zo’n reguleringsbenadering die zich expliciet richt 
op meerdere alternatieve coördinatiemechanismen (markten, bedrijven, staten, 
associaties) en hun interactie. Konden we geen vergelijkbare resultaten vergelijken 
met een minder extensieve typologie van reguleringsmechanismen?
 Voor wat betreft de rol van bedrijven als coördinatiemechanismen kunnen we hun 
opleidingsinvestering binnen een land op het eerste gezicht heel aardig verklaren 
als logische reacties op een verschillende institutionele omgeving. Het hoge 
aanblijfpercentage van leerling na afronding van hun opleiding en verwachtingen 
over het gedrag van anderen (zowel leerlingen als bedrijven) zijn echter eveneens 
belangrijke factoren in de verklaring van de ruime opleidingsinvesteringen van Duitse 
bedrijven. Wanneer we verschillen in opleidingsinvesteringen tussen landen bekijken, 
springt direct het belang van de arbeidsorganisatie binnen bedrijven in het oog als 
directe oorzaak (‘proximate cause’) voor de verschillende rol van het leerlingwezen 
in de V.S. en Duitsland. Externe institutionele verschillen (bijvoorbeeld in wetgeving 
en arbeidsverhoudingen) kunnen vervolgens worden geanalyseerd als indirecte 
oorzaken (‘remote causes’). Dergelijke factoren beïnvloeden de arbeidsorganisatie 
zoals die zich binnen bedrijven ontwikkelt. Ze beïnvloeden opleidingskeuzen indirect 
doordat ze eerder de ontwikkeling van de arbeidsorganisatie hebben beïnvloed, en 
direct doordat ze op dit moment (samen met de bestaande arbeidsorganisatie) de 
verwachte opbrengsten van alternatieve opleidingskeuzes bepalen.
 Naast arbeidsorganisatie is rekrutering een belangrijke interveniërende variabele. 
Zo zagen we dat in het (volwassen) leerlingstelsel in Wisconsin het vaak zittende 
werknemers waren die daarna leerling werden, terwijl in Duitsland overwegend 
schoolverlaters in dienst worden genomen. Het is, dus, niet vanzelfsprekend dat 
een leerlingwezenwet een soepele overgang van school naar werk garandeert: dat 
doen ze alleen als bedrijven schoolverlaters in dienst nemen.
 Instituties verschaffen een omgeving waarop bedrijven reageren – maar 
bedrijven kunnen verschillend reageren op vergelijkbare omgevingen. Nationale 
verschillen in de arbeidsorganisatie en het personeelsbestand in bedrijven kunnen 
zo objectieve redenen zijn voor het feit dat verschillende bedrijven verschillende 
reageren op vergelijkbare externe prikkels. Opleidingskeuzes van bedrijven zijn in de 
praktijk zelden de uitkomst van een gedetailleerde kosten/baten vergelijking, maar 
reflecteren een meer kwalitatieve strategische keuze. De theoretische notie van 
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een actie oriëntatie van bedrijven past goed bij het empirische bewijs op dit punt. 
Een goed voorbeeld is dat Duitse bedrijven (en hun organisaties) in opstand komen 
als de staat dreigt zich meer met de bekostiging van opleidingen te interveniëren, 
terwijl Nederlandse bedrijven dat deden toen ze vreesden dat de overheid zich op 
dat punt wat zou terugtrekken.
Leerlingwezenopleidingen zijn een goed voorbeeld van hoe een bedrijf als een 
alternatief coördinatiemechanisme kan opereren voor een (externe) arbeidsmarkt. 
En we hebben gezien dat zelfs leerlingwezenopleidingen, gebaseerd op vergelijkbare 
wetgevingsprincipes, verschillende vormen kunnen aannemen in verschillende 
landen – en sectoren.
 Het belang van associaties als coördinatiemechanisme werd door Streeck et 
al. (1987) al getoond op basis van hun belangrijke rol in de regulering van het 
Duitse leerlingwezen, en ook in Nederland spelen associaties een belangrijk (en 
groeiende) rol. In de V.S. spelen ze over het algemeen juist geen grote rol. Maar 
in het uitzonderingsgeval waar ze dat wel doen – in de vakbondssector in de 
Amerikaanse bouw – zien we dan een florerend leerlingstelsel in een land waar daar 
overigens geen sprake van is. Collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten kunnen helpen om 
leerlinglonen laag te houden vergeleken met die van (half)geschoolde werknemers. 
In ruil kunnen daarvoor scholingsrechten voor de leerlingen worden vastgelegd, 
bijvoorbeeld door bindende eindtermen. En ze kunnen helpen een consensus ten 
gunste van opleidingsinvesteringen in een gemeenschap van bedrijven in stand te 
houden.
 Men moet het belang van associaties echter ook niet overschatten. Zo is wel eens 
te nadrukkelijk gewezen op het feit dat Duitse werkgeversorganisaties hun leden 
zouden stimuleren tot opleiden. Dat doen ze wel, maar de motor achter het Duitse 
leerlingwezen zijn de vrije opleidingskeuzes van bedrijven. Vermeldenswaard is 
ook dat de Duitse hoge opleidingsinvesteringen overwegen tot stand komen zonder 
de collectieve steun van opleidingsfondsen zoals die in Nederland veel voorkomen 
(en de Amerikaanse bouw). Naast Duitse werkgeversorganisaties zijn ook de 
strategische keuzes van Duitse vakbonden van belang. 
 Het belang van bedrijven en associaties als coördinatiemechanismen ontkent niet 
het belang van marktmechanismen, maar beïnvloed hoe die marktmechanismen 
precies opereren. Markten voor middelbare kwalificaties niet goed te modelleren als 
een enkele markt met een enkel uniform product. Omdat bedrijven zowel producent 
als consument van kwalificaties zijn, zijn aanbod- en vraagzijde van de markt niet 
goed te scheiden. Maar marktmechanismen spelen ook op meerdere punten een 
rol. Er is tenminste een marktmechanisme waar jongeren voor beroepsopleidingen 
kiezen, en een markt waar afgestudeerde jongeren banen zoeken. Deze twee 
markten worden verbonden door beroepsopleidingen.
 Als bedrijven kiezen voor het zelf opleiden van leerlingen kiezen ze analytisch 
gezien voor het bedrijf als coördinatiemechanisme boven de markt. Maar ook dat 
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betekent niet dat de externe markt geen rol speelt. In Duitsland zien we dat juist het 
feit dat opleidingsbedrijven leerlingen langdurig aan zich binden leidt tot gefocuste 
matchingsprocessen in de markt voor opleidingsplaatsen – resulterend in een ‘rank-
order’ toernooi. De georganiseerde markt van het Duitse leerlingwezen lijkt tot 
gewenster gedrag van bedrijven en jongeren te leiden dan de ongeorganiseerde 
Amerikaanse markt.
 Internationale verschillen in de rol van andere reguleringsmechanismen 
betekenen dat overheden een verschillend terrein bespelen als ze beroepsonderwijs- 
en scholingsmarkten reguleren. Vergelijkbare pogingen tot wetgeving kunnen zo 
tot divergerende resultaten leiden. Net als bij regulering door associaties moeten 
we ook de autonome macht van overheden bij de regulering van beroepsonderwijs 
en scholing niet overschatten. Met die kanttekening zijn er drie waardevolle doelen 
ze door beleid kunnen proberen te bereiken in eigen land:
• Bedrijven die actief jongeren rekruteren;
• Bedrijven die jongeren actief screenen, en schoolprestaties daarbij 
betrekken;
• Jongeren die lokaal actief geholpen worden  met hun overgang van school 
naar werk.
Het belang van de rol van andere reguleringsmechanismen moet overheden leren 
dat arbeidsmarktregulering zeker zo belangrijk is als de regulering van (beroeps)
onderwijs. Een tweede belangrijk aspect is vanzelfsprekend de institutionalisering 
van scholen en hoe ze opereren. De verschillen in de rol van scholen in de drie 
nationale beroepsonderwijsstelsels die we hier bestudeerden is in elk geval een 
reflectie van bredere verschillen in markten voor middelbare kwalificaties.
 We concluderen dat regimes die beroepsonderwijs en scholing reguleren uit 
meer bestaan dan overheden en hun wetgeving en beleid. Een effectieve analyse 
van reguleringsregimes voor beroepsonderwijs en scholing beschouwt tenminste 
vier potentieel equivalente coördineringsmechanismen: marktmechanismen; 
hiërarchieën (bedrijven); overheden, en associaties. Voor overheden betekent 
het relatieve gebrek aan autonomie om eenzijdig een effectief reguleringsregime 
te bepalen dat er niet één onzichtbare hand is die beroepsonderwijs- en 
scholingsmarkten in elke regio en elke bedrijfstak op een vergelijkbare manier 
regelt. De hand die elke feitelijke markt voor middelbare kwalificaties reguleert is 
een specifieke combinatie van de vier bovengenoemde reguleringsmechanismen. 
Vergelijkbaar overheidsbeleid kan leiden tot duidelijk verschillende uitkomsten 
vanwege verschillen in de rol van andere reguleringsmechanismen, en omgekeerd. 
Nationale overheden hebben zo geen andere serieuze optie dan hun eigen weg te 
gaan bij de ontwikkeling van hun markt voor middelbare kwalificaties. Het kopiëren 
van regelgeving uit andere landen zal zelden tot vergelijkbare resultaten leiden. 
Internationale vergelijkingen kunnen wel helpen om nieuw licht te werpen op 
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sterkten, zwakten en bijzonderheden in eigen land, en alternatieve ideeën helpen 
genereren voor verbeteringen in eigen land.
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